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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THE IMPACT OF DECENTRALIZATION AND NEW INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS ON PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COLOMBIA AND PARAGUAY
by
Cristina A. Rodriguez-Acosta
Florida International University, 2016
Miami, Florida
Professor Allan Rosenbaum, Major Professor
The purpose of this research is to examine the factors that have influenced political
decentralization in Paraguay and Colombia and how the new intergovernmental relations
that result in political, fiscal and policy decentralization impact local governments and their
capacity to deliver public services. The research, building on institutional theory, places
particular emphasis on trying to explain and understand how intergovernmental relations
shape the decentralization—and effectiveness—of public service delivery to local and
regional governments, particularly in the areas of health and education.
The research method is principally a path-dependent within-cases analysis. The
analysis traces how the processes of decentralization evolved from 1990 to 2010. Special
attention is given to critical junctures, or special political or social circumstances, that have
significantly changed the process of decentralization. Data was collected mainly through
reviews of documents, journals and newspapers, and most significantly through elite
interviews “tailored to the purposes of the study” (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). Leaders
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of political parties, unions, non-governmental-organizations and civic movements were
interviewed in both countries.
The research shows that political parties play a very important role, not only in
the design and implementation of decentralization of public service delivery, but also in
sustaining and furthering the process. The analysis is based on the assumption that
increased decentralization of health and education to local and regional levels should
positively impact basic health and education indicators. If decentralization, as argued,
helps governments to be more responsive to local needs, and if more health and education
programs are decentralized to the local and regional level in response to the demands of
many communities, it is predicted that health and education indicators would improve, as
people would have easier access to these services.
Analysis of health and education indicators in the form of infant mortality rates
(deaths of children under one year old, live births) and school enrollment show mixed
results for both Colombia and Paraguay.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

Introduction
Twenty years ago, as a young graduate student in Washington, DC, I was
introduced to the concept of decentralization by a former colleague who was then working
at the World Bank. Decentralization, with its devolution of power and authority to regional
and local governments seemed to me, unrealistic. No central government would devolve
(any) authority to lower levels of government unless forced by compelling reasons.
A few months later, as a recently hired Program Coordinator for a large US Agency
for International Development (USAID) program aimed at strengthening local
governments and democratic institutions in South America, I found myself again exposed
not only to the concept of decentralization, but to actually assisting governments in Chile
and Paraguay implement it.
A few weeks later, the implication of what decentralization reforms really entailed
came to light at a meeting with local government officials in the regional capital of
Concepcion in the Department of Concepcion, Paraguay, a locality about 415 Km or 5 ½
hours away from the capital city of Asuncion. At the local health clinic, some broken
windows caught our attention. When I asked why they had not been repaired, I was told
that the Health Ministry in Asuncion had yet to send the funds for that particular repair.
The realization that administrative and fiscal decentralization could allow these local
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authorities to make their own decisions, and not depend on authorizations and funding from
distant bureaucrats in the city of Asuncion, made me realize the importance of these
reforms.
In the mid-1990s, Paraguay’s decentralization supporters relied heavily on
Colombia’s experience with decentralization and to some extent modeled their reforms on
that country’s successful reforms and initiatives. With time, and through work with
municipal associations around the Hemisphere, it became clear that political,
administrative, and fiscal decentralization was key to strengthening local governments and
to delivering better services, especially education and health, to local communities.
However, lingering questions motivated me to seek a better understanding of the context
in which unitary systems (such as Colombia and Paraguay) decentralize and, likewise,
under what conditions might they recentralize.
Thus, the present research aims to examine, first, the factors that have influenced
political decentralization in these two countries, and how the new intergovernmental
relations that result as a consequence of political, fiscal and policy decentralization impact
local governments and their capacity to deliver public services. This research puts
particular emphasis on understanding how intergovernmental relations shape the
decentralization—and effectiveness—of public service delivery (particularly in the areas
of health and education) to local and regional governments.
Building on institutional theory (Frederickson & Smith, 2003), and previous
academic research, the present study seeks to answer the research question of how
intergovernmental relations shape and modify political and other decentralization
processes in countries with unitary forms of government and how those processes inform
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and define the implementation of decentralized public service delivery in the areas of health
and education at the local and regional level. Other key objectives include explaining and
analyzing how differences in the implementation of health and education decentralization
have impacted the delivery of those services at the local level.
The proposed research is firmly based on—and supports the importance of—a
political-economic analysis, with the belief that knowledge of the policy context greatly
contributes to the understanding of very complex policymaking processes. Context
specificity matters, though opponents of a political-economic analysis often argue that such
a focus neglects, or fails to examine, the marginal improvements feasible even in very
complex and difficult policy environments (Corduneanu-Huci et al., 2013). The present
research offers an analysis of both the “larger picture” of the institutions and stakeholders
involved in the public service decentralization process, as well as the particular impact of
such reforms on more basic indicators, in an attempt to examine those marginal
improvements that indeed were made in both Colombia and Paraguay.

Significance of the Study
This research aims to uncover better understanding of why countries with a unitary
form of government, such as Colombia and Paraguay, engage in political decentralization,
and how such processes influence the shape and effectiveness of public service delivery
with particular emphasis on health and education. The proposed research utilizes a
qualitative-descriptive and comparative approach based on institutional theory and
previous academic research.
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The findings of the research—through an examination of how timing and sociopolitical determinants played a role in changing the balance of power, and an examination
of the subnational level policies that were promoted and implemented—could prove useful
for policy-makers both in Latin America and other regions of the world, who are initiating,
or at different stages of decentralization processes. Findings will also be valuable to
international donor and multilateral organizations who have spent hundreds of millions of
dollars promoting and supporting decentralization—often in an uncoordinated manner and
without a full understanding of the socio-political circumstances that could be influencing
how such initiatives can or cannot be implemented.

Background
In Latin American countries, political constitutions are a reflection of each
country’s history, culture, and political evolution since the Independence movements of
the early XIX century. As such, the countries in the region are diverse and unique and
provide specific characteristics that have shaped their respective political institutions. Most
assuredly, the quality of governance is influenced by the kind and quality of government
present in a particular country or society. Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno (2005), with their
centripetal theory of democratic governance, posit that for the proponents of centralist
theory, good governance is the result of political institutions that are controlled by a central
authority. On the other hand, decentralization theory argues that the diffusion of power
among many independent bodies is most likely to lead to good government.
These two visions of what brings about good governance resurfaced strongly with
the return to democracy in the region in the 1980s. In fact, in many parts of the world, the
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late 1980s and early 1990s saw the promotion of decentralization as a dominant issue in
the agenda of many national governments, regional leaders, and development agencies.
Decentralization was seen as key to reestablishing the democratic credentials of the State
in formerly authoritarian regimes and as a way to make governments more responsive,
closer to the people, and transparent. Many also proposed decentralization as the best way
to promote better governance, reduce inequalities and strengthen economic development.
Decentralization was viewed as key to improving the quality of governance by making
governments more accountable.
A key reason for decentralization in Latin America was most likely the result of the
political evolution of the 1980s and 1990s, in which central governments, often highly
authoritarian, had lost credibility. Civil society and emerging political groups started to
demand more participation after decades of dictatorial governments. Seemingly, the
collapse of centrally controlled economies had made central governments obsolete. Thus,
the international community was ready to support decentralization as a means to
democratization.

However,

in

the

end,

decentralization—when

successfully

implemented—is inevitably a locally driven political process and “in seeking explanations
for the popularity of decentralization, we must therefore look mainly at the thinking of
leaders within the governments of developing countries” (Manor, 1999).
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Decentralization
Decentralization is defined in this research as the transfer of political,
administrative and fiscal responsibilities and authority to subnational (regional or local)
levels of government (Falleti, 2005).
The central concern of the proposed research rests mainly on better understanding
the role of political actors and their interactions in the defining and implementing of
decentralization processes (in particular for the provision of public services). As a
consequence, special attention is given to the underlying political relationships driving this
process (Gomez, 60). The principal theoretical framework is based on institutional theory:
“an institutional approach is one that emphasizes the role of institutions and
institutionalization in the understanding of human actions within an organization, social
order, or society” (March & Olsen_B; 1998).
The present research is based on a comparative institutionalist approach in which
the objective is to explain how specific institutions shape outcomes (Grindle, 2000). As
such, the research focuses on the historical context, the dynamics and actions of the groups
involved, and the interactions that might generate cooperation and conflict around areas of
policy reforms.
Institutions are characterized by “the sets of working rules that are used to
determine who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed or
constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what
information must or must not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned on individuals
dependent on their actions” (Ostrom, 1990; page 51).

6

Institutions shape the rules of the game. Examining the institutions involved, and
the rules and constraints that define incentives for decentralization, helps explain the
behavior of stakeholders in the process of public service delivery decentralization. The role
of political and economic actors can be better understood, and their likeliness to change
can be better explained, by examining the origins and the internal mechanisms of the
institutions with which interact (Corduneanu-Huci et al., 2013).
Institutional theory emphasizes the significance of institutional structures in
affecting the course of reform (March & Olsen, 1989); thus, special importance is given to
examining constitutions and legal frameworks. The interrelationship of political
institutions also affects the distribution of power—even though context and motives also
matter. Thus, political institutions (and their inter-relationships) are able to influence the
process of decentralization. Therefore, the need to concentrate on bargaining relationships
between executives, political parties, and subnational governments as underlying factors
controlling the reform process is of fundamental importance (Gomez, 58). March and
Olsen’s logic of expected consequences—based on the premise that actors are rational and
act in pursuit of their best interests; and logic of appropriateness (with its emphasis on
rules, identities, and institutions)—facilitates the understanding of the political bargaining
processes that characterize processes of decentralization. As they note, “political actors
are constituted both by their interests, by which they evaluate their expected consequences,
and by the rules embedded in their identities and political institutions.” (March & Olsen_B,
1998).
According to institutional theories, political democracy depends not only on
economic & social conditions but also on the design of political institutions
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(rules/procedures/roles/strategies

become

important)

(March

&

Olsen,

1989).

Decentralization is then the result of the interaction of numerous political institutions
including legislative bodies, political parties, subnational levels of government, executive
office holders and their deputies, and civil society actors among others.
At the heart of most decentralization reforms is a basic struggle for power and
control. Inevitably, this creates conflict and tension.

Examining how conflict and

compromise is achieved by the different political actors contributes to the understanding
of decentralization processes (Lyne, 2006).
Several factors have been posited to account for many of the differences in
decentralization outcomes observed in Latin America, including the following:
1) The motivation of key actors is a fundamental element in defining how and when
decentralization will occur and to what extent it will be implemented (basically, the degree
of political will);
2) The institutional arrangements (legal framework) put in place that define and
often have limited the capacity and autonomy of local governments in performing their
new roles. Institutional arrangements will determine the degree to which political power
and authority is transferred from central government to subnational levels; the
administrative assignment of specific functions; the roles for each level of government;
and the capacity to generate, collect, and administer one’s own revenue.
3) Finally, important “state-society relations” also influence the outcome of
decentralization initiatives. History, cultural values, and traditions (including variations
within a country) play a key role in influencing the outcome of decentralization processes,
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helping to explain how regions and localities within the same country might expect
different results from the decentralization process (Tulchin & Selee, 2004).
The struggle for power and control is evident in the decentralization process of the
two countries analyzed here. In both Paraguay and Colombia, in the early 1990s, significant
political changes occurred that helped place the issue of decentralization at the forefront of
the political agenda. Impetus for these political reforms resulted from: the international
movement toward increased democratization, especially in the Latin American context—
in conjunction with years of the State’s failure in the provision of services, and buttressed
by support from multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, the Inter-American
Development Bank, and cooperation agencies like the US Agency for International
Development. But, as we shall see, over time, the implementation of these reforms began
to stall. The present research also aims to analyze the reasons and factors for this
development.

Case Selection: Paraguay
A high degree of government centralization and authoritarianism characterized
Paraguay’s history for most of the XX century. Beginning in 1952, one person (Alfredo
Stroessner) and one political party (Partido Colorado) controlled the country for 37 years.
Together they controlled almost all aspects of life in Paraguay. This led to the establishment
of a culture of clientelism, corruption, and mismanagement that has been difficult to
overturn.
The dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner ended in 1989, and the decentralization
process began soon after with the 1991 election of mayors by popular vote for the first time
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in the country’s history. Political decentralization was further encouraged through the
pressure brought by regional leaders during the constitutional assembly, which was elected
to draft a new constitution for the country. As a result, the 1992 Constitution established
Paraguay, somewhat ambiguously, as a unitary, decentralized state.
The Constitution also recognized the role of Departments (equivalent to states or
provinces) and municipalities and it introduced the figure of the Departmental Governor
and Departmental Council (legislative body) to be directly elected by popular vote. In the
Constitution, responsibilities and sources of revenues for Departments are only vaguely
mentioned, leaving Congress to further define them by enacting necessary legal
framework. Competencies and revenue sources for municipal governments also are only
vaguely addressed by the new Constitution.
In practice, the Congress has been very slow to enact the necessary legal framework
and central government agencies have been reluctant to implement the few initiatives that
have been approved. The central government continues to control and monopolize revenue
sources and to have great powers of intervention in subregional governments. Congress
has introduced little legislation to change this situation.
One of the earliest and most significant attempts at decentralization in Paraguay
was initiated by the administration of President Juan Carlos Wasmosy (1993-1998) in the
areas of health services and, to a lesser degree, education. After nearly 15 years of health
and education decentralization, what is the situation in Paraguay? Has decentralization
really improved the conditions of those municipalities that have been part of the
decentralization process? What do key health and education indicators suggest?
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How have the relationships between the executive, congress and subnational
leaders impacted the decentralization process? What roles were played by political parties
(especially the dominant Colorado Party) and other socio-political actors in shaping
decentralization? If decentralization has stalled, what has changed the path toward effective
political, fiscal and administrative decentralization?
The answers to these questions are unclear because very little research has been
conducted on these issues. In fact, among scholars analyzing decentralization processes in
Latin America, Paraguay’s decentralization has received the least attention. The present
study aims to provide needed insight into Paraguay’s decentralization process.

Case Selection: Colombia
Colombia experienced a rapid, significant, and consistent decentralization process
in the 1980s and 1990s, but subsequently experienced a considerable slowdown in the last
decade. The country has three levels of government: national, regional (Departments), and
municipal. Each Department is headed by a governor and a legislative assembly;
municipalities are led by a mayor and a municipal council. All of these officials are directly
elected by the people.
Contrary to other countries where political and administrative decentralization
came first, Colombia’s decentralization started with fiscal issues. With the constitutional
reform of 1968, a mechanism to transfer funds to Departments to be spent on health and
education was implemented. In the 1980s, the concepts of administrative decentralization
and deconcentration were added to the debate on decentralization. In 1986, political
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decentralization of the country was strengthened with the direct election of mayors by
popular vote.
Simultaneously, a program to reform municipalities was also initiated.
Municipalities regained responsibilities over water provision, environmental health, the
building and maintenance of schools, hospitals and roads, housing, urban transportation
and cadasters (property tax rolls). Health and education responsibilities were progressively
transferred to municipalities and Departments, along with the funds to support them. But
this resource and administrative transfer often occurred without needed technical and
human resources.
In the early 1990s, Colombia experienced one of the most difficult periods in its
history. Political and social instability, the product of years of armed conflict, drugsmuggling and related political and social violence, were significantly undermining
Colombia’s institutions. Recognizing the need to address the increasing fragility of the
State, the government of President Virgilio Barco called for the election of a Constitutional
Assembly in late 1990. In it, the traditional political parties did not have a clear mandate
and a plurality of movements were represented (including former guerrillas). Much of the
debate centered partly on the merits of a federal versus a centralist state. In the end, the
1991 Constitution established Colombia as a unitary, decentralized and participatory state.
The 1991 Constitution redefined the roles and functions of Departments and municipalities
and established a completely new fund transfer system that was implemented by law in
1993 (Acosta, 2003). Health and education decentralization began at this time.
Continuing political violence, combined with apparent fiscal imbalances created by
excessive subnational expenditures and growing indebtedness, seems to have contributed
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to a decline in the promotion of fiscal, political, and administrative decentralization by the
central government. The governments of former Presidents Samper and Pastrana, and
especially President Uribe, seemingly halted the process of decentralization. Thus, the
country had been viewed as a model for decentralization by other countries in the region
(in fact, when Paraguay began its decentralization process, it looked to Colombia’s
government officials for guidance), appeared to no longer be at the forefront of
decentralization. If this is the case, where do health and education decentralization stand
after more than 20 years of experience? Have indicators in those areas improved? Are
Colombians receiving better health and education services, and if so, what is the
consequence? Can Colombia still be a model for other unitary countries starting the process
of public service delivery decentralization?

Research questions
As noted above, many factors are involved in the promotion of decentralization
processes, and in the design and implementation of decentralized public service delivery
policies. The kind of intergovernmental relations that both produce decentralization
initiatives and, subsequently, result from these processes will influence the policies that
can be implemented at subnational levels of government. The more subnational
governments control the process, or exert influence on it, the more likely that the
decentralization of public services (such as health and education) will not be just
administrative deconcentration but will include fiscal decentralization and some degree of
policymaking autonomy as part of its implementation.
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In a country like Paraguay, where the initiative for political decentralization was
strongly influenced by representatives from subnational levels of government, what type
of decentralization in health and education has resulted? Have these policies been more or
less effective? In a country like Colombia, where subnational political leaders were
actually quite successful in implementing the decentralization of public services (Falleti,
2005), what has happened to slow down the process? In either country, have health and
education indicators improved due to decentralization?
A first proposed hypothesis (H1) posits that if national, regional, and local political
leaders participate and collaborate in the promotion of political, fiscal, and administrative
decentralization, there is a greater probability for the passage, approval, and
implementation of public service decentralization laws.
A second hypothesis (H2) posits that once public service delivery decentralization
has been enacted, the higher the degree of collaboration between national, regional, and
local levels of government, stakeholders (in essence the type of intergovernmental relations
established) and citizens (other socio-political actors), the greater the probability of its
success and effectiveness.
In the absence of progress with decentralization in the last decade, a third
hypothesis (H3) posits that in the case of Paraguay, even though the process of
decentralization was started by subnational authorities, the presence of one dominant and
clientelistic

political

party

has

slowed

political,

fiscal,

and

administrative

decentralization; thus shifting the balance of power back to the national government.
In the case of Colombia, a fourth hypothesis (H4) posits that even in the presence
of multiple regional and local political movements, as power is centralized in the executive
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branch, the slowing of decentralization is more likely; thus shifting the balance of power
in favor of the national government.

Variables
For the purpose of the present research, the success and effectiveness of health and
education decentralization processes is the dependent variable. It is measured by the
number of health and education policy/programs that were decentralized to regional and
local levels, as well as by how basic performance indicators (such as infant mortality rate
and school enrollment) have been affected.
Independent variables considered include:
●

Institutionalization of the decentralization process. This is measured in terms of the
presence or absence of a clear regulatory framework defining the administrative,
fiscal, and political responsibilities of each level of government, the ability of the
central government to override decisions and policies taken by lower levels of
government; and the extent of implementation of relevant regulations and policies
at each government level.

●

Role of political parties and politically active social movements. This is measured
in terms of the presence or absence of political agreements in favor of
decentralization; support in national, regional and local legislative bodies for
decentralization legislation by the different parties/groups; coalition building
strategies in support of the decentralization process; voting records; and/or public
declarations.
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●

Involvement of other socio-political actors. This variable is measured by the
presence or absence of an active media, student movements, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and union movements and their ability to influence the
process through the established political parties or through demonstrations and
activism. The role of international organizations and national and international
financial institutions in influencing the process is also considered.

●

Control variables such as national education and poverty levels and other relevant
indicators are also taken into account.

Decentralization is operationalized by four dimensions: the share of revenue
collection and revenue expenditure of subnational governments; their policy making
authority; how officers are selected (elected or appointed); and, how their regional interests
are represented in the national legislatures (Falleti, 2005, p 333). This is very important
when analyzing decentralization processes in Latin America, and especially in the cases of
Paraguay and Colombia, because the way in which intergovernmental relations are
established, and how interactions happen, often affects the type of policies that can be
implemented.

Methods, Data Collection, and Sample
The research method is principally a path-dependent within-cases analysis. The
analysis traces how the processes of decentralization evolved from 1990 to 2010. Special
attention is given to critical junctures, or special political or social circumstances, that
significantly changed or altered the process of decentralization. The research aims to
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determine if the presence of certain contextual factors (or their absence) was necessary for
decentralization to move ahead (to see if any causality could be established).
This research required a close examination of each country’s history, present
conditions, and culture to better understand the socio-political circumstances in which the
decentralization processes occurred. Data was collected mainly through the reviewing of
documents, journals and newspapers and, most significantly, through elite interviews
“tailored to the purposes of the study” (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). In this regard,
interviews of national, regional, and local political leaders were very important. Leaders of
political parties, unions, NGOs, and civic movements were interviewed in both countries.
Over 25 interviews were conducted in Paraguay utilizing a semi-structured questionnaire.
All interviewees requested that their comments not be audio-recorded. In Colombia, 15
interviews were conducted, following the same format, and there too, interviewees
preferred not to be audio-recorded. Interview notes were however taken.
The interviewees included legislators representing all political parties in each
country’s

Congress,

subnational

legislators

and

elected

local

authorities

(mayors/governors), former cabinet level officials in charge of decentralization policies
and their implementation, and civil society representatives working on the promotion and
implementation of health and education decentralization policies. Voting records on
matters affecting decentralization were sought but in neither Colombia nor Paraguay were
they available—only recently did both legislative bodies begin to record individual votes.
A fundamental challenge in analyzing the information gathered through interviews
is the accuracy of reconstructing how decisions were made and how things would have
changed if decisions were different. To prevent such bias, as many of the actors involved
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in the decentralization decision making process as possible were interviewed. Different
historical interpretations are also taken into account.
To measure the effectiveness of health and education decentralization, indicators
such as student enrollment and coverage in the case of education decentralization, and
infant mortality rates (deaths of children under one year of age, live births) for health
decentralization are used for both countries. A comparison at the regional and municipal
levels is done using these selected indicators, accounting for the specificities of each
country’s service provision decentralization scheme and legal framework.
In the case of Colombia’s health decentralization experience, municipalities and
Departments that meet certain central-government-specified-criteria are then certified to
provide health services. Thus, the present research compares Departments with the highest
number of certified municipalities versus those with the fewest certified municipalities to
see if there are significant differences in indicator outcomes (e.g., infant mortality rates).
A total of five Departments are compared.
Paraguay’s health decentralization places greater emphasis on citizen participation
and on the creation of Local Health Councils (LHCs) to design and implement local health
plans. To evaluate the same basic indicator, six Departments (three with the most LHCs
and three with the fewest LHCs) are compared.
Regarding education decentralization, the analysis of Colombia uses school
enrollment and coverage as indicators of success, and it compares the performance of those
indicators across Departments. The case of Paraguay is particularly difficult to assess, as
so little progress has been made in implementing education decentralization.
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The analysis of indicators is based on the assumption that increased health and
education decentralization to local and regional levels should have a positive impact on
basic health and education indicators. If decentralization, as argued, helps governments to
be more responsive to local needs, and if more health and education programs are
decentralized to the local and regional level in response to the demands of many
communities, it is predicted that health and education indicators would improve as people
would have easier access to these services.
Access to adequate funding is important for the provision of health and education
services, as local and regional control over those funds will presumably ensure that they
are allocated effectively and reflect the most important needs of the respective
communities. Lack of resources can seriously affect the ability of local and regional
governments to provide the necessary services. Thus, the percentage of health and
education expenditures spent at the local and regional level has also been included when
the information has been available. Recognizing that many other socio-economic factors
influence health and education indicators, control variables such as income, poverty rates,
and inequality are also included in the analysis. Results generally show a positive
correlation between intergovernmental cooperation and the enactment of decentralization
policies. On the other hand, the impact of decentralization on the basic indicators
mentioned is often mixed and difficult to establish.
In the following chapters, the extensive literature on Latin America’s
decentralization processes (Chapter 2) is reviewed to contextualize the evolution of
political decentralization in both Colombia and Paraguay, and how that evolution has
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promoted (or hindered) decentralization of health and education policymaking and service
delivery to the subregional and local levels of government.
Chapter 3 offers a review of Colombia’s institutional framework, as well as a
description and analysis of its decentralization process. The interplay of intergovernmental
relations and how they have shaped the manner in which public services have been
decentralized in terms of norms, structure, and procedures is then analyzed. Chapter 4
applies the same analysis to Paraguay’s decentralization process.
Chapter 5 tests hypotheses three and four regarding the perceived slowdown of both
countries’ decentralization processes by analyzing the role of political parties in the
approval of key decentralization legislation and how decentralization has impacted
political parties and their ability to influence the process. In both cases, the hypotheses tend
to be confirmed. The research also examines the importance of informal institutions such
as clientelism and patronage (discussed in Chapter 5), and the role they play in cultivating
personalized relations, intermediaries, administrative bureaucracies and organizations,
which often hinder decentralization reforms.
Subsequently, we will investigate the effectiveness of health and education
decentralization in both countries (Chapters 6 through 9). An important element is the
search for differences and similarities in both countries to uncover what factors could
produce more effective results in terms of future health and education decentralization.
Finally, the research brings together the analysis of both countries to provide
answers to the research questions, and provide conclusions and recommendations for future
policy development and research (Chapter 10).
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It is hoped that this study contributes to scholarly writings that pay special attention
to the socio-political context in which important political reforms occur, as well as to the
research on the interaction between political institutions and social forces and their impact
on public service delivery.
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CHAPTER II

DECENTRALIZATION: WHAT IS IT AND HOW DO WE MEASURE IT?
OVERVIEW OF THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN LATIN AMERICA
“Decentralization is a process that unfolds over time; more important, it is neither
a linear process nor one that necessarily results in similar outcomes.
Decentralization can mean progress toward improved governance and democracy
as well as the erosion of local conditions of well-being” (Grindle, 2007, p. 10)

Defining Decentralization
The meaning of decentralization varies widely, and the term has been used to
describe government transformation and policy initiatives since the 1980s. In its early use
from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, decentralization came to be associated with
privatization and downsizing governments as dissatisfaction with government services
increased (Rondinelli, Nellis, Cheema; 1984). By the mid-1980s and early 1990s,
decentralization evolved into meaning not only the privatization of government enterprises,
but also the transfer of government responsibilities to subnational levels of government
(Rosales & Valencia Carmona, 2008; Wilson et al., 2008; Restrepo, 2006)
In the present study decentralization is defined as the transfer of political,
administrative, and fiscal responsibilities and authority to subnational (regional or local)
levels of government (Falleti, 2005). Administrative decentralization gives subnational
levels of government more responsibility in public policy delivery, including its planning,
implementation, and (depending on the case) financing.
Administrative decentralization can take different forms depending on how much
authority, including fiscal responsibility, is actually transferred to the subnational levels
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(Katorobo, 2004; Eaton, 2006). In administrative decentralization by deconcentration
(Rondinelli et al., 1984; World Bank, 2007), the central government transfers
administrative functions, roles, and responsibilities to its own agencies, present at the given
subnational level. The decisions are still made at the central level but are implemented at
the subnational level.
In some instances, the national government delegates power and authority to semiautonomous agencies allowing them to control the day-to-day implementation of certain
programs or policies (administrative decentralization by delegation). In this case
government agencies are more or less independent, but the central government still controls
and defines the policy aspects, and the agencies are accountable to the central government
(Rondinelli et al., 1984; Manor, 1999; Katorobo, 2004; World Bank, 2007).
Finally, administrative decentralization by devolution refers to cases in which the
central government transfers not only the fiscal and administrative authority but also the
political power for policymaking to subnational governments that are autonomous in the
implementation of policies, and more importantly, who have control and autonomy over
the use of their financial resources, as well as the capacity to raise resources (Rondinelli et
al., 1984, World Bank, 2007).
Of these three, only administrative decentralization by devolution can be
considered as effective decentralization because the state would have reformed its
administrative, fiscal, and political structure in favor of subnational levels of government;
however, as long as local/regional authorities do not have autonomy over the decision
making process and implementation of public policies including their own finances,
effective decentralization has not taken place.
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Decentralization, by its very nature, is a multidimensional and non-linear process
(Montero & Samuels, 2004) that involves political, economic, administrative, and
organizational factors that combine differently and vary across time and cultures. Being a
process, and mainly a political one, decentralization is susceptible to reversal, requires
implementation-time, and is not inevitable—the process is mainly a political choice.

Measuring Decentralization
Following the brief definition of decentralization above, and keeping in mind that
it is a process with many different dimensions and implications, what are the difficulties
that exist in measuring political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization? How does one
quantify those three dimensions?
Given the diversity of legal frameworks and decentralization processes, certain
baseline criteria are generally used to measure political or democratic decentralization such
as direct popular elections of subnational authorities, the existence of recall provisions for
elected officials, popular participation in subnational elections, and how competitive these
elections are (Shah & Ivanyna, 2012). To these criteria, others add the ability (or
inadequacy) of subnational governments to block financial or non-financial bills issued by
the central government (Treisman, 2002).
Similarly, Kearney (1999) proposes nine dimensions that measure the level of
decentralization in any given country, including the formal government structure of the
country as established by the country’s constitution and the selection of regional
executives. Other dimensions used by Kearney to measure decentralization are how local
executives are elected, and the ability or inadequacy of central governments to override
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decisions and policies determined at subnational levels of government. Revenue sharing
and revenue raising capacity, as mentioned above, are also two important dimensions when
trying to understand the level of decentralization. In terms of policy decentralization, it is
important to examine the type of authority subnational governments have on issues of
education, infrastructure, and policing at the local level.
Treisman (2012) measures level of decentralization using “conceptions of
decentralization,” which are grouped into categories such as vertical decentralization or
government structure, decision-making decentralization, appointment decentralization,
electoral decentralization, fiscal decentralization, and personnel decentralization.
When considering how to measure administrative decentralization, three main
criteria are proposed (Shah & Ivanyna, 2012): freedom to hire, fire, and set terms of
reference for subnational employees; the freedom to contract out responsibilities and
establish public-private partnerships; and the ability to pass by-laws or ordinances that
would regulate local/subnational activities.
Based on these criteria, decentralization could be measured along the following
lines:

Table 1: How to Measure Decentralization
Dimension
Government structure or
Vertical decentralization
Decision-making
decentralization

What it means
Refers to the number of tiers
in the country
Extent of authority to make
decisions by subnational
authorities1

1

What it measures
Measures political
decentralization
Measures political and
policy decentralization

This can vary greatly depending on each country’s legal framework from weak autonomy to subnational
veto (Treisman, 2012).
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Appointment decentralization Subnational authorities can
make appointments without
approval from above
Electoral decentralization
Subnational authorities are
elected
Fiscal decentralization
Subnational governments’
share of tax revenue and
expenditure
Personnel decentralization
Subnational authorities have
autonomy in the
administration of their
employees.

Measures both political
and administrative
decentralization
Measures political
decentralization
Measures level of fiscal
autonomy
Measures
administrative
decentralization

Source: Author, based on Treisman (2012)

These dimensions offer a holistic view of the many areas that any decentralization
process touches on and will be used in the present research to measure the level of
decentralization of the case studies (Colombia and Paraguay). They are by no means
exhaustive—as each dimension can have many sub-dimensions—but they provide a set of
criteria from which further analysis can be made.

Fiscal Decentralization
Fiscal decentralization, with its concurrent need for fiscal responsibility, is a key
component of any decentralization process (World Bank, 2007). It entails not only the
capacity of subnational levels of government to have adequate revenues and decisionmaking ability over expenditures, but also—and maybe more importantly—the authority
to generate and collect their own revenues independently of the central government.
It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of fiscal decentralization in countries that
are diverse and complex, and that are transitioning from a very centralized tradition. No
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uniform measurement can be established, as each country has a particular fiscal
arrangement, resulting from country-specific political, economic, and geographic
structures (Cetrangolo & Goldschmit, 2012); but researchers generally agree that fiscal
decentralization occurs when subnational governments have the capacity to decide their
own expenditures (budget), have control over taxes (to collect or create new ones), and
have the capacity to collect fees for services (Gargarella & Arballo, 2012). This autonomy
should also apply to how monetary transfers from the central government are used at the
subnational level.
In fact, a number of criteria of fiscal decentralization have been used to assess the
level of fiscal decentralization (Katorobo, 2004), including: autonomy (subnational levels
of government should independently set their expenditure priorities); revenue adequacy
(having enough revenue to cover obligations); equity; predictability; resource allocation
(central governments should not control resource allocation at the local/subnational level);
simplicity (revenue sharing should be characterized as simple and transparent); incentives
(for good management and efficiency); and safeguards for grantors (the central government
has an acceptable monitoring role in how programs and policies are met, and transferred
funds are used).
The usual indicators that assess level of fiscal decentralization include subnational
revenues as a percentage of GDP, subnational expenditures as a percentage of GDP,
subnational revenues as a percentage of total government revenue, and subnational
expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditure (Harbers, 2010).
When assessing fiscal decentralization, it is important to examine the regulatory
framework and what types of revenue sharing and revenue collection authority is granted
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to subnational levels of government (including their capacity to create new source of
revenues). When comparing expenditures at the local level, it is important to assess how
much local governments rely on intergovernmental grants or transfers rather than on
mobilizing and collecting their own revenues through independent taxes, fees, and
borrowing (Rodden, 2004). Local governments must determine how revenue will be spent
and to what degree they control this process.
Fiscal decentralization can be measured by a range of local functions, the autonomy
in rate and base setting for local financing of local expenditures, the level of responsibility
and control over municipal and social services, autonomy in procurement as well as the
ability to borrow both domestically and in foreign markets, and the ability to issue bonds
(Shah & Ivanyna, 2012).
For many countries, a central problem continues to be overreliance on central
government transfers. Latin America, for example, is characterized by great asymmetries
between expenditure devolution and revenue generation (Brosio & Jimenez, 2012). Lack
of capacity at the local level and politically-motivated unwillingness to collect taxes (when
authority is given) further complicate the implementation of fiscal decentralization
reforms. As noted by the World Bank 2007 decentralization report:

“In many developing countries local governments or administrative units possess
the legal authority to impose taxes, but the tax base is so weak and the dependence
on central government subsidies so ingrained that no attempt is made to exercise
that authority” (World Bank, 2007; p. 3).
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Fiscal decentralization is a key issue in the discussion of decentralization. Only
subnational governments that have both the authority and the ability to collect taxes and
fees as well as create new ones, and that can decide on how those funds will be spent, will
be truly accountable to their constituents and be able to improve governance and
responsibility at the local and regional levels.

Political and Fiscal Decentralization in Latin America—Overview2
Background on Latin America’s Decentralization Process
“In most Latin American countries, since colonial independence, the shaping of
intergovernmental relations has been a crucial component of the debate on the
institutional structure of government and constitutional design. In the region,
political reform and federalization/decentralization intersect in the political and
intellectual debate with an intensity that, possibly, is not observable in other
continents” (Brosio and Jimenez, 2012; p.1).
In Latin American countries, political constitutions are a reflection of each
country’s history, culture, and political evolution since the independence movements of the
XIX century. As such, they are diverse and unique and provide specific characteristics to
the political institutions of each country. The struggle against the dominance of the colonial
capital city versus the cities and regions of the interior also meant a struggle between
federalism and unitarism in Latin America. In some countries like Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico and Venezuela this was resolved in favor of the cities and regions of the interior
that wrestled power away from the center in a federal system, although in practice

2

It is not the purpose of this section to analyze in depth the decentralization process of Latin America, but
rather to offer an overview of the situation, placing our case studies in the context of the Hemisphere.
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centralization (especially in fiscal issues) continues to be a source of tension. In other
countries, the issue was resolved in favor of the capital city and these countries were
politically organized into unitary forms of government. Such is the case of Bolivia,
Colombia, Chile, Paraguay, and all of Central America.
There are contrasting views on how type of government influences quality of
governance in a particular society. Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno (2005), with their
centripetal theory of democratic governance, posit that for proponents of centralist theory,
good governance is the product of political institutions that are controlled by a central
authority. Decentralization theory argues that only the diffusion of power among many
independent bodies can guarantee good governance (Saito, 2008; Gerring et al., 2005).
This dual vision of good governance resurfaced strongly with the return to
democracy in the region in the 1980s. In fact, in many parts of the world, the late 1980s
and 1990s saw the promotion of decentralization as a central issue in the agenda of many
national governments, regional leaders, and development agencies. Decentralization was
seen as key to reestablishing the democratic credentials of the State in formerly
authoritarian regimes, and as a way to make governments more responsive, transparent and
closer to the people. Many reformers also proposed decentralization as the best way to
promote better governance, reduce inequalities, and strengthen economic development.
Although there were—and are—significant differences in how and why the process
of decentralization was initiated, some basic principles were supported by promoters of
decentralization: the diffusion of power, broader political participation, and limits on
governmental action were key to ensuring good governance (Gerring et al., 2005; Saito,
2008).
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Questions have been raised regarding the endogeneity of decentralization, in
particular the influence of multilateral organizations in promoting the principles of
decentralization. However, even if some donor organizations in the 1980s promoted
decentralization and worked with grassroots to ensure sustainability and move away from
large scale centrally controlled projects, countries did not decentralize merely because of
international organizations (Manor, 1999; O’Neill, 2005).

Bilateral and cooperation

organizations “tended to support decentralized institutions once they were created rather
than pressuring recipient governments to experiment anew with decentralization” (Manor,
1999).
The reasons for decentralization in Latin America were most likely the result of the
political evolution of the 1980s and 1990s, in which central government had lost credibility
and civil society as well as political groups began to demand greater participation. After
decades of authoritarian governments, the collapse of centrally controlled economies had
made the central governments in many cases obsolete, and the international community
was ready to support democratization. In the end, decentralization is a political process and
“in seeking explanations for the popularity of decentralization, we must therefore look
mainly at the thinking of leaders within the governments of developing countries” (Manor,
1999). As countries began the decentralization process, with some experiencing relative
success in empowering citizens and increasing political representation of previously
marginalized groups, and as subregional governments gained more preeminence in the
political arena, many unitary countries followed the trend.
The move toward decentralization in Latin America could also be explained by
institutional isomorphism and its three mechanisms for change: coercive where formal and
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informal organizational pressure and cultural expectations lead to change; mimetic where
uncertainty leads organizations to model themselves after other organizations (countries
that

have

successfully

transitioned

from

centralized/authoritarian

to

decentralized/democratic system were powerful examples to follow), and; normative
where change stems from professionalization (consultants and networks that were actively
promoting decentralization—Washington Consensus is just one example of these kinds of
networks and professionals (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
For many left leaning intellectuals and politicians, the decentralization reforms of
the last 20 years of the Twentieth century aimed to ensure access of international capital to
important markets (Restrepo, 2006). The “strategic function” of territories is only
important as long as international capital is guaranteed access to local markets.
Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s and in the 1990s new territorial pressures surfaced as Latin
American began its transition to democracy. The need to strengthen local governments as
a response to the political crisis became evident (Restrepo et al., 2006). Decentralization
took on a new meaning, moving away from market-oriented policies toward an emphasis
on local autonomy and local and regional governments to promote economic development,
citizen participation, and the wellbeing of democracy in general (Rosales, 2012).
Restrepo characterizes Latin America’s decentralization process as “centralist
decentralization,” as it not being driven by local authorities and/or local demands, but
imposed and dictated from the central government (2006). As central governments have
defined the extent of subnational autonomy, and in many cases have established how
resources will be transferred and spent, the argument goes that decentralization has not
been locally motivated. This view though, is not shared by many. The argument does not
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account for municipal associations, mayors, and governors from all over Latin America
that have undoubtedly pressed for decentralization reforms. It ignores the fact that much of
the legislation needed to implement decentralization has been decided and approved at the
congressional level, where regional representation of political interests is important and
quite vocal in many countries. Thus, it is interesting to see how regional politicians have
supported decentralization once elected to the national legislatures or if they have changed
their support.
To the criticism that decentralization is part of a “neoliberal agenda,” Gordin (2003)
argues that decentralization has not necessarily increased the power of market interests or
private capital. Neoliberal reforms have introduced great transformations in
intergovernmental relations as a result of many fiscal decentralization policies that are or
were part of a neoliberal agenda. Tibeout, Musgrave, and Oates emphasize the importance
of fiscal decentralization—with its concomitant transfer of administrative and political
authority—to the strengthening of democracy (Gordin, 2003).
Falleti (2005, 2010) offers a more nuanced interpretation of the origins of
decentralization and the types and levels of autonomy that mayors and governors are able
to obtain from central governments that is dependent on what level of government has
leverage when decentralization processes are initiated. Falleti’s sequential theory of
decentralization emphasizes the importance of analyzing the timing and order in which
each type of decentralization (fiscal, political, administrative) occurs in any given country
as key determinants of the intergovernmental balance of power that emerges in the
decentralization process (Falleti, 2005). Falleti maintains that in order to “evaluate the
consequences of decentralization…, we need to establish first when and how
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decentralization policies increase or decrease the power of subnational officials”. The
characteristics of the decentralization process will depend on the result of this interaction
and it will condition further policies of decentralization affecting the balance of power in
intergovernmental affairs.
O’Neill (2005) offers an explanation based on political incentives and election
cycles, where representatives of national political parties and central government would
support decentralization if they see an electoral advantage in doing so. The importance of
political incentives is also noted by Montero and Samuels (2004) who stress the relevance
of political relationships between national and subnational politicians to understand
decentralization; “because decentralization involves shifting power and resources
vertically between branches of government, institutional and electoral explanations of
decentralization should therefore focus on the way in which subnational politicians are
linked to or claim leverage over national politicians and parties” (p.22).
In summary, several factors account for differences in decentralization outcomes
seen in Latin America, including the following:
1) The motivation of key actors is a fundamental element in defining how
decentralization will occur and to what extent it will be implemented (basically the degree
of political will);
2) The institutional arrangements (legal framework put in place) that limit the
capacity and autonomy of local governments in performing their new roles. Institutional
arrangements will determine the transfer of political power and authority from central
government to subnational levels; administrative assignment of specific functions; roles

34

for each level of government; and capacity to generate, collect, and administer own
revenues.
3) Finally, the importance of “state-society relations” also influences the outcome
of decentralization. History, cultural values, and traditions (including variations within a
country) play a key role in influencing the outcome of decentralization, helping to explain
how regions and localities within the same country might expect different results from the
decentralization process (Tulchin & Selee, 2004).

Evolution of Decentralization in Latin America3
As a whole, Latin America is a very diverse continent with over 570 million
inhabitants who are highly urbanized (77.8% live in cities) and a region where significant
social and economic inequalities4 remain.
The diversity can be observed by comparing the number of municipalities in a
country like Brazil (over 5,000) to the country of Uruguay (only 19). Colombia, Peru, and
Argentina have over 1,000 municipalities while Ecuador, Paraguay, El Salvador, and
Honduras have over 200 municipalities. Population also varies greatly among all countries
(Table 2), and nearly 90% of Latin America’s municipalities have less than 50,000
inhabitants (Rosales & Valencia Carmona, 2012).

Table 2: Number of subnational governments and population

3

A modified version of this section was published in the summer issue of Hemisphere Magazine. Volume
24. Summer 2015. http://lacc.fiu.edu
4
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Source: Rosales and Valencia Carmona, 2008

As noted above, Latin American countries vary in the extent and depth of their
decentralization processes, but over the last 30+ years all countries have initiated or
deepened political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization. In some instances,
particularly in the case of Venezuela, some serious regressions have occurred5.
Historically, highly centralized governments have characterized Latin America.
There are only four federal countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. All others
have unitary systems, though each has unique structures of regional and local governments

5

The government of the late President Hugo Chavez, and the current administration of President Nicolas
Maduro have, through laws and decrees, severely curtailed the political, administrative, and fiscal autonomy
of regional and local governments.
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and a specific degree of decentralization. In all countries, the national executive branch is
preeminent and politics are very centralized (Rosales, 2012).
With the return to democracy in many Latin American countries in the 1980s and
early 1990s, political decentralization seems to have occurred first. In the early 1980s, very
few countries elected their local authorities by popular vote, and today mayors are directly
and freely elected in all countries except Cuba.6 Administrative and fiscal decentralization
followed with the necessary reforms to institutions and legal frameworks (Rosales, 2012).
In general, the larger countries of South America (i.e., Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia,
Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador) initiated important reforms and redistributed competencies
and resources to subnational governments, not without controversy or great difficulty.
Although Mexico initiated “new federalism” to open its political system, political and fiscal
reform continue to favor state governments over local governments. Peru, under the
government of former president Alberto Fujimori, experienced a slowdown in the
decentralization process that subsequently re-emerged in the years after 2000. In Central
American and Caribbean countries, decentralization has progressed more slowly, with
Guatemala and Nicaragua emphasizing political decentralization, and Honduras and El
Salvador emphasizing fiscal decentralization. Costa Rica, one of the most stable countries
in Central America, introduced political decentralization with the direct election of mayors
by popular vote only in 2002, while Panama has registered very little progress in this area
(Rosales, 2012; Rosales and Valencia Carmona, 2008).

6

This assertion is always controversial, as it is commonly said that all countries but Cuba elect their local
leaders. Cubans also vote for their local authorities but these candidates must belong to the Communist Party
and are nominated—and previously approved—by the Cuban Communist party.
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In terms of administrative decentralization, there has been a clear trend to
decentralize the provision of certain services (in particular health and education) to
subnational levels of government with great variation in terms of the extent of these
reforms, their financing, and the legal framework that regulates them.
Typically, local governments in Latin America provide basic services such as
garbage collection, sewer and water, urban planning and zoning, parks and recreation,
markets, transit, education and culture, environmental protection, and public safety, among
others. Nevertheless, in Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, and Colombia, services such as primary
health care, elementary and secondary education, and other social programs have been
transferred to local and regional governments (Rosales, 2012). In Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico, the delivery of social programs, as well as health and education, is shared between
the three levels of government; and in Central America, local governments have had great
difficulty in providing basic services. Furthermore, fragmentation of policy
implementation has characterized the decentralization process in Latin America over the
last 20 years, where synchronization between assigning responsibilities, powers of tax
collection, transfers from central governments, and implementation capacity has been
lacking in many countries (Lora, 2007).
Fiscal decentralization across Latin America has progressed in varying degrees
over the last 30 years, but has been characterized by great asymmetry between devolution
of expenditure and devolution of taxing responsibilities (Brosio, 2012; Martinez-Vasquez,
2011).
Between 1980 and 2009, the percentage of subnational governments’ expenditures
as part of the total national expenditures increased from 11% to almost 19% (see Table 3),
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with countries like Colombia (unitary) and Bolivia (also unitary) showing important
increases, from 26% to 33%, and from 15% to 27%, respectively. After the years of
centralization under former president Fujimori, Peru’s expenditures increased from 9% to
34%. Among federal countries, Brazil showed the largest increase, from 32% to 55%, with
Argentina and Mexico showing important increases as well. Central American countries,
on the other hand, showed a decline in their participation in total governmental expenditure,
with the exception of El Salvador where a very small increase occurred.
Table 3: Percentage of the Expenditure of Subnational Governments in Total
Governmental Expenditure – 1980 to 2009
Brazil (1980)
Argentina (1980)
Mexico (1980)
Venezuela (1979)

32.4
22.2
22.0
2.4

Brazil (2008)
Argentina (2006)
Mexico (2007)
Venezuela (2007)

55.0
50.8
31.8
8.0

Colombia (1982)
Ecuador (1980)
Bolivia 1986
Peru (1990)
Uruguay (1980)
El Salvador (1978)
Paraguay (1980)
Guatemala (1980)
Costa Rica (1980)
Chile (1980)
Dominican Rep.
(1980)
Panama (1980)

26.3
18.3
14.8
9.1
8.6
5.8
5.5
4.5
4.0
3.7
3.5

Colombia (2006)
Ecuador (2004)
Bolivia (2008)
Peru (2007)
Uruguay (2005)
El Salvador (2007)
Paraguay (2007)
Guatemala (2009)
Costa Rica (2007)
Chile (2007)
Dominican Rep.
(2006)
Panama (2005)

33.0
22.1
27.0
34.0
13.2
7.0
6.5
4.4
3.7
14.0
5.3

Average Latin
America

11.6

Average Latin
America

18.9

2.0

1.7

Source: Adapted from Rosales (2012, page 25), based on IMF, World Bank, IDB, and UCLG data.

Subnational governments, and in particular local governments, in most of Latin
America have as their main sources of revenue:
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-

Locally collected taxes and fees (especially property taxes)

-

Transfers from the central government (conditional or unconditional)

-

Loans from different financial institutions or agencies (this option varies greatly
by country)

-

Other revenue (royalties, grants, gifts, and donations)

The most common tax that almost all countries in Latin America assign to local
governments is the property tax, which is by far their largest source of revenue, though
their ability to collect it varies greatly by region and by country. Other taxes and fees
include car registrations, driver license fees, construction permits, and public markets,
among others.
One measure of fiscal decentralization is the level of autonomy that subnational
governments have in generating their own revenue. In Dickovick’s ideal types (2011)
(based on measuring the fiscal aspects of decentralization: revenue, expenditure and
contractual autonomy of the sub-national units), Latin American countries can be found
between the Moderate type with large amounts of legally mandated transfers and major tax
bases, but where transfers can be inconsistent (especially countries such as Brazil,
Argentina, and Colombia), and the Low type with small amounts of legally mandated
transfers, minor tax authority, and minimal transfers (most other countries).
Adding to the lack of autonomy in revenue, many countries still have insufficient
autonomy in expenditure: only six countries allow local governments to create new taxes,
and in seven countries the regional or central government has veto power over local
governments’ budgets (see Table 4). In many countries, there is a lack of local
administrative capacity and profuse fragmentation (local governments that are too small),
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lack of clear legal frameworks assigning expenditure responsibilities, confusion over
revenue sharing (formulas are not clear, discussions over conditionality of the revenue
sharing), irresponsible borrowing, and a concerning overreliance on transfers from the
central government.
Table 4: Local Governments Taxing Authority in Latin America
Country

Authority
to
introduce
new taxes

Authority
to define
taxes and
fees levels
within legal
framework

Authority
to change
basis of
taxation

Control or
veto power
of regional
or central
government
over local
budgets

Responsible
for
Collecting
Fees

Responsible
for
Collecting
Taxes

Local
Central/Regi
on
Local
Local

Local
Central

Argentina
Bolivia

Yes
No

Yes
No

Yes
No

No
Central

Brazil
Chile

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

No
No

Colombia
Costa Rica

No
No

Yes
No

No
No

No
Central

Dominica
n Republic
Ecuador
El
Salvador
Guatemala

No

No

No

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

No

Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama

No

Local
Private
Sector
Central

Local
Central/Loc
al
Central
Private
Sector
Central

No
No

No
No

Local
Local

Local
Local

Yes

No

No

Local

No
No
No
No

Yes
No
Yes
Yes

No
No
Yes
No

No
Regional
Central
Central

Local
Local
Local
Local

Paraguay

No

No

No

Central

Local

Peru
Uruguay

No
Yes

No
Yes

No
No

No
Central

Local
Local

Central/Loc
al
Local
Local
Local
Central/Loc
al
Central/Loc
al
Local
Local

Venezuela

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Local

Local

Source: Adapted from Jorge Martinez-Vasquez in Informe Mundial GOLD 2, UCGL, 2011
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As previously noted, Latin American subnational governments have come to rely
heavily on transfers from the central government, which helps explain their revenue
increases while their own tax resources that have remained stagnant (Gomez Sabaini and
Jimenez, 2012). This overreliance on transfers makes subnational governments vulnerable
to cuts due to macroeconomic fiscal and economic imbalances (e.g., the 2008 economic
crisis triggered significant cuts in central government transfers) or political reasons. It also
makes them vulnerable to conditionality imposed by central governments (Rezende &
Veloso, 2012).
Some of the main flaws identified by Rezende and Veloso (2012) in the
intergovernmental transfer system applied in Latin America include the lack of clear
principles and objectives to organize such transfers, the multiplicity of transfer sources and
criteria applied, rules that are neither clear nor stable, new and multiple conditionality on
the use of such funds, and the absence of a system of “periodical revision of the transfer
regime.” This overreliance also creates a disincentive for subnational governments to
improve their own revenue collection capacity (Martinez-Vasquez, 2011), reducing their
ability to negotiate with the central government. Some of these weaknesses must be
addressed if subnational governments in Latin America intend to achieve autonomy of
expenditure and revenue, both key factors in the delivery of public services.

Final Perspectives on Latin America’s Decentralization
After more than 30 years implementing political, fiscal, and administrative
decentralization in the Hemisphere, the achievements are mixed, the difficulties and
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challenges are many, and in some instances, there is a sense that in the XXI century
decentralization is no longer a priority in many Latin American countries7. Presidentialism,
and its tendency toward centralization, is too strong and difficult to overcome (Restrepo,
2006).
Decentralization is not necessarily a perfect solution to a country’s development: it
neither ensures better service delivery, nor is it the only factor influencing citizen
participation. In fact, decentralization is not always efficient due to weak administrative or
technical capacity at the local level. It can entail the loss of economies of scale or the
capture of service delivery by local elites. It can also increase or create new tensions
between local and regional governments and the central government over the control of
scarce financial resources (World Bank Report, 2007; Rondinelli, et at 1984).
Nevertheless, achievements can be linked to the decentralization processes initiated
in the last thirty years in Latin America, including the elections of subregional authorities,
particularly local authorities, by popular vote. The legal framework for decentralization
has encouraged important political reforms and increased citizen participation in most
countries. Subnational governments have increased their share of expenditures and
revenues and have more decision making authority as to how those funds can be spent. The
transfer to subnational governments of policy making decision power and implementation
has contributed considerably to increased capacity at the local level. Increased levels of
citizen participation have contributed to innovations in social policy implementation, as

7

In fact, Dr. Daniel Cravacuore of the National University of Quilmes, Argentina posits in his recent research
(2014) that without a stronger defense by local and regional governments of their autonomy and prerogatives,
and without pushing for a more comprehensive agenda for decentralization, the relationship between central
governments and subnational ones would revert to the pre-1990s situation with strong dominance of the
central government.
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well as to the inclusion of previously excluded social groups in the policy making process.
Municipal associations in particular have been strengthened, and overall subnational levels
of government have taken a more proactive role (Rosales, 2012). Their increased relevance
can be seen in the number of subnational authorities that have become national leaders in
their countries.
In conclusion, decentralization implies a profound change and readjustment of
intergovernmental relations. The way these changes are shaped and implemented will
affect governance and policymaking decisions and implementation. It is in this context of
Latin American decentralization that we will examine how decentralization has impacted
intergovernmental relations in the two case studies presented here—Colombia and
Paraguay—and how intergovernmental relations has shaped policy decentralization in
health care and education.
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CHAPTER THREE

COLOMBIA: INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND DECENTRALIZATION
Introduction
Colombia, a country of 45 million inhabitants (2010)8, is characterized by its great
cultural, geographical, and social diversity. Though its history has been marked by periods
of conflict and violence since gaining independence from Spain, Colombia has
simultaneously experienced remarkable economic and political stability by Latin American
standards. Situated in the northern region of South America, it has been an example of
decentralization, closely followed and studied by politicians, academics, and government
practitioners.
Until very recently, the country was notoriously dominated by two main political
parties. Colombia has been fragmented by violence, but also has a very diverse and rich
history; the country’s decentralization aimed to achieve stability and provide services to
citizens that have been generally disenchanted with the political and economic system.
As in many other countries, Colombia’s political institutions have been shaped by its
particular history. This chapter will offer a brief review of the country’s history, the
creation of its most important government institutions, and the decentralization reforms
initiated in the mid-1980s, and deepened in the early 1990s.

8

http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/poblacion Banco Central de la Republica de Colombia
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Historical Background
From Independence to 1886
Colombia was part of the Spanish crown colonies in the New Kingdom of
Granada—composed of modern-day Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama, and certain
areas of Peru. The country declared independence from Spain in July of 1810, and Simon
Bolivar ensured the end of Spanish dominance after the battle of Boyaca in 1819. The
period after independence was characterized by internal conflicts that resulted in the
dismemberment of the Kingdom in 1830, and the creation of modern day countries (with
the exception of modern-day Panama, which was part of Colombia until 1903).
Civil strife and internal conflicts were also characteristics of the nascent country
with deep regional differences that did not necessarily recognize the leadership of
Bogota—the center of political and cultural life. The first Colombian constitution was
enacted in 1821, establishing a very centralist organization but was otherwise
conventionally liberal (Hudson, 2010). From 1849 to 1886, Colombia fluctuated between
a liberal republic and a highly centralized, authoritarian government. The oscillation was a
response to the political differences and impact of the two traditional political parties that
were to dominate Colombia’s modern history: the Liberal Party, which tended to be
progressive and urban-based; and the Conservative Party, which was more traditional,
closely linked to the Catholic Church, and mostly rural-based.
In 1886, a new constitution was enacted that reversed the federalist trend
established by the Liberal Party, and inaugurated 45 years of Conservative rule. The period
was once again characterized by factionalism within political parties and political and
economic instability (Hudson, 2010).
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This period of Colombian history saw a poor country with dramatic regional
differences, managed from Bogota by political elites in a way that intensified those regional
differences. Citizens did not feel they belonged to a nation, but rather an exclusive
membership in one of two political parties (Hylton, 2006).

From 1886 to the 1950s
This period of Colombian history was marked by terrible civil wars, economic
booms, political instability—including Colombia’s only coup d’état—the rise of armed
guerrillas, narco-trafficking, paramilitaries, and overextended civil and military conflicts.
As a result, Colombia has been a very fractured and polarized society where political
competition has been a zero sum game expressed in various forms of violence.
Between 1880 and 1930, Colombian politics were dominated by the Conservative
Party and the Catholic Church, and the government was very centralized. These factors
strengthened clientelism rooted in the coffee export boom that began in the 1880s. This era
also brought the commercial and banking elites of Antioquia Department to national
prominence (Hylton, 2006).
In the 1890s, Colombia was dominated by a coffee economy; the country became
a world exporter of coffee, and saw the consolidation of landed elites as the new political
elites of the country. Between 1899 and 1902, in the civil war known as the War of a
Thousand Days, the Liberal Party lost to the Conservative party. The war caused great
economic losses and human casualties and precipitated Panama’s declaration of
independence (Hudson, 2010), which was facilitated by the United States.
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In 1886, a new centralist Constitution was enacted that gave the president the power
to name governors; term-lengths for all political offices were extended; demonstrations
against the government were forbidden; and heavy emphasis was placed on “order”
(Hylton, 2006).
Between 1904 and 1930, Colombian politics were characterized by Conservative
Party dominance, though power-sharing mechanisms were established with the Liberal
Party to avoid more disruptions.
Divisions within the Conservative Party allowed the Liberals to reclaim the
presidency. In 1930, the Liberal Party won the presidential election, inaugurating the period
known as the “Liberal Pause” (Hylton, 2006), which lasted until 1946. During this time,
the urban middle classes claimed a part of the riches generated by the economic boom,
ushering a wave of mass mobilizations against the government. Liberals united around the
charismatic figure of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, whose nationalism appealed to people of all
economic classes and ethnic backgrounds. Special efforts were made to reform the 1886
constitution to ensure the separation between State and Church, but the efforts were
unsuccessful.
The Liberal establishment resented Gaitan’s influence and locked him out of the
presidency in 1946. He then decided to run as an independent, thus splitting the Liberal
Party and allowing the Conservatives to win the election with Laureano Gomez, who was
aligned with the most conservative wing of the party.
In 1946, Gaitan was assassinated, ushering in one of the darkest periods of
Colombian history, known as “La Violencia” (the Violence), which officially lasted from
1946 to 1957.
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The death of Gaitan generated massive demonstrations in Bogota (then known as
the Bogotazo), which were brutally put down by the Conservative government. Other
major urban areas also experienced demonstrations and repression.
Partisan conflict spread quickly in the coffee growing areas of the country. Liberal
elites in this region, fearing Conservative revenge for actions that occurred during the War
of a Thousand Days, organized armed resistance. Conservatives also reacted by arming
their base. Bloodshed spread around the country and thousands were killed, many in rural
areas. By the end of the conflict, an estimated 300,000 individuals—mostly men—had been
killed, and 2 million had been forcibly displaced9.
In 1951, Laureano Gomez momentarily stepped down due to health issues and, in
1953, when he attempted to regain his post, the only military coup in Colombian history
occurred. General Rojas Pinilla took over the government, increasing violence and
repression against Liberal Party members. Partisan sectarianism increased significantly,
and changing parties was seen as a treason to family and country. The roots of Colombian
inequality (access to land) were not addressed nor solved by this conflict (Hylton, 2006;
Hudson, 2010). Regional guerrilla movements emerged during this crucial time in
Colombian history.

9

There is little agreement and much controversy as to the total number of people who were killed during La
Violencia, as some deaths were not recorded and occurred in rural areas. What is known is that most of the
dead were poor peasants (Hylton, 2006; Hudson, 2010).
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The National Front, 1957 – 1982
The horrors of La Violencia, and the terrible social and economic consequences it
had on the country, were so great that the political elites of both parties realized that some
compromise was needed to pacify the country. By 1957, Colombian political elites of both
parties realized that Rojas Pinilla intended to remain in power, and they united to topple
him. Thus, in 1958 a national agreement between the two parties was signed to diminish
the violence and to establish a power sharing mechanism. The agreement called for both
parties to share power equally, alternating the presidency, and parity of representation at
all levels of government. Regional and local political power remained more important than
central government authority in most places, as Liberals and Conservatives sought to
maintain the economic well-being of the nation, and there were no major ideological
differences between them.
By 1961, the national government sponsored new agrarian reform laws without
much success. The lack of progress and the continued dire situation of landless peasants,
as well as serious urban poverty, fueled the surge of guerrilla movements10. In 1970 Misael
Pastrana, a Conservative, was elected president (1970-1974) and sponsored public works
and urban remodeling to generate employment and reform to deal with those problems.
In 1974, Lopez Michelsen, a Liberal, was elected president (1974-1978). Urban
discontent increased sharply and the guerrilla movement M-19 was formed. In general, the
mid-1970s saw widespread protests around the country over public services delivery. In

10

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known as the FARC, was created in 1964, along with the
National Liberation Army or ELN. By 1967, the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) was also formed.
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1977, the major trade unions organized the “paros civicos” or civic strikes to protest lack
of services and opportunities, but these efforts were seriously repressed.
Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala (1978-1982), a Liberal, allowed widespread suppression
of the paros civicos and the guerrilla movements present in the country. Colombia was
again experiencing a spiral of political violence, widespread crime, and civic protestations;
it appeared as if governmental authorities had no control of the situation. As Hylton (2006)
notes:
“In the late 1970s and early 1980s intensified repression diminished state authority
and created a climate in which the Left insurgencies thrived” (page 65). This in turn fueled
the creation of death squads that eventually became regional paramilitary forces.

Crisis Time, 1982 to 2010
In 1982, Belisario Betancourt (1982-1986), a Conservative, was elected president.
President Betancourt initiated a peace process with the insurgencies. A broad electoral left
emerged and it was strongly resisted at the regional and local level. High levels of political
violence, torture, and disappearances characterized this period of Colombian history. The
power of the cocaine-exporting barons increased dramatically, and paramilitary forces took
control of vast areas of the country. The guerrilla movements M-19, the EPL, and the
FARC ended negotiations with the government. In 1984, the then Minister of Justice,
Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, was killed by narco-traffickers. In 1985, M-19 seized the Palace of
Justice, which was destroyed during the counterassault. Over 100 people were killed,
including half of the members of the Supreme Court (Hudson, 2010). In 1989, the popular
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Liberal candidate for President, Luis Carlos Galan, was assassinated, along with two other
presidential candidates.
During the 1990s, unemployment was high especially among young males, which
facilitated the recruitment efforts of drug businesses, paramilitary organizations, and the
left insurgency (Hylton, 2006). More and more people were being displaced by violence;
smaller armed groups were disarmed and most of their members later killed. Political
participation continued to erode. Insurgencies allied themselves in some instances with the
drug barons and so did paramilitary groups (created to counter the violence of the leftist
guerrillas). The violence was out of control in many parts of the country. Both insurgency
and paramilitary groups took control over vast resources, populations, territories, and
transport routes during this decade.
It was in this context of violence and uncontrolled political chaos that Cesar
Gaviria, a Liberal, was elected president (1990-1994). Realizing the seriousness of the
situation, and trying to legitimize the political system, President Gaviria convened a
Constitutional Assembly to produce a new and more democratic constitution as a possible
solution to the spiral of violence engulfing the country.
The new Constitution, approved in 1991, introduced important political, fiscal, and
social reforms (recognition of indigenous peoples and their territories; streamlining the
judiciary and limiting the authority of the executive; reforming how senators,
representatives, mayors, and governors were to be elected; reaffirming fiscal and political
decentralization; and, including participatory approaches to democracy, among other
reforms).
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But decentralization also opened a new opportunity for armed groups to enter into
electoral competition (Hylton, 2006; Eaton, 2006). As Hylton (2006) notes: “Capitalizing
on decentralization, the paramilitaries were now poised to contest insurgent power by
taking over regional and local office through the Liberal Party, as Conservatives had done
after 1946” (page 81).
In 1993, the infamous Medellin cartel suffered a major blow when its leader, Pablo
Escobar, was killed by the Colombian authorities. This event did not dislodge power from
the drug barons, as Escobar’s death gave power to the Cali cartels that were, at least, more
moderate in their attacks to judicial and political figures.
In 1994, the Liberal Ernesto Samper was elected president (1994-1998), but his
presidency was dogged from the beginning by allegations of drug money involvement in
his political campaign (Hylton, 2006; Hudson 2010). At this time, the economic crisis of
the country deepened and, for the first time, Colombia received an aid package from the
International Monetary Fund. The War on Drugs became an essential component of USColombia relations, and both insurgents (FARC and ELN) and paramilitary groups were
linked to drug trafficking and common criminality. Their actions made many parts of the
country extremely violent and caused massive displacements of poor and peasant families
to urban areas. Paramilitary advances were exceptional, with the founding of the United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in 1997 (Hudson, 2010).
When Andres Pastrana, a Conservative, was elected president (1998-2002), he
sought to negotiate peace with the FARC. For that purpose, a Switzerland-sized
“demilitarized zone” was created in the south. At the same time, the US and Colombian
governments launched the Plan Colombia, a five year, $4 billion aid package—80% of
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which was to be used by the Colombian military and police. In 2002, a peace agreement
was also negotiated with paramilitary groups. Both negotiations failed and President
Pastrana ordered the armed forces to recapture the area previously given to the FARC.
In 2002, a former Liberal governor of Antioquia, Alvaro Uribe, who now promoted
a very conservative agenda and was running as an independent, was elected president. The
US-backed Plan Colombia was expanded. Peace agreements with no accountability were
reached with paramilitary groups. Insurgencies continued to lose support from the general
population (Hylton 2006; Hudson 2010) because of their often violent strategies.
President Uribe embarked on an aggressive campaign against the guerrilla
movements. In 2004, the Colombian Congress approved legislation that allowed for the reelection of the President, handling President Uribe a major political victory. This was
ratified by the Constitutional Court in 2005 (Hudson, 2010). That same year, a
controversial law went into effect that gave almost complete amnesty to members of the
paramilitary forces known as AUC.
In 2006, President Uribe was overwhelmingly reelected with over 62% of the votes
(Hudson, 2010). His 2006-2010 term was characterized by human rights abuse
allegations 11 , increased military action against the FARC, and civil malaise over the
economic situation of the country. In 2009, President Uribe faced defeat as his proposed
referendum to allow for a second reelection was invalidated by the National Electoral
Council. The FARC reaffirmed their armed struggle and rejected surrender. In 2010, the

11

In 2008, the scandal over the “false positives” unraveled, revealing large-scale extrajudicial killings of
poor young men to increase the alleged count of guerrilla members killed. By 2009, the UK had stopped
bilateral military aid to Colombia due to human rights abuses allegations (Hudson, 2010).
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Constitutional Court reaffirmed the unconstitutionality of Uribe’s second reelection
ambitions, and his former Minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos, was elected president
later that same year.
This brief review of Colombia’s modern history, suggests that to understand
Colombian politics, it is necessary to understand the “multiple layers of previous conflicts
and the accumulated weight of unresolved contradictions” (Hylton, 2006, page 7). The
coexistence of democratic institutions and continued internal armed conflict are the central
characteristics of Colombia’s political system (Table 5 below provides an overview of the
country’s complex political history).
Decentralization, in particular political decentralization, was seen by most political
actors, parties, and the political establishment as a way of restoring legitimacy to a system
that has been highly exclusionary, clientelistic, and unable to provide for the majority of
its citizens.

Table 5: Turning Points in Colombia’s Modern Political History
Since Independence to 2010
1811 – 1819
1819 – 1830

Independence movement against the Spanish crown
Simon Bolivar won the battle of Boyaca and the Republic of Colombia
was created. In 1830, a new Constitution was proclaimed. Ecuador and
Venezuela seceded. Bolivar died.

1832 - 1858

Republic of New Granada
A new Constitution strengthening the central executive was enacted in
1843.
Slavery was ended in 1852.
1853 a new more Liberal Constitution was enacted.

1858 - 1861

Confederacion Granadina was established by the 1858 new
Constitution that aimed to create a federal state.
Church property was expropriated.
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1863

Liberals enacted another more liberal Constitution that established a
federal state and increased individual liberties.

1886

Conservatives regained power and a new Constitution was enacted,
ending federalism in favor of a highly centralized government. The
Country was renamed Republic of Colombia, federalism ended and the
Departments were created at the regional level
War of the Thousand Days.
Panama, backed by the U.S., declared independence from Colombia.

1899 - 1902
1903
1904 - 1930

A period of political reconciliation and alternation between the Liberal
and Conservative party ensued.

1930 - 1945

A period of social reform, including attempts to agrarian reform under
Lopez Pumarejo presidency.

1946- 1958

La Violencia. After the assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, and the
return of the Conservatives to the government, the country was
engulfed in a civil war that caused thousands of deaths, mostly in rural
areas.
The National Front: both political parties agreed to a sharing power
formula to peace the nation. Liberals and Conservative would alternate
the presidency and all political posts equally
Guerrilla movements started to appear in this period

1958 - 1978

1979 - 1990

1991

Terrorism and counterinsurgency characterized Colombia. Guerrilla
movements were active, political turmoil increased, and drug cartels
infiltrated politics and the judicial system.
A new Constitution establishing Colombia as unitary and decentralized
was enacted. Minorities were given constitutional recognition. Fiscal,
administrative, and political decentralization were significantly
expanded.

1990 – 1994

Presidency of Cesar Gaviria, a Liberal, Convened the Constitutional
Assembly.

1994 - 1998

Presidency of Ernesto Samper. Allegations of drug money in his
political campaign would plague his administration.

1998 – 2002

Presidency of Andres Pastrana, a Conservative, tried to negotiate peace
agreements with counterinsurgency and the FARC. Both failed.

2002 - 2010

Independent candidate Alvaro Uribe was elected President in 2002 and
reelected in 2006. Military campaigns against the FARC and other
guerrilla movements were increased. An amnesty was signed with the
counterinsurgents. Country was heavily criticized for human rights
abuses.

2010

Juan Manuel Santos, former Minister of Defense of President Uribe,
was elected President.

Source: Author based on Hudson, 2010
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Structure of Subnational Governance in Colombia
The 1991 Constitution: New Design of the Colombian State
As noted above, the 1991 Colombian constitution transformed the political, fiscal
and administrative organization of the country. It was also an attempt to pacify the country
and give political leaders, and new political players (e.g., demobilized guerrilla leaders),
more involvement in running the nation. It was the latest of many Constitutions adopted in
the country’s history (see Table 6 below).

Table 6: Administrative Political Organization of Colombia
Year of the Constitution
1811
1821
1830
1832
1843
1853
1858
1863
1886
1991

System Adopted
Federal
Centralist
Centralist
Centralist
Centralist
Federal
Federal
Federal (Created the United States of
Colombia)
Centralist/Unitary
Unitary/Decentralized

Source: Adapted from Monteoliva & Dangond

The process of convening, drafting, and approving the new constitution was heavily
influenced by the historical context of the country and its violent past. The traditional
political parties were not committed to the process, and new forces (former guerrilla
movements [e.g., M-19], indigenous groups, and other minorities have traditionally been
excluded) did play a significant role in drafting the new document. The process is best
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understood as a series of negotiations among different actors with different political and
negotiating capacities.
“The traditional parties and the political class that represented them in Congress
not only were at the margin of this convulsive process, but were also seen as the ones
responsible for the institutional stagnation that had resulted in the crisis” (Bejarano, 2001;
page 56).
The process of convening the constitutional assembly occurred with traditional
parties playing a marginal role; thus, those traditional political parties (which still
controlled Congress) had no real incentives to implement the new mandates of the
constitution (Bejarano, 2001).
There was high abstention for the election of the Assembly (74%), meaning that
only a minority of Colombians elected those who represented them at the Assembly. Both
traditional parties fared worse than expected, and the biggest surprise was the
representation obtained by the demobilized guerrilla movement, M-19, which obtained
almost 27% of the votes for a total of 19 representatives to the Assembly; indigenous
groups obtained almost 2% of the votes for a total of 2 representatives (plus 2 non-voting
representatives at the Assembly) (See Table 7 below).
Table 7: Votes to the Constitutional Assembly, December 9th, 1990
Political
Party/Movement

Number of
Delegates
25
19

Percentage of
Votes in the
Assembly
35.7
27.1

Percentage
of Total
Vote
31.2
26.7

Liberal Party
Democratic Alliance M19
Movement of National
Salvation

11

15.7

15.5
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Number
of Votes
1,158,344
992,613
574,411

Conservative Party
Independent
Conservatives
Christian Union*
Patriotic Union (UP)
Indigenous Groups
Other Lists
Blank votes
Invalid votes
Total

5
4

7.1
5.7

6.4
5.0

236,794
185,316

2
2
2
0

2.9
2,9
2.9
0.0
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100

3.1
2.5
1.5
6.4
1.1
0.7
100

115,201
95,088
54,226
236,362
37,735
24,467
3,710,557

Source: Adapted from Santos Perez & Ibeas Miguel, 1995
* Coalition of non-Catholic Christians

For the first time in Colombian history, the traditional political parties did not have
control over the future of Colombian politics. The aim was to modernize the political
system and make it more representative. But, the fragmentation of the parties represented
in the Assembly also meant that the Constitution included contradictory articles and too
many “feel good” intentions (Bejarano, 2001; Kugler & Rosenthal, 2005). The low
participation rate also meant that citizens were not fully involved in the decision making
process of the new Constitution.
Nevertheless, the new Constitution was a watershed for Colombian politics and
brought about significant changes in judicial, administrative, and political life, with
important consequences for its governmental organization.
Below are several important changes to the new Constitution (Bejarano, 2001;
Kugler & Rosenthal, 2005; Alesina et al., 2005):
•

A strong impetus for decentralization, which been initiated by former
administrations in the mid-1980s;
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•

It established the popular election of governors and confirmed the popular
election of mayors (first elected in 1986 as a result of Congressional law);

•

It established three mechanisms for fiscal decentralization:
o Situado Fiscal to the Departments (general transfers),
o Transfer of funds for health and education to Departments and
municipalities,
o Transfer of Royalties from the exploitation of natural resources
(Regalias);

•

It established that transfers of national revenues to Departments and
municipalities should increase annually (until reaching 22% of national
revenue by 2002).

The new Constitution dismantled the political restrictions that the National Front
had created and opened up the political system to new political parties and movements;
new mechanisms for citizen participation at the local level were introduced, along with
mechanisms of control and accountability over political power (Bejarano, 2001). The
reforms also impacted how Congress was to be elected. Senators would now be elected at
the national level and not regionally—to undermine the power of traditional, regionallybased political elites. In the House of Representatives, regional electoral districts were
maintained.
In theory, the Constitution increased the power of control of Congress over the
Executive branch (But, in general, Colombia continues to be heavily presidential especially
due to the emergency powers granted to the executive—though limited—and the
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fragmentation and atomization of parties). The greatest innovation in this regard is the
ability of Congress to censure cabinet ministers (Hudson, 2010; Bejarano, 2001).
In regard to political parties, the Constitution eliminated restrictions that in the past
gave dominance to the traditional parties and recognized the right of citizens to create
parties, political movements, and groups without limitations. State financing for political
campaigns was guaranteed, as well as equal access to the State communication media
during elections.
The Constitution also introduced the ability for private citizens to contest legislation
directly with the highest courts in the land. As a result, much legislation is contested and
sometimes overturned on procedural grounds. Overly egalitarian expectations created by
the Constitution contribute to a judicial activism that often overrides Congressional
decisions (Kugler & Rosenthal, 2005).
Some major changes the new Constitution brought were reforms in the judicial
system. It created the Constitutional Court (Corte Constitucional), charged with
interpreting the true meaning of the Constitution and ensuring that legislation passed was
in accordance with the spirit of the document. As a result, much legislation approved by
both the Executive and the Legislative has been rejected by this Court, as well as decisions
made by other courts (including the Supreme Court) (Kugler & Rosenthal, 2005). The
activism of the judiciary as a consequence of these changes has not gone unnoticed or uncriticized.
Articles 275 to 278 of the 1991 Constitution also created the position of the attorney
general or procurator (Procurador General) elected by the Senate to a 4-year term from a
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shortlist presented by the President, the Supreme Court, and the State Council. The attorney
general is charged with:
•

Monitoring compliance with the Constitution, laws, court decisions, and
administrative acts;

•

Protecting human rights with the help of the Ombudsman;

•

Defending the interests of society;

•

Defending the collective interests of Colombians, especially with regard to the
environment;

•

Ensuring the diligent and efficient exercise of administrative functions;

•

Exercising vigilance over the official conduct of those who hold public office,
including elected officials; preferably exercising disciplinary authority;
conducting investigations and imposing the appropriate penalties under the law;

•

Intervening in proceedings before the judicial or administrative authorities,
when necessary, to defend legal order, public property, or individual rights and
fundamental guarantees;

•

Requiring from public officials and individuals necessary information.

To fulfill its duties, the Agency of the Attorney General shall have powers of
judicial police, and may bring such actions as it deems necessary 12. These actions are
closely coordinated with the Ombudsman office (Defensoría del Pueblo), charged mainly
with the defense, promotion, and respect of human rights. At the local level, the local
procurators or Personeros are the entities responsible for exercising administrative control

12

https://c-politica.uniandes.edu.co/oec/index.php?ac=oc&main=5&id=1&dat=25#d1
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in municipalities. It is their responsibility to protect and promote human rights, the public
interest, and monitor the conduct of those who perform public functions in the
municipalities. The Personeros are elected by the Municipal or District Council to 4-year
terms.
One area in which the new Constitution had a major impact was on fiscal
decentralization13. Articles 356 and 357 of the Constitution commit the central government
to a rigid structure of fiscal decentralization, but the document does not have provisions
that obligated subnational governments to be fiscally responsible. Regional governments
can have unbalanced budgets and run fiscal deficits. Criticisms of the fiscal
decentralization model established by the 1991 Constitution include: this rigid structure
has negative affected the central government’s finances; the responsibilities of each level
of government in matters of health and education were not clearly established; and,
municipal governments have been fiscally irresponsible and have not used the funds
efficiently or effectively (Kugler & Rosenthal, 2005; Bejarano, 2001; Alesina, 2005).
Overall, and as stated above, the 1991 Colombian Constitution, despite its
shortcomings, applied significant changes to the political system; the document
represented a fiscal, administrative, and political decentralization model for other unitary
countries around the world.

13

This will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
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Structure of the Colombian State after the 1991 Constitution
Territorially and administratively, Colombia is divided in 32 Departments and
about 1,100 municipalities, and special districts, indigenous entities, and the Capital
District: Bogota (Hudson, 2010). Governors, who were named by the President before the
1991 Constitution, are now directly elected by the people for a 4-year term, and cannot be
immediately reelected. Each Department also has a regional Assembly elected by popular
vote. The main function of a Department is to coordinate and promote local and
Departmental development (Hudson, 2010).
Mayors are elected to 4-year terms and cannot be immediately reelected either.
Each municipality also elects by popular vote the members of the Municipal Assembly
(Municipal Council or Junta) with a minimum of seven members to a maximum of twentyone.
The first popular election of mayors occurred in 1988 after a 1986 Law of Congress
was passed. The 1991 Constitution confirmed their right to be directly elected by the
people. In the 1994 general election, the first governors were directly elected.
As is the case in many Latin American countries, the responsibilities of the different
levels of government are established by the Constitution and the legal framework that
derives from it. In the case of Colombia, the national government concentrates great power
and functions. Subnational levels of governments (e.g., Departmental governments) have
less clearly defined roles and responsibilities and their administrative responsibilities are
usually defined as “coordination and collaboration” with national and local authorities.
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Local governments have more autonomy and various administrative responsibilities (see
Table 8 below).

Table 8: Organization of the Colombian State – Powers by Level of Government
Legislative Authority
(With the capacity to
enact and propose laws)

National Level

Departmental
Level

- The National Congress
(two chambers, Deputies
and Senators) – only one
that can approve laws.
With capacity to present
law proposals to
Congress:
- The Government
through the respective
Ministry
- The Constitutional
Court
- The Supreme Court
- The State Council
- The Superior Council of
the Judiciary
- The National Electoral
Council
- The Attorney General's
Office
- The Comptroller
General of the Republic
- The Ombudsman
- Thirty percent of the
councilors or deputies
elected in the country
- Citizens representing at
least 5% of registered
voters
- No decentralized
legislative authority
- Deputies are elected by
direct vote of inhabitants
of each Department for
national congress

Administrative
Authority
(With the capacity to
enact and enforce
administrative
regulations, impose
administrative sanctions,
etc.)
Executive Power (the
President of the republic,
the Vice-President,
assisted by Ministers)

Judicial Authority (With
capacity to resolve and
decide conflicts, impose
sentences, and are of
universal enforcement)

Judicial Power (Supreme
Court, Tribunals,
Constitutional Court, and
Judges)

Constitutional Court
Attorney General

- Governors are the
executive power at the
Departmental level
- Departmental Councils
enact administrative rules
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- There is no
decentralization of judicial
activities
- There are judicial districts
with regional judges and
tribunals but are dependent

Municipal
Level

- Departmental
Assemblies enact
administrative or
regulatory ordinances but
do not enact laws in the
formal sense
- Municipalities have
Councils, can only enact
administrative or
regulatory ordinances at
the local level

on the National Judicial
system
- Judicial districts do not
necessarily match
Departmental limits

- Mayors are the head of
- Local judges of the
the executive at the local
misdemeanors courts are not
level
member of the Judicial
- Municipal Councils
branch and can only impose
enact administrative
administrative sanctions
regulations
- Misdemeanor courts
impose administrative
sanctions only
Source: Author based on Hudson (2010) and Government of Colombia web resources

Departmental Governments in Colombia
Colombia has 32 Departments—that vary greatly in population, geography, and
natural resources—divided among the Andean region (most populated, with approximately
30 million inhabitants), the Atlantic (5 million inhabitants) and Pacific (1 million
inhabitants) regions, and the Orinoco and Amazon regions with 800,000 and 700,000
inhabitants respectively14.
Socio-economic disparities between Departments is clearly observable via
differences in the Human Development Index (HDI), according to information published
by the National Planning Department (See Table 9 below). Advances in these indicators
are not homogeneous; on the contrary, considerable social, demographic and economic
differences between Departments are present. In 2007, of the 23 most populous
Departments, only the Departments of Cundinamarca, Atlántico, Antioquia, Valle and
Santander, in addition to Bogotá—the capital city and a special district—presented an HDI

14

Sistema Uno, based on 2005 Census
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above the national average (0.78). The Departments with lower values for this indicator
were Cauca, Nariño, Sucre, Caqueta and Choco (0.67) (Grajales & Cardona, 2011).
Table 9: Human Development Index by Department (2005)
Department

HDI

Choco

0.67

Nariño

0.72

Caqueta

0.73

Cauca

0.73

Sucre

0.73

Magdalena

0.74

Norte de Santander

0.74

Cordoba

0.75

Boyaca

0.76

Cesar

0.76

Meta

0.76

Quindio

0.76

Tolima

0.76

Bolivar

0.77

Caldas

0.77

Huila

0.77

Risaralda

0.77

La Guajira

0.78
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Anitoquia

0.79

Atlantico

0.79

Cundinamarca

0.79

Valle del Cauca

0.79

Santander

0.80

Bogota, DC

0.83

Total for the country

0.78

Source: Adapted from Grajales and Cardona (2011)

Departments have autonomy in managing their affairs and in planning and
promoting economic and social development within their territory and, under Article 298
of the Constitution, they can exercise administrative functions of coordination and
complementarity with municipal governments. They play an intermediary role between the
national government and municipalities and are in charge of the provision of services as
determined by the Constitution and laws15.
Departmental governments are (according to the 1986 Decree Law 1222) charged
with:
1.

Participating in the development of national plans and programs for
economic and social development, for public works, and for coordinating
their execution in their territories;

15

http://portalterritorial.gov.co/apc-aafiles/7515a587f637c2c66d45f01f9c4f315c/1_Guia%20Elementos%20web.pdf
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2.

Fulfilling the responsibilities of providing national services, or
coordinating their implementation and fulfillment, in accordance with
conditions/requirements set by a delegation, contract, or agreement;

3.

Promoting and implementing, in compliance with the respective national
and Departmental plans, economic activities integral to Department
development and to the welfare of Department inhabitants;

4.

Providing technical, administrative, and financial assistance to
municipalities, promoting their development and the welfare of
Department inhabitants;

5.

Exercising control over municipalities as indicated by the legislation;

6.

Cooperating with the competent authorities in the execution of tasks
necessary for the conservation of the environment and the proper
preservation of natural resources;

7.

Performing other administrative functions and provision of services that
the Constitution and the laws establish.

Departments in Colombia are categorized by the level of own revenue collected and
by population (Article 302 of the Constitution). The Department’s ability to provide
services (as delegated and/or decentralized from the central government), in many
instances, depends on their category (i.e., Departments with less population and less
capacity to collect their own revenues are less able to provide such services). The table
below (Table 10) shows the different categories of Departments, as established by Law
617/2000.
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Table 10: Departmental Categories
Category
Special
First
Second
Third
Fourth

Population (inhabitants)
More than or equal to 2,000,000
Between 700,001 and 2,000,000
Between 390,001 and 700,000
Between 100,001 and 390,000
Less than or equal to 100,000

ICLD*
More than 600,000 SMLM**
Between 170,001 to 600,000 SMLM
Between 122,001 and 170,000 SMLM
Between 60,001 and 122,000 SMLM
Less than or equal to 60,000 SMLM

*ICLD: current revenues, regularly collected (transfers excluded) (acronym for its Spanish name: Ingresos
Corrientes de Libre Destinación)
** SMLM: Legal minimum monthly wages (acronym for its Spanish name: Salarios Mínimos Legales
Mensuales)
Source: Author based on Elementos Básicos del Estado Colombiano

As mentioned above, governors are elected directly by the people to 4-year terms
and cannot be immediately reelected. The governors, who are also agents of the national
government, direct and coordinate the provision of national services under the conditions,
and according to the delegation, given by the President of the Republic (Article 181 of the
Constitution). The President, in cases prescribed by law, is responsible for dismissing the
governors.
Their responsibilities, as noted in the 1991 Constitution, include:
1.

To comply with, and enforce, the Constitution, laws, decrees of the
governor, and the ordinances of the Departmental assemblies;

2.

To direct and coordinate the administrative action of the Department and
act as manager and promoter of the comprehensive development of the
territory in accordance with the Constitution and laws;

3.

To direct and coordinate national services in the conditions of delegation
conferred by the Executive power;
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4.

To provide, in a timely manner, to the Departmental Assembly the draft
ordinances of plans and programs of economic and social development,
public works, and annual budget of revenues and expenditures;

5.

To freely appoint and remove managers or directors of public institutions
and industrial or commercial enterprises of the Department.

6.

To encourage, in coordination with the elected deputies, the social and
economic development of the region;

7.

To create, eliminate, and merge jobs within the Departmental
administration and establish their functions.

8.

To remove or merge Departmental entities in accordance with the
ordinances;

9.

To

object—on

grounds

of

unconstitutionality,

illegality

or

inconvenience—draft ordinances, or sanction and promulgate them;
10.

To review the acts of the municipal councils and mayors and, on grounds
of unconstitutionality or illegality, forward them to the competent court
to decide on validity;

11.

To ensure the accurate collection of Departmental revenues, of the
decentralized entities, and of those which are subject to transfer to the
national authorities;

12.

To call for special sessions of the Departmental Assembly in which only
the issues and materials for which it was summoned can be dealt with;

13.

Exercise the administrative functions delegated by the President and all
other matters as established by the Constitution and the laws.
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Departmental Assemblies or Councils (Asambleas Departamentales) are in charge
of controlling the Department’s administration (to ensure transparency and that no excesses
are committed by the administration). Councils are elected by the people (also for four year
terms) and have budgetary and administrative authority. They must have no less than 11
members and no more than 31 (Article 299 of the Constitution). Assemblies also prepare,
debate, present, and approve Departmental ordinances aimed at improving the living
conditions of the Department and promote its development.The general functions of the
Departmental Assemblies include:
1.

To regulate the performance of responsibilities, and the provision of
services, by the Department;

2.

To regulate—in coordination with the municipalities—sport, education,
and health programs under the terms established by law;

3.

To issue provisions related to planning, economic and social
development, and financial and credit support to municipalities, as well
as provisions related to tourism, transportation, environment, public
works, roads and the development of its border areas;

4.

To request reports on the exercise of functions from the Comptroller
General of the Department, as well as from secretaries of state, heads of
administrative Departments, and from the directors of decentralized
agencies present in the territory;

5.

To

adopt

development

plans

and

implementation, and ensure compliance;
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programs,

promote

their

6.

To propose motions of censure to administrative secretaries and high
Departmental government officials for malpractice in the performance of
their duties or for unresponsiveness to Assemblies’ requests for
information;

7.

To establish taxes and contributions necessary for the performance of
Departmental functions16;

8.

To approve the Departmental budget and issue the necessary ordinances
to ensure its approval;

9.

To create and abolish municipalities, organize municipal territories, and
organize provinces;

10.

To determine the structure of the Departmental administration, the
functions of their offices, pay scales, creating public facilities and
industrial and commercial enterprises and approve the formation of
mixed companies;

11.

To perform other functions determined by the Constitution and the law;

As this brief description of Departmental governments in Colombia shows, the
intermediate level of government has not been given a specific set of responsibilities by
the Constitution; only by subsequent legislation have Departments been given shared
responsibilities with municipalities (e.g., health, education, infrastructure, and the
promotion of sports and tourism). But the laws are vague and confusion and duplication

16

In fact, this prerogative was curtailed by the Constitutional Court, which ruled that only the national
Congress can create new taxes.
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of efforts are common. The laws are clear, though, in the cases where municipalities do
not meet the national government’s minimum requirements to provide basic services
(especially in health and education). When conditions are met, municipalities are
“certified.”
In cases where the municipality is not certified, the law requires that services be
provided by the Departmental government. This provision has created conflict and tension
between local and Departmental authorities as the funding is still transferred to the local
government, and the funds must then be made available to the Department. The autonomy
of governors is also curtailed by their dual role as both representatives of the people who
directly elected them and “agents of the President” in the territory.
Fiscal decentralization has been a major component of Colombia’s decentralization
process. The next section will briefly describe the structure of municipal governments and
their roles and competencies—to then examine fiscal decentralization at the subnational
level.

Municipal Governments in Colombia
Across Latin America, municipal governments date back to the era of Spanish
colonialism and have always played an important role in the structure of the State and in
local development. Colombia’s case is not different, and local authorities have always
played a significant role in the political, social, and economic life of the country.
With almost 1,100 municipalities, Colombia’s municipal governments are diverse
in natural resources, population, extension, and levels of development. For example, the
municipality of Cumaribo in the Department of Vichada comprises over 66,000 square
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kilometers and has a total population of just 28,800 (2005), and the municipality of
Sabaneta in the Department of Antioquia comprises just 15 square km and has 44,800
inhabitants (2005). Very large and complex urban areas characterize Colombian
municipalities like the capital city of Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Cartagena, Barranquilla—all
urban areas with well over 1 million inhabitants17.
The 1991 Constitution reaffirmed the administrative, political, and fiscal autonomy
of local governments. It upheld the direct popular election of mayors and councilmembers
established by law in 1986 for four year terms without possibility of immediate reelection.
As is the case with Departments, municipal governments in Colombia are divided
into seven categories, which are used to establish the mayors’ salaries and to establish
limits on the operating costs of local governments. The categories are based on the local
governments’ population, their fiscal and administrative capacity, and current revenue
capacity (transfers not included). The municipalities in the last three categories of Table
11, below, tend to be the poorest and possess the least administrative capacity. As of 2007,
89% of Colombia’s 1,098 municipalities belonged to category six18.
Table 11: Local Governments Categories
Category Population
(inhabitants)
More than or equal to
Special
500,001
Between 100,001 and
First
500,000
Between 50,001 and
Second
100,000

ICLD*

Number of
Municipalities***

More than or equal to 400,000
SMLM
Between 100,000 and 400,000
SMLM
Between 50,000 and 100,000
SMLM

17

5
17
17

http://www.semana.com/especiales/los-10-mas/asi-somos/ciudades-mas-pobladas-colombia.html and
National Department of Statistics (DANE).
18 http://www.portalterritorial.gov.co/preguntas.shtml?apc=r-caqueta;x;x;x1-&x=80241 accessed on
9/28/2015
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Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth

Between 30,001 and
50,000
Between 20,001 and
30,000
Between 10,001 and
20,000
Less than or equal to
10,000

Between 30,000 and 50,000
SMLM
Between 25,000 and 30,000
SMLM
Between 15,000 and 25,000
SMLM
Less than or equal to 15,000
SMLM

19
19
31
990

*ICLD: current revenues, regularly collected (transfers excluded) (acronym for its Spanish name: Ingresos
Corrientes de Libre Destinación)
** SMLM: Legal minimum monthly wages (acronym for its Spanish name: Salarios Mínimos Legales
Mensuales)
*** As of 2007 (source www.portalterritorial.gov.co)
Source: Author based on Elementos Básicos del Estado Colombiano and government sources

The 1991 Colombian Constitution establishes the responsibilities and powers of
local governments to be:
1. Manage municipal affairs and the provision of public services as determined by
law;
2. Promote the economic and social improvement of the inhabitants of the
respective municipality;
3. Organize the development of the territory and build the infrastructure required
for municipal progress;
4. Address the unmet needs of health, education, sanitation, drinking water, public
services, housing, recreation and sport, with particular emphasis on children,
women, the elderly and disabled sectors, directly and in collaboration,
complementarity, and coordination with the Departmental governments and the
national government, under the terms defined by the law;
5. Plan the economic, social, and environmental development of the territory, in
accordance with the law and in coordination with other entities;
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6. Promote community participation, as well as the social and cultural wellbeing
of the people;
7. Ensure the responsible use of natural resources of the municipality and proper
management;
8. Other activities, as indicated in the Constitution and by the laws19.

Aside from this broad and somewhat vague list of powers and responsibilities of
municipal governments, established by the 1991 Constitution (Article 311), subsequent
legislation has sought to better define and clarify the attributions of local governments.
Since 1991 to 2010, a broad number of laws were approved in this regard, including20:
-

Laws 715 of 2001 and 1176 of 2007 (health, education, drinking water, basic
sanitation and other sectors);
Law 100 of 1993 (health);
Law 115 of 1994 (education);
Law 181 of 1995 (sports and recreation);
Law 397 of 1997 (culture);
Law 01 of 1991, Law 105 of 1993, Law 336 of 1996 (infrastructure and
transport);
Law 99 of 1993 (environment);
Law 142 of 1994 (public services);
Laws 3 of 1991, Law 400 of 1997, Law 38 of 1997, Law 546 of 1999, Law
708 of 2002 (housing)

Colombia’s decentralization legal framework not only establishes that municipal
governments must coordinate and collaborate with Departments in the provision of services
(in particular health and education), but also clearly states that Departmental governments

19

Elementos Básicos del Estado Colombiano, 2011

20

There is also an important number of Decrees and Regulations that further define the roles of
municipalities and Departments in the provision of these services.
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must provide these services when municipalities do not meet minimum criteria in service
provision.
The constitutional authorities of local governments are the mayor and the municipal
councils (all elected directly by the people). Based on Article 315 of the Constitution, some
of the main responsibilities of the mayors include:
1.

To comply with and enforce the Constitution, the Law, the National
Government decrees, and ordinances and agreements of the Municipal Council;

2.

To keep the public order in the municipality, in accordance with the law and
the instructions and orders given by the President of the Republic and the
respective governor;

3.

To direct the administrative action of the municipality; ensure compliance with
the functions and the provision of services in charge; legally represent the
municipality in and out of court;

4.

To eliminate or merge municipal entities and in accordance with respective
agreements;

5.

To present to the Council, in a timely fashion, the draft agreement on plans and
programs of economic and social development, public works, annual budget of
revenues and expenditures and others deemed appropriate for the smooth
running of the municipality;

6.

To sanction and promulgate the agreements that the Council has adopted and
object to those it considers inappropriate or contrary to law;
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7.

To create, delete, or merge the jobs of its dependencies, define their roles, and
establish their remuneration in accordance with relevant agreements;

8.

To collaborate with the Council for the proper performance of their duties;

9.

To organize municipal expenditures in accordance with the local investment
plan and budget;

10.

To execute other activities that the Constitution and the law stipulate.

Each municipality also has a municipal Council or Asamblea o Consejo with a
minimum of 7 members and maximum of 2121, based on population size (Law 136 of
1994). Councils are autonomous in terms of administration and budgets, and they exercise
political control over the municipal administration.
The laws and the Constitution establish the following duties of municipal councils:
1. To regulate the functions and efficient delivery of services by the municipality;
2. To adopt the social development, economic, and public works plans and
programs;
3. To authorize the mayor to enter into contracts and temporarily exercise functions
that correspond to the Council;
4. To vote, in accordance with the Constitution and the law, the fees and expenses of
the municipality;
5. To approve the annual budget of revenues and expenditures;

21

The capital city of Bogota’s Council has 45 members, but a different legislation applies to Bogota.
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6. To divide municipalities into comunas (for urban areas) and corregimientos (for
rural areas) to improve service delivery and ensure participation of citizens in
managing local public affairs;
7. To regulate land use and oversee planning and zoning and all other activities
related to the construction and sale of residential properties;
8. To determine the structure of the municipal administration, the functions of their
offices, and pay scales and create public facilities and industrial and commercial
enterprises and approve the formation of mixed companies;
9. To elect the ombudsman (personero) for the period prescribed by law, and such
other officers as the law may determine;
10. To issue the necessary rules for the control, preservation, and protection of the
ecological and cultural heritage of the municipality;
11. To propose a motion of censure with respect to the Secretaries of the Office of the
Mayor for issues related to the performance of their duties;
12. To perform other functions determined by the Constitution and the law.

In the Colombian local government system, municipal councils have played an
important overseeing role and their relations with mayors have not always been cooperative
and collaborative. In fact, interviews with mayors indicate their frustration at Councils that
overstep their responsibility and become obstructionist. Councilmembers complain that
many mayors do not respect the council and that mayors tend to centralize all activities in
the mayor’s office.
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Another important characteristic of the Colombian subregional level of government—
aimed at increasing accountability and citizen participation—are Laws 131 and 134 of
1994, which made it possible to remove ineffective or incompetent mayors and governors
from office by popular vote (revocatoria de mandato)22.
Finally, the local level in Colombia includes special districts—those local governments
that, due to their size and level of development, require special legislation (Articles 322
and 238 of the Constitution). Special districts combine the fiscal, administrative, and
political responsibilities of governors and mayors, and their legal framework is especially
defined by applicable laws. Presently, there are five Special Districts in Colombia: the
Capital District of Bogota; the Tourist and Cultural District of Cartagena de Indias; the
Tourist, Cultural, and Historic District of Santa Marta; the Special Industrial and Port
District of Barranquilla; and the Special Industrial, Port, Biodiversity and Ecotourism
District of Buenaventura.
The next section will describe the very significant and far reaching fiscal
decentralization reforms introduced by the new Constitution, and what these reforms meant
for the provision of services, especially health and education.

22

Very few revocatorias have been successful, partly because the requirements to be met by the proponents
are complicated and difficult to achieve, but also the law requires that on the day of the vote, 55% of those
registered must participate. From 1996 to 2014 a total of 47 applications for recalls were voted in the polls,
but none of them prospered and leaders continued in office. (http://www.registraduria.gov.co/-Revocatoriadel-mandato,615-.html and http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-6158688).
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Fiscal Decentralization in Colombia: Departmental and Municipal Finances
Contrary to other countries where political and administrative decentralization
came first, Colombia’s decentralization began with fiscal issues. The constitutional reform
of 1968 established a mechanism to transfer funds to Departments for health and education.
The 1991 Constitution redefined the roles and functions of Departments and
municipalities and established a completely new transfer system, which was implemented
by law in 1993 (Acosta, 2003). The 1968 situado fiscal (portion of revenues transferred
from the central government to local and Departmental governments) was increased from
15% to 23%, then nearly to 25% by 1996. These funds were earmarked for education (60%)
and health (20%), with the remaining 20% standing as discretionary funds. Another source
of revenue for municipalities came from the Municipal Participation Fund, although the
transfer system was regarded as complicated and rigid. Those funds were to be spent on
education (30%), health (25%), water and projects (20%), and 25% on other social projects
(Alesina et al. 2000). Finally, a portion of royalties from oil and coal production was
allotted to municipalities.
Regarding fiscal decentralization, the Constitutions states:
1- Article 356 established that the central government retains control of revenue
collection and taxation but is mandated to transfer significant amounts to
subnational governments.
2- The goal of decentralization is to make public service delivery, in particular health
and education, more efficient. Funds are strictly earmarked, and local and
Departmental governments have little influence on how those funds are to be spent.
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3- Article 364 established that local governments should not spend beyond “their
means” but language is otherwise vague. (This provision immediately created
concerns about the fiscal responsibility of local governments).

Departments collect taxes on liquor, beer, and tobacco consumption representing about
70% of their total own raised revenues. Another 20% is collected from taxes on motor
vehicles, and 10% are small taxes. But governors are in a difficult position as they do not
have clear roles and responsibilities. The 1991 Constitution did not solve this issue and
they still have few functions and few independent revenue sources (Acosta & Bird, 2003).
The main source of municipalities own revenues are property, industry, and commerce
taxes. About 35% of their revenues come from property taxes, 38% from taxes on industry
and commerce (taxes on gross receipts), and 13% from gas surcharge; the remaining 14%
of their revenue comes from other fees (Acosta & Bird, 2003).
Nationally, about 80% of taxes are collected by the national government, and the other
20% by subregional governments. The national government transfers about 25% of
collected revenue to Departments, and 60% of the funds must be spent on education while
20% must be spent on health.
Overall, the transfers between 1993 and 2001 were divided in three categories (Alesina
et al., 2000):
1. The Situado Fiscal (the percentage of current revenues that the national government
transfers to subregional governments—about 25%) is transferred to all
Departments, local governments, and the special districts according to very specific
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and complex formulas (with 4 components in the case of Departments, and 10
components in the case of municipalities);
2. The Municipal Participation Fund that originates from the Value Added Tax
(VAT), which has risen from 12.2% in 1990 to 22% in 2001;
3. The transfer of royalties, which are collected by the central government and paid
by the mineral extracting companies (mostly oil and coal). This is regulated by
different laws, which implement Articles 360 and 361 of the Constitution. The
royalties revenues were originally divided as follows:
a. 47.5% is transferred to the mineral producing Departments;
b. 12.5% is transferred to the producing municipalities;
c. 8% is transferred to municipalities where exporting ports operate;
d. 32% is transferred to the National Royalties Fund.23
Between 2007 and 2011, and according to the National Department of Planning (NDP),
201 municipalities concentrated 90% of the royalties transferred, and 80% of the royalties
benefitted just 17% of the country’s population. In the producing Departments, during the
same time period, the total transferred per person was $280,000 pesos; in contrast, nonproducing Departments received only $35,000 pesos per person (NDP, 2012). In time, new
legislation was introduced to reduce these imbalances.24

23

The National Royalties Fund is in charge of transferring funds to those Departments and municipalities
that do not receive those funds directly (non-producing Departments/municipalities). The Fund was created
by the 1991 Constitution and its implementation and regulations can be found on Laws 141 of 1994, and Law
756 of 2002.
24

In 2012, major reforms were introduced to the National Royalties Fund diminishing the transfers to
producing Departments and municipalities, and increasing them to all other Departments and municipalities
with the aim of making the system more equitable.
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In the case of municipal governments, a formula for national transfers has been
established by the National Department of Planning, in charge of implementing
decentralization, and is as follows (Jaramillo, 2004):
-

40% according to poor population

-

20% accounting for the relative poverty level

-

22% according to total population

-

6% based on fiscal efficiency

-

6% based on administrative efficiency

-

6% based on advances on quality of life

Regarding fiscal efficiency, the National Planning Department requires yearly
reports from all local governments on their executed budget.
Local governments are required by law to spend the transfers as follows:
-

30% for education

-

25% on health (15% has to be for the subsidized plans)

-

20% for water and sewage

-

5% for recreation, sports, and culture (at least 2% on culture)

-

20% for other projects such as electricity, municipal equipment, community
development projects, and debt payment for capital projects such as roads
(Jaramillo, 2004).

The use of revenues by subnational governments is very rigid and centrally
mandated (Alesina et al., 2005). Overall, about 80% of all transfers are earmarked for
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health and education. But, there is confusion surrounding the responsibilities in those areas
between the three levels of government. The interaction of the different levels of
government is not clear or transparent, and many contradicting rules add to the confusion.
In the end, the central government retains much control and responsibility over health,
education, and the provision of other social services.
The rigidity of the fiscal transfers and the lack of clear intergovernmental rules, too
many contradictory policies, and the emphasis on health and education expenditures, has
left Departments and municipalities with very little revenue expenditure and collection
autonomy (Alesina et al., 2005; Acosta & Bird, 2003), making them very dependent on
central government transfers, and “acting against the emergence of accountable and
responsible local governments” (page 36).
The 1991 Constitution had established that in order for subnational governments to
fulfill their new roles, the financial mechanisms also needed to be in place (Articles 356
and 357). The Constitution defined two mechanisms for financing: the abovementioned
situado fiscal (the resources from the central government transferred to Departments and
municipalities and earmarked for health and education); and the municipal transfers (or
participaciones municipales) to be used for specific purposes in health, education, and
water and sewage (Bonet et al., 2014).
The distribution of these resources was regulated by Law 60 of 1993 and
established a fixed percentage tied to the national current account revenue (Ingresos
Corrientes de la Nacion). For the situado fiscal, the law envisioned that for 1994, 1995,
and 1996 it would be 23%, 23.5%, and 24%, respectively. From 1997 onward, the
percentage was to be 24.5%.
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By 1997, the central government’s deficit was growing considerably due to a
decline in the nation’s GDP and a serious downturn of the economy. A series of reports
concluded that the “principle cause of this deficit was the growth in transfers” (Acosta,
2003). Controlling macroeconomic stability became a central issue for the national
government and measures were taken to cap transfers to subregional governments as well
as more restrictions on how funds could be spent, including how much elected and
appointed officials could be paid (Restrepo, 2006).
In 2001, the national government modified for the first time—and transitionally—
the transfer system, de-linking it from the national current account revenue of the country
(Law 715). In this reform, transfers would increase according to the inflation rate plus a
2% increase for the years 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005; and a plus of 2.5% for the years
2006, 2006, and 2008 (Bonet et al., 2014; Zapata, 2010; Restrepo, 2006).
Law 715 also created the General Sharing System (SGP—reflecting Spanish
terminology: Sistema General de Participaciones). The SGP consolidated in one fund what
was previously known as the situado fiscal and the municipal fund (Bonet, et al.,2014).
The percentages earmarked for education and health were changed to 58.5% and 24.5%
respectively, and 17% was intended for general purposes including water and sanitation,
culture, sports, and recreational activities. An important change was also introduced with
Law 715: instead of first establishing a percentage that then would be distributed to
subnational governments and subsequently assigned by the policy sector as previously
required (Law 60 of 1993), the new normative first established the percentage, per policy
sector, that would then be distributed to subnational governments (Bonet, et al.,2014).
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In 2007, again by an act of Congress (Law 1176), the percentages for the SGP were
redefined and the de-linkage from the national current account revenue was made
permanent. This new modification again established that the rate of increase would be tied
to inflation rates plus 4% for the years 2008 and 2009; 3.5% for the year 2010; and 3%
between 2011 and 2016 (Zapata, 2010). Another modification introduced by this law was
to separate the provision of water and basic sanitation from the general purpose fund (now
11.6% from 17%), establishing a distinct percentage (5.4%) (Bonet et al., 2014).
Critics of these reforms—including the Colombian Federation of Municipalities—
consider these two laws a setback for the decentralization process, as the central
government curtails their fiscal autonomy and restricts their funding.
This complex fiscal decentralization legal framework can be visualized in Table 12
below, and shows the active legislative agenda and the central government’s concern for
balancing the fiscal decentralization required by the Constitution with the need for
macroeconomic fiscal stability—a major preoccupation for Colombian central government
authorities.

Table 12: Fiscal Decentralization Legal Framework – Major Changes

Type of
Distribution
per
Destination

Political Constitution
(Articles 356 & 357)
Law 60 of 1993
Situado Fiscal:
Departments, capital
district, and special
districts of Cartagena
and Santa Marta

Legislative Act
01/2001
Law 715/2001
General Sharing
System (SGP):
Municipalities and
Departments

Municipal Participation:
Municipalities
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Legislative Act 4/2007
Law 1176/2007
General Sharing System
(SGP): Municipalities and
Departments

Growth of
Transfers

The Situado Fiscal was
calculated as a
percentage of ICN*:
1994 (23%), 1995
(23.5%), 1996 onward
(24.5%)
Municipal Participation:
for investment in social
areas as percentage of
ICN: 1994 (15%),
between 1995 and 2001
(1% point until reaching
22%)

Minimum
allocations
by sector

Distribution
Mechanism

Criteria for
Resource
Distribution

Situado Fiscal:
- Education: 60%
- Health: 20%
- Education & health
(other sources): 20%
Municipal Participation:
- Education: 30%
- Health: 25%
- Water & Sanitation:
20%
- Sports, Recreation,
Culture, and Free
time: 5%
- Investment (not
earmarked): 20%
Geographical
distribution first to
Departments and
municipalities, and after
by policy area
(education and health)
Situado Fiscal:
- 15% equally for
Departments, capital
city, special districts
- 85% according to
number of people
actually receiving
services, and
proportion of people
who need services.

Growth of SGP: 20022005: inflation + 2%;
2006-2008: inflation +
2.5%
From 2009: percentage
average of the ICNs of
the previous 4 years.
It was established that
every 5 years, and as
an initiative of
Congress, the amounts
could be revised as
well as the distribution
criteria.
Education: 58.5%

Growth of SGP: 20082009: inflation + 4%;
2010: inflation + 3.5%;
2011-2016: inflation +
3%. 2017 onward:
percentage average of the
ICNs of the previous 4
years.
Education sector: 20082009: inflation + 5.3%;
2010: inflation + 5.1%;
2011-2016: inflation +
4.8%
Education: 58.5%

Health: 24.5%

Health: 24.5%

General Purposes:
17%

Water & Basic Sanitation:
11.6%
General Purposes: 5.4%

Policy areas first
(education, health,
others) and
subsequently by
geographical areas
(Departments and
Municipalities)
Education Sector:
- per population
served
- per population in
need of services
- per equity
Health Sector:
- per population in
need
- per equity
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Policy areas first
(education, health, others)
and subsequently by
geographical areas
(Departments and
Municipalities)
Education Sector:
- per population served
- per population in need of
services
- per equity
Health Sector:
- per population in need
- per equity
- per administrative
efficiency

Municipal Participation:
- 40% per population
- 20% proportional to
municipality’s
poverty rates
compared to national
rate
- 22% according
population share in
the national total
- 6% proportional to
fiscal efficiency
- 6% for administrative
efficiency**
- 6% for improvements
in quality of life
Follow up
Mechanisms
and
Resource
Control

Poor control and
oversight in the use of
resources

- per administrative
efficiency
General Purposes:
- per relative poverty
- per urban & rural
population
- per fiscal efficiency
- per administrative
efficiency

Poor control and
oversight in the use of
resources

Water & Basic Sanitation:
- coverage deficit
- population served
- effort in extending
coverage
- poverty levels
- adherence to
administrative and fiscal
efficiency
General Purposes:
- per relative poverty
- per urban & rural
population
- per fiscal efficiency
per administrative
Monitoring, reporting,
follow up, and control of
the resources in place
(Decree 028 of 2008)

*ICN: Ingresos Corrientes de la Nacion (national current account revenue)
** measured as the lower administrative cost per capita in the delivery of public services
Source: adapted from Bonet et al., 2014

Local and Departmental governments in Colombia rely heavily on the transfers
from the central government. Between 2002 and 2008, the total transfers and royalties from
the central government to local and Departmental governments clearly surpassed what
these governments were able to collect on their own (Table13 below).

Table 13: Main Sources of Revenues for Subnational Governments
(2002 – 2008, million thousands)
2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

7,109

8,395

9,443

10,441

11,834

11389

11,673

5,190
1,255
7,774
803
15,023

5,896
1,722
9,788
910
18,317

6,547
2,187
10,354
960
20,049

7,205
2,488
11,063
969
21,752

8,424
2,607
11,444
1,261
23,736

8,675
1,914
11,981
1,333
23,903

9,007
1,771
13,320
1,787
25,886

Municipalities
Current
Income
Taxes
Non taxes
Transfers
Royalties
Totals

90

Departments
Current
Income
Taxes
Non Taxes
Transfers
Royalties
Totals

3,333

3,789

4,629

5,214

4,695

5,011

4,782

3,044
219
6,954
1,243
11,461

3,245
480
6,021
1,488
11,233

3,450
930
7,303
1,384
13,067

4,016
941
7,286
1,663
13,908

3,963
826
7,730
1,802
14,328

4,167
966
7,666
1,953
14,753

4,078
799
7,726
2,132
14,735

10,441

12,184

14,072

15,656

16,529

16,400

16,456

3.20
14,728

3.51
15,809

3.77
17,658

3.92
18,349

3.79
19,173

3.53
19,648

3.44
21,046

4.51

4.55

4.74

4.60

4.40

4.23

4.40

2,047

2,398

2,343

2,632

3,063

3,287

3,919

0.63

0.69

0.63

0.66

0.70

0.71

0.82

26,484

29,550

33,116

35,633

38,056

38,656

40,621

8.12

8.51

8.88

8.93

8.72

8.31

8.49

Consolidated
Subregional
Govs.
Current
Income
% of GDP
Transfers
As % of
GDP
Royalties
As % of
GDP
Total
Income
As % of
GDP
Source: Adapted from Zapata, 2010

Municipalities have different capabilities to collect their own taxes and some have
serious fiscal deficiencies. Zapata (2010) argues that in the 1990s, municipalities with over
50,000 people (municipal categories 1 and 2) increased their capacity to collect property
taxes, as well as other taxes and fees. On the other hand, those municipalities with between
20,000 to 50,000 inhabitants (municipal categories 3 and 4) were able to increase their
collection beginning in the 2000s. The vast majority of Colombian municipalities, though,
continue to have serious problems collecting their own revenues, and are dependent on
transfers from the central government (see Table 14 below).
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Table 14: Revenue Source of Municipal Governments, 2000 – 2012 (percentage)
Tax
Revenue
Non tax
Revenue
Transfers
Royalties
Others

2002

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

28

32

28

29

30

29

30

32

30

31

31

32

32

6

6

7

8

10

10

9

7

6

5

5

6

7

45
4
17

43
5
15

46
4
15

52
4
6

51
4
4

48
4
8

44
5
11

47
5
8

47
6
11

48
5
11

50
5
9

45
7
10

50
3
8

Source: adapted from Bonet et al., 2014

Table 15: Revenue Source of Departmental Governments, 2000 – 2012 (percentage)
Tax
Revenue
Non tax
Revenue
Transfers
Royalties
Others

2002

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

25

23

25

27

25

27

27

28

26

26

26

25

25

8

7

2

4

7

6

5

6

4

6

6

6

7

48
12
8

53
11
6

57
10
6

51
12
6

54
10
4

50
11
6

52
13
3

51
12
4

49
16
5

50
13
5

49
15
4

47
16
6

48
12
8

Source: adapted from Bonet et al., 2014
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Departments continue to be very dependent on liquor and cigarette taxes and lottery
ticket sales. Departments, contrary to municipal governments, do not have the autonomy
to create new fees or to modify those they already collect; thus, they have less flexibility
and the royalties transfers have become a very substantial source of revenue (see Table 15
above).
Overall, and during the first ten years since the approval of the 1991 Constitution
and the enactment of Law 60 of 1993, the resources transferred from the central
government to the subnational governments increased by almost 2 percentage points of
GDP, from 3.5% to 5.4% between 1993 and 2001 (Bonet et al., 2014). Since the approval
of Law 715 in 2001, though the transfers have continued to increase, the amount—as
percentage of GDP—has declined to 4.8% in 2002, then again to 3.8% in 2012 (Bonet et
al., 2014). The principal reason for this is that the central government has increased its
revenue with a booming economy and a reformed tax system that allows the central
government to collect more. Meanwhile, transfers to subnational governments are no
longer tied to the national current account revenues.
Fiscal decentralization in Colombia has been a long and difficult process with many
adjustments due to the need to ensure the economic macro stability of the country. Large
amounts of resources have been transferred to subnational levels of government especially
earmarked for the provision of mostly education and health services, but the relationship
between Departments, municipalities, and the central government continues to be difficult.
Duplication of efforts, certification-requirements to provide services, and the multiple legal
requirements and bureaucratic complexities add to the tensions and distrust between the
three levels of government.
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What is clear is that the principal source of revenues for Colombia’s subnational
levels of government continue to be the transfers from the central government (SGP) and
the royalties25. Although both Departments and municipalities have increased their own
revenue collection capacity, this heavy dependence on national transfers makes them
dependent on—and weakens their negotiating capacity with—the central authorities.

Other Institutional Players: the Colombian Federation of Municipalities and the
National Federation of Departments
The Colombian Federation of Municipalities
The Colombian Federation of Municipalities (FCM—reflecting Spanish
terminology) has played a significant role in advancing, defending, and promoting
decentralization in Colombia. Created in 1989, FCM is a professional municipal
association, and regarded as one of the most effective of Latin America. Remarkably
apolitical, it represents all municipalities and districts of the country.
The reforms introduced by the 1991 Constitution—where the FCM played a
significant role in defining the autonomy and new roles of local governments—were a
major challenge for mayors and local authorities who until recently had been named by the
central government. With the process of decentralization, mayors became more
autonomous and were given expanded responsibilities over key policy areas such as
education and health, as well as access to financial resources for the delivery of those
services.

25

50% for Departments and 28% for municipalities (Bonet et al., 2014) in the case of SGP, and in the case
of royalties, 13% for Departments and 5% for municipalities.
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The FCM was created as an initiative of mayors of large cities like Bogota, Cali,
and Cartagena with key support (financial and administrative) from the Spanish Federation
of Municipalities and Provinces, and the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation in
Colombia.
The FCM played an important role during the Constitutional Assembly ensuring
that decentralization was strengthened and that the autonomy of local governments was
respected. During the first years following the enactment of the Constitution, the FCM
worked intensely to ensure that the decentralization legislation being discussed in the
national Congress included the interests and rights of local governments. The FCM also
provided—with the assistance of multilateral agencies— much needed technical advice to
local authorities on their new and expanded responsibilities.
Between 1992 and 1998, during a period FCM referred to as “constitutional
euphoria” in its own publication, the enactment of key legislation occurred, including Law
60 in 1993, which regulated fiscal decentralization, health, and education services. This
law included a provision to fund the FCM using transfers from municipalities and districts,
but this was later deemed inappropriate by the Constitutional Court. Thus, the FCM found
other means of financing its activities: revenue is collected from services and technical
assistance provided by the FCM, grants and donations, and marketing, as well as, most
importantly, administering the traffic and drivers’ license system nationally on behalf of
local governments (10% of the total collected)26.

26

The Federation administers, since 2002, the SIMIT system (Sistema Integrado de Multas e Infracciones
de Transito), the national system for payment of traffic fines and moving violations. With this new system
violators can pay their fines in any part of the country, and when renewing licenses, the system also shows
who has pending payments. According to the Federation, collections increased by 1,270%. In 2010 the total
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As mentioned in the previous fiscal decentralization section, from 1998 onward,
the fiscal crisis of Colombia increased and the national government saw this as an
imperative to control transfers to local governments by adjusting and redefining the
percentages established by the Constitution. Although the FCM strongly opposed the new
proposals, in the end, it was unable to block the modifications made by Law 715 of 2001
and its concurrent legislative acts.
The FCM has also played an important role in protecting the lives and well-being
of local authorities threatened by guerrillas or counterinsurgency groups. To do that, the
FCM lobbied the national government, and a protection program was established in
collaboration with the Ministry of Interior and Justice. As a result, in 2008 no mayors were
assassinated (between 1990 and 1999, an average of 10 mayors were killed each year, with
a peak of 19 in 2000), and violence against local authorities was greatly reduced27.
In 2007—when fiscal decentralization reforms were again being discussed in
Congress—the FCM played a role in successfully lobbying Congress and the national
government to increase the percentage points tied to inflation as part of the new formula of
the General Participation System (SGP) to transfer funds to local governments. The
government had originally proposed a permanent formula using an increase based on the
inflation rate plus 2%. The FCM’s lobbying efforts resulted in a sliding scale of inflation
plus increasing percentage points through 2016.

revenue of the FCM surpassed 27 billion Colombian pesos or about $US
(https://www.fcm.org.co/QuienesSomos/Estados%20Financieros/Balances%202011.pdf)
27

9

million

Between 1988 and 2008, a total of 162 mayors were assassinated (FCM numbers—Revista Municipios).
Since 2004, between 180 and 200 mayors have received special protection.
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Interviews with representatives from the FCM point to the many successes of the
organization in defending the interests of mayors and local authorities, but also note the
need to be vigilant, as the national government has a “natural tendency to centralize.” Of
particular concern, and defined as a “pending task” of the FCM, is to reform the
Constitution to allow the immediate reelection of mayors. In fact, many mayors feel that
the FCM supported the constitutional reform that allowed President Uribe to be reelected
in 2006, but resent that mayors and governors were left out of the political reform28.
The FCM works collaboratively with many of national government agencies in
areas of interest to municipalities such as education, health, culture, transit, planning,
public administration reform, public safety, and others. The organization continues to be
institutionally stable, both in terms of vision and goals, and its professional staff is
organized into themes or areas and representatives who lobby Congress and follow-up on
legislation that may impact municipal governments. The national government has
recognized the FCM as a natural and singular counterpart in consultations involving
matters of local government.

The National Federation of Departments
While the FCM predates the 1991 Constitution by several years and was key in the
push for decentralization reform, its counterpart at the Departmental level—the National
Conference of Governors—was created in 1994. In 1998, the organization changed its
name to National Federation of Departments (FND—reflecting Spanish terminology).

28

In fact, opposition to the immediate reelection of mayors and governors is very strong, and Colombia
remains the only country in Latin America where mayors cannot be immediately reelected.
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The FND brings together the 32 governors from around the country, maintaining
and managing its own resources. The FND works to promote the development and
strengthening of Departments, promotes regional and municipal development, and works
to support Departments in the implementation of national policies delegated and/or
decentralized by the national government. The organization also provides technical
assistance to its members on economic development projects. In essence, the FND’s goal
is to promote the interests of the Departments, defend their autonomy, strengthen their
administration, and promote decentralization.
The FND receives and administers Departmental taxes. This function was granted
in Law 223 of 1995, which gave the FND authority to collect, manage, and transfer funds
from taxes on liquor, cigarettes, and tobacco, liquor mixtures, and beers. Its activities are
funded by membership fees paid by each Department, donations and grants, and by fees
for the provision of services.
The Department-centered FND—as is the case with the Municipal-centered
FCM—represents Departments in matters involving the national government and its
agencies, the national Congress, and other government entities and international agencies;
FND is recognized as the official interlocutor of the governors by the central government.

Conclusions
As described in the previous sections, Colombia’s political and administrative
decentralization process responded to the acute need to re-legitimize a political system
besieged by conflict, tension, lack of trust, and violence. Fiscal decentralization (and some
administrative decentralization) predated the 1991 Constitution. In fact, fiscal
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decentralization began in 1968 and 1985 with transfers to subnational governments
earmarked for health and education in both cases as attempts to calm social discontent with
service provision.
The reforms introduced in the 1991 Constitution brought about political changes of
great significance for the country. The popular election of mayors and governors
accelerated the fragmentation of the two main political parties, new local elites surged, and
the traditional link between the political elites based in Bogota, and the regional barons
were cut (Gutierrez Sanin, 2010). The changes also indicated that the many independent
political movements emerging in the country had no obligation to the traditional parties,
further weakening them.
In the process of administrative decentralization, local governments and
Departments were given broader responsibilities in the areas of health and education (two
areas where both had been previously involved), and expanded roles in water and
sanitation, recreation, planning, and local and regional development. However, as in other
countries facing similar reforms, regional government responsibilities were not clearly
defined and the duplication of efforts and tensions were considerable.
Gutierrez Sanin (2010) argues that due to Colombia’s history and heavy reliance
on central authorities, decentralization was not an endogenous phenomenon, and it
transferred responsibilities and funds to governments that were not administratively ready
to handle them29. The lack of local capacity continues to be a criticism of local and regional
governments, and a fact that is addressed both by the Municipal Federation (FCM) and

29

This vision is shared by many authors such as Garay Salamanca & Salcedo-Albaran (2010): Escobar
Lemmon to cite just a few.
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Departmental Federation (FND) through their training activities and technical assistance
programs. But, in a country where more than 80% of local governments (as indicated in
the status of local governments in this section), belong to categories five and six (smaller
populations and the weakest administrative capacity), the lack of local capacity is not
surprising. In cases where local governments lack capacity to provide services, Colombian
legislation mandates Departmental governments to take over service delivery.
An important element of the Colombian model is that the 1991 Constitution
established percentages for central government transfers and created a national royalties
fund. This has made the process of changing the percentages, or adjusting for fiscal
imbalances, more difficult; many times, constitutional changes were needed to address
issues (Zapata, 2010).
Fiscal decentralization was an important aspect of the first ten years of Colombia’s
new Constitution. That period saw transfers from the central government to subregional
governments increase dramatically, though simultaneously, national revenues fell due to
the economic crisis. As noted above, an alarmed central government viewed decreasing
transfers as the only way to control the macroeconomic stability of the country. Thus,
starting in 2001, a slow but persistent fiscal recentralization began.
In many Latin American countries, including the case of Colombia, subnational
governments rely heavily on transfers from the central government, making them not only
less autonomous, but also less likely to be prudent and efficient in the use of those resources
(Zapata, 2010). Although municipal governments in particular have been able to increase
their capacity to collect taxes and fees, they—as well as the Departmental governments—
are still heavily reliant on transfers from the central government. Moreover, the transfer
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system in Colombia is very complex not only in structure, but also in the criteria used,
making it difficult to understand and manage.
Decentralization has empowered local and regional political elites, promoted the
emergence of new actors, increased citizen participation, and re-legitimized the Colombian
state in the view of citizens—helping to bring about necessary political reforms.
Decentralization has also opened new modes of participation, and given local and regional
governments a voice in the delivery of services (Gonzalez Sanin, 2010). As in many other
countries, the results of Colombia’s decentralization process are mixed and still unfolding.
This chapter has offered a brief summary of Colombia’s history and institutional
evolution, presented the main institutional actors of the decentralization process, and
reviewed Colombia’s political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization reforms.
Chapters 5, 7, and 9 will review the impact of these reforms on Colombia’s political system
and on the provision of health and education services.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PARAGUAY: INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND DECENTRALIZATION
Introduction
The Republic of Paraguay, a country of approximately 6.3 million inhabitants30 (2010),
is located in the heart of the South American continent. Paraguay has a long and proud
history of asserting itself while surrounded by powerful, and at times hostile, neighbors. In
the late XIX century, after declaring independence, the country confronted its two largest
and most powerful neighbors, Brazil and Argentina with the help and support of Uruguay;
the conflict (known as the Triple Alliance War or the Great War, 1864-1870) decimated
Paraguay’s male population,31 destroyed its economy, and brought the country not only
great human suffering but also the loss of almost one third of its territory.32 Nearly sixty
years later, in the 20th century, Paraguay faced another war, this time with its neighbor to
the West, Bolivia, for the Chaco territory (1932-1935). This war also devastated the
country’s economy and psyche. These wars initiated long periods of institutional instability
and political turmoil among the ruling elites and the political parties they represented.
Without major migratory movements, and detached from global cultural trends, and wary

30

Paraguay. Dirección General de Estadística y Censos. Proyección de la población nacional 2000 – 2050.

31

The estimated Paraguayan population in 1864 was 800,000. Of those, about 200,000 survived, and about
68,379 were male, half of them children. Carlos Pastore. La lucha por la tierra en el Paraguay in Flecha
(2013).
32

Paraguay lost to Brazil and Argentina 140,000 sq. km or 50,054 sq. miles
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of attack from its larger neighbors, Paraguay’s political culture encompasses strong
nationalism and proud independence.

Historical Background
From Independence to 1870
Paraguay’s political tradition is authoritarian and centralist, with strong caudillos
(political leaders) in control of government for extended periods of time. After gaining
independence, the country was governed by Juan G. Rodriguez de Francia (1816-1840)
whose presidency was characterized by his authoritarianism and central control over the
country and the important reforms he introduced, including compulsory and free public
education (Flecha, 2013).
Carlos Antonio Lopez succeeded Rodriguez de Francia in 1840 and subsequently
governed for 22 years. His government aimed to ensure Paraguay’s independence and the
promotion of commerce, trade, industry, and the arts and sciences. Lopez promoted
progress and modernization, notably without emphasis on individual liberties (Flecha,
2013). During his term, the Constitution of 1844 was approved, and the division of power
was established, but all power was concentrated in the Executive branch. Individual rights
were not explicitly recognized. Members of Congress were elected by landowners only.
Carlos Antonio Lopez was succeeded by his son, Francisco Solano Lopez in 1862.
The legacy of his presidency includes isolationist policies and the promotion of agricultural
and industrial innovations, but also the Triple Alliance War and the near annihilation of
the country.
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Since the creation of the Paraguayan nation, the State has controlled society and the
economic system. The Lopez presidencies nationalized all wealth and made the State the
central actor in both economic and commercial life, inhibiting any other form of economic
development (Flecha, 2013).

The Republic of the Liberal Constitution (1870 – 1936)
After the Triple Alliance War, opponents of the Lopez government who had been
in exile, along with some Paraguayans that fought with the enemy, took control of the
government, called for a national constitutional assembly, and, as a result, the 1870
Constitution was enacted—with a clear liberal bias. This modern and progressive
Constitution formalized the division of power, the independence of the press, the
protections of freedom of religion and association, and the universal right to vote (except
for women, who at the time were the majority of the population). The Constitution also
reorganized the State by creating several ministries (foreign affairs, finances, and interior,
among others).
The Triple Alliance War not only brought a new political class to power, but also
meant the entrenchment of nationalistic sentiment in the country and installed a deep
resentment and suspicion of neighboring countries. The social fabric of Paraguay was
destroyed, and the need to reconstruct the State and its reach was imperative. Political
instability and conflict continued and the Constitution’s was barely implemented.
In the 1890s, the political situation partially stabilized. By 1894, the Liberal Party
was created by a group of young students leaders opposed to the authoritarian government
of Bernardino Caballero. As a reaction to the creation of the Liberal Party, Bernardino
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Caballero created the “Asociacion Nacional Republicana” (known as the Colorado Party).
From that point forward, the two political parties were a constant presence in Paraguayan
political history, including fights, confrontations, and even civil wars; numerous coup
attempts, armed uprisings, conspiracies, civil strife, and three military-civilian wars
marked the beginning of the twentieth century.
In 1923, Eligio Ayala of the Liberal Party became president and a period of
modernity and progress was initiated. Finances were improved, budgets were balanced,
basic education improved, and infrastructure was built—the government attempted to
implement a Liberal Constitution.
The Chaco War 1932-1935 (peace treaty signed in 1938) brought even more
instability to Paraguayan politics. Paraguay kept most of the Chaco territory, and the war
gave impetus to the national economy through the defense industry, food services, and
provisions for the troops.

Military Power as a key player in Paraguayan politics – from 1936 onward
In February of 1936, another military coup occurred in Paraguay. The difference
this time was that the movement was not led by civilians, but by military men, who saw
themselves as the guarantors of peace and progress. The military suspended the Liberal
Constitution of 1870. A new form of military interventionism and identification with the
State began, and continued until the early 1990s.
The period from 1936 to 1947 was characterized by factionalism within political
parties and within the army, with constant military revolts, and with the Liberal Party and
other smaller parties (like the Communist and Febrerista parties) wrestling for power with
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the Colorado Party (which was also divided between a more democratic fraction and a neofascist conservative one). By 1947, these divisions and the struggle for control of the State
ended with a violent and terrible civil war between the right wing fraction of the Colorado
Party and its military supporters, and the opposition. In the end, the Colorado Party, and its
supporters in the armed forces, were victorious; they imposed one of the most repressive
regimes in the Southern Cone, forcing the exile of hundreds of thousands of Paraguayans.
The regime also consolidated the politization of the armed forces, and the control of every
level of the State by the Colorado Party and its supporters. Instability and internal fights
continued within the governing Colorado Party, culminating in 1954 with a coup by
General Alfredo Stroessner, the leader of the military movement, and the person who
would become the authoritarian leader of the country for the next 35 years.

The Stroessner years: 1947 – 1989
General Stroessner´s administration was characterized by extreme repression of
anyone who opposed the government. The marriage between the Colorado Party and the
armed forces, with complete obedience to Stroessner, was achieved. By the 1960s, with the
opposition repressed, jailed, or exiled, Stroessner’s control over the State was complete.
The State, dominated by the Colorado Party, its supporters, and the armed forces, became
the only provider of economic or social wealth. Stroessner was able to co-opt some support
from representatives of opposition political parties, and by 1967 a new Constitution was
approved, which gave a democratic façade to the regime and allowed the reelection of
Stroessner eight consecutive times. The Colorado Party, monopolized by the “stronismo,”
became the government’s propaganda arm and the controller of public employment (i.e.,
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everyone who aspired to work in the public sector had to be affiliated with the party).
Members of the armed forces had to swear loyalty to the party, and even private companies
that depended on approvals from the government needed to pledge allegiance to the
Colorado Party. The symbiosis between the Colorado Party, the government, and the armed
forces was complete (Flecha, 2013).
“The price of peace” of the Stroessner years was rampant corruption, contraband,
and drug and arms dealing, among other illegal activities done by regime supporters. In the
1980s, the end of the economic boom—brought about by the construction of the Itaipu and
Yacireta hydroelectric dams—meant that members of economic and social sectors such as
the peasantry, the industrial workers, and the lower middle classes, who were dependent
on government largesse, began to question the dictatorial government (Flecha, 2013). The
economic crisis also meant that the economic benefits of the military and the powerful
business elites were reduced. The international order was also changing rapidly with the
return of democratic systems to the Southern Cone, and a new impetus to support
democracy in the Western Hemisphere by the United States and certain European
countries. Thus, divisions within the Colorado Party deepened, and in February of 1989, a
military coup ended the Stroessner regime and initiated the transition to a democratic
system.

The return of democracy: 1989 – 2010
General Andres Rodriguez led the military revolt against Stroessner. Even though
the head of the presidency changed, the traditional link between the Colorado Party, the
armed forces, and the government bureaucracy was not broken, and no major
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anticorruption efforts or state modernization initiatives occurred. New elections were
called to select the new president for the 1989-1993 period. The democratic transition was
done from the top and from within the regime (Flecha, 2013; Paredes, 2008) with very little
participation of the opposition or civil society.
Elections occurred in May of 1989 and General Andres Rodriguez, the candidate
of the Colorado Party, was elected president with 73.3% of the votes. The Liberal Party
with Domingo Laino obtained 21.6% of the votes, and, in accordance with electoral law in
place at that time, the winning party secured two thirds of all seats in both chambers of
Congress.
The Rodriguez administration faced many challenges and difficulties trying to
move away from a very personalized and authoritarian regime. In the political arena,
democratization meant: dismantling repressive structures within the police and the security
forces of the State, ensuring civil liberties, and severing the links between the Colorado
Party and the armed forces. On the economic front, the challenges included eradicating
poverty and improving an obsolete system of production. And, finally, in the social arena,
the administration faced serious urban/rural inequalities in terms of access to land, services,
income, and labor conditions (Flecha, 2013; Flecha & Martini, 1994).
Part of the transition urgently required a new electoral code that ensured fairness
for the opposition in future elections. In 1990, a new electoral code was enacted that,
though not perfect, was perceived by all parties as fair. The electoral code was first tested
with the municipal elections of 1991—the first ever to occur in the country’s history.
The municipal elections of 1991 were the first serious challenge to the dominance
of the Colorado Party. The Party only received 43% of the votes, a significant drop from
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their last national results, while the Liberal Party obtained 33% of the votes. Of the eleven
municipalities in the greater Asuncion area, six were won by the Liberal Party, and four by
the Colorado Party. Asuncion, by far the largest and most important of all Paraguayan
municipalities, was won by a former student leader, Carlos Filizzola, who headed an
independent civic movement. The Colorado Party saw losing the municipality of Asuncion
as a disaster. In the rest of the country, 45 municipalities (out of 217 at the time) were won
by the Liberal Party (Flecha & Martini, 1994).
The next step in the democratic transition of Paraguay was drafting a new
constitution. The Colorado Party had understood that internal differences were
undermining their ability to win elections, and all the factions agreed on a power
distribution quota in view of the upcoming elections to the Constitutional assembly. In
December of 1991, representatives to a Constitutional assembly were elected and the
Colorado Party won a majority of the vote (54%), indicative of how much the party had
learned from past failures in the municipal elections, and how well it understood the
importance of the new Constitution (Paredes, 2008).
The new Constitution was approved in 1992 and, even if it was not very progressive
in social and economic rights, it was a great improvement in terms of political and citizens’
rights. The Constitution established the division of power between the Executive, the
Legislative, and the Judicial branches of government and did not allow the president to
serve a second term (Silvero Salgueiro, 2011).
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The elections of 1993
In the 1993 elections, Juan Carlos Wasmosy, a successful businessmen but not a
traditional Colorado Party activist, was elected President with 39.9% of the votes. Domingo
Laino of the Liberal Party received 32%, and Guillermo Caballero Vargas of the Encuentro
Nacional received 23% of the votes. Within the Colorado Party, Wasmosy was not
supported by a faction loyal to Luis Maria Argaña—a traditional, popular leader—nor did
he have the support of Lino Oviedo—a powerful and influential army general.
Lacking majority support in the national Congress, governance was challenging during
the Wasmosy-Seifart presidency. In essence four major elements made it very difficult
(Paredes, 2008):
1) Distributing power quotas and government jobs among the many Colorado groups,
the armed forces, and the business sector traditionally close to the party was
challenging; and clear public policy and administration were difficult to establish;
2) Lacking a majority in Congress, and the alliance of the “argañistas” with the
Liberal Party, meant that key legislation was not approved;
3) The emergence of General Lino Cesar Oviedo as a key influential figure in the
armed forces with presidential aspirations, became a constant source of instability
in the coming years;
4) The divisions, and lack of a clear leader, within the Colorado Party continued to
affect the presidency.

Nevertheless, the Wasmosy-Seifart administration was able to pass reforms toward the
consolidation of democracy. With the support of the Liberal Party, the Judicial power was
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reformed by: the creation of the Judicial Council (Consejo de la Magistratura), the
appointment of new judges—members of the armed forces who were “de-affiliated” from
the Colorado Party (an important reform to eliminate armed forces interference in
politics)—and the establishment of a Supreme Electoral Court.

From the 1999 March Crisis to the election of Fernando Lugo (2008)
In 1996 municipal elections were held. The Colorado Party, which had rallied
around the traditional leader, Argaña, won 52% of the votes, regaining many of the
important municipalities that it had lost in the previous elections. The city of Asuncion
though, was once again won by the opposition, with Martin Burt as new mayor.
The triumph of the Colorado Party signaled an entente between Argaña and his
supporters and President Wasmosy. Argaña’s candidates had won a majority of the votes—
his leadership within the party was unquestionable and his presidential aspirations were
within reach. But Argaña needed resources and Wasmosy had control of government
resources (Paredes, 2008). Thus, Argaña committed himself to support Wasmosy and his
agenda through the end of his presidency, accepting a Wasmosy confidant as his eventual
vice presidential candidate, guaranteeing his silence regarding allegations of corruption
among the business community linked to the Itaipu damn (the so called “Itaipu barons”),
and favoring those “Itaipu barons” in future public works.
However, with the 1998 presidential elections fast approaching, the entente was
short lived. Different factions within the Colorado Party jockeyed for positions in the future
government. The primary elections within the Colorado Party tested and impacted the
future of the country and of its democracy very seriously. General Oviedo had surged as a
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key figure and enjoyed wide support within the Colorado Party. He was adamant in his
opposition to Argaña and his faction. In an effort to remove Oviedo from the presidential
contest, President Wasmosy directed the arrest of the general for previous allegations of
malpractice. Oviedo was arrested and condemned to ten years in prison. Nearly one year
later, a compromise was reached and Raúl Cubas Grau (supporter of Oviedo, during his
time in prison) and Luis Maria Argaña were selected to represent the Colorado Party in the
1998 election (Paredes, 2008).
The Colorado Party won the election with 54% of the votes, while the LainoFilizzola opposition from the Liberal and Encuentro Nacional Party received 43%. In
Congress, the Colorado Party won 45 out of 80 seats in the House of Representatives, and
24 of 45 seats in the Senate. The divisions between those close to Oviedo and those close
to Argaña ensured political instability. In order to remove the possibility of a future Oviedo
presidency, the Argañistas worked out an agreement with the Liberal Party with the
intention of eventually impeaching the President. In effect, Cubas Grau, as previously
agreed with Oviedo, ordered the release of the general, but when the Supreme Court ruled
the release decree unconstitutional, political instability became rampant. In March of 1999,
the Vice-president, Argaña, was assassinated in an attack that was seen by all as ordered
by General Oviedo. Political chaos followed, protesters gathered in Asuncion, Oviedo fled
the country, first to Argentina and then to Brazil, and the Chamber of Deputies decided to
impeach President Cubas Grau who finally resigned. The President of the Senate, Luis
Gonzalez Macchi, was named interim president (Paredes, 2008).
Although the Presidency of Gonzalez Macchi began with a broad political accord
that included the Liberal Party and the Encuentro Nacional (in fact some ministries of
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relevance were given to representatives of those parties), conflict and ineptness
characterized the administration. In fact, the Liberal Party left the coalition by the end of
April 1999, after a request for 40% of the government administration positions was not
honored. The Encuentro Nacional, which performed poorly in the 1996 municipal elections
and in 1998 presidential elections, remained in the coalition government (Flecha, 2013;
Paredes, 2008).
The 2000 election to select a new vice-president became a watershed moment for
Paraguayan political life and, in particular, for the Colorado Party. For the first time since
the return of democracy, the Colorado Party was defeated in a national election by the
Liberal Party, whose candidate—Federico Franco—won with the support of Oviedo’s
followers. The election reaffirmed the importance and value of securing the support of
Oviedo and his party (UNACE).
In the 2001 municipal elections, the Colorado Party once again showed its strength
and ability to organize and won most of the municipalities in the country, including the city
of Asuncion, with Enrique Riera elected as mayor.
The poor performance of the Colorado Party in the presidential elections held in
April of 2003, was likely a reflection of its constituencies’ fatigue with the very public
infighting and animosity within the Party’s different factions. Its candidate, Nicanor Duarte
Frutos, was elected, but only earning 37.1% of the votes; The Party lost its majority in
Congress.
The Duarte Frutos presidency (2003-2008) was marked by significant socioeconomic challenges, as well as political turmoil, resulting from permanent internal
struggles for power and influence within the Party, the lack of support from the opposition,
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and the destabilizing figure of General Oviedo. Duarte Frutos himself, who by 2006 was
strongly promoting and pursuing a modification of the 1992 Constitution that would allow
the reelection of the President, made the situation worse. His reelection plan finally failed
and ultimately exacerbated existing political animosity and conflict (Flecha, 2013).
By 2006, with the general presidential elections of 2008 approaching, the political
arena in Paraguay was dramatically changed by the emergence of former bishop Fernando
Lugo as a galvanizing figure for the opposition; he gained support from many in the
Colorado Party who had grown tired of unfulfilled promises, the constant political
infighting, and the lack of socio-economic progress.
The 2008 presidential elections proved to be historical for the democratic process
of the country. The Liberal Party had agreed to support Fernando Lugo, who had support
from many smaller parties, both on the right and the left on the political spectrum.
Conversations with the two other important opposition parties (UNACE of Oviedo and
Patria Querida, a center right party) had failed, and both parties presented their own
candidates for the national election (Lino Oviedo and Pedro Fadul respectively). Once
again, the Colorado Party, after bitter and rancorous primaries, had finally settled on the
candidacy of Ms. Blanca Ovelar, former Minister of Education and a protégé of President
Duarte Frutos.
On April 20, 2008, sixty years of Colorado Party dominance ended with the election
of Fernando Lugo as President. The support of the Liberal Party proved essential to his
election, as well as the split of the Colorado votes between Blanca Duarte and Lino Oviedo.
Expectations were high and the governing challenges confronting the Lugo
administration were immense. Until that moment, the political transition to democracy in
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Paraguay had been strongly linked to the internal processes of the Colorado Party that
benefitted from a weak and divided opposition. The election, for the first time, of a nonColorado to the highest office in the country shocked the political world of Paraguay and
filled society with great expectations of renewal and change.
Many of these expectations, though, would not be fulfilled. President Lugo, early
in his presidency, faced scandalous allegations about his private life that undermined his
legitimacy as a different type of leader. His political movement did not have a majority in
Congress, and relied on its main political ally, the Liberal Party, to secure approval of its
legislative agenda. The alliance proved to be fragile at best and conflictive most of the time.
Differences among the disparate and diverse political movements that comprised the
governing coalition made matters worse for President Lugo and his team.
President Lugo was unable to build a working coalition with opposition parties in
Congress or within his own political movement (Flecha, 2013). From the moment he took
office, and up to 2011, his administration failed to propose a participatory plan to deal with
the many demands facing the country.33 In 2009, and in part as a result of the worldwide
economic crisis, Paraguay’s economy faced serious challenges. Its main export products’
prices plummeted, remittances from abroad had dwindled, and the lack of foreign currency
impacted its ability to import goods and services; thus, Paraguay’s economic growth
declined from 6.8% in 2006 to 5.8% in 2008 to 1.5% in 2009 (Flecha, 2013). Socio-

33

Interviews with Paraguayan historians and political scientists, as well as with former mayors, and
legislators. Asuncion, September 2013.
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economic indicators declined drastically, the political situation did not improve, and
general discontent with the government increased.
The governability and economic crisis continued to deepen, and the administration
was unable to move reforms forward without exhausting its dwindling support and political
capital. By 2012, the situation became unbearable, with congressional threats of political
impeachment of the president for poor performance. That same year, and as a consequence
of a serious and confusing incident in which 6 police officers and 11 peasants were killed
by armed men alleged to be part of a nascent guerrilla movement, the impeachment of the
president was approved by the Chamber of Deputies. The president lost the support of the
Liberal Party and in less than 24 hours the president was impeached, removed from office,
and his vice president, the Liberal Federico Franco became the country’s new president.34
The new political era envisioned by many Paraguayans came to an abrupt end, and
generated one of the most serious challenges to Paraguay’s democratic institutions in the
country’s history (see Table 16).35

Table 16: Turning points in Paraguay’s political history
Since Independence to 2010
1811 – 1813

From Independence to the dictatorship of Francia

1813 – 1839

Dictatorship of Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia

34

Much has been said and discussed about the legality and the procedure of the President’s impeachment. It
is not the intention here to fully discuss all aspects of the process or to describe the political situation in great
detail. The scope of this study ends in 2010.
35

President Franco served the remaining years of Lugo’s term and in 2013, new presidential elections
occurred in which the Colorado Party returned to power, winning an overwhelming majority at all levels of
government. Mr. Horacio Cartes was elected as President for the 2013 - 2018 term.
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1839 – 1840

Consulate of Mariano Roque Alonso and Carlos Antonio Lopez

1840 – 1862

Presidency of Carlos Antonio Lopez

1862 – 1870

Presidency of Francisco Solano Lopez

1864 – 1870

War of the Triple Alliance

1869 – 1887

Weak governments and the formation of the Liberal and Colorado Parties

1887 – 1904

Hegemony of the Colorado Party

1904 – 1936

The Liberal Era

1932 – 1935

Chaco War – Presidency of Eusebio Ayala

1936 – 1937

The Febrerista (February) Revolution

1937 – 1939

Subalternizacion of the Liberal Party to the military

1939 – 1940

Estigarribia establishes the basis for an authoritarian regime

1940 – 1946

Dictatorship of Higinio Morinigo with the support of the armed forces

1946 – 1947

“Democratic Spring” – coalition

1947 – 1989

The Stroessner era

1989 - Present

Democratic transition and consolidation of democracy

Source: Author based on historic documents

Concluding Comments on the Transition to Democracy
The past influences the future. The “Paraguayan nation” is built on a foundation of
its history, including past wars, suffering at the hands of powerful neighbors, and struggle
for autonomy and respect (Lopez, 2010).
The history of democratic transition in Paraguay is strongly linked to the evolution
of different factions within the Colorado Party, and how each was able or unable to prevail
over others, because control of the party meant control of the resources of the State and the
government (Fretes Carreras, 2011). Paraguay, unlike its neighbors, and due to its history,
lacked a “democratic culture” or a “historical memory” of democracy.
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The State, and access to government, has traditionally been seen as a way to
advance politicians’ careers and benefit those who support them. The Paraguayan transition
to democracy occurred from above and from within the power system itself. Those who
were close to Stroessner’s deposed regime—namely the armed forces and a sector of the
Colorado Party—accomplished the transition. It was not a revolutionary coup or an
abandonment of the prevailing system (Arditi, 1990). Thus, the democratic transition
entailed the reform and struggle for control in an alliance between the Colorado Party, the
armed forces, and the state bureaucracy (Fretes Carreras, 2011).
In its early stages, the Paraguayan transition to democracy was characterized by:
1) The presence of authoritarian and traditional actors who were part of the old
system and who initiated the process;
2) The inclusion of leaders and political parties of the opposition in the political
process but without conditions or a unified democratic vision;
3) Electoral processes characterized by some irregularities and lack of public
information;
4) The immediate modification of the armed forces’ structure;
5) Proposals for the reform and modernization of the State and the privatization of
public services;
6) A loosely defined legal framework that showed poor control mechanisms of
governmental institutions.
Given Paraguay’s long history of authoritarian regimes and centralism, the
challenge was not to “regain” democracy, but to establish and create new democratic
institutions in a context lacking any democratic history. The Colorado Party’s acceptance
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of results from the 2008 elections marked the beginning of the consolidation of Paraguay’s
democracy and the end of this transition (Fretes Carreras, 2011).

Structure of Subnational Governance in Paraguay
The 1992 Constitution: New Design of the Paraguayan State
A milestone of the Paraguayan transition to democracy was the 1992 new
Constitution that replaced the 1967 Constitution enacted during the Stroessner era, defining
the country as unitary and decentralized (see Table 17 for summary of Paraguay’s previous
constitutions’ main provisions).

Table 17: Paraguay’s Political Constitutions
Year
1844

1870

1967
1992

Political Administration Law of the State: it established three branches of
government but all power was concentrated on the Executive branch. Individual
rights were not explicitly recognized. Congress was to be elected by the people,
but even though the right to vote was universal, only people with property could
be elected to office.
Liberal Constitution—a very modern and progressive constitution, it formalized
the division of power, the independence of the press, the protections of freedom
of religion and association, and the universality of the right to vote (except for
women, who at the time were the majority of the population). The constitution
also reorganized the State with the creation of several ministries (foreign affairs,
finances, interior, among others).
Constitution of the Stroessner era. It was of authoritarian and presidentialist
character. It allowed the indefinite reelection of the President. The Legislative
and Judicial powers were subordinated to the Executive.
Defines the country as unitary and decentralized. Guarantees individual rights
and establishes the division of power between the Executive, Legislative, and
Judicial branches of government. It does not allow for the reelection of the
President.

Source: author based on Balmelli (2004), Flecha (2013), Silvero Salgueiro (2011)
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The new Constitution sought to remedy some of the problems brought about by
excessive centralization and authoritarianism by: maintaining the division of powers but
redefining them, creating control institutions independent and autonomous of the
government, and establishing the State both as unitary and decentralized.
The Constitution also mandated the creation of the Electoral Tribunal in charge of
running the country’s elections.
Some of the most important reforms introduced by the 1992 Constitution include:
a) Introduction of a broad definition of democracy with participatory and pluralist
principles;
b) Guaranteeing a respect of peoples’ rights;
c) Introduction of the principle of decentralization as a key element of the
Paraguayan state. In this regard, Articles 1 and 3 of the Constitution defined the
state as unitary and decentralized;
d) Curtailing presidential authority;
e) Assigning new control powers to the Congres;
f) Deeply reforming the Judicial system to ensure its independence.

In the new Constitution, the principle of decentralization is clearly expressed with
the new political/administrative structure established for administration of the territory.
Furthermore, the 1992 Constitution, for the first time in Paraguayan history, gave
administrative autonomy to the regional level (Departments), and reaffirmed the existing
autonomy of the municipalities. Both Departments and municipalities became
decentralized administrative territories. This element of autonomy was reinforced by the
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fact that governors, mayors, and Departmental and local councilmembers were to be
directly elected by the people, though confusion and lack of clarity on their responsibilities
(especially in the case of governors) abound.
In regard to presidential power, the new Constitution eliminated all the prerogatives
in the former Constitution that allowed this power to be concentrated in the president. The
president is no longer allowed to dissolve Congress or govern by decree. The president can
no longer order a state of emergency without the approval of Congress, nor is reelection
allowed. The curtailing presidential power does not mean that the Executive is reduced in
attributions. The president remains the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, is head
of the government and of the State, names and removes ministers of the Executive without
the approval of Congress, establishes the guidelines of the government, and can propose
legislation to Congress; the President can also veto laws approved by Congress and can
condone or pardon sentences. The introduction of the figure of a vice president did not
reduce the preeminence of the president within the political system (Silvero Salgueiro,
2011).
The new Constitution redefined the role of Congress. In addition to the traditional
role of enacting laws, it must approve the General Budget of the Nation and approve
international treaties. Congress was also given new oversight authority over the
government. The Senate and the Chamber of Representatives can summon ministers of the
Executive and senior civil servants for questioning. They can propose a vote of no
confidence, and they can propose a motion removing the involved minister or civil servant
(to the president), though the president is not obligated to comply. Congress can appoint
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investigative commissions, and it can demand information and documentation from
different private and public agencies.
The introduction of impeachment procedures (juicio politico) is evidence of the
intent to strengthen the oversight role of Congress (Article 255). The Chamber of
Representatives can initiate impeachment procedures against the president, the vice
president, ministers, members of the Supreme Court, and other senior government officials
for misconduct or crimes committed while in office. The Senate is charged with judging
and, if found guilty, the accused will be removed from office.
The 1992 Constitution introduced reforms to ensure the independence of the
Judicial system. The president no longer appoints all judicial posts, including the members
of the Supreme Court who are now appointed by the Senate for life, in accordance with the
Executive, from a list proposed by a Judicial Council or Consejo de la Magistratura (in
itself a newly created institution). Lower court judges are named by the Supreme Court,
but also nominated from lists proposed by the Consejo de la Magistratura. The
Constitution also guarantees the economic independence of the judicial system by
establishing that no less than 3% of the national budget should be allocated to it, and the
Supreme Court administers these funds. To avoid electoral fraud and political
manipulations, an Electoral Court was established and charged with registering voters and
organizing, conducting and verifying the electoral process in general (Flecha, 2013; Silvero
Salgueiro, 2011; Balmelli, 2004).
In a country without a tradition of decentralized governance, the Constitution also
created significant tension between the principle of decentralization and the concept of a
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unitary state, defining many rights but not clearly establishing what level of government
was in charge of providing them (Silvero Salgueiro, 2011).
The Paraguayan state is unitary because the Executive power directs the general
administration of the country, and Departments’ and municipalities’ development
programs are subordinated to the national development plans (Article 177); the National
Parliament is the only branch of government allowed to enact laws (municipal and
Departmental councils can enact ordinances and rules, but they are administrative and
cannot overrule national laws or contradict national legislation); the Judicial system is
centralized, and final decisions are made by the Supreme Court (Flecha, Sosa, Cristaldo et
al., 2003).
The decentralized nature of the State is evidenced by the strengthening of
municipalities, and the establishment of governors as heads of Departmental governments
(replacing the much despised “presidential delegates” of the Stroessner era), directly
elected by the people. These regional governments are entrusted with political,
administrative, and normative autonomy. Departments and municipalities are given fiscal
autonomy (as allowed by financial laws), and the Executive power cannot arbitrarily
remove governors and mayors (there are specific mechanisms to be followed).
Article 156 of the Paraguayan Constitution states that:
“… in the interest of the political and administrative organization of the State, the
national territory is divided into Departments, municipalities, and districts36 which, within

36

The Constitution introduces here the concept of “District” without further explanation of its functions or
attributions. All articles of the Constitution refer to the administrative organization of the state as divided in
Departments and municipalities. Some assume that some representatives at the constitutional convention
wanted to introduce a difference between rural and urban municipalities (Barboza, 1993), but the term
“Districts” is not mentioned in any other part of the National Constitution.
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the limits of this Constitution and its laws, enjoy political, administrative, and normative
autonomy for the management of its interest and autarchy for the collection and investment
of its resources”.
The table 18 below summarizes the organization of the State and the powers of the
different levels of government as established by the 1992 Constitution.
Table 18: Organization of the Paraguayan State – Powers by Level of Government
Legislative Authority
(With the capacity to
enact laws)

National Level

The National
Congress (two
chambers, Deputies
and Senators)

Departmental
Level
(Gobernaciones)

- No decentralized
legislative authority
- Deputies are elected
by direct vote of
inhabitants of each
Department for
national congress
- Departmental Juntas
or Councils enact
administrative or
regulatory ordinances
but do not enact laws
in the formal sense
- Municipalities have
Councils or Juntas but
these do not have
legislative powers,
they enact
administrative or
regulatory ordinances

Municipal Level
(Intendencias)

Administrative
Authority
(With the capacity to
enact and enforce
administrative
regulations, impose
administrative
sanctions, etc.)
Executive Power (the
President of the
republic, the Vicepresident, assisted by
Ministers)
- Governors are the
executive power at the
Departmental level
- Departmental
Councils enact
administrative rules

Judicial Authority
(With capacity to
resolve and decide
conflicts, impose
sentences, and are of
universal enforcement)

- Mayors are the head
of the executive at the
local level
- Municipal Juntas
enact administrative
regulations
- Misdemeanor courts
impose administrative
sanctions only

- Local judges of the
misdemeanors courts
are not member of the
Judicial branch and can
only impose
administrative
sanctions

Source: author based on Flecha, Sosa et al., 2003
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Judicial Power
(Supreme Court,
Tribunals, and Judges)
- There is no
decentralization of
judicial activities
- There are judicial
districts with regional
judges and tribunals but
are dependent on the
National Judicial
system
- Judicial districts do
not necessarily match
Departmental limits

Departmental Governments in Paraguay
Article 161 of the Constitution established that the governments of the 17
Departments would be presided over by a governor and by a Departmental Council or Junta
(see Table 18 above). Both the governors and the members of the Departmental Council
are elected directly by the residents of the Department, and only councilmembers can be
reelected. For the first time, in the 1993 election, governors and Departmental councils
were elected.
One potential problem in the office of governors: the 1992 Constitution (Article
161), as well as the Administrative Departmental Law (Law 426/94), established that
governors are expected to represent the president in the Department, even though governors
are directly elected by the people. This provision creates tension between governors and
the president when conflicts of interest arise between the residents of the Department and
the sometimes broader concerns of the national government (Rosenbaum & Rodriguez
Lagier, 1995).
Under the Constitution, and the Administrative Departmental Law, governors are
responsible for the “general administration of the government.” They can create
secretariats to help them better administer governmental issues such as health, education,
public works, planning, etc., according to their priorities. Departmental Councils must have
a minimum of seven members and a maximum of twenty-one with the same number of
alternates. Each Council must have one president, one vice-president, and two secretaries.
Councils can enact ordinances, statutes, and regulations; they have a supervisory role over
the actions of the Departmental executive, and approve Departmental development plans
and the budget. Overall, though, the functions of the Departmental councilmembers are not
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clearly defined and this has resulted in many confrontations with governors, and even in
calls for their dissolution.37
In summary, and according to the Constitution and the Administrative Law,
Departmental governments have the following authority (Rosenbaum & Rodriguez Lagier,
1995):
1. To coordinate activities with different municipalities of the Departments; to
organize Departmental services that jointly affect more than one municipality;
2. To prepare and approve Departmental development plans, which must be
coordinated with the National Plan of Development;
3. To prepare and approve a budget to be submitted to the Ministry of Finances
and approved in the nation’s general budget by the National Congress;
4. To coordinate and support activities of the national government in the territory,
especially in the areas of health and education;
5. To facilitate the creation of Departmental development councils.

Departmental governments should also: coordinate the activities of the Regional
Health Councils and the Education Councils; and the provision of services such as water,
electricity, public works, and transportation. Through Departmental development plans,
Departmental governments should promote agriculture, industry, and commerce. In reality,

37

Interviews with Paraguayan politicians, political scientists and analysts, news analysts. Asuncion,
September 2013 and December 2014.
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and given the significant diversity among the 17 Departments, 38 the level of services
provided by these Departmental governments varies greatly.

Departmental Revenues
As stated above, Departmental governments are governed by the Administrative
Departmental Law (Law 426/94) and by the National Constitution. Most Departmental
governments consider the law to be too restrictive on their fiscal autonomy and on their
attributions and functions.
In terms of revenue, Departments are highly dependent on transfers from the central
government, as up to 80% of their revenue is transferred from the central government
(COPLANEA interviews), and the remaining 20% is transferred from municipalities. The
Constitution established that 15% of the revenue collected by municipalities on property
taxes should be transferred to the Departments (Article 169), but the Administrative
Departmental Law failed to establish clear transfer mechanisms. As a result, since the
beginning of the decentralization process in Paraguay, the Ministry of Finance has at times
moved very slowly, or not at all, in distributing collected revenue to the Departments.
Departments also receive transfers from the Valued Added Tax (15%) collected in
the Department, and from gambling, earmarked for education, health, and public works. In

38

The Department of Central, for example, the one closest to the capital city of Asuncion, is the smallest
geographically but the most populous Department with a population of over 1.5 million (2008) representing
35% of the population, it has the best social standards and infrastructure; and it concentrates more than 56%
of the country's industries (http://www.central.gov.py/newsite/?page_id=26). On the other hand, the
Department of Alto Paraguay, though much larger in land area, has a population of approximately 12,000
(http://www.dgeec.gov.py/Publicaciones/Biblioteca/Atlas%20Censal%20del%20Paraguay/20%20Atlas%2
0Alto%20Paraguay%20censo.pdf)
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the case of gambling, Article 40 of the law transfers the revenues from gambling licenses
to the municipalities, which then are required to transfer a percentage to the Departments.
Finally, beginning in the year 2000, Departments also received transfers from
royalties collected by the national government for administering the Itaipu and Yacireta
national hydroelectric dams (Law 1309/98).

These funds can be used for capital

improvements but under no circumstances for personnel salaries or benefits.
In terms of expenditures, Departmental governments, per the national Constitution,
have autonomy in the use of their revenues. National legislation also established that
governors and Departmental councilmembers must be paid from the Department budgets
(Law 426/94), and they must abide by the national Administrative Financial Law, which
establishes that Departmental budgets must be approved by Congress (Law 1535/99).
Table 19 below summarizes the legal framework pertaining to resource revenue and
expenditure of Departmental governments.
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Table 19: Legal Framework of Departmental Governments Finances
Judicial Norm
1992 Constitution

Revenues

Administrative
Departmental
Law 426/94
Law 1309/98
(Royalties law)
1992 Constitution

Administrative
Departmental
Expenditures Law 426/94
National
Administrative
Financial Law
(Law 1535/99)
1992 Constitution
Budget

National
Administrative
Financial Law
(Law 1535/99)

Description
Transfers from the national
budget
15% of municipal property
taxes
15% of municipal property
taxes
Transfers from gambling and
Value Added Tax (VAT)
Transfers from royalties of
Itaipu and Yacireta dams

Comments
- Governorships do not
have their own source of
revenues
- Extremely dependent on
central government
transfers
- Do not collect national
taxes or any other
revenue
- Lack of clear formulas
for national transfers

Autarchy on expenditures
decisions
Salaries for governors and
councilmembers must be
paid from Department
budget
Departmental governments
must adjust their
expenditures to what the law
allows

Autarchy is not fully
implemented as there are
irregularities in the way
central government
transfers the funds, and
due to changes in transfer
formulas

Budgets are prepared by
Departmental governments,
submitted to the Ministry of
Finance for approval, and
included in the national
budget which is approved by
Congress

- Departments do not
approve their own budget
as its final approval is
subject to the Ministry of
Finances and Congress
- Any reallocation of the
budget must be approved
by the Finance Ministry

Source: adapted from COPLANEA, 2003

Municipal Governments in Paraguay
Mayors and local council members (Municipal Juntas) are elected by direct vote of
a municipality’s residents (Article 167). The population and budget size of each
municipality determine the number of members to the municipal councils. Mayors can be
reelected for one additional five-year term (Law 1830/01), and councilmembers can be
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indefinitely reelected. The first time mayors and municipal councilmembers were directly
elected was in 1991.
The 231 Paraguayan municipalities are regulated by Articles 166 to 171 of the 1992
Constitution, and by Administrative Municipal Law 3966 of 2010, which replaced Law
1294 of 1987, the law that was in effect for much of the period analyzed in the present
research.39 Article 166 of the national Constitution defines municipalities as “organs of
local government, with legal status which have political, administrative, and normative
autonomy within their jurisdiction, as well as absolute sovereignty in the collection and
investment of resources.” In contrast to the constitutionally created governmental
Departments, municipalities have always existed in the political/administrative history of
Paraguay, though subject to political manipulations and without much autonomy. In the
Stroessner years, mayors were named by the regime.
Mayors are the general administrators of the municipality and have the authority to
organize its secretariats, directorates, and divisions according to the needs and budget of
the respective local government. Members of the municipal councils are elected at the same
time as the local executives. The municipal councils must be organized—with a president,
a vice-president, and advisory committees—and they are free to establish internal rules.

39

As mentioned above, in the 1990-2010 period that concerns this study, the Municipal Administrative Law
in force was Law 1294 of 1987. In fact, much of the political discussions and divisions regarding furthering
decentralization within Congress and the political establishment involved the approval of the new municipal
administrative law, which was not achieved until 2010. Thus, we will consider the impact of Law 1294/87
throughout the study and discuss the approval of Law 3966/10 later on.
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Article 168 of the Constitution lists the functions and attributions of municipal
governments, which include40:
1. Jurisdictional management in areas of urban planning, environment, education,
culture, sports, tourism, sanitary and health services, municipal police, and
inspection agencies;
2. The administration of its assets;
3. The budget process;
4. Participation in national revenues;
5. Issuance of ordinances, regulations, and resolutions;
6. Regulation and control of transit, including public transportation and other
matters related to the circulation of vehicles.
The Administrative Municipal Law 1294/87 (which was in effect until 2010)
described in more detail the responsibilities of municipal governments, which
included:
1. The establishment of a physical, urban, and rural planning system;
2. The construction, maintenance, and beautification of urban infrastructure such
as parks, streets, avenues, and other public places that are not under the
jurisdiction of another government agency;
3. Waste collection and disposal;
4. Maintaining public places and roadways;

40

This section relies on the 1995 study of Paraguayan decentralization done by the author in conjunction
with Dr. Allan Rosenbaum for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) – see references for
details.
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5. Urban planning authority;
6. Control, regulation, and services of public markets, slaughterhouses, fairs, and
other food services;
7. Fostering public education, culture, sports, health, public housing, public
welfare programs, and tourism;
8. Responsibilities over the preservation of historical monuments, works of art,
and other cultural heritage in cooperation with other government agencies;
9. Regulation and control of public transportation, and other matters related to the
circulation of vehicles;
10. Regulation and control of public performances, publicity, sports and
recreational activities;
11. Creating and regulating the municipal police force for the control and
performance of only those activities under municipal jurisdiction;
12. Furnishing services such as lighting, water, and sewage in the event that these
services are not provided by other public services;
13. Some environmental authority for the protection of the environment;
14. Promoting citizen participation;
15. Other functions in compliance with municipal goals.
Law 1032/96 expanded the role of municipalities in the area of health with the
establishment of a National Health System that sought to decentralize certain aspects of the
health services provision to the municipalities. The law allowed for the creation of Local
Health Councils, which were coordinated by the municipalities. In the area of education,
changes in the legal framework gave municipalities a role in the coordination of District
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Education Councils (Law 1264/98), with mixed results in their implementation. A series
of other laws (Law 1590/2000 for national transportation; Law 100/92, which created local
and regional transportation councils; Laws 1100/97 and 1561/2000 for environmental
protection; and Law 1334/98 for consumer protection) expanded the role of local
governments in regulating and controlling public transportation and protection of the
environment and consumers, but little has been accomplished in terms of actual
decentralization of such services.
While the listing of areas of responsibility suggests that municipalities have broad
authority and power, the reality is for all but a dozen or so of the country’s local
governments, the situation is quite different. Lack of local capacity, and the country’s long
tradition of centralized government, has meant that most public services are in fact
delivered by agencies of the national government. Asymmetries between municipalities are
also a factor, as some (e.g., the capital city of Asuncion, Encarnacion, and Ciudad del Este)
are able to provide certain services, but others are too small to effectively deliver services.

Municipal Revenues
Historically, local governments in Paraguay have been very limited in their capacity
to collect revenue. National governments have no tradition of revenue sharing with
subnational governments. Laws dealing with municipal finances are, for the most part, very
restrictive and highly centralized in that their administration is closely overseen by central
government agencies, in particular the Ministry of Finances.
A significant change in this regard began with the new Constitution, which allowed
municipalities to collect property taxes and retain 70% of those revenues. The remaining
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30% is split 15% for the Departments, and 15% to a fund that supports the poorest
municipalities. In the case of Asuncion, territorially not a part of any Department, its 30%
is split between the poorest municipalities’ fund and one to improve transportation and
access to the capital city.
A central problem for municipalities in collecting property taxes is that values have
historically been under-assessed, and municipalities are restricted in their ability to increase
those assessments. Under the law, the Ministry of Finances sets the values to be charged
for the property tax, composed of a tax on the land and a tax on the building. Tax rates are
differentiated by geographic zones within each municipality, and the value is assessed
depending on whether properties are located on paved streets, stone streets, or dirt roads.
Municipalities do have a wide array of fees and services (including car registrations
and licenses, waste collection, and road maintenance, among others) they can charge and
have autonomy to collect such fees.41 Municipalities can also generate revenue by renting
property. Revenue from gambling activities and, especially, royalties from the Itaipu and
Yacireta hydroelectric dams, which are transferred by the central government, are also
important sources of revenue for Paraguayan municipalities.
Municipal expenditures vary by municipalities’ size and capacity to provide
services, but overall, municipal employee salaries represent the largest expenditure item
(up to 45% of municipal expenditures), followed by capital investments in maintaining
streets, buildings, and machinery equipment and repairs of municipal property.

41

Municipalities in Paraguay are not allowed to create new fees; only the fees allowed by law can be
collected, though they can regulate the amounts charged as long as the increases are in line with services
provided.
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In terms of budget authority, local governments in Paraguay have autonomy and
autarchy in the approval of their budgets, not needing supervision or approval from the
Ministry of Finance and/or the Congress. Table 20 below summarizes the legal framework
pertaining to the resource revenue and expenditure of municipal governments.

Table 20: Legal Framework of Municipal Governments Finances
Judicial Norm
1992 Constitution
Administrative Law
1294/87
1992 Constitution
Administrative Law
1294/87
National Tax system
Law 125/91
Revenues
Law 881/81
establishing the tax
regime for the City
of Asuncion
Law 620/76 and Law
135/91 establishing
the tax regime for
other municipalities

Law 1309/98
establishing the
transfer of royalties
from Itaipu and
Yacireta to

Description
Autarchy for revenue
collection
- Municipalities can
collect property taxes and
retain 70%
- Law 125/91 provides
that the property tax is
assessed by the National
Cadaster Service, an
agency of the central
government
- Municipalities can
collect taxes and fees
Regulation of municipal
taxes:
-Taxes (licenses, raffles
and drawings,
entertainment, slaughter
houses, construction
permits, etc.)
- Fees (sweeping and
cleaning, garbage
collection, inspection of
vehicles, cemeteries, etc.)
- Contributions
(pavement maintenance,
etc.)
Coparticipation of
royalties funds
transferred from the
central government
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Comments
- Lack of proper cadasters
and tensions with the
National Cadaster Service
office
- Lack of willingness to
collect taxes and fees by
municipal authorities
- Complexity of fees and
of the new tax regime,
making implementation
confusing
- Ministry of Finances not
always cooperative in the
transferring of funds
- Lack of local capacity
hinders local
governments’ ability to
implement projects or
make use of newly
transferred funds from
royalties
- Lack of transparency
from the Central
government in the
transferring of funds.
- Complicated transfer
formulas makes the
process difficult to
understand
- Lack of transparency at
the local level

Municipalities and
Departments
1992 Constitution
Expenditures Administrative
Municipal Law No.
1294/87

1992 Constitution

Budget

Law 1535/99
Financial
Administration of
the State

Autarchy in the
administration and
investment of resources
Legislation establishes
maximum salaries that
can be paid to mayors
and councilmembers, as
well as to administrative
personnel
They are authorized to
approve their own
budgets; are not
dependent on the
Nation’s budget. They
must comply with norms
established by Law
1294/87
Applies to them only in
case the Law 1294 is
repealed

- There is no agreement as
to who is “administrative
personnel”
- Maximums are based on
estimated revenues and
not on actual revenue,
thus creating
overestimated budgets
- There are major tensions
and conflicts in many
municipalities between
the mayors and their
Municipal Councils
during the budget
approval process and
during its implementation

Source: adapted from COPLANEA, 2003

Fiscal Decentralization in Paraguay
As mentioned in previous sections, Paraguay’s 1992 Constitution and a number of
laws, some enacted before the transition to democracy and others after the new Constitution
was approved, have sought to establish a legal framework for fiscal decentralization. The
process has been characterized by conflict emanating from transfer formulas that are not
clear, the very limited revenue collecting capacity at the local level (and nonexistent for
regional governments), and from the preeminence and control of much of the process by
the Finance Ministry, which has been at times reluctant, if not overtly opposed, to fully
transfer funds entitled (by law) to local and regional governments.
Part of the problem has been, and continues to be, the overgrown size of the
Paraguayan state. Efforts to reduce its size have been marred by confrontations, tensions,
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and regressions. The Presidency of Juan Carlos Wasmosy (1993-1998), for example,
launched a campaign to privatize state enterprises, which was met with much resistance by
unions, Congress, and many in society (Neffa, 1996). The efforts, aimed at reducing the
number of state employees, failed over the years, and in fact, the Paraguayan state
continues to be the largest employer in the country. In 1994, 97.4% of public expenditures
were done by the national government, only 0.3% by Departmental governments (which
had recently been created in 1992), and 2.3% by municipalities. In 1990, the proportion
was 99% by the central government, and just 1% by municipalities (Neffa, 1996). Not
much has changed, according to the President of the Governors Association: by 2010, the
share of expenditures by Departmental governments was still about 1% and for local
governments around 2%.42
The national budget is divided in two parts: the central administration (Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial branches), and the so-called “decentralized entities or agencies,”43
including the 17 Departments, the National University system, Social Security agencies,
development promotion agencies, public enterprises, and financial entities.

42

Meeting with President of Paraguay’s Governors’ Council. Asuncion, December 2014.

43

Decentralized entities or agencies is the name given by the Paraguayan government to public agencies
having legal status and autonomy to administer themselves, but are dependent on the Executive branch; they
include the Paraguayan Central Bank, autonomous agencies such as the Directorate for Social Welfare
(Direccion de Beneficiencia y Ayuda Social – DIBEN), the National Social Prevention agency, public
enterprises, and national universities. It is important to note that Departments are under this category, further
complicating the relations between governors and the Executive branch.
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Evolution of Fiscal Decentralization Reforms
Before the creation of governorships and the reforms introduced by the new
Constitution in favor of local governments, the only fiscal relationship between
municipalities and the central government was the property tax, which was collected by
the central government, which subsequently transferred 16% to the then Institute of
Municipal Development (IDM—reflecting Spanish terminology).
The IDM distributed only 4.4% of the funds to the municipalities of the interior,
1.6% was transferred to the Water and Sewer agency (CORPOSANA, itself a public
agency), and 10% was retained by the IDM for its budget. The Municipality of Asuncion
received its 16% directly from the Ministry of Finance. No municipality was allowed to
borrow foreign loans without approval from the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank,
and investment projects in any municipality needed to be included in the National
Development Plan, previously approved by the Secretariat for Technical Planning—an
agency of the Executive branch (Neffa, 1996).
The first wave of reforms occurred after the 1992 Constitution was adopted. The
Constitution was vague on revenues for Departments (Article 164), basically leaving
Congress to enact the necessary laws that would fund the newly created governorships.
A second wave of reform in the early 1990s included the approval, in 1994, of the
Administrative Departmental Law 426 (Ley Orgánica Departamental 426/94) that
regulated transferring 15% of the property tax revenue to the Departments. The new law
introduced sharing (coparticipacion) of the Value Added Tax (VAT or IVA in Spanish).
That is, 15% of the VAT collected in each Department was to be transferred back—

138

earmarked for health, education, and public works. The law assigned the Ministry of
Finance with the collection and transfer of funds, as well as coordinating and controlling
the collection process.
Another new source of revenue for Departmental and local governments introduced
by the new law was the sharing of gambling revenues. The law established that 30% of
funds collected from gambling activities would be transferred to the municipalities where
gambling occurred, 30% to the Departments of the involved municipalities, 30% to the
Directorate of Social Welfare of the Central Government (DIBEN—reflecting Spanish
terminology),44 and 10% to the national treasury. The percentages are slightly different for
the Municipality of Asuncion, where most of the gambling in Paraguay occurs, with 25%
to the Municipality, 20% for Departmental governments, 20% for poor municipalities, 25%
for the DIBEN, and 10% for the national treasury (Rosenbaum & Rodriguez Lagier, 1995).
Subregional governments are bound by the Financial Administrative Law 1535/99
that regulates their relationship with the Ministry of Finance in terms of budget preparation
and approval, particularly budgets of Departmental; the law established what is/is not
allowable under the law in terms of expenditures.
A new, and very important, component of subnational governments’ revenue was
the approval, in 1998, of Law 1309 that established and regulated the transfers of royalties
paid to the Paraguayan central government by Brazil and Argentina for the use of the Itaipu
and Yacireta hydroelectric dams. These funds are transferred to the Ministry of Finance,
which, in the year 2000, began incrementally transferring them to Departmental

44

Dirección de Beneficiencia – DIBEN
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governments (up to 10%), and to municipalities (up to 40%), with differentiation between
those territories affected or not by the flooding caused by the construction of the dams (see
Table 21 below).45
Table 21: Royalties Distribution by Level of Government

Central Government
Departmental Gov.
Municipal Govs.
Totals

Affected by
Flooding

No Flooding

Total

5%
15%
20%

5%
25%
30%

50%
10%
40%
100%

Source: Author

Problems in the implementation of these laws abound. The lack of political will by
the Ministry of Finance to transfer funds to Departmental governments in particular
seriously hinders their ability to provide services as required by law or to implement
programs and projects beneficial to their communities. Withholding of transfer, or
transferring partial amounts, is one of the most common concerns expressed by governors,
mayors, and former subnational authorities.46 Lack of capacity and knowledge of financial
management is also a concern for many smaller municipalities and governorships, as well

45

The 50% corresponding to subnational governments started to be transferred in the year 2000. No more
than 10% was transferred on that first year, the proportion was to increase by 5% each year.
46

In fact, as early as November of 2014, serious tensions emerged between the Ministry of Finance, the
Executive, and the Governors Association for the approval of the 2015 budget, where Governors complain
that the Ministry of Finance is only transferring 2% of the VAT and not the fully 15% as required by Law
426. http://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/politica/gobernadores-no-quieren-ser-floreros-responde-luisgneiting-al-ministro-1306659.html and http://www.ultimahora.com/lanzoni-niega-conspiracion-y-ratificalegalidad-aumento-n848057.html

140

as the lack of clear rules and procedures (or effective implementation of the rules and
procedures) to ensure transparency and accountability.
The central government continues to have a prominent role in the country’s public
spending both in total numbers, and as a proportion of the country’s GDP. The size of the
central government can also be assessed by the amount of expenditures that are committed
to the payment of salaries and pensions. In the 2000-2009 period, the bulk of public
spending was used to pay for personnel services,47 representing about 44% of the public
spending; 14% was paid on pensions and retirement and about 20% on capital expenditures
(Table 22); an average of 16% was spent on infrastructure (Zarate, 2010).

Table 22: Composition of Total Expenditures of the Central Government (as
percentage of the total)
Area

Average
Average
Average
2000 – 2004 2005 – 2009 2000 - 2009
Current Expenses
79.2
77.8
78.5
Personnel Services
43.6
43.7
43.6
Goods and Services
6.2
7.0
6.6
Contract Interests
6.9
4.9
5.9
Current account transfers
6.1
7.2
6.6
Pensions & Retirements
15.1
12.5
13.8
Capital Expenditures
20.8
22.2
21.5
Infrastructure Investment
17.8
15.1
16.5
Financial Investment
0.2
0.7
0.4
Transfers
2.8
6.4
4.6
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
Source: Zarate, 2010

47

It includes salaries for doctors and teachers.
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In 1994, central government expenditures represented almost 15% of GDP, and by
the year 2000, its share represented about 23% of GDP and the Departmental governments
had barely reached 0.4% of GDP (Table 23).

Table 23: Departmental Governments Spending Compared with the Central
Government and GDP
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Average Annual
Change
Percentage share of Governorships in Central Administration and GDP
G/GDP
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.2
G/CA
0.9
1.2
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.8
1.2
Source: COPLANEA, 2003

The Departmental governments’ continued dependence on transfers from the
central government affects their ability to plan and to allocate funds for social programs or
to provide services. Decentralized entities, dependent on the Executive branch, on the other
hand, have maintained and increased their participation in public spending.
Since the year 2000, royalties have become a fundamental source of revenue for
both Departments and municipalities. Some Departments’ budgets have become more
dependent on royalties than others. In the Departmental government of Central (the largest
in terms of population and economic activity), royalties were 14.5% of capital revenues for
the 2000-2006 period, while in both Canindeyu and Neembucu it was over 80%
(COPLANEA, 2007). The Departmental government of Central has been transferred
approximately 4.6 million US dollars in the 2000-2010 period, while the Department of
Neembucu has received approximately 11.2 million US dollars (Table 24 and 25 below).
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Table 24: Revenues as per contract for Itaipu and Yacyreta (Millions of Guaranies)
Year
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008 (*)
Total

Itaipu
61,830
139,348
137,193
178,226
335,395
463,686
346,001
369,299
504,327
702,490
942,478
718,782
1,226,604
1,128,009
1,443,967
1,422,386
1,550,503
1,566,768
1,539,656
1,314,943
16,091,891

Yacyreta
5,947
13,844
24,497
47,125
54,287
62,967
57,281
131,184
47,673
220,473
100,534
316,122
502,595
672,184
2,256,713

* Projected
Source: COPLANEA based on Ministry of Finance
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Total
61,830
139,348
137,193
178,226
335,395
463,686
351,948
383,143
528,824
749,615
996,765
781,749
1,283,885
1,259,193
1,491,640
1,642,859
1,651,037
1,882,890
2,042,251
1,987,127
18,348,604

Table 25: Transfers of Royalties to Departmental Government (in Guaranies, millions)
Departments

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Concepción

-

547.8

968.4

1,302.7

San Pedro
Cordillera

300.5 547.8
300.5 547.8

968.4
968.4

1,302.7
1,302.7

Guairá

300.5 547.8

968.4

Caaguazú

300.5 547.8

Caazapá

300.5 547.8

Itapúa*

2007

2008

1,620.8 2,221.5 2,703

2,939.1

3,039.0 3,918.0

3,732.0

1,620.8 2,250.3 2,865
1,620.8 2,455.8 2,605

2,939.1
1,762.2

3,039.0 3,918.0
3,039.0 3,918.0

3,732.0
3,733.0

1,302.7

1,620.8 2,477.2 2,760

2,939.1

3,040.0 3,918.0

3,732.0

968.4

1,302.7

1,302.7 2,230.2 2,845

2,952.1

3,039.0 3,918.0

3,733.0

968.4

1,302.7

1,620.8 2,287.8 2,878

2,939.1

3,039.0 3,918.0

3,732.0

976.5 1,780.5

2,324.1 3,126.4

3,908.8 6,044.5 6,908

7,053.9

7,295.0 9,404.0

8,958.0

Misiones*

976.5 1,780.5

2,324.1 3,126.4

3,908.8 4,721.8 6,454

7,053.9

7,294.0 9,403.0

8,958.0

Paraguarí

300.5 547.8

968.4

1,302.7

1,620.8 1,999.5 2,875

2,939.1

3,039.0 3,918.0

3,732.0

Alto Paraná*
Central

976.5 1,780.5
-

2,324.0 3,126.4
968.4
1,302.7

3,908.8 5,253.7 6,784
1,620.8 2,272.9 1,840

7,053.9
2,939.1

7,468.0 9,404.0
3,039.0 3,918.0

8,958.0
3,732.0

Ñeembucu

300.5 547.5

2,324.1 3,126.4

3,908.8 5,451.7 4,030

7,053.9

7,295.0 9,404.0

8,958.0

Amambay

300.5 547.5

968.4

1,302.7

1,620.8 2,325.8 2,435

2,939.1

3,039.0 3,918.0

3,732.0

Canindeyú*

976.5 1,780.5

2,324.1 3,126.4

3,908.8 5,871.5 6,899

7,053.9

7,295.0 9,403.0

8,958.0

Presidente Hayes

300.5 547.8

968.4

1,302.7

1,620.8 2,448.0 2,102

2,939.1

2,474.0 3,919.0

3,733.0

Boquerón

-

968.4

1,302.7

1,620.8 2,325.8 2,875

2,939.1

3,039.0 3,918.0

3,732.0

Alto Paraguay

300.5 547.8

968.4

1,302.7

1,620.8 2,215.7 2,338

2,939.1

3,098.0 3,918.0

3,732.0

Total Millions of guaraníes 6,911 13,147
Exchange Rate
3,485 4,105

23,241
5,719

31,264
6,436

38,675
5,969

54,853
6,164

62,204 69,374
5,620
5,047

72,610
4,350

94,035
4,860

89,577
4665

Millions of US dollars

4.1

4.9

6.5

8.9

11.1

17.1

19.3

19.2

2.0

-

3.2

2005

2006

13.7

*Departments directly impacted by the flooding of Itaipu and Yacireta Source: www.hacienda.gov.py
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2009

2010

Transfers from VAT tax and gambling are not as important to the Departments
compared to royalties transfers, except in economically significant Departments such as
Central, Alto Parana, and Itapua—where the VAT and gambling revenues are substantial
(Tables 26 and 27 below).

Table 26: Transfers of Valued Added Tax to Departments (in Guaranies, millions)

Years
Gobierno(Departamental
Concepción
San+Pedro
Cordillera
Guairá
Caaguazú
Caazapá
Itapúa
Misiones
Paraguari
Alto+Paraná
Central
Ñeembucu
Amambay
Canindeyú
Presidente+Hayes
Boquerón
Alto+Paraguay
Totals

2001
++++++++++717
++++++++++320
++++++++++514
++++++++++693
+++++++1,680
++++++++++701
+++++++2,779
++++++++++574
++++++++++422
+++++++7,692
+++++++7,448
++++++++++504
++++++++++920
++++++++++752
++++++++++793
++++++++++376
++++++++++469
(((((27,354

2002
++++++++++422
++++++++++230
++++++++++355
++++++++++759
+++++++1,209
++++++++++251
+++++++1,973
++++++++++520
++++++++++594
+++++++8,481
+++++++5,850
++++++++++333
++++++++++857
++++++++++499
++++++++++500
++++++++++254
++++++++++329
(((((23,416

2003
++++++++++228
++++++++++180
++++++++++312
++++++++++635
++++++++++675
++++++++++133
+++++++1,365
++++++++++418
++++++++++319
+++++++9,351
+++++++4,046
++++++++++179
++++++++++462
++++++++++256
++++++++++270
++++++++++149
++++++++++163
(((((19,141

2004
++++++++++936
+++++++2,929
++++++++++577
+++++++1,539
+++++++2,364
++++++++++628
+++++++2,666
++++++++++763
+++++++1,249
+++++++9,786
+++++10,901
++++++++++932
+++++++1,727
+++++++1,029
+++++++1,078
+++++++1,291
++++++++++668
(((((41,063

2005
++++++++++873
++++++++++544
++++++++++596
+++++++1,616
+++++++2,399
++++++++++659
+++++++2,799
++++++++++801
+++++++1,310
+++++10,151
+++++11,308
++++++++++793
+++++++1,814
+++++++1,052
++++++++++871
++++++++++598
++++++++++660
(((((38,844

2006
+++++++1,013
++++++++++575
++++++++++632
+++++++1,666
+++++++2,613
++++++++++699
+++++++2,949
++++++++++878
+++++++1,390
+++++++9,756
+++++13,589
++++++++++870
+++++++1,815
+++++++1,145
+++++++1,195
++++++++++674
++++++++++716
(((((42,175

2007
+++++++1,013
++++++++++575
++++++++++632
+++++++1,666
+++++++2,613
++++++++++755
+++++++3,185
++++++++++948
+++++++1,502
+++++11,609
+++++14,482
++++++++++940
+++++++2,076
+++++++1,237
+++++++1,291
++++++++++737
++++++++++788
(((((46,049

2008
+++++++1,305
++++++++++669
++++++++++726
+++++++1,914
+++++++3,012
++++++++++803
+++++++3,389
+++++++1,037
+++++++1,598
+++++12,382
+++++15,555
++++++++++999
+++++++2,209
+++++++1,316
+++++++2,556
++++++++++786
++++++++++838
(((((51,094

2009
+++++++1,419
++++++++++727
++++++++++789
+++++++2,081
+++++++3,274
++++++++++873
+++++++3,684
+++++++1,128
+++++++1,737
+++++13,459
+++++16,908
+++++++1,086
+++++++2,402
+++++++1,431
+++++++1,492
++++++++++855
++++++++++911
(((((54,256

2010
+++++++1,419
++++++++++728
++++++++++789
+++++++2,081
+++++++3,274
++++++++++873
+++++++3,684
+++++++1,128
+++++++1,736
+++++13,459
+++++16,909
+++++++1,086
+++++++2,402
+++++++1,431
+++++++1,493
++++++++++855
++++++++++912
(((((54,259

Source: Ministry of Finance report on “Transfers to Departmental Governments, 2001 – 2011”
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Totals
((((((((((9,345
((((((((((7,477
((((((((((5,922
((((((((14,650
((((((((23,113
((((((((((6,375
((((((((28,473
((((((((((8,195
((((((((11,857
((((((106,126
((((((116,996
((((((((((7,722
((((((((16,684
((((((((10,148
((((((((11,539
((((((((((6,575
((((((((((6,454
((((((397,651

Table 27: Transfers to Departmental Governments – Gambling Revenues (in
Guaranies, millions)

Years
Gobierno(Departamental
Concepción
San+Pedro
Cordillera
Guairá
Caaguazú
Caazapá
Itapúa
Misiones
Paraguari
Alto+Paraná
Central
Ñeembucu
Amambay
Canindeyú
Presidente+Hayes
Boquerón
Alto+Paraguay
Totals

2001
++++++++++338
++++++++++442
++++++++++374
++++++++++341
++++++++++545
++++++++++802
++++++++++572
++++++++++218
++++++++++333
+++++++1,345
+++++++1,750
++++++++++271
++++++++++300
++++++++++295
++++++++++221
++++++++++210
++++++++++220
(((((((8,577

2002
++++++++++195
++++++++++406
++++++++++407
++++++++++358
++++++++++461
++++++++++349
++++++++++509
++++++++++144
++++++++++432
+++++++1,572
+++++++1,810
++++++++++287
++++++++++343
++++++++++351
++++++++++171
++++++++++210
++++++++++245
(((((((8,250

2003
++++++++++195
+++++++2,165
++++++++++492
++++++++++358
+++++++1,461
++++++++++672
+++++++1,527
++++++++++144
++++++++++523
+++++++1,632
+++++++3,636
++++++++++303
++++++++++416
++++++++++805
++++++++++227
++++++++++210
++++++++++377
(((((15,143

2004
++++++++++460
++++++++++601
++++++++++516
++++++++++458
++++++++++731
++++++++++419
++++++++++745
++++++++++383
++++++++++507
++++++++++850
+++++++2,744
++++++++++357
++++++++++394
++++++++++357
++++++++++362
++++++++++301
++++++++++316
(((((10,501

2005
++++++++++624
++++++++++844
++++++++++655
++++++++++602
++++++++++973
++++++++++562
+++++++1,010
++++++++++506
++++++++++695
+++++++1,394
+++++++3,142
++++++++++490
++++++++++553
++++++++++564
++++++++++483
++++++++++431
++++++++++395
(((((13,923

2006
++++++++++504
++++++++++723
++++++++++594
++++++++++225
++++++++++803
++++++++++419
++++++++++696
++++++++++444
++++++++++529
+++++++1,184
++++++++++899
++++++++++409
++++++++++421
++++++++++482
++++++++++403
++++++++++329
++++++++++327
(((((((9,391

2007
++++++++++504
++++++++++723
++++++++++594
++++++++++225
++++++++++803
++++++++++590
+++++++1,062
++++++++++531
++++++++++731
+++++++1,424
+++++++3,310
++++++++++515
++++++++++581
++++++++++592
++++++++++507
++++++++++453
++++++++++414
(((((13,559

2008
++++++++++660
++++++++++893
++++++++++693
++++++++++637
+++++++1,030
++++++++++594
++++++++++811
++++++++++535
++++++++++453
+++++++2,665
+++++++3,333
++++++++++519
++++++++++585
++++++++++597
++++++++++511
++++++++++456
++++++++++385
(((((15,357

2009
++++++++++556
++++++++++698
++++++++++633
++++++++++561
++++++++++901
++++++++++535
++++++++++784
++++++++++478
++++++++++651
+++++++1,098
+++++++2,471
++++++++++428
++++++++++491
++++++++++566
++++++++++487
++++++++++395
++++++++++367
(((((12,100

2010
++++++++++735
++++++++++993
++++++++++771
++++++++++709
+++++++1,146
++++++++++661
+++++++1,190
++++++++++595
++++++++++820
+++++++2,408
+++++++3,711
++++++++++577
++++++++++652
++++++++++665
++++++++++569
++++++++++508
++++++++++465
(((((17,175

Totals
((((((((((4,771
((((((((((8,488
((((((((((5,729
((((((((((4,474
((((((((((8,854
((((((((((5,603
((((((((((8,906
((((((((((3,978
((((((((((5,674
((((((((15,572
((((((((26,806
((((((((((4,156
((((((((((4,736
((((((((((5,274
((((((((((3,941
((((((((((3,503
((((((((((3,511
((((((123,976

Source: Ministry of Finance report on “Transfers to Departmental Governments, 2001 – 2011”

Municipalities also saw their revenues increased with the collection of property
taxes, as allowed by the new Constitution, and the capacity to collect fees for goods and
services. The table below (Table 28) shows the evolution of public spending between 1993
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and 2001, and the total amount spent by local governments in Paraguay. In this period,
municipalities more than doubled their budget expenditures.48

Table 28: Evolution of Public Expenditure Budget (in Guaranies, millions)
Year
1993
1995
1996
1999
2000
2001

Central Government
2,004,109,352,786
3,262,506,809,605
4,186,941,636,802
5,757,711,119,794
7,604,699,304,000
6,563,116,873,652

Governorships
37,269,381,000
70,610,656,000
171,286,255,000
196,747,781,000
170,940,893,000

Municipalities
52,497,190,626
90,449,931,935
122,093,042,072
76,953,301,641
137,216,203,590
144,574,000,000

Source: COPLANEA. Central Government and Governorships from the Ministry of Finance. Municipalities,
information for the years, 1993, 1993, 1995, 1996 and 1999 are from the IDM; years 2000 and 2002 are from
the Accounting Division of the Ministry of Finance

Transfers from royalties have become a major source of revenues for local
governments (e.g., Departments) in Paraguay. In a 2007 study of 145 municipalities of
Paraguay, the percentage of local government expenses paid for with royalties increased
from less than 0.6%, in the year 2000 when transfers begun, to 46.4% in 2006 (see Table
29), with an average of 83% spent to cover capital expenses 49 (Table 30). Royalties
transfers have become a source of tension between subnational governments because so
many modifications have been made to the law, resulting in many local governments not

48

It is important to note again, that the capacity to collect and spend revenues in Paraguay varies greatly by
the size of the municipality. The Municipality of Asuncion is by far the largest in the country and the one
that spends the most in comparison to other municipalities.
49

The law requires that up to 80% of royalties revenues be spent on capital investment.
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directly affected by the flooding caused by the Itaipu and Yacireta dams benefitting more
than those directly affected.50

Table 29: Percentage of Selected Municipalities’ Total Expenses Financed by
Royalties
Year
Expenses

2000
0.6

2001
13.9

2002
31.2

2003
25.9

2004
32.9

2005
45.8

2006
46.4

Source: COPLANEA, 2007

Table 30: Percentage of Royalties Spent by Selected Municipalities (by type of
Expense)
Type of
Expense
Current
Expenses
Capital
Expenses
Financial
Expenses
Total

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Average

12.9

15.3

10.5

22.2

20.8

17.2

15.8

16.4

86.6

84.7

88.6

76.4

79.2

81.5

84.2

83.0

0.5
100.0

0.0
100.0

0.9
100.0

1.4
100.0

0.0
100.0

1.3
100.0

0.0
100.0

0.6
100.0

Source: Adapted from COPLANEA, 2007

Table 31 shows the total royalties transfers to municipalities by Departments from
2005 to 2010 with significant increases each year since the transfers began. In fact, when
comparing the total figures of Table 32 and Table 33 (which show total revenue transfers—
including gambling, royalties, and other resources), the overreliance on royalties is clearly
seen. For example, the municipalities of the Department of Neembucu received in 2010 a
total of 25.4 billion Guaranies, of which 24.1 billion came from royalties’ transfers. Even

50

http://www.vanguardia.com.py/v1/index.php/edicion-impresa/politica/item/3306-ley-de-royalties-sepromulgó-como-intercambio-de-favores-pol%C3%ADticos and http://www.abc.com.py/edicionimpresa/editorial/injusta-e-irracional-distribucion-de-royalties-y-compensaciones-553719.html
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the Department of Central, one of the richest and the most populated in the country, the
difference is barely 4 billion Guaranies—it received total transfers of 63.9 billion
Guaranies and royalties were 58.1 billion. Gambling is not a significant source of revenue
for local governments (Table 33).

Table 31: Royalties Transfers to Municipalities, by Departments (in Guaranies,
millions)

Years
Departaments
Capital
Concepción
San*Pedro
Cordillera
Guairá
Caaguazú
Caazapá
Itapúa
Misiones
Paraguari
Alto*Paraná
Central
Ñeembucu
Amambay
Canindeyú
Presidente*Hayes
Boquerón
Alto*Paraguay
Totals

2005
************8,877
************5,473
**********13,205
**********12,166
**********10,051
**********15,573
************6,483
**********52,590
************9,076
**********10,779
**********27,038
**********30,449
**********16,928
************2,572
**********14,186
************3,451
************1,033
************1,105
33333333241,035

2006
************7,823
************4,832
**********11,668
**********10,805
************8,506
**********13,737
************5,730
**********47,621
************7,968
************9,520
**********26,154
**********26,864
**********15,076
************2,273
**********12,035
************2,645
************** 865
************** 968
33333333215,090

2007
************9,883
************6,413
**********14,733
**********14,676
**********12,194
**********18,681
************7,353
**********64,049
**********10,776
**********12,895
**********35,046
**********40,074
**********20,004
************3,207
**********17,348
************4,824
************1,644
************2,143
33333333295,943

2008
************8,121
************6,059
**********16,623
**********14,873
**********11,725
**********18,614
************7,705
**********65,059
**********10,129
**********12,615
**********33,336
**********43,427
**********18,801
************2,875
**********16,869
************5,590
************1,509
************2,218
33333333296,148

2009
**********13,942
************9,983
**********19,644
**********17,951
**********16,469
**********22,744
************9,402
**********79,908
**********13,125
**********15,528
**********44,179
**********52,474
**********20,954
************3,991
**********20,341
************7,070
************2,576
************3,337
33333333373,618

2010
**********10,873
************8,819
**********19,731
**********19,628
**********15,980
**********24,367
**********10,547
**********82,551
**********13,184
**********16,793
**********46,111
**********58,177
**********24,148
************4,312
**********21,361
************7,838
************2,335
************3,243
33333333389,998

Totals
333333333359,519
333333333341,579
333333333395,604
333333333390,099
333333333374,925
33333333113,716
333333333347,220
33333333391,778
333333333364,258
333333333378,130
33333333211,864
33333333251,465
33333333115,911
333333333319,230
33333333102,140
333333333331,418
33333333333 9,962
333333333313,014
333331,752,313

Source: Prepared with information of the reports “Transfers to Municipal Governments” of the Ministry of
Finance
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Table 32: Total Transfers to Municipal Governments by Departments (all sources,
in millions, Guaranies)

Years
Departaments
Capital
Concepción
San-Pedro
Cordillera
Guairá
Caaguazú
Caazapá
Itapúa
Misiones
Paraguari
Alto-Paraná
Central
Ñeembucu
Amambay
Canindeyú
Presidente-Hayes
Boquerón
Alto-Paraguay
Totals

2005
------------10,958
--------------6,309
------------15,843
------------14,254
------------12,063
------------18,086
--------------7,876
------------55,588
------------10,210
------------12,811
------------28,949
------------33,824
------------18,847
--------------2,892
------------15,037
--------------4,024
--------------1,261
--------------1,193
4444444444270,025

2006
-------------9,904
-------------5,486
-----------13,811
-----------12,742
-----------10,170
-----------15,933
-------------6,786
-----------50,142
-------------8,930
-----------11,231
-----------27,728
-----------30,329
-----------16,598
-------------2,559
-----------12,758
-------------3,017
-------------1,006
-------------1,050
444444444240,180

2007
-----------11,455
-------------6,877
-----------16,340
-----------15,895
-----------13,706
-----------20,641
-------------8,020
-----------65,995
-----------11,533
-----------14,387
-----------36,632
-----------42,951
-----------21,060
-------------3,397
-----------17,998
-------------5,213
-------------1,730
-------------2,270
444444444316,100

2008
-----------15,409
-----------10,931
-----------22,316
-----------20,344
-----------18,687
-----------25,472
-----------10,708
-----------83,159
-----------13,951
-----------17,546
-----------45,990
-----------56,415
-----------21,752
-------------4,219
-----------21,251
-------------7,620
-------------2,818
-------------3,486
444444444402,074

2009
-----------15,910
-----------10,797
-----------22,139
-----------20,347
-----------18,604
-----------25,397
-----------10,658
-----------82,988
-----------14,002
-----------17,536
-----------46,131
-----------55,736
-----------22,038
-------------4,172
-----------20,989
-------------7,666
-------------2,782
-------------3,466
444444444401,358

2010
-----------11,109
-------------9,857
-----------22,807
-----------22,645
-----------18,945
-----------28,139
-----------12,471
-----------86,589
-----------14,482
-----------19,532
-----------48,981
-----------62,977
-----------25,413
-------------4,762
-----------22,762
-------------8,987
-------------2,632
-------------3,447
444444444426,537

Totals
4444444444474,745
4444444444450,257
444444444113,256
444444444106,227
4444444444492,175
444444444133,668
4444444444456,519
444444444424,461
4444444444473,108
4444444444493,043
444444444234,411
444444444282,232
444444444125,708
4444444444422,001
444444444110,795
4444444444436,527
4444444444412,229
4444444444414,912
4444442,056,274

Source: Prepared with information of the reports “Transfers to Municipal Governments” of the Ministry of
Finance
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Table 33: Gambling Transfers to Municipal Governments (by Departments,
Guaranies, millions)

Years
Departaments
Capital
Concepción
San(Pedro
Cordillera
Guairá
Caaguazú
Caazapá
Itapúa
Misiones
Paraguari
Alto(Paraná
Central
Ñeembucu
Amambay
Canindeyú
Presidente(Hayes
Boquerón
Alto(Paraguay
Totals

2005
((((((((((((((((((( '
(((((((((((((( 428
((((((((((((1,669
((((((((((((1,198
((((((((((((1,284
((((((((((((1,348
(((((((((((((( 920
((((((((((((1,520
(((((((((((((( 706
((((((((((((1,241
(((((((((((((( 578
(((((((((((((( 171
((((((((((((1,349
(((((((((((((((( 86
(((((((((((((( 342
(((((((((((((( 321
(((((((((((((( 150
((((((((((((((((((( '
444444444413,311

2006
((((((((((((((((((( '
(((((((((((((( 274
((((((((((((1,241
((((((((((((1,112
((((((((((((1,009
((((((((((((1,112
(((((((((((((( 616
((((((((((((1,146
(((((((((((((( 564
(((((((((((((( 975
(((((((((((((( 377
(((((((((((((( 359
(((((((((((((( 992
(((((((((((((((( 68
(((((((((((((( 274
(((((((((((((( 137
(((((((((((((((( 68
((((((((((((((((((( '
444444444410,324

2007
((((((((((((((((((( '
(((((((((((((( 119
(((((((((((((( 760
(((((((((((((( 407
(((((((((((((( 777
(((((((((((((( 766
(((((((((((((( 286
(((((((((((((( 525
(((((((((((((( 308
(((((((((((((( 624
(((((((((((((( 348
(((((((((((((((( 63
(((((((((((((( 497
((((((((((((((((((( '
(((((((((((((( 166
(((((((((((((( 167
((((((((((((((((((( '
((((((((((((((((((( '
44444444444 5,813

2008
((((((((((((1,467
(((((((((((((( 423
((((((((((((1,274
(((((((((((((( 963
(((((((((((((( 801
((((((((((((1,155
(((((((((((((( 564
((((((((((((1,515
(((((((((((((( 427
(((((((((((((( 790
((((((((((((1,467
((((((((((((3,283
(((((((((((((( 586
(((((((((((((( 228
(((((((((((((( 574
(((((((((((((( 366
(((((((((((((( 101
(((((((((((((( 149
444444444416,133

2009
((((((((((((1,968
(((((((((((((( 385
(((((((((((((( 814
(((((((((((((( 762
(((((((((((((( 668
((((((((((((1,028
(((((((((((((( 385
((((((((((((1,296
(((((((((((((( 360
(((((((((((((( 656
((((((((((((1,227
((((((((((((2,463
(((((((((((((( 448
(((((((((((((( 181
(((((((((((((( 452
(((((((((((((( 293
(((((((((((((((( 99
(((((((((((((( 129
444444444413,614

2010
(((((((((((((( 236
(((((((((((((( 535
((((((((((((1,254
((((((((((((1,213
(((((((((((((( 987
((((((((((((1,502
(((((((((((((( 637
((((((((((((1,930
(((((((((((((( 577
((((((((((((1,028
((((((((((((1,894
((((((((((((3,787
(((((((((((((( 777
(((((((((((((( 284
(((((((((((((( 710
(((((((((((((( 478
(((((((((((((( 171
(((((((((((((( 204
444444444418,204

Totals
44444444444 3,671
44444444444 2,164
44444444444 7,012
44444444444 5,655
44444444444 5,526
44444444444 6,911
44444444444 3,408
44444444444 7,932
44444444444 2,942
44444444444 5,314
44444444444 5,891
444444444410,126
44444444444 4,649
44444444444444 847
44444444444 2,518
44444444444 1,762
44444444444444 589
44444444444444 482
444444444477,399

Source: Prepared with information of the reports “Transfers to Municipal Governments” of the Ministry of
Finance

Overall, the process of fiscal decentralization that began in Paraguay in the early
1990s has created some institutional and legal framework conducive to its
implementation—however, serious political and administrative concerns remain.
Overreliance on transfers from the central government, in particular royalties, place
local and Departmental governments at the mercy of administrators from the Executive
branch, especially from the Ministry of Finances. The transfers are not reliable and their
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amounts fluctuate, many times, depending on the political circumstances of the moment.
In addition, subnational governments’ lack of political will to enforce full collection of
revenues (in the case of municipalities), and the poor professionalization and capacity of
much of their human resources (see next section, below), complicate the planning,
implementation, and evaluation needed to provide services and goods.

Human Resources at the Subnational Level
Since the beginning of the decentralization process, the lack of capacity at the
subregional level of government has been, and continues to be, one of the major challenges
to the effective implementation of fiscal and administrative decentralization. This reality
has continuously been cited by the central government to limit the extent to which
decentralization is allowed to progress.
In Paraguay, a large number of people actively work in the public sector. Although
difficult to ascertain and verify, in 2003, the Central Government employed an estimated
174,362 individuals (including contractors, but excluding armed forces or health and
education workers), up from about 96,600 in 1994 (Rosenbaum & Rodriguez Lagier,
1995). By 2008, the number had increased to 204,722; and by 2013, the number had
reached 255,253.51 The increase in personnel at the Departmental level can only be inferred
from the growth in payroll services paid, which has increased, in particular from 2003

51

http://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/economia/la-cantidad-de-funcionarios-publicos-crecio-cercadel-50-en-una-decada-1235762.html and
http://www.portalguarani.com/2335_victor_manuel_sosa/16871_reinventando_la_gestion_publica_en_el_p
araguay__por_jose_maria_ibanez__victor_manuel_sosa.html
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onward (coinciding with increased fiscal transfers). At the local level, numbers are nearly
impossible to find. By 1994, about 4,000 people worked in the 217 municipalities, of which
nearly 3,200 did so at the Municipality of Asuncion; in 2003, almost 53% of all municipal
employees worked for the Municipality of Asuncion, and by 2013 the number of
employees at the Asuncion municipality had increased to 8,000.52
Efforts to improve capacity have occurred under the auspices of, and mostly funded
by, multilateral organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the United
Nations Development Program, the Organization of American States, the U.S. Agency for
International Development, and the German and Japanese cooperation, as well as many
others, sometimes in collaboration with national and foreign universities. However, these
efforts have lacked continuity.
The constant growth of the public sector, and the continued politization of many
government positions, as well as nepotism and patronage at all levels, have slowed reforms
in the public sector. The Paraguayan Organization of Municipal Cooperation (OPACI), the
municipal association that represents the interests of Paraguayan local governments, has
promoted training for its members but these initiatives have not been sustained, and the
lack of financial resources continues to be a challenge.
The problems of human resources at the Departmental and municipal levels can be
summarized as (COPLANEA, interviews):

52

http://www.ultimahora.com/nomina-funcionarios-confirma-superpoblacion-la-municipalidad-asuncionn735226.html Information on the number of employees at other municipalities is not readily available. Even
the Secretary of Civil Service does not have access to that information, and there is great reluctance to provide
such information.
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•

Lack of administrative, fiscal, and managerial capacity, with serious difficulties in
budget management;

•

Tensions between long term civil service and political appointees, delaying in many
instances the implementation of programs and services;

•

Growth of number of staff as result of political cycles, by which every new election
brings a wave of new people hired by the winners of the election;

•

Promotions that are still very much based on political loyalties and not necessarily
on performance or capacity; in fact, there are no evaluations of personnel
performance;

•

Absence of rules for selecting and promoting public personnel at the Departmental
or municipal level;

•

Lack of flexibility to dismiss employees;

•

The opposition to Law 1626/2000 (which regulates and seeks to professionalize
civil service in Paraguay) by many unions and interest groups who have challenged
the constitutionality of the law—making civil service reform difficult to achieve;

•

Lack of transparency and accountability for the actions of civil service workers,
their incomes, and non-compliance with their obligation to submit affidavits of
goods and properties owned.

Furthermore, many of these problems are believed to have contributed to increasing
society’s perception that subnational authorities are corrupt, inept, and unable to solve the
problems of their communities and regions. All of this adds to a general lack of trust and/or
support of the decentralization process, and can potentially be a serious drawback in a
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historically centralized country, where decentralization was presented as a solution to so
many local needs. 53

Other Institutional Players: the OPACI and the Governors’ Council
OPACI
Paraguayan local governments are represented by the Paraguayan Organization for
Municipal Cooperation (OPACI—reflecting Spanish terminology), which acts as the
country’s municipal association. The former Institute for Municipal Development (IDM—
reflecting Spanish terminology) was abolished in 1999. The objective of OPACI is to
advance the interests of municipalities.
The objectives of OPACI, as described on its organizational chart, are:
1)

To promote cooperation between the municipalities of the country and
coordinate actions with state and non-state public institutions to promote
development and planned common interests;

2)

To strengthen the system of municipal autonomy enshrined in the
Constitution and Municipal Organic Law;

3)

To promote and develop the institutional strengthening of municipalities
and consolidation of participatory democratic principles;

4)

To promote citizen participation in municipal management.

53

Interviews with former Governors of Department Central and COPLANEA. Asuncion, Paraguay,
September 2013
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The association aims to act as an intermediary between local governments and other
government branches, in particular the Executive and the Legislative branch, but its impact
has been, at best, moderate. Its capacity to lobby Congress in support of municipalities has
been weak, and the organization itself has been impacted by internal political infighting.
Its financial situation has been seriously strained by the 1992 Constitution, which
eliminated the mandatory appropriation of funds from municipalities that provided the
organization with significant revenue. Its capacity to provide services to municipalities has
thus been impacted as well. Many mayors have become more autonomous and have opted
not to be part of OPACI.
Another problem for OPACI is that members of municipal councils have not been
actively involved in it, and actually have their own association, the Paraguayan Association
of Municipal Councils (AJUMPA), which strives to represent the interests of elected
councilmembers.
With a staff of about 80 people, the organization’s principal activity is to gather
data about license plates, vehicles, and drivers’ licenses,54 to record this data at a computer
center, and to report it to the municipalities, other public and private organizations, and to
private citizens. It also performs a limited amount of legal counseling and drafts and
modifies laws pertaining to the municipal movement, and occasionally organizes
conferences and seminars (Rosenbaum & Rodriguez Lagier, 1994; interviews).

54

These activities represent 80% of the organization’s budget, and it is now being challenged by new
legislation that would create a National License Plates Registry endangering OPACI’s main source of
revenue.
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One of the main achievements of OPACI, during the decentralization discussions,
was its success in lobbying Congress for the approval of the royalties transfer legislation.55
It is one of the few occasions in which the organization was truly effective. However,
overall, OPACI has not developed a clear vision of how local governments can express
their common interests in order to present an effective lobbying effort.

The Governors’ Council
The Paraguayan Council of Governors was created in the mid-1990s to provide
newly elected governors with a voice and to influence the discussion and implementation
of decentralization policies at that time.56 The organization represents the interests of the
country’s 17 governors.
Each governorship contributes to the organization’s general budget57 and its staff is
quite limited (about 4 people, mainly administrative personnel). The lobby activities of the
Council reside mainly in its president, and its effectiveness depends on this person’s ability
to negotiate with the national Congress and/or with the president of the republic on issues
related to greater fund allocation to the governorships. Governors do not have clear
responsibilities under the Constitution, and existing laws do not clarify their duties and

55

Interview with OPACI legal counselor, Asuncion, Paraguay, December 2014.

56

In fact, the Institute for Public Management & Community Service, through a US Agency for International
Development (USAID) funded project, played a fundamental role in giving technical assistance and advice
for the creation of the Council.
57

In December of 2014, the amount paid by each Governorship to the Council was about 2 million guaranies
or the equivalent of about US$ 400 per Department. Most of the budget is spent on office rental and staff
salaries. (Interview with Governors’ Council President, December 2014).
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responsibilities. As indicated in previous sections, their financial situation is also very
unstable—completely relying on transfers from the central government.58
In short, the Governors’ Council has yet to emerge as an established influential
voice in Paraguayan politics. After more than 20 years of decentralization, the governors
have not been able to establish themselves as autarchic subnational authorities, and quite
often there is conflict and overlap with local authorities.

Some Final Thoughts on Paraguay’s Political and Fiscal Decentralization
Overall, Paraguay’s political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization has been a
slow process with many advances and setbacks along the way. Since 1992, with the
approval of the new Constitution, the country has achieved great successes in political
decentralization; elections are perceived as fair by the majority and citizen participation
has increased and many are empowered.
Fiscal decentralization has been difficult to implement. It has resulted, mostly, in
subnational governments becoming increasingly reliant on central government transfers,
with little effort from local governments to increase their revenue capacity or to lobby for
the creation of new revenue sources. The situation is worse for Departmental governments.
Royalties from the hydroelectric dams have become the most important revenue source for
subnational governments, leaving them in a weakened position when dealing with the
central government.

58

The unreliability of the transfers by the central government continues to be a serious problems for
Governors in Paraguay. For example, of the 15% of the VAT collected in each Department that must be
transferred to them, the Ministry of Finances only transfers about 0.8% of the funds collected (interview with
Council’s President, Asuncion, December 2014).
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Administrative decentralization has also advanced, especially in health, and
setbacks have occurred in education policy, water management, or public transportation.
A lack of clear understanding by most social actors of what decentralization means and
implies, as well as an unwillingness from most political actors to commit to the
decentralization process, have infused the process with uncertainty.
Transforming a historically, culturally, and socially centralized country into a more
decentralized one is a process that takes many decades; thus, the process is not without
controversy, political power struggles, and differences in opinion. In the case of Paraguay,
decentralization was seen as an integral part of the democratization process in the search
of ensuring political stability.
The next chapter will examine the process by which key decentralization legislation
was approved or opposed at the Congressional level, and the role played by political parties
in this process.
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CHAPTER FIVE

DECENTRALIZATION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS:
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES: THE CASE OF COLOMBIA AND
PARAGUAY
Introduction
This chapter will analyze the role of political parties and their interactions in
defining and implementing decentralization processes (in particular, for the provision of
public services), as well as their role in promoting or slowing down decentralization in
Paraguay and Colombia. In doing so, we will analyze the role of political parties,
clientelism, and patronage in slowing down decentralization in Paraguay (Hypothesis 3)59;
and, in the case of Colombia, the chapter will examine the role of political parties and how
decentralization has promoted the emergence of multiple regional and local political
movements and parties, contributing then to the slowdown of decentralization in that
country as well (Hypothesis 4)60.
The main assumption is that the greater the support of political parties represented
in legislative bodies for decentralization policies, the greater the probability for the
passage, approval, and implementation of public service decentralization laws. As a
consequence, special attention will be given to the underlying political relationships

59

H3: In the case of Paraguay, the presence of one dominant and clientelistic political party has slowed down
political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization; thus, shifting the balance of power back to the national
government.
60

In the case of Colombia, the presence of multiple regional and local political movements, as power is
centralized in the Executive branch, the slowing down of decentralization is more likely; thus, shifting the
balance of power in favor of the national government.
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driving this process (Gomez, 2003). The principal theoretical framework is based on
institutional theory: “an institutional approach is one that emphasizes the role of
institutions and institutionalization in the understanding of human actions within an
organization, social order, or society” (March & Olsen_B; 1998).
This chapter will begin with a brief literature review of political parties and how
decentralization has impacted them through deinstitutionalization and fragmentation. It
will also examine the role of Paraguayan and Colombian political parties to test how these
parties have or have not supported the enactment and implementation of decentralization
legislation in each country to assess the validity of the abovementioned hypotheses. It will
conclude that in both countries, the decentralization movement has indeed slowed down;
and, political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization has impacted already weakly
institutionalized political parties in a way that has hindered the progression of the process.

Conceptual Framework: Political Parties and Decentralization
According to institutional theories, political democracy depends not only on
economic and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions. Thus, rules,
procedures, roles, and strategies become important (March & Olsen, 1989).
Decentralization is then the result of the interaction of numerous institutions including
legislative bodies, political parties, subnational levels of government, executive office
holders and their deputies, and civil society, among others. Utilizing an institutional
approach, in the case of decentralization in Colombia and Paraguay, we will examine the
role played by presidentialism and its relationship to stable democracies (Mainwaring,
1990; Haggard & McCubbins, 2001), political clientelism and how it affects the
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implementation (or abandonment) of policies (Roniger, 2004), and how presidentialism
and state size affect party behavior in these two countries—as state size is key to
understanding the amount of resources controlled by the executive (Zucco, 2003).
The interactions between legislative bodies and the executive power may be
important in defining decentralization, as executives may be more interested in supporting
legislation that furthers administrative decentralization, and legislators more in favor of
legislation that enhances political decentralization (Escobar-Lemmon, 2003).
In the research literature, the role played by political parties, party systems, and
electoral systems is examined. To understand decentralization, close attention should be
paid not only to the nature of political parties and how subnational leaders are able to
influence national leaders (Willis, Garman, & Haggard, 1999; Montero & Samuels, 2004),
but also to the structure of individual parties at particular points in time and the electoral
incentives that might encourage the advancement of decentralization reforms (O’Neill,
2005). According to this view—what O’Neill proposes as an “electoral theory of
decentralization” —central level politicians with greater political sensitivity to subnational
political outcomes are more likely to support decentralization.
Parties that are regionally based, and are institutionalized, will support
decentralization as it would allow them to access politically significant government
positions (Escobar-Lemmon, 2003). In this view, the internal organization of political
parties becomes important, as those with strong state-level party organizations would back
decentralization: deputies from areas expected to benefit from decentralization will be
more likely to introduce decentralization legislation. Thus, parties that are not nationally
dominant would support decentralization. Furthermore, parties with decentralized
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nomination procedures are more likely to support decentralization (Escobar-Lemmon,
2003). According to this logic, legislators who must respond to subnational officials within
their parties are more likely to support decentralization than legislators who are more
responsive to national party leaders (Eaton, 2004; Dickovick, 2011).
Decentralization shifts the focus of competition from only the national level to
include both the local and regional levels. It changes the “cost of entry” into the political
arena for all parties involved, or must provoke fundamental changes to the internal
characteristics of political parties (Faguet, 2011).
Political decentralization, by increasing the number of political “positions,”
increases the number of politicians who are willing to run for office, and thus, increases
the competitive incentives to offer better public services. “The principle of democratic
advancement also increases subnational politicians’ effort to win popular support, which
strengthens their party competitively in national elections”, “thus national party
sponsorship of local challengers can raise competition in local elections, and so improve
the quality of local policy-making” (Faguet, 2011).
The party system can be fundamental to understanding how decentralization is
shaped. In a party system that favors national elites, local leaders can be forced to accept
institutional changes that compromise their power (Weingast, 2011). On the other hand, in
political systems where local elites have dominance, the reverse could occur and national
elites might be forced to accept subnational elites’ preferences.
When the “legislative accountability” system makes congressmen accountable to
provincial party leaders and not voters, it allows those provincial party leaders to gain
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control over areas of national policy in ways that allow them to perpetuate themselves in
their leadership positions and extend their influence.
Scholars also argue that decentralization in Latin America further weakened
already fragile party systems (Sabatini, 2003). When decentralization was initiated, both
national and international actors expected that it would reinvigorate political parties and
make them more responsive to local and regional needs. “In practice, however, national
parties have often floundered amid the new circumstances, with locally defined parties
emerging where old national organizations have failed” (Sabatini, 2003: 139).
Direct appointment of governors and mayors, as well as control of financial
resources, contributed to party discipline and cohesion. But, the discrediting of national
parties, along with the availability of hundreds of directly elected positions, created the
conditions for aspiring politicians and political movements to enter politics without having
to depend on the traditional parties for support. “The irony has been that many of the parties
that pushed for decentralization are simply not well-equipped organizationally to deal with
its political consequences” (Sabatini, 2003: 149).
Citizens’ trust in government and in political parties would also seem to play an
important role in the decentralization process (Escobar-Lemmon, 2003). In her analysis of
the Venezuelan and Colombian cases, Escobar-Lemmon posits, “While the data support
prior findings that decentralization is supported by parties whose future electoral
prospects are better at the subnational level, the analysis also shows that citizen’s trust in
government and greater wealth affect deputies’ support for decentralization” (2003: 683).
As the effectiveness of the government to deliver services and goods is questioned, citizens
will demand more responsiveness; thus, deputies that represent those areas of the country
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with the least trust in government will back decentralization as a way of increasing trust in
government.
In contrast, Falleti argues that more important than the structure of political parties
and electoral incentives is the sequence by which decentralization occurs in each particular
situation. Falleti posits that the “type of territorial interests (national or subnational) that
prevails in the reforming coalitions is the main factor leading to the adoption of different
types of policies” (2010: 13). It would then be relevant to any analysis of political
decentralization to examine how coalitions are formed and what kind of impact subnational
authorities have on the decentralization process. Falleti’s “sequential theory of
decentralization” proposes that the types of reforms, their extent, and their degree are
largely dependent on what type of decentralization is implemented first, and who initiates
the process (national versus subnational governments). The sequential order of different
types of decentralization (fiscal, administrative, and political) will help explain the
resulting change in the intergovernmental balance of power.

Decentralization and the Deinstitutionalization of Political Parties
As previously noted, policy outcomes are the result of the interaction among many
different political players, and this interaction is influenced by different political and
institutional factors (Scartascini et al., 2010) such as the political party system; the type of
legislature present in each country (and the dynamics within it); the presidential system;
the legal framework established by the national constitution and the laws (including the
electoral law), and; the autonomy and capacity of the national and subnational
bureaucracies; as well as the judiciary and civil society.
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Also, as mentioned above, the level of institutionalization is a significant
characteristic of party systems. The more institutionalized a party system is, the more likely
that parties will have long-term programmatic goals with clear positions on key policy
issues and concrete proposals (Jones in Scartascini et al., 2010). In parties where the
program is important and stable, voters demand more accountability and people know what
to expect from each party. Institutionalized party systems also help ensure greater policy
consistency “because of the strong role played by parties in political recruitment and the
concerted efforts made by elites to promote and protect the value of the party label. In
weakly institutionalized party systems, interparty competition is based primarily on
personal appeals or short term populist policy proposals designed to win over voters and
then be forgotten once the election takes place” (Jones, 2010: 20-21).
The consequences of decentralization for political parties have been extensively
researched (Dargent & Muñoz, 2011; Hopkin, 2003; Harbers, 2010; Lago-Peñas, 2010;
Scartascini et al., 2010), and there is general consensus that decentralization reforms
present a financial resource dilemma for parties as they are forced to compete in many
more elections (in the case of political decentralization). Competing in many different
jurisdictions requires not only resources for the campaigns, but also increases the need for
clientelistic resources to ensure loyalty to the party.
Fiscal decentralization also increases the autonomy of local leaders from national
party leaders, as they no longer necessarily need this support to win elections. Also, by
opening new spaces for political competition at the subnational level, local authorities gain
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new protagonism to the detriment of traditional party bosses who were previously involved
in appointing local and regional authorities—and thus could gather clout both locally and
nationally.
Dargent and Muñoz (2011) contend that deinstitutionalization of political parties is
linked not only to the distribution of power, but also to resources. “Resources are crucial
for party aggregation, and that reforms designed to distribute power and resources in the
political system can reduce local candidates’ incentives to join and remain loyal to
political parties, particularly when those parties’ reputations are weak” (page 47).
Decentralization, in particular fiscal decentralization, has contributed to reducing
the power of traditional political parties’ regional bosses who controlled the distribution of
resources and could deliver votes during national elections. These bosses were able to
ensure clientelistic programs and strongly opposed decentralization—understanding that
the reforms would empower mayors and governors to the detriment of their influence. For
resource-based theories, regional party bosses become the “gatekeepers” of those
resources, and through patronage are able to provide incentives to local politicians to be
and remain loyal to the political party (Dargent & Muñoz, 2011). It is argued that—
especially—fiscal decentralization breaks this link of dependence between national and
local political leaders, allowing local political cadres to advance their own electoral goals.
As a result, party cohesion and discipline is harder to maintain and enforce and, as a
consequence, the party system gradually deinstitutionalizes (Dargent & Muñoz, 2011;
Harbers, 2010).
Thus, the spatial and geographical aspects of party competition matter when we
examine decentralization, and the “territorial dimension” or “nationalization” of the parties
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can be defined as the extent to which political parties obtain similar vote shares throughout
the national territory (Harbers, 2010).
As decentralization reforms have been implemented around the world, the
“denationalization” of electoral politics has become more common with the arrival of new
political movements that represent regional or local interests gaining more power and
relevance than traditional political parties. Thus, the need to better understand the territorial
dimension of electoral politics becomes clear (Hopkin, 2003)
Jones (2010) also suggests that “differences in nationalization also are likely to
have public policy consequences. Decisions related to national transfers to subnational
units, administrative reform, and subsidies may be strongly influenced by the degree of
party system nationalization. Where a party’s base of support is relatively constant across
geographic units, it may be more likely to treat all units equally. In contrast, where its
support varies widely across geographic units, the party may tend to base its decisions in
part on the degree of support it receives in specific geographic units” (page 26).
In analyzing the level of institutionalization and nationalization of the party system,
the following factors are particularly relevant: the individual(s) in control of the candidatenomination process; how the electoral system is designed; the timing of national and
subnational elections; and the level of autonomy of subnational authorities (governors and
mayors) (Jones, 2010; O’Neill, 2005).
In regard to the forces propelling denationalization of political parties, Hopkin
(2003) points to two reasons beyond regional power struggles that are insufficiently
studied: first, the influence of clientelism and/or the presence of powerful political figures
at the subnational level; and, second, the way national leaders or political parties adapt to
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the threat posed by the emergence of powerful subregional political parties, and the
increased importance of subnational and “supranational” electoral arenas.
If political parties are seen as organizations, and not as parts of a “party system,”
as Panebianco (1988, cited in Hopkins) posits, then it is important to examine how changes
in the political environment impact the ability of parties to adapt to changes. Panebianco
stresses the limitations to parties’ abilities to adapt and change posed by institutionalization
and the rigidities of party organizations. Thus, impacts such as decentralization pose a
challenge to parties, as they are not able to adapt rapidly to changes. In a process of
decentralization, with its concurrent “denationalization,” traditional parties are at a
disadvantage to adapt to those challenges.
“It is also the case that such reforms are not always welcomed by national-level
party organizers”, since “severe functional or territorial changes dislocate the party
organization and upset channels of patronage” (Ashford 1982, 1-2 in Hopkins, page 5).
Unintended consequences of institutional reforms are the result of changes in the
balance of power inside the party organization. When changes brought by decentralization
make elections revolve around local and regional issues, and voters cast their ballots in
favor of local and regional candidates to the detriment of national leaders, the internal
dynamics of the parties are changed. The balance of power will shift from the center to the
periphery.
Not all share the view of decentralization’s impact on the institutionalization of
political parties. Contrary to Harbers (2010) and Hopkin (2003), Lago-Peñas and LagoPeñas (2010) did not find empirical evidence supporting the relationship between the
degree of decentralization and the nationalization of parties. In their view, what matters is
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the internal dynamics and history of each party, and their ability to adapt to changes:
“decentralization reforms should be seen as a consequence of parties’ responses to
strategic opportunities and threats, and the organizational changes resulting from multilevel electoral politics are mediated by parties’ own internal histories and conflicts”
(Lago-Peñas & Lago-Peñas, 2010: 8). The internal dynamics of each political party are as
important to keep in mind as the level of influence that political subnational authorities
could have on national political authorities of the same party. Conflict, both within
subnational authorities and within national authorities, can limit their capacity to promote
or oppose decentralization reforms (Eaton, 2004).

Clientelism and Patronage
A danger of decentralization that is closely linked to the level of institutionalization
of political parties relates to clientelism and patronage. By decentralizing, new sources of
corruption and ineptitude are transferred to the local levels. New political actors are
introduced by decentralization and new relationships are established (Garcia-Guadilla &
Perez, 2002). But what is the relationship between clientelism/patronage and
decentralization? Does the presence of patronage and clientelism hinder or advance
decentralization?
Clientelism is defined as an exchange system based on a “complex of rules and
practices for the organization, representation, and control of demands and interests of
society; these relationships are based on political subordination in exchange for the
discretionary granting of available public resources and services” (Heredia, 1997 in
Garcia-Guadilla & Perez, 2002: 93).
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Clientelism in Latin America can be explained by politicians’ desire to rise within
their parties and as a first step toward building their political careers and by politicians’
inclination to see the goods and services of the state as primarily private benefits that will
help them muster the support they need from their colleagues to advance their political
careers. Public policies are also seen as goods useful to promote their careers (Benton,
2007).
“In Latin America, politicians have concentrated on promising particularistic
benefits rather than public goods because ‘patronage is the primary glue that holds modern
clientele networks together’ (Mainwaring, 1999:180). Those politicians with the greatest
ability to distribute largesse had the best chance of building support and surpassing party
colleagues during the race to further [their] careers” (Benton, 2007, 57).
Policy goals are thus sacrificed by the dynamics of patronage. Politicians will prefer
a candidate that offers better patronage benefits. Intra-party divisions are the logic
consequence of the struggle over state resources and goods. “Latin American politicians’
efforts to secure patronage and pork to build careers have led them to build minimum
winning coalitions rather than consensus around candidates, leading to divisive factional
disputes” 61 (Benton, 2007; 78). This also helps explain the tendency to shift policy
positions, the lack of strong ideology, numerous political allegiances, and the lack of
substantive policy platform. This type of behavior could impact the ability of reformers to
achieve decentralization—the continually changing positions of politicians affect the
possibility that decentralization reforms will be enacted and implemented.

61

Interviews with various Colombian political figures shared this view and noted that the Colombian
political and electoral system deepens this tendency.
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If political parties are highly institutionalized and programmatic, the parties would
compete based on policy, “in clientelist systems, political parties compete based on the
distribution of selective incentives to voters, and are judged by voters primarily based on
their ability to distribute/deliver these incentives” (Saiegh in Scartascini et al., 2010: 40).
Hilgers (2012) posits that clientelism involves an asymmetric relationship, but a
mutually beneficial one in terms of power and exchange for those who are part of the
exchange: “All clientelistic relationships operate a mediated and selective access to
resources and markets from which others are normally excluded” (2012: 26). At the core
of clientelism is the unequal power relationship by which political parties, leaders, and
their constituents establish the exchange of goods and services that often requires political
allegiance. Voting for the party, for example, would ensure the person has access to state
jobs or benefits.
As Hilgers notes, clientelism “erodes” (by inhibiting the development of a vibrant
civil society, dividing society, and weakening the legitimacy of the state), “accompanies”
(by letting clients choose among a number of patrons with access to resources), “and/or
supplements democratic processes”; democratic electoral processes not only allow for
different patrons to compete for clients, but also might provide opportunities for a new type
of patron and a new type of clientelistic relationship to arise (2012:17).

Political Parties and Decentralization in Paraguay:
The Persistence of Clientelism and Patronage
Paraguay’s political history and political development is marked, as in the case for
all countries, by its particular history and experiences. The two major wars that affected

172

the country in the nineteenth century, the Triple Alliance War and the Chaco War (for more
details, please refer to Chapter 4), shaped Paraguayan politics and its political parties. The
wars also initiated long periods of institutional instability and political turmoil among the
ruling elites and the political parties they represented (the two major parties—the Liberal
and the Colorado Parties—emerged in the 1890s). Without major migratory movements,
detached from major cultural trends, and wary of attack from its larger neighbors,
Paraguayan political culture expresses strong nationalism and proud independence.
The political instability brought by years of conflict among the ruling elites ended
in the 1950s with the arrival to power of Alfredo Stroessner, a military leader that would
unify the government in alliance with the Colorado Party and the armed forces. General
Stroessner exercised almost absolute control over the fate of the nation for the next forty
years. The Stroessner years were characterized by the monopoly of power, the
militarization of politics, the politization of the armed forces, and the militarization of the
Colorado Party. The Colorado Party became the conduit for clientelism and patronage:
Party membership was a prerequisite for entrance into the military academy, the police, or
any civil service job. Economically, any company aiming to provide services to the State
needed to have the approval of the Colorado Party.
By the late 1980s, internal divisions within the Colorado Party (always latent)
intensified as the General aged and succession questions challenged the status quo.
Economic malaise and poor economic performance further challenged the business elites’
alliance with the government, and frictions within the military led to a revolt against
Stroessner—who was deposed in 1989. It was the beginning of Paraguay’s transition to
democracy, but the process would be marked by years of political instability, as well as by
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the power struggles within the Colorado Party and its allies for the control of the State and
its resources.
With the return to democracy in 1989, a series of reforms were introduced including
the enactment of a new electoral code (introducing party primaries for the first time) and a
new Constitution in 1992.
The new Constitution was undoubtedly influenced by the political and cultural
history of the country. Central to that history had been very strong government
centralization and decades of authoritarianism. The new law of the land sought to remedy
some of those problems by: maintaining the division of powers but redefining it, creating
control institutions independent and autonomous of the government, and defining the
Paraguayan State as both unitary and decentralized.

Some of the most important reforms introduced by the 1992 Constitution include62:
a) Introduction of a broad definition of democracy with participatory and pluralist
principles;
b) Guaranteeing respect of peoples’ rights;
c) Introduction of the principle of decentralization as a key element of the Paraguayan
state. In this regard, Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution defined the Paraguayan
state as unitary and decentralized;
d) Curtailing presidential authority;
e) Assigning new control powers to the Congress;

62

For more details, please refer to Chapter 4
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f) Deeply reforming the Judicial system to ensure its independence;
g) Creating the Electoral Tribunal in charge of running the country’s elections.

In the new Constitution, the principle of decentralization is clearly expressed with the
new political/administrative structure established for administration of the territory.
Furthermore, the 1992 Constitution, for the first time in Paraguayan history, gave
administrative autonomy to the regional level (Departments) and reaffirmed the existing
autonomy of the municipalities. Both Departments and municipalities became
decentralized administrative territories. This element of autonomy is reinforced by the fact
that governors, mayors, and Departmental and local councilmembers are to be directly
elected by the people.
The impetus for decentralization in Paraguay occurred in the early 1990s—partly from
the efforts of representatives from the country’s interior in the constitutional convention
that aimed to balance the power gap between the capital city of Asuncion and the country’s
other regions. Years of appointed central government “delegates” and mayors had led to a
desire for more control at the local and regional level. This group, called the “bancada
campesina” or the “peasants’ delegation,” effectively lobbied the rest of the constitutional
representatives to include decentralization, and the elections of governors and mayors
directly by the people, in the new Constitution (Flecha & Martini, 1994; Nickson &
Lambert, 2002; interviews)63.
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Reviews of the discussions held by representatives to the Constitutional Assembly show great
discrepancies on what decentralization meant and what interpretation—and more significantly what impact
—it would have on the political structure of the country. Some argued in favor of just administrative
decentralization without any significant political decentralization, while representatives from the interior of
the country argued for both political and administrative decentralization as ways to ensure accountability
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Regardless of the reasons for decentralization, since the early 1990s, the country has
seen a push for policy decentralization in areas such as health, education, and finances.
Some reforms have been introduced with mixed results, but, since the early 2000s with the
serious political and economic crises that followed, there has been a lack of political will
to fully decentralize certain policy areas.
It is argued here that greater support from political parties and legislatives for
decentralization policies increases the likelihood of passing, approving, and implementing
public service decentralization laws.
The clientelistic and patronage nature of Paraguayan politics and political parties make
decentralization policies very difficult to implement.
The two main political parties of Paraguay are the Colorado Party and the Liberal Party.
The Colorado Party has traditionally been the dominant party and the one that controlled
the State and its resources through its unconditional alliance with General Stroessner. At
its origin, the Colorado Party represented the rural oligarchy; broadly speaking, its
ideological stance is considered more rural-oriented, traditional, clerical, statist, and
conservative (Abente Brun, 2007).

from the central government in Asuncion, increase citizen participation, and promote economic development.
Most debates transpired between members of the Colorado party, but some representatives of the Liberal
Party expressed similar concerns about the possible impact of declaring Paraguay both a unitary and
decentralized state.
Interviews with former representatives to the Constitutional assembly confirm the view that introducing
decentralization was a way for the central authorities of the Colorado Party, in particular, to appease the
demands of Colorado members from the interior, though central authorities were not particularly interested
in implementing it.
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The Liberal Party has traditionally represented the more urban, commercial
bourgeoisie; thus, it is considered more urban-oriented, more modern, mildly anti-clerical,
and more pluralist (Abente Brun, 2007).
Other political parties that have played a role following the transition to democracy
include the Patria Querida party (more urban and conservative, pro-business), the
Encuentro Nacional party (representative of the urban middle classes), and the Pais
Solidario Party (a socialist group). There is also a diversity of smaller left-leaning political
parties, including the Frente Guazu of former President Lugo, as well as a splinter group
of the Colorado Party that created the UNACE Party, led by former General Lino Oviedo
until his death.
All these parties have—during the 1990-2010 period—had representation in the
Paraguayan Congress, and have had the opportunity to move decentralization forward. But,
all these parties have matched the clientelistic nature and habits of the Colorado Party when
it was in power. The “pervasive logic of clientelism,” as Abente Brun calls it, has been
present in all Paraguayan governments since the transition to democracy regardless of who
controlled the Executive (i.e., the Colorado Party, for the most part except during the 20082010 period – see table 34), or the Congress (which alternated between the Colorado Party
and the opposition thanks to odd alliances with different parties, and with differences in
the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies).

177

Table 34: Control of Congress by Political Party
1989 – 1993 period
1993 – 1998 period
1998 – 2003 period

controlled by the Colorado Party
controlled by the opposition
controlled by the Colorado Party
shared control, but with more leverage by
the opposition parties
controlled by the Colorado Party

2003 – 2008 period
2008 – 2012 period
Source: author

All political parties in Paraguay perceive access to the State and its resources as the
only way to extend their political base64. A good indicator of this can be observed in the
growth of public sector employees, which has not diminished, regardless of political party
in control of the government. Table 35 below shows the percentage of GDP generated by
taxes and fees and the percentage of those revenues that are spent on salaries and benefits
to state employees—an indicator of what Abente Brun (2012) calls “bureaucratic
pressure.”

Table 35: Bureaucratic Pressure in Paraguay

Fiscal
Pressure
Bureaucratic
Pressure

19801989

19891999

2000200365

20042005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

7.7%

10.5%

9.7%

11.9%

12.0%

11.4%

11.8%

13.0%

13.1%

42.4%

61.3%

86.0%

61.0%

62.0%

63.0%

61.0%

66.0%

61.0%

Source: Abente Brun. Page 56

64

Review of local press throughout the 1990-2010 period, show many articles and reports on the increased
number of people named to government agencies, ministries, in the Parliament, and at the local and
Departmental level by each new administration regardless of the political power (newspapers Ultima Hora,
ABC, Radio Nanduty, among others).
65

This period saw the election of a vice-president of the Republic of the Liberal Party. The increase in
bureaucratic pressure can be attributed to a spike on government jobs created to benefit Liberal supporters.
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The table above shows that the capacity to collect revenue in Paraguay has been
increasing, but, more importantly, the expenses spent on salaries has increased from about
42% in the 1980 to 1989 decade to 61% by 201066. A recent study by the IDB notes that,
on average, the cost of public employees in the countries under study accounts for 41% of
tax revenue67.
The introduction of electoral reforms, such as the need for party primaries, have
contributed to fragmentation in Paraguayan political parties. This is the case, in particular,
for the Colorado Party as the primaries have made unifying the different factions of the
Party much harder to achieve (Setrini, 2010). To some extent, the same can be said for
larger parties such as the Liberal Party, which has seen personal rivalries divide and split
alliances within the party. In Paraguay, both major parties, if not all political parties, are
highly personalistic; thus, programmatic values and policy areas are not as important as
loyalty to a party leader or party faction.
Decentralization has also introduced further incentives for party fragmentation as
now mayors and governors also see their role as providers of jobs and benefits to their
supporters, weakening party loyalty, and increasing clientelism and patronage practices
(Dargent & Muñoz, 2011; Harbers, 2010).
Regarding support for decentralization legislation, the impact of the Paraguayan
political parties represented in Congress has been mixed. Though most political parties pay
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The growth of the public sector has been a persistent point of contention among political parties in
Paraguay. Numbers are hard to come by and difficult to verify. Even the Secretary of Civil Service does not
have an accurate account of how many people work for the national, Departmental, or municipal levels in
Paraguay. Reviews of newspapers show that the issue is constantly discussed, and each political party or
faction accuses the other of using State employment as a way to reward political loyalties.
67

http://www.eltiempo.com/economia/sectores/nomina-publica-en-2015-/15114935
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lip service to decentralization, their record of support for decentralization in Congress
indicates otherwise: during the 1992-2010 period, only eight laws related to
decentralization were approved; of those laws, only two related to public service delivery
(health and education decentralization), four were finance related, and two dealt with the
municipal and Departmental structure of the country. Though all these laws were approved
by a majority of parties represented both in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, many
languished in committee for years before being taken up68.
As an indicator of the level of clientelism and patronage prevalent in the country—
researchers argue that legislators in Paraguay are more inclined to pursue particularistic
policies rather than pursue large policy changes (Molinas et al., 2004). The authors
reviewed every single piece of legislation introduced since the return of democracy up to
2003. A further review of legislation proposed between 2003 and 2010, for the present
analysis, also revealed that Paraguayan legislators tend to introduce laws dealing with
particularistic or private issues (e.g., giving pensions to constituents or former Chaco War
veterans, proposals to solve land issues, etc.), and hesitate to introduce what could be
perceived as controversial legislation69.
The need to ensure political support through clientelism and patronage (and not
only from their constituents but also from large state bureaucracies) would incentivize
legislators to avoid controversial policies that could also reduce the level of support from
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Regrettably, the Paraguayan Congress does not keep records of how each representative by political party
voted these laws. Only recently has this been done. It would had been interesting to examine how members
of different political parties voted for the laws, and if there were significant deviations from party rhetoric.
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Digesto Legislativo. http://digesto.senado.gov.py/index.php
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now elected mayors and governors who are often seen as potential rivals; not to mention
the reticence to upset large bureaucracies that are very reluctant to give up power. The fact
that only two major pieces of legislation dealing with public service delivery (health and
education) have been introduced and voted on solidifies this view. Other laws dealing with
fiscal, education, and political decentralization have also been voted on; however, none has
had—in the period studied here—as much implementation as the health decentralization
law due in part to lack of bureaucratic support and the inability of key stakeholders to create
strong coalitions to push reforms forward.
The composition of the Senate (45 members, elected from closed party lists in a
nation-wide electoral district) is also attributed as a contributing factor that encourages
centralization, as senators do not necessarily represent local elites and tend to be more
responsive to national party leaders (Molinas et al., 2004). Interviews with members of the
Senate reinforced this view, and also stressed the fact that—in many instances—governors
(who cannot be re-elected) eventually aspire to be members of the Senate; thus, incumbent
Senators would not be very supportive of decentralization legislation that could empower
governors (and potential rivals).
Interviews with members of the Chamber of Representatives (Cámara de
Diputados) and political analysts reinforce the view that Deputies, who are elected in a
regional base (by Departments), tend to be more supportive of decentralization (in fact,
every major piece of legislation dealing with decentralization was started by the Chamber
of Representatives). Because Representatives must respond to their local constituents, and
garner much support from mayors and the governor of their respective Department, they
are more inclined to promote decentralization legislation. In the Paraguayan case, even
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though Representatives are responsive to their subnational leaders, they have been unable
to greatly influence their national leaders in deepening or enforcing decentralization
reforms (Willis, Garman, & Haggard, 1999; Montero & Samuels, 2004; O’Neill, 2005).
Moreover, many of these laws faced strong opposition and even overcame vetoes
from the Executive branch. Reticence toward the implementation of decentralization
policies persists in large government bureaucracies and many political leaders do not want
to upset them, as they constitute a very important voting bloc.
We argue here that in the case of Paraguay, with parties that are weakly
institutionalized and highly personalistic, as long as the most important job of the State is
perceived to be providing jobs and perks to political supporters of the current government,
effective decentralization of public policies will not be achieved. Resources are shifted
from priority areas to the salaries, perks, and other benefits of those with an interest in
keeping the status quo, or to those who desire access to such benefits. As Richards
(2008:101) notes, “important reforms are blocked by a lingering institutional overhang
that continues to serve the predatory state.”
Thus, in the case of Paraguay, the proposed hypothesis three (H3) is positive: the
presence of two dominant and clientelistic political parties has slowed down political,
fiscal, and administrative decentralization, thus shifting the balance of power back to the
national government.
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Political Parties and Decentralization in Colombia:
Deinstitutionalization/Fragmentation, Regionalism, and a Return to Centralism?
Colombia’s decentralization process ranks among the most ambitious and far
reaching in Latin America. Prompted by the need to re-legitimize the state and its
institutions 70 , the process—as noted above—has seen difficulties in implementing
decentralization due, in part, to the particulars of the country’s history.
Decentralization has also been challenging for Colombian political parties.
Traditionally the country has had two major political parties: the Conservative and Liberal
Party, which—given their inability to find consensus and negotiate differences—had many
times led the country to violent confrontations and civil wars. The Conservative Party has
traditionally been the party of the landed elites and those who are rural-based and very
supportive of the Catholic Church. The Liberal Party, on the other hand, has traditionally
been urban-based. The increase of urbanization has meant the continuous increase of the
Liberal Party’s representation in the national Congress from the 1960s onward. In general,
the average representation of the Liberal Party in Congress had been about 55%;
Conservatives, 25%; and the remaining 20% among other political groups (Cardenas et al.,
2006; Roland & Zapata, in Alsina et al., 2005).
Clientelism, a longtime characteristic of Colombian politics, can be traced to the
country’s Spanish colonial past (Martz, 1997). The practice has been an integral part of the
relationship between national party leaders and regional and local ones, and every
administration, throughout its history, has used patronage and clientelism as mechanisms
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For more details see Chapter 3.
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of social and political control (Martz, 1997; Osterling, 1989). Andrade (2011) assigns much
of the crisis of Colombian political parties in terms of legitimacy and representation to their
clientelism and corrupt practices. The failure of the Colombian state to exercise its
presence in vast areas of the country, its unresponsiveness to popular needs, and its inability
to curtail violence have often been explanatory variables used to, if not justify at least
explain, the persistence of clientelism (Hudson, 2010).
Decentralization has impacted the nationalization—defined as the extent to which
parties obtain similar shares of the votes throughout the national territory (Harbers, 2012)
—of Colombian political parties as both the Liberal and Conservative Parties have seen
their share of votes diminish to regional parties or movements in each election since the
mid-1990s.
Political and fiscal decentralization created the incentives for regional leaders to
distance themselves from the traditional leadership of their parties to strengthen their own
support base (Dargent & Munoz, 2011; Cardenas et al., 2006; Gutierrez Sanin, 2010). The
extensive fiscal decentralization in Colombia has certainly contributed to the fragmentation
of parties and helped foster the emergence of regional political movements like those along
the Colombian Atlantic coast.
With decentralization, Colombia has also given its local and regional authorities a
large number of functions ranging from primary and high school education, infrastructure,
health programs, transportation, and local economic development, while simultaneously
guaranteeing access to national transfers and, very importantly, royalties from oil and coal.
Thus, local and regional governments, though not autonomous in their revenue sources
(and though much controversy still surrounds the efficiency and regional equity in the
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allocation of royalties funds), do have a steady source of funding and have reduced their
financial dependence from national parties. Election campaign reforms have exacerbated
the financial independence of political candidates, as they now receive funding directly
from the State and are not dependent on their “national party’s” resources (Cardenas et al.,
2006). Colombian traditional parties have, as a consequence, deinstitutionalized and
fragmented (Dargent & Munoz, 2011; Hudson, 2010; Cardenas et al., 2006; Restrepo,
2004; Sabatini, 2003; Gutierrez Sanin, 2010).
Much of these changes are a result of the reforms introduced in the 1991
Constitution, which included electoral reforms specifically aimed at reducing the power of
regional barons already in Congress (by eliminating budget resources); the Constitution
also lowered the requirements for new parties to compete in national and local elections71,
thus opening the system to new parties. The electoral law allows multiple factions to
present lists under the same party label (Cardenas et al., 2006; Roland & Zapata, 2005)72.
As a consequence, and beginning in the mid-1990s, the Conservative and Liberal Party
gradually—and increasingly— began losing their share of the votes in national and local
elections (Table 36 below).
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Only 50,000 valid signatures are needed to create a new political party. Many legislators leave their
traditional party to create a new movement or party. His or her representation is largely regionally based, and
the incentives for clientelism increase as they only need to satisfy the needs of their much smaller
constituencies.
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“In the 1994 congressional elections, the Liberal Party presented 134 lists for the Senate and 293 lists for
the House of Representatives” (Hudson, 2010; page 240).
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Table 36: Presidential Share of the Vote (1998-2010)
Year

Liberal
Party

1998
2002
2006
2010

34.6
31.8
11.8
4.4

Conservative Si
Party
Colombia
(Sanin)
34.3
26.9
5.8
6.1
-

Uribe’s
Party
53.1
62.4
46.5

Polo
Partido
Democratico Verde
22
9.2

21.5

Source: Dargent & Munoz, page 54

In Congress, all of these changes have meant that, at times, it can be very difficult
to keep track of which congressman is in which party, and on which platform said
congressman might run for president. The changes have impacted the possibility of further
policy decentralization moving forward, as the excessive fragmentation has affected
legislators’ abilities to influence the policymaking process.
The largest remainder system (LR-Hare) used until 2003 73 , also encouraged
fragmentation, as the system rewarded seats based on large remainders and not necessarily
by filling quotas; thus, Congressmen were elected by narrow bases and they had to cater to
their clientelistic needs. In the case of the Senate, no representation thresholds were put in
place to discourage small lists. Again fragmentation was encouraged as the system of
remainders was left in place. As a result, smaller and smaller numbers of Senators have
been elected by the quota system since 1998, and more and more were elected by the
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In 2003, the d’Hondt system was introduced requiring a minimum of 2% of the total vote to obtain
representation in the Senate, and a minimum of 50% of the electoral quotient to obtain seats in the House.
The minimum requirement for creating a new party were raised, participating in multiple parties was
forbidden, party discipline in Congress is now compulsory (Hudson, 2010). This reduced the number of lists
presented in the 2006 election, but in the 2007 subnational level elections, the numbers increased as writesin were allowed.
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remainder system. Thus, senators only need to gather enough votes regionally to be elected,
and do not need to campaign on a national district level (Hudson, 2010; Roland & Zapata,
2005). Also, by using a single nationwide district, Departments with less population are
underrepresented (Hudson, 2010), and their regional needs sometimes are not taken into
account during the legislative process.
As centralist Executives (concerned with macroeconomic stability and security
issues) try to re-centralize functions, a divided, diverse, and multiparty representation in
Congress has been less able to form a front to push back advances aimed at curtailing
decentralization74.
Colombia has always had a very powerful Executive. The president, before the
1991 reforms, had many proactive powers including the ability to issue decrees, urgency
petitions, ex-post judicial review, and declarations of states of siege and of economic
emergency. With the 1991 Constitution, these powers were somewhat curtailed,
particularly in the issuing of decrees and states of emergency, which now require approval
from the new Constitutional Court. But, an area that remained unchanged is the president’s
ability to prioritize bills in the legislature’s agenda through the “discharge of urgency
petition.” In this process, Congress has 30 days to approve or reject a proposed bill
(Cardenas et al., 2006). Thus, the president retains much of the initiative on legislation, but
also is the only one authorized to introduce bills concerning the ministries, salaries of
public employment, foreign exchange, budgets, and national debt, among others (Cardenas
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But, Congress still retains influence through the work of the Committees and membership to them (which
is party determined), thus legislators organize procedural coalitions to secure membership, and sometimes
are able to push back on certain initiatives.
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et al., 2006). As these authors note, a powerful Executive and a very personalistic electoral
system delegates much of the national agenda to the Executive and its ministries.
In fact, interest groups such as the Colombian Federation of Municipalities and the
Colombian Federation of Departments (formerly the Governors Association) have
increased their lobbying efforts in Congress, and even directly with the Executive, to
influence policies that might impact the territories.

Interviews with the Colombian

Federation of Municipalities, and the organization’s documents and reports, highlight the
significant role it played in pushing back the scope of fiscal decentralization reforms that—
in both 2001 and 2007—were passed as initiatives from the Executive branch.
Thus, decentralization in the case of Colombian political parties involves
multiplication of regional parties and political movements, all highly variable in their
allegiances, with weak ideological principles—convenience and electoral aspirations have
replaced the two traditional political parties.
It is then important to measure the level of support that political parties had lent to
decentralization75. A significant indicator is the number of laws actually voted on that deal
with decentralization. In contrast to other countries such as Paraguay, Colombia between
1990 and 2010 has produced an impressive array of legislation, including decrees,
ministerial orders, and other regulations establishing a complex and vast legal framework
in favor of political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization (see Table 37 below
indicating number of laws).
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As is in the case of Paraguay, Colombia has not kept records of voting patterns by members of Congress.
Only recently are voting records by legislators and parties recorded, but for the period considered here, that
information is not available. Congress minutes keep only the total of votes in favor or against each law and
they are not differentiated by political party.
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Table 37: Number of Key Decentralization Laws Approved by Country for the 1990
– 2010 period

Colombia
Paraguay

New
Constitution
1991
1992

1990 – 1995
14
1

1996 – 2000
10
5

2001 – 2010
8
2

Total
32
8

Source: Author

The laws include political laws such as the Popular election of Governors and
Departmental Assemblies, citizen participation law (Law 134/94), and extension of
government periods for subnational authorities (Legislative act 02/02), among others.
Other laws relate to fiscal matters, such as Law 60/1993 establishing the revenue
sharing system, the co-financing system and royalties law (142/94), reforms to the transfer
system (Legislative act of 01/02; Law 715/01), fiscal adjustment laws (617/00; 549/99;
550/99), strengthening of territorial revenues (Laws 633/00; 788/02; 863/03), and fiscal
responsibility law (Law 819, 2003).
Finally, many administrative-oriented laws were also approved, including the
public services provision laws on health, education, and other services; the new municipal
law (Law 136/94); the reorganization of service provision law (715/01); law 152/94
establishing the organic development plan; Law 225/95, which modified the administrative
budget law; and Law 344/96 for the rationalization of public expenditures, etc.
In fact, there is almost a contradiction in that this vast legal framework has hindered
the autonomy of subnational governments—the implementation of these laws is strictly
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and largely regulated and controlled by the central authorities, especially in the areas of
health and education, as well as in fiscal matters76.
Thus, in the case of Colombia, the constitutional and electoral reforms introduced
by the new Constitution contributed to the denationalization and fragmentation of political
parties, and though decentralization has greatly advanced, the central authorities
maintain—through legal requirements and strict reporting demands—control of the
decentralization process. As such, hypothesis 4 (H4) tends to be positive.

Conclusions
This overview of decentralization’s impact on Colombian and Paraguayan political
parties, and their respective ability to influence the decentralization process, has found that
decentralization has indeed contributed to the deinstitutionalization and fragmentation of
well-established traditional parties in Colombia by making regional legislators more
independent (politically and fiscally) from central party authorities; and, in the case of
Paraguay, decentralization has exacerbated internal differences within the two main
traditional parties, contributing to more clientelism and patronage, as new players (mayors
and governors) seek to control resources and benefits. In both cases the increased number
of veto players have imposed a low rate of policy change.
The differences among supporters of decentralization, and their internal divisions,
contribute to the Executive’s lack of support for decentralization in the case of Paraguay;
and in the case of Colombia, to the Executive’s ability to define the decentralization agenda
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Some political reforms are still hotly debated, including the immediate reelection of mayors, which has
not been approved although the Colombian Federation of Municipalities have heavily lobbied for this reform.
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with an emphasis on fiscal issues and control over policy areas—restraining the autonomy
of subnational governments. In both cases, the deepening of decentralization reforms has
been inhibited over the years.
Escobar-Lemmon posits that regionally based and well institutionalized parties will
tend to support decentralization (2003). The Colombian case seems to support her
findings—at least at the beginning of the decentralization process. In the case of Colombia,
where regional parties and/or political movements have dominated elections over the last
fifteen years, decentralization (administrative, financial, and political) is maintained on the
political agenda thanks to their pressure (and the pressure exercised on them by mayors
and governors) and representativeness in Congress, as well as by legislators’ ability to
negotiate with the Executive. But, their lack of cohesion and ability to set a common agenda
also motivate the Executive’s tendency to re-centralize government functions, especially
in areas of fiscal decentralization.
In the case of Colombia, some of the consequences brought about by the 1991
Constitution relate to what Restrepo (2004) calls a “technical tie”: as mayors and governors
no longer need to respond to the Executive’s requests, the Legislative and the Executive
branches work together to advance their agendas to the detriment of subnational
governments. Local and regional governments are still largely dependent on the Executive
and Legislative branches for their budgets and their revenue transfers; thus, although there
is still an incentive to work together, the Executive branch maintains the upper hand.
In the case of Paraguay, a country without strong regionalism—that is much smaller
in size and population than Colombia—regional interests have not been able, in the long
term, to influence or sustain the process of decentralization. Clientelism and patronage,
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partly measured by the number of legislation introduced of particularistic nature and by the
increase in public sector employees, play an important role in hindering further
decentralization. From the beginning of the democratic transition, decentralization was a
concept not clearly understood by the political elite as the reviews of the constitutional
convention demonstrate; moreover, there was no consensus on the potential impact of
decentralization.
In Colombia, and as predicted in previously mentioned research, extensive fiscal
decentralization has indeed encouraged autonomy of regional leaders from the national
party leaders, contributing to party fragmentation. In Paraguay, which only recently has
seen an increase in fiscal decentralization, it is too early to predict if regional and local
leaders will become more assertive, or if clientelism and patronage will further increase.
Interviews with national, regional, and local political leaders seem to support the latter
view.
In both countries, political parties lack strong programmatic bases and rely on
caudillism and personal leadership—lacking stability and policy consistency.
Decentralization, and the implementation of decentralization policies, is then subject to the
will of political leaders who may or may not support it. Not having a strong party ideology
or program also limits society’s chances to demand accountability on crucial policy issues.
In both cases, weakly institutionalized parties lack long-term programmatic goals (Jones
in Scartascini et al., 2010) and lack consistency on key policy issues; thus, it is easy for
them to switch and offer support for certain legislation and not for others. This may explain
the reasons behind why political parties—both in Colombia and Paraguay—support

192

decentralization in their official discourse, but do not demonstrate their support for
decentralization through their actions.
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CHAPTER SIX

PARAGUAY: HEALTH DECENTRALIZATION 1990 – 2010

Introduction
Paraguay, one of South America’s poorest countries has a long tradition of both
government centralization and authoritarianism. The country’s transition to democracy
began in 1989 with the ousting of General Alfredo Stroessner, who held uninterrupted
power for over 35 years.
The democratization of the country coincided with a new impetus around the world
of government decentralization processes. In fact, the late 1980s and 1990s saw the
promotion of decentralization as a principal issue on the agenda of many national
governments, regional leaders, and development agencies. Decentralization was viewed as
key to reestablishing the democratic credentials of the State in formerly authoritarian
regimes—a way to make governments more responsive, closer to the people, and
transparent. Many also proposed decentralization as the best way to promote better
governance, provide better services, reduce inequalities, and strengthen economic
development. Decentralization, by dispersing power, was viewed as key to improving
governance.
An early attempt to decentralize Paraguay was initiated by the administration of
then President Juan Carlos Wasmosy (1993-1998) in the area of health. In 1996, a new
legal framework for health decentralization was enacted and pilot projects were initiated.
After almost 20 years of health decentralization, what has been the impact of
decentralization in terms of key health indicators in Paraguay? Has decentralization really
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improved health conditions in those municipalities that have been part of the
decentralization process? This chapter examines infant mortality rates (deaths of children
under one year old; live births) to analyze if decentralization of health services has
impacted (or not impacted) a critical health problem in Paraguay. We will attempt to test
two of the research hypotheses:
H1: If national, regional, and local political leaders participate and collaborate in
the promotion of political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization, there is a
greater probability for the passage, approval, and implementation of public service
decentralization laws.
And,
H2: Once public service delivery decentralization has been enacted, the higher the
degree of collaboration between national, regional, and local levels of government
(in essence the type of intergovernmental relations established), stakeholders and
citizens (other socio-political actors), the greater the probability for its success and
effectiveness.
To accomplish this, we will briefly review the health decentralization process in
Paraguay and its main reforms, examine its implementation at the Departmental and
municipal level, and compare the results of the process in seven Departments of the
country. The chapter concludes with an overall assessment of the decentralization process
that occurred in Paraguay between 1996 and 2010.

Decentralization and Public Service Provision: Literature Review
Decentralization is defined as the transfer of political, administrative, and fiscal
responsibilities and authority to subnational (regional or local) levels of government
(Falleti, 2005). Administrative decentralization gives subnational levels of government
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more responsibility in public policy delivery including planning, implementation, and
(depending on the case) financing.
A key argument of decentralization proponents is that decentralizing the provision
of services—such as health and education—to local governments will improve the quality,
equity, and efficiency of those services, as well as increase users’ satisfaction (Ugalde &
Homedes, 2008; Lockwood, 2009).
The World Bank points to two main reasons why services such as health, education,
water, and sanitation should be decentralized to the local level: first, central governments
have systematically failed to adequately provide those services especially in terms of
meeting the needs of the poor; and secondly, these services are consumed locally (Ahmad
et al., 2005). Local governments are closest to the people; they are most likely to know and
understand their needs, and will be better suited to allocate scarce resources according to
the real needs of their communities and not according to misguided policies designed from
a distant central capital (Mehrotra, 2005; Platteau, 2009). The willingness of people to pay
for public services that respond to their priorities, particularly if they were involved in the
decision making process, is another potential advantage of decentralization (Litvack &
Seddon, 2007). Local governments become in essence more accountable to the local
communities (Ahmad et al., 2005; Mehrotra, 2005; Khaleghian, 2003; Azfar et al., 1999).
As stated by Khaleghian (2003), “Many of the proposed benefits of decentralization
are based on the premise that it brings local decision makers closer to the constituencies
they serve.” With decentralization, social actors will put pressure on local level leadership
to respond to local needs and demands, and then two benefits can result: “synergy between
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interventions across sectors and the effective delivery of individual public services”
(Mehrotra, 2005).
Katorobo (2004) stresses the importance of the principles of subsidiarity and of
management by results in the decentralization of public service delivery:
“The concept of service delivery to citizens forces actors (local governments,
groups of affected citizens, etc.) to focus on what exactly the subnational
government intends or plans to provide to the citizens, and what the citizens should
expect in terms of quantity and quality of the services being rendered.” (Katorobo,
p. 26, 2004).
The literature on the benefits and types of decentralization is extensive (Faguet,
2000; Gerring, Thacker, & Moreno, 2005; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Falleti, 2005) and
stresses the importance of decentralization to strengthening local governments and their
service provision capacity. The research literature also examines problems posed by
decentralization—among them the lack of capacity at the local level to implement and
deliver new services (Ahmad et al., 2005); the dangers of local elite capture (Bardhan &
Mookkherjee, 1998); problems with local corruption and lack of clear legal framework;
and excessive borrowing (Ahmad et al., 2005); and, central government resistance
(Khaleghian, 2003).
Introducing a competitive political process, free flow of information, expanded and
strong NGO networks, and a reduction in inequality are ways to reduce the risk of local
capture (Bardahm, 2009). The lack of proper accountability and citizen involvement in the
design and implementation (including budget allocations) of public service delivery
decentralization is a major obstacle to its success and is the result of what Devarajan,
Khemani, and Shah (2009) call “partial decentralization.” In partial decentralization—
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which they argue has been the norm in most developing countries implementing service
delivery decentralization—central governments might have decentralized resources but
local authorities have no control over those resources, which have been earmarked, thus
reducing local governments incentives “to pursue effectiveness of spending and policies,
opening the door to clientelistic policies.” In a situation of partial decentralization, in
communities where local authorities do not have ownership over budgetary decisions and
outcomes, and where their only role is to distribute funds received from above, citizens
will have an incentive to mobilize to obtain private benefits from these funds, thus helping
to explain the risk of “capture.”
Partial decentralization is less a design problem and more a political problem, as
decentralization policies are often decided by central authorities who like to maintain
control over local and regional governments by deliberately withholding resources from
local governments, transferring those resources under strict conditions, or transferring them
to those local politicians who are more closely identified with them (Devarajan et al.,
2009).
In an effort to ensure that services are effectively delivered, issues of relevance and
responsiveness must be taken into account, as well as adequacy, costs and benefits, quality
and quantity of service, expected outcomes, impact, and timely delivery (Katorobo, 2004).
A key question continues to be: are subnational levels of government capable of
providing services? In the decentralization processes around the world, much has been
discussed both about the capacity of local governments to provide services, as well as the
justifications for it. Some of the arguments—and the variations of opinion—are partly
based on the vision of what the role of subnational governments should be. If a “managerial
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view” prevails, in which local governments’ main role is to efficiently deliver services,
then local governments would then have clearly defined competencies, resources, and
purposes. As central governments define such competencies, local governments are
considered subordinate to central governments, and decentralization would then be dictated
by what the central governments think is the appropriate role of local governments
(Nickson, 2011). This, most likely, is a recipe for conflictive relationships.
If, on the other hand, the view is one of “governmental type,” then local
governments are not only the providers of services, but also have a distinctive and
important relationship with their communities that allows them to make policy decisions
(Nickson, 2011). In this view, local governments are considered partners of central
governments, with shared responsibilities based on the principle of subsidiarity; thus, there
should be more autonomy to decide, at the local level, what services to provide and how to
fund service provision. The relationship between central and local levels should be
characterized more by negotiation and consensus and less by confrontation.
Other authors (Cetrangolo & Goldschmit, 2012) are concerned with questions of
efficiency in decentralized service delivery at the local level, and if it contributes to greater
“social cohesion” at the territorial level. Their concern relates more to the ability of
decentralization to reduce the large inequalities present in Latin America and within
countries themselves.
Reforms are almost always shaped and influenced by the institutional framework
of each country, the way society interacts with its institutions, and the broader international
context, as well as by the many political contingencies and strategies that sometimes open
up opportunities for policy change (Kingdon, 2003). Policy changes are also, in grand part,
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dependent on the presence of policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 2003; Mintrom & Norman,
2009; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996), those specific advocates of policy change who are able
to garner support from different stakeholders, create coalitions, bring in inside and outside
expertise or support to promote and enact the aimed policy changes.
Different processes shape and implement reforms such as decentralization of
service delivery (Kaufman & Nelson, 2004). Reform of public service delivery tends to be
long, complicated, played in multiple arenas, and not without setbacks and challenges.
Kaufman and Nelson (2004) distinguish four phases in any public policy decentralization
reform that are important when analyzing these processes: the inclusion of the proposed
reforms in the policy agenda of decision makers; the initiation of concrete proposals for
reforms that would be eventually presented to the decision makers; the formal authorization
of such reforms (usually through legislative initiative or by decree); and finally, the
implementation phase. All these phases imply the need to analyze “veto points” formed by
a combination of constitutional rules and political majorities and circumstances at any
given time (Immergut, 2008), and “veto players” are defined as any institutional or political
actor whose agreement is necessary for the approval of not only the needed legislation
(Tsebelis as per Immergut, 2008), but also for its implementation.
In light of the arguments in favor of decentralization, many developing countries
initiated the process of decentralizing health and education services to regional and local
levels. The decentralization of health and education services usually involves the
devolution of some administrative functions to local or regional levels of government or
—in certain instances—to local branches of the central government. Functions include—
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depending on the country—control over personnel, equipment, supplies, procurement, and
delivery of services (Hutchinson, 2002).
In regard to the effectiveness of services decentralization, the literature is mixed.
Kubal (2006) in studying the case of Chile, emphasizes the need for increased resources at
the local level for the implementation of health services decentralization to be successful.
Further, Kubal argues that the lack of adequate resources is partly to blame for the initial
lack of success of the process in Chile.
In an analysis of Tanzania’s health decentralization process, Hutchinson (2002)
finds that in general, districts that experienced decentralization reported better outcomes
compared to those not involved in decentralization. Both Bardhan (2002), in evaluating the
decentralization of public service delivery in Brazil, Nicaragua, and Bolivia—and
Mehrotra (2005) in his study of decentralization cases in Latin America, South Asia, and
Africa—conclude that in all cases the results of decentralizing public services has been
positive.
Some case studies provide “descriptive and suggestive correlations,” but evidence
of the relationship between decentralization and effective service delivery is not conclusive
(Bardhan, 2002). What seems to be clear—as Ahmad et al. and Azfar et al. (2005) note—
the importance of accountability and access to information at the local level is vital to the
success of services decentralization, along with other key elements such as the existence
of a clear legal framework, well defined fiscal and financial arrangements, definition of
administrative responsibilities and the infrastructure present locally, the educational level
of the communities involved, institutional arrangements, and the levels of poverty present
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at the time of initializing the decentralization process (Ahmad et al., 2005; Bardhan, 2002;
Khaleghian, 2003; Azfar et al., 1999).

Paraguay’s Health Sector
Paraguay, with a population of about 6.3 million (IMF 2009 World Economic
Outlook) is one of South America’s poorest countries with great regional disparities: the
wealthiest eastern part of the country is home to close to 97% of the total population, while
the Western part—by far the largest geographical region of the country—contains only 3%
of the population (largely aboriginals).
Politically, the 1992 Constitution defines the country as a “decentralized unitary
state,” with 17 Departments headed by governors elected by popular vote, and 236
municipalities with directly elected local mayors and municipal councils.
Investment in education and health has generally been very low and there has only
been a slow advance in the implementation of structural and institutional reform. The
economic recession of the last decade has further deteriorated quality of life. The country
has a significant social deficit and is highly unlikely to achieve the objectives of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (World Health Organization-WHO, 2007);
poverty has increased to about 35.6% of the population with the highest concentrations of
poor people found in rural areas (Dirección General de Estadística, 2007).
Health problems in Paraguay are acute and reflect regional and income inequalities.
Vector-borne diseases, as well as vaccine-preventable diseases, are common. Other chronic
communicable diseases such as TB are common and constitute important health problems
(WHO, 2007). Leading causes of death among all age groups in the country are diseases
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of the circulatory system, malignant neoplasm, accidents, and communicable diseases.
Among the many issues facing the health sector, infant mortality is a serious problem. It
has been estimated that every year 7,000 deaths occur among children less than 1 year of
age (WHO, 2007). Lack of proper vaccinations for children (especially under five) is a
great contributor to this tragedy77.

General Organization of Health Sector
The 1992 Paraguayan political Constitution established that health is a basic right
of all citizens and called for the creation, by an act of Congress, of a National Health
System. Article 168 of the Constitution specifically calls for local governments to be
responsible for preparing local health plans; preparing and implementing reproductive
health plans at the local level; the organization and coordination of the Local Health
Councils (LHCs); the promotion, coordination, and implementation of health plans of the
National Health Ministry; and the provision of health services. The Constitution did not
specify the responsibilities of Departmental governments in health policy implementation,
aside from calling for a coordinating role between Departments, local governments, and
central government health authorities (Estrada et al., 2010). Many aspects were left to be
later defined and dealt with by Congress.
Provision of health services in Paraguay is divided between the public, the semipublic, and the private sector. The Ministry of Health is in charge of providing health
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Many of these indicators have to be taken with a grain of salt, as underreporting is a serious problem in
Paraguay, thus the reliability of data has to be considered. Regional and ethnic disparities also need to be
taken into account as indigenous populations have much higher mortality rates than the general Paraguayan
population.
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services to the majority of the Paraguayan population (about 63%), particularly the low
income and vulnerable population without medical coverage. Military health services
cover about 3% of the population and they have their own medical facilities, as do the
national police. Other public health institutions include the municipal and Departmental
health services, the National University of Asuncion, and other agencies of the national
government (Itaipu and Yacireta78). The public sector includes the vast majority of district
and specialized hospitals in the country, as well as about 130 health centers, 50
dispensaries, and about 670 health posts (Boslaugh, 2013; PAHO, 2001; Angeles et al.,
1999).
The semi-public sector is mainly comprised of the Institute of Social Welfare
(Instituto de Prevision Social) or IPS—the organization’s Spanish acronym. IPS provides
health care for government and private sector employees and their dependents.
Government, employers, and employees pay toward the financing of the system. IPS is
funded by 9% workers’ contribution, 14% by employer’s contribution, and 15% by the
State. Though contributions to the IPS are mandatory, the IPS system suffers from
problems of exclusion and low coverage due to high informality in Paraguay’s labor
market; contributions are often stopped or are discontinued when workers change jobs; and
high contribution evasion exists—up to 70% per some estimates (Gimenez Caballero,
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Itaipu and Yacireta are two hydroelectric dams that Paraguay shares with Brazil and Argentina
respectively. The Itaipu dam, the second largest in the world in terms of annual energy generation, is a great
source of revenue to the Paraguayan government as Brazil pays large sums for the surplus energy generated
by the dam and not used by Paraguay. Yacireta does not generate as much revenue as Itaipu, but it is also an
important source of revenue. Both Itaipu and Yacireta are independent-state-run enterprises considered
“decentralized agencies” by the Paraguayan government, meaning that they are autonomous in their
administration and revenue management.
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2012). IPS includes a smaller number of hospitals (12), as well as clinics (5)—mostly in
urban areas (Boslaugh, 2013; PAHO, 2001; Angeles et al., 1999).
Finally, the private sector includes non-profit organizations, as well as for profit
health providers, with hospitals and clinics that concentrate mostly in the city of Asuncion
and the Central Department. The quality of their service varies, but they are generally
perceived as expensive and inaccessible to most people.

Health Decentralization Reform in Paraguay 1990 – 2010
In Paraguay, as in other parts of the continent, health reform was part of a broader
process of democratization and strengthening of subnational governments. The
decentralization occurred in two main phases. One phase started in 1990 with the transfer
of certain administrative responsibilities from the central level to the Ministry’s own
regional centers (Regiones Sanitarias). This phase can better be called deconcentration and
not really decentralization. This deconcentration helped strengthen regional centers and
improved their administrative capacity, empowering some of the regional directors and
their staff. Changes in the Ministry and political tensions slowed down this process during
1993-1995 (Angeles et al., 1999).
In 1994, newly elected mayors and governors began demanding more
decentralization and autonomy. By 1995, the Chamber of Deputies of Congress created the
National Commission on Decentralization, in charge of evaluating law proposals related to
decentralization (Rojas, 2000).
A second phase of decentralization started in 1995 with new authorities in the
Ministry and more political support (Angeles et al., 1999). In December of that year, the
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first meeting of Departmental Health Secretaries, Regional Health Directors, mayors, and
the Ministry was held. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed in support of
health decentralization as a way to improve service delivery.79 The MOU was adopted and
approved by Congress and it became the basis for the discussions regarding the proposed
health decentralization law in 1996 (Rojas, 2000).
The health decentralization process had a heavy component of international
agencies’ support, in particular from the US Agency for International Development
(USAID), which at the time funded a relatively large project supporting local governments,
decentralization, and citizen participation. 80 USAID’s involvement continued for many
years, and its support has been viewed as essential to the process. Critical to the process of
decentralization was the appointment of Dr. Andres Vidovich Morales as Minister of
Health, because unlike his predecessors, he supported and promoted decentralization as the
only possible way to improve health conditions in Paraguay. In Congress, the initiative
garnered support in the Chamber of Deputies or Representatives, but not in the Senate.
Many informational meetings were held around the country with governors, mayors, civil
society, and communities in general to explain the initiative’s aims; much technical
assistance was also given in the mid-1990s to the Ministry to strengthen the institution and
to clarify the aims of the reform (Flecha & Rodriguez Lagier; 1994).
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The meeting was organized by Florida International University (FIU), contracted by USAID in the
framework of a decentralization and democracy project being implemented at the time.
80

Disclaimer: the project was being implemented by the Institute for Public Management & Community
Service of Florida International University, and the author was closely involved in the design and initial
implementation of the health decentralization process, though the active FIU involvement ended right before
the approval of the law that created the National Health System in 1996.
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In nearly all of these meetings and lobbying activities, the efforts of Minister
Vidovich Morales as a policy entrepreneur must be highlighted. Although conscious that
decentralization was not a high priority for the Wasmosy administration or many Senators
in Congress, Minister Vidovich Morales was able to create an advocacy coalition, and used
the influence and support of the USAID funded project as an outside force to galvanize,
and leverage, support from many stakeholders.
Finally, after much consultation, the proposed law was approved by the Chamber
of Deputies, rejected by the Senate, and ratified again by the Deputies. It then went back
to the Senate where it was not acted on. Thus, and in accordance with Paraguayan Law,
due to the Senate’s inaction, the Executive Branch approved and enacted the law in
December of 1996. Thus, in just one year, the first significant legislation to decentralize
service delivery was approved through the support and lobbying efforts of governors,
mayors, and the Ministry of Health (in particular, support from then Minister Dr. Andres
Vidovich Morales)81 (Rojas, 2000; Flecha and Rodriguez Lagier, 1994).
Law 1032/96 was a watershed in Paraguay’s political history. As the first attempt
to decentralize services, it had a significant component of citizen participation; it called for
collaboration and cooperation between the public and private sector, as well as civil
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Minister Vidovich Morales was very successful at gathering support from Representatives in Congress by
taking advantage of the technical assistance provided by IPMCS through the USAID funded project. In the
mid-1990s Colombia was seen as successful decentralization example, and Minister Vidovich Morales – with
the support of IPMCS - organized many seminars and conferences with Colombian health experts, former
Governors, and Ministers to galvanize support for his initiative. At one point, with the assistance of IPMCS,
and to get the commitment of then President Wasmosy, the then Assistant Secretary of Health and Human
Services of the US, Dr. Walter Broadnax, visited the country and made the case for decentralization to the
full Congress and in private meetings with President Wasmosy.
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society, in the implementation of health reforms; and it empowered mayors, and to a certain
extent governors, in the provision of services at the local level.
The National Health System Law aimed to:
-

improve the efficiency and quality of service provision,

-

improve the equity of service provision, and

-

promote community participation in the planning and delivery of health
services.

In search of efficiency, the law also created new governmental agencies to assist
and oversee the desired reforms. Thus, the following entities were created: the National
Health Advisory Board (Consejo Nacional de Salud); a National Health Fund (Fondo
Nacional de Salud) that was to execute health financing functions; a regulatory and rulemaking body, the National Medical Directorate (Dirección Médica Nacional); and a
monitoring and auditing agency, the Health Superintendent (Superintendencia de Salud).
In the new National Health System, citizen participation was explicitly outlined via
the creation of Local Health Councils (LHCs). During the first year after the approval of
Law 1032/96, the Ministry concentrated its efforts to establish as many LHCs as possible
in the municipalities and in the Departments. Thus, one measure of decentralization success
is the number of LHCs that have been established through the years.
As mentioned above, the process had, from the beginning, a significant component
of citizen participation—it was expected that each municipality, through their recently
created LHCs, would identify, design, and implement their local health plans with the input
of the community. The strategic health plans, designed by the Ministry, had citizen
participation strategies as key objectives calling for “citizens who are involved, aware, and
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responsible for their role as leaders in the health planning of their communities” (Law
1036/96). Activities, technical assistance, and support aimed to train communities on the
meaning of health decentralization and the mechanisms to involve citizens in the process
were initiated. The objective was to ensure citizens’ empowerment, as well as improve
transparency and accountability (Colindres & Veldhuyzen Van Zanten, 1996; CIRD,
1997). Overall, and as noted by Rojas (2000), citizen participation, especially at the local
level, has been instrumental to the decentralization process—helping identify needs and
solutions and overseeing implementation and monitoring of local programs (PAHO, 2001;
USAID, 2008).
The implementation phase initially faced many obstacles, including: a lack of
understanding of the process by community members, mayors, and authorities at the three
levels of government; complexities in the creation of LHCs and Local Health Plans;
resistance by some Regional Health Directors (which are named by the Ministry of Health);
tensions between government authorities due to lack of clear mandates, especially in the
case of governors and their health secretaries, and; in some areas of the country, lack of
citizen participation (Rojas, 2000).
An important development in the implementation of the law was the approval of
Decree 19966 in 1998, which sought to operationalize Law 1032/96. Again, the importance
of citizen participation is underscored in the decree’s title: “Through which local health
decentralization, citizen participation, and self-management are regulated as an essential
strategy for the development of the National Health System” (Angeles et al., page 8). By
this decree, administrative responsibilities of local health facilities (health posts, district
hospitals, and health centers) were transferred to local governments through a formal
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agreement between the Health Ministry and the respective local government. The transfer
though, was not mandatory.
The process of decentralization required a step-wise progression before
administrative responsibilities could be transferred to the local level. These steps included
securing political support from the municipality—indicating willingness to take over these
responsibilities. A functioning LHC needed to be created/in place. Also required was a
signed contract agreement between the Ministry, the mayor of the municipality, other local
and regional authorities, and the directors of the major health facilities present in the
territory to formalize and define the obligations of the Ministry, the municipality, and the
LHC. By way of the agreement, responsibilities for the administration, supervision and
monitoring of health facilities providing basic healthcare were transferred to the local level,
and the municipal government delegated administrative responsibilities to the LHC. The
design, planning, and implementation of local health plans, as well as the control of the
budget and the performance supervision of the public health facilities, was to be done
jointly by the municipality and the LHC (Angeles et al., 1999).
As part of the reforms, LHCs were to be funded not only by transfers from the
Ministry (based on past expenditures and projected expenditures, as indicated by local
health plans), but also by the local municipality, which had to allocate 5% of its budget to
the LHC, and by the revenues generated at each facility; these funds were to be deposited
into a municipal government account and earmarked for health activities. Regrettably, how
municipalities defined health expenditures was not clearly outlined and, thus, some
municipalities did not transfer the resources to the LHCs.
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Table 38 below indicates the role assigned by Law 1032/96 to the different
stakeholders involved in the process.

Table 38: Role of Principal Stakeholders at the beginning of the decentralization
process
Ministry of Health
•

•

•
•

Transfer of
administrative
responsibilities
and
infrastructure, as
well as funding
Ensure
availability of
Human Resource
at each health
facility
Salaries are paid
by Ministry
Provide training
and technical
assistance

Municipal
Governments
• Allocate 5% of
municipal
budget to health
expenditures
• Form the LHC

Local Health Councils
•

•

•
•

Prepare and
design the Local
Health Plan
Comply with all
sanitary laws and
regulations
Administer
financial resources
Monitor
implementation of
Local Health Plan

Civil Society
•

•

•

Organizations
would be
involved in the
creation of
LHCs
Organization
would actively
participate in
the design and
implementation
of local health
plans.
Would oversee
process and
demand
accountability

Source: Adapted from Gustavo Angeles et al. (1999)

The implementation of the program was not without confusion; decentralization
was new in Paraguay, and real change did not simply materialize—time was required to
finalize agreements among the municipalities, the other stakeholders, and the Ministry. By
1998, 23 municipalities had signed decentralization agreements: 17 in Central Department,
2 in Cordillera, and 4 in Misiones. By 1999, 17 of the 23 renewed their agreements. But,
of the 23 original municipalities that signed agreements in 1998, only 10 (and all of them
in Central Department) actually initiated administrative changes, mostly to improve the
quality of available services, by using the revenues generated locally at the health facility.
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In 1999, the process suffered a significant slowdown due to the political situation
in Paraguay. The vice president was assassinated and reports of a looming coup were
widespread. The resulting political turmoil hampered the process. Only the Central
Department continued and sustained the process (Rojas, 2000) as the LHCs and mayors
involved remained active and continued receiving support and technical assistance from
organizations such as the Resource and Information for Development Center (CIRD—
reflecting Spanish terminology), which was heavily funded by USAID.
Also in 1999, an important development significantly impacted the progress of
health decentralization services in Paraguay. The new agreements to be signed with the
Ministry of Health required that funds generated at each local health center, health post, or
district hospital be deposited in a Ministry of Finances’ bank account, which would then
transfer those funds back to the Health Ministry, and from there back to the local level.
This was done in accordance with the Financial Administrative Law of the country, which
regulates procedures for all government institutions; however, central authorities were
ultimately given control over resources that were never fully transferred back to local
levels. The new requirement also allowed Health Ministers who were not enthused with
the process to delay the implementation of decentralization—based on technicalities within
the law.
Other persistent problems: numerous municipalities did not comply with the
stipulation that 5% of their budgets were to be allocated to LHCs; underhanded tactics were
common (e.g., considering trash collection to be a health service provision; thus, those
expenses counted toward the 5% they were required to allocate for health).
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Health workers at the local level remained employees of the national health
ministry. This jeopardized the process of decentralization. By the year 2000, there were
19,842 health employees at the Health Ministry, including doctors, nurses, and other health
professionals. About 7,000 of those were administrative and administrative support
personnel 82 . LHCs were not able to reform human resource policies and/or discipline
workers, who considered themselves accountable to the Regional Health Secretaries
(named by the Ministry in Asuncion). A major problem was that Regional Health
Secretaries retained funds sent by the Ministry, and used those funds to contract new
employees or to buy supplies not needed by the LHCs (CIRD, 2002; and interviews). By
the early 2000s, these developments had heavily impeded the implementation of health
provision decentralization (CIRD, 2002).
Nevertheless, by 2001, even though the decentralization process was progressing
slowly, citizen participation and collaboration among the municipalities involved in the
program continued. International organizations continued to support the institutions that
had been established, continued to strengthen human resources, and assisted with the
funding of medicines and other medical needs (PAHO, 2001).
During the 1996-2003 period, the Ministry continued the deconcentration of some
technical and administrative services to regional and local authorities. Improvements in
some health indicators were noted, especially vaccination rates, maternal health care, infant
mortality rates, and infrastructure improvements at hospitals and health posts. Health
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These numbers are to be taken cautiously as there is no reliable information on the number of public
employees at the different government agencies in Paraguay. Many people are employed by the Ministry of
Health and also by the Institute of Social Welfare (IPS for its Spanish acronym) or by a regional health center
or hospital, and thus they can be counted multiple times. Those who are hired on temporary contracts are
often not included in the counts.

213

expenditures as percentage of GDP remained at the same level (see Table 39), or in some
instances increased during this period (CIRD, 2002)
Table 39: Total Health Expenditures 1998 - 2010
Year
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998

Health Exp. % of Public Exp.
17,13%
16,08%
14,93%
15,25%
14,13%
13,08%
12,17%
11,61%
11,43%
10,92%
11,58%
12,41%
15,24%
14,88%
N/A

Health Exp. % of GDP
4,34%
3,43%
3,00%
3,25%
2,41%
2,40%
2,35%
2,12%
2,16%
2,07%
2,39%
2,65%
3,23%
3,03%
2,82%

Source:www.datosmacro.com/estado/salud/Paraguay

Between 2000 and 2006, under the administration of at least three different
ministers (See Table 40 below), there were different levels of political commitment and,
consequently, varying levels of incentives for continuing the decentralization
implementation process. Often, little was done to implement the local health plans or to
sign new agreements at the local level—though the plans continued to be supported by
some senior officials at the Health Ministry, USAID, and the Pan-American Health
Organization (PAHO).

Table 40: Health Ministers of Paraguay, 1996 – 2010
Period of Government
July 1994 – August 1998
August 1998 – March 1999
March 1999 – January 2003

Name
Dr. Andres Vidovich Morales
Dr. Carmen Frutos de Almada
Dr. Martin Antonio Chiola
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Political Party
Colorado Party
Colorado Party
Colorado Party

January 2003 – August 2003
August 2003 – May 2005
May 2005 – June 2006
June 2006 – August 2008
August 2008 – June 2010

Dr. Jose Antonio Mayans
Dr. Julio Cesar Velasquez
Dr. Teresa Leon Mendaro
Dr. Oscar Martinez Doldan
Dr. Esperanza Martinez

Colorado Party
Colorado Party
Colorado Party
Colorado Party
Frente Guazu Government

Source: Author – Ministry of Health of Paraguay

A third phase in the decentralization process started in the year 2004—with the
administration of Dr. Julio Velazquez as health minister—when new decentralization
agreements were signed or existing ones were renewed. Thus, in 2004, the Ministry
reinitiated the decentralization process with the signing of 32 agreements with local
governments in 12 Departments. Regardless of these advances, the funding of LHCs, and
their ability to collect and use revenues, continued to be a source of controversy.
In 2005, given the lack of clarity on the use of funds by LHCs, local and regional
political leaders endorsed a Congressional law that would clarify the situation. The law
was approved in 2006 (Law 3007/06) and established that regional and local health
councils that collected funds, while administering the LHCs as established by their
agreements with the Ministry of Health, will be able to use and allocate those funds without
having to transfer them to the Ministry of Finances as required by Law 1535. A major
obstacle had been removed. By the end of 2008, a total of 49 new agreements had been
established (Gaete, 2012).
But, as of 2008, the country still lacked a general decentralization law, which
impacted the implementation of health decentralization by local agreements—many local
authorities feared working in a potential legal vacuum that could make them susceptible to
central government accusations of malpractice.
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The Lugo Administration took office in August of 2008 and established a new
vision of health policy. Fundamentally, it focused on free access to health services for all
Paraguayans (Gaete, 2012; Gimenez Caballero, 2012; Mancuello y Cabral, 2011). LHCs
would no longer collect fees. To replace this funding, the Ministry of Health was to transfer
1% of its budget to LHCs. These funds were named Equity Funds (Fondos de Equidad).
With equity, all people were to have equal access to health services (Barrios Kuck, 2002).
Table 41 below summarizes the legal framework of the revitalized approach to health care
decentralization in Paraguay.
In this new modality, municipalities and the Ministry (not Departments), signed
decentralization agreements, and some administrative functions are thus decentralized, but
LHCs now administer funds transferred from the central government and not locally
generated funds. Those funds were to be complemented by transfers from the local
government (5% of budget), Departmental governments, and civil society organizations.
By 2011, 196 agreements were in place—about 82% of municipalities in Paraguay.
From 2008 to 2011, about 20 million dollars had been transferred to LHCs in the form of
Equity Funds83 (Gaete, 2012).

83

Equity Funds refer to the concept that all LHCs and municipalities will receive “equity funding” according
to their needs and history. The concept in Spanish is referred as Fondos de Equidad
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Table 41: Legal Framework for Health Decentralization in Paraguay
National Constitution

Law 1032/96

Created the National Health
System

Decree 19966/98

Regulated the local health
decentralization, citizen
participation, and the
management of health
facilities at the local level as a
way to help the
implementation of Law
1032/96

Contractual agreements
between Municipalities
and Ministry (starting in
1998 to present)

Law 426/94

Created Departmental
Governments
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• Defines the country as
decentralized
• Article 69 call for the
promotion of a National
Health System
• Established the
administrative
decentralization of health
services
• Established community
participation as key element
in the management of
services through local,
regional, and national Health
Councils
• Promoted the signing of
decentralization agreements
and contracts between
municipalities and central
authorities
• Made possible the temporary
transfer of basic health
services (district hospitals,
health posts and centers) to
municipalities.
• Established the requirements
needed for the signing of
decentralization agreements
• Agreements are optional and
municipalities may or may
not request the transfer of
services
• Municipalities that sign the
agreement must allocate 5%
of their budget to health
• Details which health services
will be transferred to the
local level
• Establishes the
responsibilities of the
Ministry, the municipality,
and the Local Health Council
• Created, within the structure
of Departmental
Governments, the
Departmental Health

Law 3007/06

Law 5099/08

Exempted LHCs from
transferring funds as required
by Administrative Financial
Law
Established Free Health
Provision

•

•

•

•

•

Secretaries (but clear
mandates were not defined)
LHCs could collect and keep
funding generated for service
provision at the local level.
Guaranteed free access to
health care regardless of
social class or income
Eliminated fees collected at
the local level or at hospitals
for most services
Established the so called
Equity Funds by which the
Health Ministry transfers 1%
of its budget to LHCs.
Promoted the creation of
Family Health Units

Source: author based on Angeles et al., CIRD, USAID, Rojas, Mancuello & Cabral, Gimenez Caballero,
Uharte Pozas

Have Reforms been Successful?
In regard to the evaluation of results, “there is no evidence at this time that would
allow (one) to see if the health sector reforms have had an impact in reducing the gap in
health indicators” (PAHO, 2001). But there have been direct investments in certain areas
—as a result of the emphasis of local health plans—namely, in children (vaccinations) and
pre and post maternal health care (PAHO, 2001).
In general, critics of health service decentralization argue that the process has not
accomplished its stated goals. It has led to increased inequality, reduced efficiency and
quality of services, and increased costs. There is insufficient evidence to establish if
decentralization failures are a result of inadequate policy choices or issues surrounding
implementation (Ugalde & Homedes, 2002).
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Ugalde and Homedes (2002) name two phases in the decision making process of
decentralization: choosing policies and policy-implementation. Paraguay has had serious
problems both with defining decentralization and with its implementation
In Paraguay, by not clearly defining coordination mechanisms between all
stakeholders, in particular among the three levels of government, many implementation
problems ensued. The difference in responsibilities between Departmental Health
Secretaries (named by the governors) and the Regional Health Directors (named by the
Health Ministry) were not clearly defined, generating tensions and duplication of efforts.
The funding system, and the transfer of those funds, was also not clearly established,
creating confusions and frustration (Ugalde & Homedes, 2002; Gaete, 2012; COPLANEA,
and interviews).
According to Martinez (2005), and many knowledgeable observers interviewed for
this research, weaknesses of the process include:
•

lack of clarity within the Health Ministry of what the process entailed;

•

divided opinions about its merits;

•

technical support units lacking enforcement authority and lack of technical
guidance to LHCs;

•

lack of political commitment;

•

lack of leadership role from the Ministry;

•

absence or deficient definition of roles and responsibilities among Regional Health
Secretaries, Departmental Health Secretaries, and local authorities;

•

among some local authorities, not considering the provision of health services to be
a local responsibility;
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•

lack of leadership among some LHCs, and not providing adequate services;

•

internal political divisions and rivalries within communities and among the three
levels of government involved;

•

lack of resources;

•

insufficient communication and clarity about the goal of the process;

•

weakness of the legal framework that has left many decisions subject to legal
review or contestation;

•

uncertainty about the stability of public health officials, which created resistance to
implementation.

Lack of political will and lack of administrative capacity at all levels of government
generated serious implementation problems (Martinez, 2005; Recalde, 2011; Gimenez
Caballero, 2012; interviews). According to the Pan-American Health Organization
(PAHO), as of 2012, the Law has not been able to fundamentally change the health system.
In the twenty years since its enactment, the management model has not changed, nor have
the care or financing systems (Gimenez Caballero, 2012; interviewees).
Fiscal decentralization has not advanced much as Departments and municipalities
only spend 3% of the public health budget, and with the reforms enacted by the Equity
Funds Law, LHCs lost the little financial autonomy they had in revenue collection.
Many aspects of Law 1032/96 have yet to be implemented (e.g., the National Health
Directorate or the National Health Fund). Only the Superintendence of Health has been
created. The National Health Council does not function consistently and has not met in
regularly since its creation. Between 1996 and 2008, less than 10% of municipalities had a
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working LHC. In 2008, with the introduction of free public health for all, and through the
Equity Funds, about 200 municipalities progressively signed up (about 80% of the total).
Supporters of the process point to successes that—given Paraguay’s weak data
collection systems—are more difficult to measure, but include (Martinez, 2005;
interviews):
•

extension of care hours at the local health posts or centers;

•

new services such as emergency care extended hours and lab services;

•

reduced doctor and nurse absenteeism;

•

increased number of patient visits;

•

increased revenues;

•

the development of LHCs as essential to citizen participation. This aspect is the
most important successful element of the process (Gimenez Caballero, 2012;
interviews).

According to Uharte Pozas (2012), the most important development in the health
decentralization process of Paraguay was the establishment of free access to services in
2008 by the Lugo Administration. The number of people visiting hospitals increased by
50% and the number of people accessing primary health centers increased from 4 to 8
million in 2010. Investment in health also increased by 77%. The creation of the Family
Health Units (Unidades de Salud de la Familia) provided basic primary health care in the
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18 Health Regions84 of the country. By mid-2011, 503 of these units had been established,
improving health coverage by 33%.
The health decentralization process in Paraguay has been a dynamic process,
subject to political will, and not necessarily a structured or strategically planned one.
Among those involved in the process, there is a general consensus that the pressure to
continue the process has come mostly from subnational levels of government and civil
society, with the assistance of donor organizations, and not necessarily from the Ministry
of Health (Gaete, 2012; interviews).

Can Health Decentralization Impact be measured in Paraguay?
The process of health decentralization in Paraguay started in 1996 with the approval
of the National Health System Law, but implementation did not begin until 1998; several
phases of implementation occurred, hindered by serious challenges. The first phase
(between 1998 and 2000) saw the signing of several agreements between the Ministry of
Health and Local and Departmental governments as indicated on Table 42. In 2004 and
2005, more agreements were signed and previous agreements were renewed; finally,
between 2008 and 2010, as a result of the decision to provide free basic health care and
with the creation of Equity Funds, the number of signatories more than doubled.
Table 42: Number of LHCs incorporated by year and with agreements in place 1998
– 2010
Year
Number of LHCs

1998 1999
23
17

2000/3
0

2004/5
32

2008
33

2009 2010
106
175

Source: Author based on CIRD materials, and General Directorate for Health Decentralization, Ministry
of Health
84

The Ministry of Health administratively divides the country in 18 “health regions,” which correspond to
the 17 Departments plus the City of Asuncion (Regiones Sanitarias in Spanish).
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The objectives of the reform, as indicated, were to transfer some decision-making
authority to the regional and local level in the design of local health programs that would
effectively reflect the needs of the population; there was an expectation that, with
community oversight of programs, plans would become more efficient and quality of care
will improve—achieving more transparency and accountability (Semidei et al., 1996).
Table 43 below shows the number of municipalities by Department that have signed
decentralization agreements with the Ministry of Health, and thus have LHCs in place. The
table shows how many LHCs were in place for each Department in 1998, 2008/2009, and
2010, also indicating the total number of municipalities that have not signed agreements,
do not have an LHC in place, and have not initiated decentralization reforms—these
municipalities do not benefit from fund transfers.
The Department of San Pedro, with a total of 19 municipalities, has the fewest
number of municipalities (as of 2010) that have signed decentralization agreements with
the Health Ministry (14), followed by the Departments of Guaira (13) and Canindeyu (10).
On the other hand, the Departments of Itapua (29 out of 30 municipalities), Cordillera (19
of 20), and Caaguazu (17 out of 21) have the largest number of municipalities with
decentralization agreements. The Department of Central, the most populated of the
country, is one of the few that has been involved in the decentralization process from the
very beginning; Central has a relatively large number of municipalities that have signed
agreements (13 out of 19), and those agreements have been in place the longest.
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Table 43: Total LHCs per Municipality and per Department (number of
municipalities with decentralization agreements signed)85
Department

Concepcion

Caazapa
Misiones
Paraguari
Alto Parana
Neembucu
Amambay
Pte. Hayes
Alto Paraguay
Boqueron
Total

Total
Mun.

7
19
20
18
21
10
30
10
17
20
19
16
3
11
8
4
3
237

With
dec.
agreem
ents
1998

With dec.
agreeme
nts Year
2008/09

New
agreements
2010

Total w/
agreements

With no
agreeme
nts

0
0
2
0
1
0
0
2
12
4
3
0
0
0
1
0
0
25

6
4
19
4
15
7
24
9
11
14
12
4
3
1
5
0
1
139

0
1
0
1
2
1
5
0
1
2
1
3
0
0
0
0
0
17

6
5
19
5
17
8
29
9
12
16
13
7
3
1
5
0
1
156

1
14
1
13
4
2
1
1
5
4
6
9
0
10
3
4
2
80

Source: Author - based on CIRD materials, and General Directorate for Health Decentralization,
Ministry of Health

This section will analyze whether health decentralization—as defined and
implemented in the Paraguayan context in the above mentioned Departments—has
positively impacted basic health indicators such as infant mortality rates (under 1 year old).
Because the Ministry of Health has placed so much emphasis on LHC contributions to
reduce infant mortality, it is interesting to compare the three Departments with the fewest
LHCs (San Pedro, Guaira, and Canindeyu) and the three Departments the most LHCs

85

A requirement for signing a decentralization agreement with a municipality is the presence of Local Health
Council. Thus, “decentralized municipalities” must include in each case a LHC.
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(Itapua, Cordillera, and Caaguazu), and the Department of Central, which has been
involved in the decentralization process from its beginnings in 199686.
As health decentralization expands, and as more health centers are established at
the local level, and as local health centers become more responsive to the demands of
communities, access to health care and information will increase and, thus, rates of infant
mortality (under one year old, live births) at the Departmental level should decline.
It is also expected that higher education levels and lower poverty rates will impact
infant mortality rates, as better educated parents will seek medical assistance sooner, and
will have more resources to seek help. In the case of the seven Departments, the average
illiteracy rate and poverty indexes were calculated based on historical trends obtained from
the Ministry of Health Basic Indicators yearly reports.
Access to appropriate funding is important. Lack of resources can affect the ability
of local and regional governments to provide the necessary services. In the case of
Paraguay, serious challenges to the funding of LHCs have been present throughout the
process with significant lapses of time where no funding—or autonomy in the use of
funding—was available to LHCs, and political opposition to the process slowed down
decentralization significantly.
Data on budget transfers for health decentralization (Table 44) to the Departments
was obtained from the Under-Secretariat for Health Decentralization of Paraguay. The
point of reference is the year 1998, when budget transfers were initiated to some of the
86

Regrettably, there are many serious limitations in Paraguay’s health/government data. From accessibility
to under-reporting, to the fact that many other institutions working on health do not report to the Health
Ministry. Consequently, information provided must be viewed with caution. Another problem encountered
had to do with the lack of consistent data gathering for the time period sought.
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Departments as a component of pilot projects in health decentralization initiated by the
Ministry of Health.
Table 44: Budget Transfer from Health Ministry to Departments
Department Total
Transfers
1998*
Concepción
47,165,270
San Pedro
74,169,500
Cordillera
125,750,000
Guairá
133,001,310
Caaguazú
34,537,500
Caazapá
19,500,000
Itapúa
0
Misiones
107,433,100
Paraguari
77,650,000
Alto Paraná
310,388,000
Central
806,754,000
Ñeembucú
158,000,000
Amambay
0
Canindeyú
0
Presidente
Hayes
28,600,000
Boquerón
0
Alto
Paraguay
0
Capital
0
Total
1,922,948,680

Equity Funds
(only)
2008
100,000,000
120,000,000
15,000,000
140,000,000
160,000,000
60,000,000
475,000,000
150,000,000
155,000,000
100,000,000
240,000,000
0
135,000,000
0
120,000,000

Equity Funds (only)
2009
1,763,805,661
918,062,005
1,797,422,095
500,905,883
2,053,193,953
858,780,099
4,864,521,065
2,093,644,868
1,396,603,768
1,558,463,116
3,051,848,187
496,096,080
744,825,394
150,000,000
730,320,379

Equity Funds
(only)
2010
2,015,000,000
1,250,000,000
3,042,342,496
935,000,000
2,955,000,000
1,185,000,000
5,553,280,832
2,198,280,832
2,150,000,000
2,080,000,000
2,915,000,000
1,270,000,000
865,000,000
420,000,000
902,500,000

30,000,000
0

321,507,447
0

503,280,832
0

0
2,000,000,000

0
23,300,000,000

0
30,239,684,992

In millions Guaranies
*it includes all transfers made at the time by the Health Ministry in all categories
Information on transfers for the 1999 – 2007 periods were not available
Equity Funds refers only to the funds transferred to LHCs beginning with the Lugo Administration.

Given the limitations on data on the Departments, the tables below include data that
enables us to observe improvements in infant mortality rates for each Departments (Tables
45, 46 and 47).
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Table 45: Department of San Pedro
Department of San
Health
Pedro
Facilities
1997
85
1998
87
1999
84
2000
84
2001
87
2002
101
2003
101
2004
104
2005
104
2006
108
2007
110
2008
110
2009
112
2010
120
2011
124
Estimated Rate of analphabetism 7.7%
Estimated Poverty Rate
37% (extreme, 2000)

Transfers

74,169,500

120,000,000
918,062,005
1,250,000,000
2,117,300,000

Mortality
Rate
17.03
17.4
13.8
18.1
17.9
22.1
19.8
16.5
17
15.7
11.8
12.1
10.1
14.5
9.4

Source: Author, based on Ministry of Health’s yearly basic indicators (Indicadores Básicos de Salud)
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Table 46: Department of Guaira
Department of Guaira
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Estimated Rate of
analphabetism 10.5%
Estimated Poverty Rate 25%
(extreme, 2000)

Health
Facilities
54
42
42
42
43
48
48
50
50
62
64
64
62
66
79

Transfers
133,001,310

140,000,000
500,905,883
935,000,000
1,419,373,334

Mortality
Rate
25.15
25.6
15.4
21.5
21
22.6
29.6
25.2
21.6
20.6
21.4
14.5
12.8
12.6
15

Source: Author, based on Ministry of Health’s yearly basic indicators (Indicadores Básicos de Salud)
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Table 47: Department of Canindeyu
Department of Canindeyu
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Estimated Rate of
analphabetism 17.4%
Estimated Poverty Rate 23%
(extreme, 2000)

Health
Facilities
35
29
36
36
36
47
47
45
45
49
55
55
68
72
74

Transfers
0

0
150,000,000
420,000,000
982,500,000

Mortality
Rate
39.62
23.5
23.8
23.5
18.9
20
20.3
24.3
29.1
22.9
21
10
12.7
11.9
12.5

Source: Author, based on Ministry of Health’s yearly basic indicators (Indicadores Básicos de Salud)

In the case of the three Departments that have the fewest municipalities with
decentralization agreements (and thus the least number of LHCs), and where extreme
poverty is more widespread than in other Departments considered here, there seems to be
a relationship between number of health facilities, increased access to funding, and declines
in infant mortality rates of children under one. In the Department of San Pedro, one of the
poorest in Paraguay, the number of health facilities incrementally increases starting in the
year 2002 reaching 124 by 2011, with a decrease in infant mortality rates from a peak of
22.1% in 2002 to 9.4% in 2011—a reduction of almost 43%. Both Guaira and Canindeyu
also experienced significant decreases in mortality rates; and in the three cases, significant
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changes begin in the year 2008—the year that Equity Funds and free access to basic health
care were established. The total funds transferred to each Department starting in 2008 were
significant, as all three saw increases of over ten times what they initially received, and,
these funds have most likely impacted the ability of LHCs to implement their local health
plans through the existing, or newly created, health facilities at the local level.
Let us now examine the three Departments with the most municipalities with
decentralization agreements and, thus, the highest number of LHCs (Tables 48, 49 and 50
below).

Table 48: Department of Itapua
Department of Itapua

Health
Facilities
1997
117
1998
86
1999
77
2000
77
2001
77
2002
87
2003
87
2004
82
2005
82
2006
78
2007
79
2008
79
2009
85
2010
90
2011
102
Estimated Rate of analphabetism 9.5%
Estimated Poverty Rate
20% (extreme, 2000)

Transfers

0

475,000,000
4,864,521,065
5,553,280,832
7,045,810,992

Mortality
Rate
26.2
20.7
21.5
21.2
25
20.6
18.8
15.6
14.5
17.2
16.8
9.6
10.1
10.1
9.9

Source: Author, based on Ministry of Health’s yearly basic indicators (Indicadores Básicos de Salud)
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Table 49: Department of Cordillera
Department of
Cordillera
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Estimated Rate of
analphabetism 7.4%
Estimated Poverty Rate
17% (extreme 2000)

Health Facilities
54
39
42
42
42
42
42
44
44
42
45
45
49
55
65

Transfers

Mortality
Rate
20.16
125,750,000
20.3
22
20.3
21.3
16.5
20.8
15.8
17.6
16.7
12.8
15,000,000
11.2
1,797,422,095
10.5
3,042,342,496
10
3,385,000,000
10.1

Source: Author, based on Ministry of Health’s yearly basic indicators (Indicadores Básicos de Salud)
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Table 50: Department of Caaguazu
Department of
Caaguazu
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Estimated Rate of
analphabetism 7.5%
Estimated Poverty 22%
(extreme 2000)

Health Facilities
80
68
62
62
62
65
65
58
58
66
69
69
73
79
84

Transfers
34,537,500

160,000,000
2,053,193,953
2,955,000,000
3,439,000,000

Mortality
Rate
17.03
19.8
18.3
17.7
18.4
40.5
13.8
15.2
16.4
12.7
13.1
9.3
9.7
10.4
8.1

Source: Author, based on Ministry of Health’s yearly basic indicators (Indicadores Básicos de Salud)

In the first ten years of the process, when legal frameworks were not clear, the cases
of Itapua, Cordillera, and Caaguazu were similar to those of San Pedro, Guaira, and
Canindeyu. Funding and/or use of funding was either not available, not properly transferred
or the autonomy on its use was curtailed; there are no significant changes in the infant
mortality rates. In fact, available data indicate that changes begin in the year 2008 when
funding, and the use of the funding, is significantly increased.
Although the number of health facilities in these instances remains somewhat
constant, there seems to be a positive impact in the reduction of infant mortality rates. In
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the case of Cordillera, for example, in ten years (from 2000 to 2010), the rate decreased by
50% from 20.3% to 10%.
Finally, we examine the case of the Department of Central (Table 51), the most
populous of the country, and the one that has, through the 1998-2010 time period, been
involved the longest with health decentralization. Results are, though, similar to the other
six Departments analyzed here; namely, improvements are mostly observed after the year
2008. The Department witnessed a 55% reduction in the infant mortality rate in the ten
years between 2000 and 2010, and data suggest that the biggest drops begin in the year
2008.

Table 51: Department of Central
Department of Central

Health
Facilities
1997
134
1998
26
1999
71
2000
71
2001
72
2002
68
2003
68
2004
73
2005
73
2006
72
2007
72
2008
73
2009
83
2010
123
2011
150
Estimated Rate of analphabetism 3%
Estimated Poverty Rate
3%

Transfers

806,754,000

240,000,000
3,051,848,187
2,915,000,000
3,797,163,636

Mortality
Rate
16.45
15.1
15.6
18.4
16.2
15.6
15.5
15.4
14.1
14.7
13.3
8.6
9.2
10.2
8.7

Source: Author, based on Ministry of Health’s yearly basic indicators (Indicadores Básicos de Salud)

233

By summing the total population of San Pedro, Guaira, and Canindeyu (i.e, the
three Departments with the fewest municipalities with decentralization agreements; and
thus, the least number of LHCs) in the periods where data on funding is available (1998,
2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011), and doing the same for Itapua, Caaguazu, and Cordillera (i.e.,
the three Departments with the most municipalities with decentralization agreements), and
combining that information with the total budget transfers of each Department, a health per
capita average can be calculated to examine whether those with the most decentralized
agreements (and thus the most LHCs) have had greater success in attracting funding to
their regions. The table below summarizes the result (Table 52):
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Table 52: Per capita health expenditures in selected Departments
San Pedro, Guaira,
Canindeyu (least
number of LHCs)

Year

Total
population

1998
2008
2009
2010
2011

653856
653856
1307712
2615424
4576992

Total
Budget US
Dollars
47,625
59,770
360,682
598,850
1,038,890

Per
Capita
US$
0.07
0.08
0.49
0.8
1.388

Number
of LHCs

1998
2008
2009
2010
2011

7192416
11769408
18961824
37923648
68654880

36,847
149,425
2,003,479
2,655,315
3,188,462

0.032
0.117
1.568
2.06
2.456

3
58
58
65

20.2
10
10.1
10.1
9.3

1998
2008
2009
2010
2011

1225612
1929918
1998994
2068066
2144591

185,460
55,172
701,574
670,115
872,911

0.163
0.043
0.549
0.519
0.672

3
12
12
13

15.1
8.6
9.2
10.2
8.7

0
10
10
11

Infant
Mortality
Rate (%)*
22.1
12.2
11.8
13
12.3

Caaguazu,
Cordillera,
Itapua

Central

Source: Author, based on Ministry of Health’s yearly basic indicators (Indicadores Básicos de Salud)
US$ 1 = Gs 4,350 as per the year 2008 – Ministry of Finance data
*Average per Department

As shown above, the per capita transfer of funds is minimal by any standards, but
in those Departments with the most LHCs, as funds per capita increased, the infant
mortality rates seem to decline. Though other factors likely played a role, and causation
cannot be established, there is some correlation between increased numbers of LHCs (a
result of decentralization requirement), increase funding to the local level (also a result of
decentralization), and improvement in basic health indicators such as infant mortality rates.
Discussion
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It is difficult to establish a causal relationship between the increase of funding,
increased number of health facilities, the levels of education and poverty, and the reduction
of infant mortality rates as data limitations do not allow us to further explore the possible
links between them. However, major changes can be observed after the Paraguayan
government established progressive free access to health care (with reducing infant
mortality rates through improved maternal health care as main objectives), and as funding
to LHCs and Regional Health Councils were significantly expanded. Though the limited
autonomy on revenue collection and expenditure that LHCs had was lost with the
administration of President Lugo (2008-2010), the benefits of free health care and the
increased number of LHCs positively impacted some basic indicators such as infant
mortality rates (children under one year old) as shown in the cases of the seven
Departments considered here.
In light of the reforms implemented in Paraguay, where so much emphasis was put
on aspects of citizen participation—and due to the severe political limitations faced by the
reformers—the relevance, responsiveness, adequacy, costs and benefits, quality and
quantity of services, as stated by Katorobo (2004), are difficult to assess.
The lack of information continues to be a problem in assessing the impact that
health decentralization has had on Paraguay’s local communities. Though outcomes such
as infant mortality rates have improved, this cannot be attributed only to LHCs and the
work they have promoted. Other factors, independent of the control of LHCs, such as
central government extensive vaccination campaigns, have most likely also played a role.
Part of the difficulties health reformers faced involved the uncertainty of support
from key decision makers such as health ministers in office or legislators in Congress that
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were able to keep the issue on the political and policy agenda. In this regard, and at the
beginning of the health decentralization process, the figure of Minister Vidovich Morales
as a keen policy entrepreneur must be stressed. It is noteworthy that after he left the
Ministry (1998) and the political upheavals the country endured, the impetus for reform
slowed.
Political turmoil and the consequent change of authorities in the Ministry impacted
the continuity of the reforms, especially in the 1999 to 2005 period where health reforms
practically stalled. Concrete reforms were proposed, but formal authorization (legislative
or ministerial decrees) was harder to come by. Many veto points (Immergut, 2008)
occurred along the way. For example, the original difficulties faced by LHCs to use the
revenues generated locally—as initially provided by the health decentralization law—
conflicted with the National Financial Administrative law. This situation created a series
of political, fiscal, and administrative challenges, and many years passed before this
problem was solved by Congress.
The lack of a clear legal framework has been a constant problem throughout the
process, and this is further exacerbated by the National Constitution itself in its creation of
governors and Departmental governorships. The Constitution does not clearly specify the
powers and responsibilities of governors. Subsequent enacted legislation has done nothing
to clarify this situation. Thus, governors can name health secretariats but their
responsibilities are not defined, aside from their need to “coordinate” their work with local
governments and central authorities. In a country as centralized as Paraguay, and with a
tradition of caudillismo and clientelism, the fact that the original agreements signed
between the Ministry and the local governments did not specify the role of governors, or
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how coordination was to occur, created conditions for conflict, rivalries, and duplication
of efforts.
The process of health decentralization in Paraguay has been one of partial
decentralization (Devarajan et al., 2009), as the central government decentralized
administrative responsibilities and some financial resources, but the overall control of the
process remained in the hands of the Ministry of Health. Funding was earmarked and only
at the very beginning of the process did LHCs have access to resources and some
independence in their use—though the amounts were insignificant.
In the case of Paraguay’s health decentralization, a “managerial view” (Nickson,
2011) has prevailed with the Ministry of Health, and other agencies of the central
government like the Ministry of Finance, controlling the overall process. The relationship
of local governments with their communities was certainly recognized and given priority—
importance was given to citizen participation, to involvement of community organizations
in the creation of local health councils, and to citizens’ role in the preparation and
implementation of local health plans. But this did not mean that those LHCs were given
autonomy in the use of funds, the management of human resources administration, or
administration.
Faced with so many difficulties and contradictions, it was the persistence of
mayors, governors, some committed senior health officials, local NGOs, and multilateral
organizations that kept the issue of health decentralization on the policy agenda; pressure
was also felt from local communities87 that had been empowered by participation in LHCs

87

In interviews with project coordinators and directors from the NGO, CIRD (in charge for most of the
period of the USAID funded project to support the health decentralization process) the issue of LHCs’
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and the local health plans. Some mayors who were part of the health decentralization
process were later elected to Congress or elected governors, or were later named as senior
government officials at the Ministry of Health; these individuals ensured that reforms were
kept on the agenda 88 . In interviews with former senior health officials, mayors, and
representatives of LHCs, the members of LHCs are credited with lobbying Congress and
driving the legal reforms needed for harmonization between the Health Law 1032/96 and
the Administrative Fiscal Law.
Most people involved in issues of health reform in Paraguay credit emphasis on
citizen participation—and increased citizen participation—as an achievement of the
process. In a country with decades—if not centuries—of citizen apathy, this is not a small
achievement.
The chapter showed that the degree of collaboration between national, regional, and
local authorities on health decentralization in Paraguay has been inconsistent, heavily
influenced by political upheavals in the country, and thus very dependent on the good will
of Health Ministers and Financial Ministers. There was not a broad national discussion on
the issue, neither consensus on how to implement decentralization. However, citizens and
stakeholders were involved and continue to be. The collaboration of all stakeholders at the
beginning of the process (1994-1999), and the role played by policy entrepreneurs,

members being empowered by the process was continuously brought up; as well as their ability to influence
the mayors of their communities to keep the programs in place. Women, especially, were empowered and
played a key role in demanding accountability.
88

For example a former mayor of Itagua became General Director of the Ministry of Health’s Directorate
for Decentralization. Others became Governors of their Department as it was the case of one mayor in the
Central Department. In many other instances, mayors became members of the Chamber of Deputies in
Congress and their former constituents were able to lobby them for support.
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guaranteed the enactment of health decentralization policies, but not its success or
effectiveness. The degree of collaboration was not sustained, in particular for the 19992004 period, and thus the process slowed down and its impact on health indicators was not
fully measurable. For the period 2005 to 2010, there seems to be a convergence of
stakeholders, giving a new impetus to the process; thus, collaboration and coordination of
stakeholders improved and progress was renewed. Thus, hypothesis one89 and two90 are
partially confirmed. The impact on basic indicators, with the information accessible at the
time of this research, has been difficult to measure, but, there seems to be a correlation
between increased funding and access and improved indicators.

89

H1: If national, regional, and local political leaders participate and collaborate in the promotion of political,
fiscal, and administrative decentralization, there is a greater probability for the passage, approval, and
implementation of public service decentralization laws.
90

H2: Once public service delivery decentralization has been enacted, the higher the degree of collaboration
between national, regional, and local levels of government (in essence the type of intergovernmental relations
established), stakeholders and citizens (other socio-political actors); the greater the probability for its success
and effectiveness.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

HEALTH DECENTRALIZATION IN COLOMBIA 1990 – 2010

Introduction
Colombia, with 45 million inhabitants (2010), 91 is characterized by its great
cultural, geographical, and social diversity. It has also been marked by decades of conflict
and violence while, at the same time, experiencing remarkable economic stability by Latin
American standards.
In the 1990s, and as a model of decentralization for many unitary countries in the
region, Colombia was—as previously mentioned—at the forefront of political, fiscal, and
public service delivery decentralization. Two key service delivery areas were targeted by
reformers: health and education. As such, here we examine the country’s experience with
health decentralization.
We intend to test the validity of hypotheses:
H1: If national, regional, and local political leaders participate and collaborate in
the promotion of political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization, there is a
greater probability for the passage, approval, and implementation of public service
decentralization laws.
And,
H2: Once public service delivery decentralization has been enacted, the higher the
degree of collaboration between national, regional, and local levels of government
(in essence the type of intergovernmental relations established), stakeholders and
citizens (other socio-political actors); the greater the probability for its success and
effectiveness.

91

http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/poblacion Banco Central de la Republica de Colombia
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This section will analyze Colombia’s experience with health decentralization by
reviewing the decentralization process, the approval of major reforms, and its impact on
basic health indicators, in particular infant mortality rates for children under 1 year of age
(one of the main goals of the reforms). We will compare the indicators of ten regional
governments (Departments), examining those that have the largest number of certified
municipalities with those that have the fewest certified municipalities. The chapter
concludes with an overall assessment of the process that occurred in Colombia between
1995 and 2010 and its implication for the hypotheses posited here.
Colombia’s Health Sector
Before the 1990s decentralization reforms, Colombia had a mixed and fragmented
health system (Hernandez, 2002; Yepes et al., 2011; Santa Maria et al., 2011; Galilea et
al., 2011) ). In fact, by the 1960s, health care was provided via five different mechanisms:
(1) services for the very wealthy were provided by private doctors and clinics, sometimes
supported by private insurance; (2) compulsory insurance, with many variations, which
covered workers in the private and public sector; (3) services for the poor, which were
usually delivered either by charities, both public (called public assistance) and private
(especially the Catholic Church); (4) care and control mechanisms provided by the State
for major epidemics or sicknesses of high impact; and, (5) popular non-medical, nonscientific care. This fragmented system was based on an individual’s ability to pay, with
limited State interference.
The system, though fragmented by type of provider, was very centralized and the
National Health System, directed by the Ministry of Health, was the agency in charge of
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establishing rules and overseeing the three basic subsystems: the public, social security,
and the private sector.
The social safety system was composed of different social security funds that
covered both public and private employees. The public sector was comprised of hospitals
and health centers that provided services to those who did not qualify for the social safety
system or those who could not afford to buy private insurance (65% of the population used
this system). Finally, the private sector covered wealthy individuals, and it was comprised
of private insurers and providers (Santa Maria, 2011; Galilea et al., 2011).
Each system was financed by different mechanisms. The social safety system was
funded by a 7% contribution per employee. Services were offered in full to the employee
but only partially to his/her family. In the case of public employees, their contribution was
5%, and, as in the case of the social safety system, the employee was fully covered, but not
the immediate family. The quality of care provided, the efficiency and equity of services
and care, in all cases was disparate.
The public sector (basically, public hospitals) was funded by Departments and the
Ministry of Health. The principal source of funding was the Situado Fiscal (funds
transferred by the central government), established back in 1968, and the voluntary
contributions of Departments and municipalities. Resources of the Situado Fiscal were
distributed in accordance with a population and poverty rate formula, based on historical
expenditures of each hospital and health center (Galilea et al., 2011; Santa Maria, 2011).
In the late 1960s, the World Health Organization and the Pan-American Health
Organization reinforced the concept that universal health care, or at least access to it, should
be a basic service provided by the State. But in Colombia, as Hernandez (2004) argues, the
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dynamics of the political alliance of the Frente Nacional—where both political parties and
their supporters benefitted from a segmented health care system—did not push for reforms
but did support a clientelistic, patronage based, and exclusionary state. Thus, the reforms
proposed by Law 12 of 1963, which required the creation of unified health service
provision system, were never fully implemented. All stakeholders involved in the provision
of health services—from state workers, to medical associations, to charities, and political
parties—preferred to protect their benefits (Hernandez, 2004).
Nevertheless, technocrats in the Ministry of Health moved toward the idea of
creating a unified system, or at least expand the provision to cover the poorest of the
population. In 1972 reforms were proposed, but Congress and the political parties rejected
them as a “communist” project. It was not until the 1980s, and with the funding and
technical assistance of the World Bank, that the idea to reform the system through
decentralization begun to be taken seriously (Hernandez, 2004).
By the late 1980s, 25% of the Colombian population had no access to health care,
18% were covered by public assistance, 17% by the private sector, and about 40% by the
formal sector (Hernandez, 2004; Yepes et al., 2010); great differences in quality, access,
and efficiency of care existed. An important development toward reform was the passage
of Law 10 of 1990, which municipalized some of the health care provision, but with serious
administrative and fiscal challenges for its implementation.
Law 10 of 1990 transferred to the Departments and the municipalities the
responsibility to provide health services, including human resources management. The law
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established that Departments would provide secondary and tertiary care (the more
sophisticated services), and municipalities would be in charge of primary health care92.
Later on, Law 60 of 1993 ratified the constitutional mandate establishing that
Departments would lead the Sectional Health System, confirming their role of providing
secondary and tertiary health services, as long as certain administrative and technical
requirements were met. The law also ceded to Departments and municipalities the health
facilities established in their territories. The law confirmed that municipalities were in
charge of providing primary health care but, also allowed them—with the approval of the
respective Department—to provide secondary and tertiary care. In these cases, the
Department would be required transfer the necessary funds to the local level.
Law 60, in the area of health, established that the national government would be in
charge of the overall health policy in the country, oversee the process of implementation
and the flow of resources, ensure transparency and accountability in the use of funds, and
ensure levels of enrollment and the quality of services provided (Santa Maria, 2001).
Departments would be in charge of: implementing, at the regional level, the
national health plans, especially in regard to the organization and reforms of public
hospitals; overseeing and controlling enrollment to health plans offered by municipalities;
and overseeing and controlling health services.
Municipalities would ensure that people (especially the most disadvantaged) would
enroll in health plans (subsidized based or contribution based). In this regard,
municipalities were put in charge of ensuring that the health companies authorized to sell
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In interviews with mayors, the importance of this law as a key milestone for Colombia’s decentralization
reform was always mentioned.
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health plans were offering the best opportunities and savings for the subscribers, ensuring
transparency and accountability; local governments also had to help identify and select the
most needed population and assist them in the process of enrollment.93
Municipalities that could demonstrate the capacity (as defined by the Ministry) to
implement health decentralization at the local level, were considered “certified” and were
transferred the resources and competences to implement health decentralization at the local
level. The requirements that a municipality must demonstrate to be certified for the
provision of health services include:
1. Organization and implementation of the local health directorate.
2. Having the needed health professional and administrators in place, and the
enactment of a manual of procedures.
3. Institutional reforms necessary for the provision of health services, including
providing health units with legal status and administrative structures.
4. Signing contracts for the provision of services.
5. Creation and organization of the local health fund.
6. Membership of employees to unemployment funds, health providers (EPS—
reflecting Spanish terminology), and pension fund.
7. Organization and operation of a basic information system, in accordance with
technical standards, and the adoption of procedures for the programming,
implementation, evaluation, control and physical and financial monitoring of health
programs.
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This would become a source of criticism as some mayors favored some people over others.
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8. Adoption of the methodology for the municipality’s annual quality, efficiency
and service coverage evaluations, in accordance with the criteria prepared by the
Department’s health development plan.
9. Implementing, with the assistance of the respective Department, the institutional
changes required by Law in terms of hospitals’ organizations, human resources,
and health management94.

In 1990, only 31% of the Colombian population had access to health care through
the social security system. The public hospitals network was deficient and inefficient, with
too many resources spent on salaries and benefits due to generous contract negotiations for
health sector workers, and politicians who provided jobs for their supporters in health
facilities (Santa Maria, 2011).
The late 1980s saw the international trend of modernization of the State influence
Colombian politics in two major ways: decentralization, and the introduction of market
oriented reforms for the provision of public and social services. These trends heavily
influenced the 1991 constitutional convention process.
The early 1990s also saw citizens’ demands for better services provision increase,
sometimes resulting in violent confrontations with government authorities. At the same
time, the political disarray provoked by the narco-terrorist threat and the deep delegitimization of the State, led to the constitutional convention of 1990 and the new
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From Portal Territorial. Translation by author. http://www.portalterritorial.gov.co/documentos.shtml
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Constitution of 199195 —which was influenced by progressive and left leaning groups (the
M-19 representatives) —ensured health care as a benefit of all Colombians96.
Thus, the new Constitution was the result of negotiations between those who
wanted a more benefactor and protector State, and those who promoted market reforms
with emphasis on efficiency and quality of services as a result of open competition (Yepes
et al., 2010).

The Approval Process of Law 100/1993: the Legislative Process
Opposite positions in regard to health care reform already clashed in the
constitutional assembly in 1990 (Ramirez, 2004). The government aimed to introduce
elements of competition, something not supported by the Social Security Institute (ISS),
but supported by the private sector and some delegates in the Assembly. The ISS was
interested in promoting solidarity, universality, and a non-segmented system to ensure a
strong presence and control of the State. The ISS supported competition only in the
provision of services. The doctors’ professional association was strongly opposed to
competition and wanted to keep the monopoly of the State. The Ministry of Health took an
intermediate position, pushing for reform that would introduce solidarity in the system, but
also with elements of competition. According to Ramirez (2004), the Ministry of Health
was not in a strong position to negotiate as, at the time, it was headed by a former member
95

All people interviewed for this research, regardless of their political affiliation, agreed that the political
and social situation the country was going through at the time cannot be underestimated when trying to
analyze the Colombian process. The need to re-legitimize the State was paramount for Colombia’s political
elite.
96

It was not until 2013 that access to health was defined by law as a basic human right of all Colombians
(Bernal & Zamora, 2013).
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of the guerrilla movement that was not particularly supported by the president, and there
was high rotation among ministers (during the Gaviria administration there were four
ministers, and during the Samper and Pastrana administrations, three each).
“The Assembly and commission debates were paralleled by a much broader
process of discussion among sector specialist and stakeholders. University forums,
workshops, and international seminars were held not only in Bogota but also in the
regions; think tanks, universities, nongovernmental organizations, unions, and government
representatives with their varied views took part.” (Ramirez, 2004. page 129).
A key reformer was Juan Luis Londoño97, named Minister of Health by Gaviria in
1992. He became a strong and outspoken leader of reform, regaining control of the process
for the Executive branch. Since there was strong opposition within the Ministry to the
reforms, Londoño assembled a team of outside experts. The team was technical, highly
professionalized, and did not have particular political party connections.
Londoño was very successful in building support for the reform throughout the
executive bureaucracy. He successfully negotiated with the president, the Minister of
Finance, and the Director of the National Planning Department. He was also able to work
horizontally with pension groups, unions, the ministry of labor, the Deputy Minister of
Finance, the ISS, and with those in charge of developing the System for Identifying
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Minister Londoño’ successful experience with implementing health decentralization made him an
international expert. In fact, the Paraguayan Minister of Health, Andres Vidovich Morales, when started the
reform process a few years later (in 1995) requested the advice of Mr. Londoño who traveled to Paraguay
and offered a week long technical advice to the Minister and his senior staff, as well as to Paraguayan
members of Congress. In 2003, Dr. Juan Luis Londoño died in a plane accident. He was at the time Minister
of Social Protection in the Uribe administration.
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Possible Beneficiaries of Social Programs (SISBEN—reflecting Spanish terminology)98, a
mechanism within the National Planning Department. He also secured support from several
universities, research centers, and NGOs. His team played a crucial role in making sure the
reforms were understood in the national Congress, and in advising Congress during the
drafting and final approval of Law 100, which was to set the whole process of health
decentralization in motion. Minister Londoño’s actions, and his ability to create and sustain
a reform coalition in the initial phase of the health decentralization process, highlights his
role as policy entrepreneur (Kingdom, 1995; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Mintrom &
Norman, 2009) able to move the process forward and to negotiate with many different
stakeholders.
During the legislative approval process, many professional associations were
involved in the discussion, along with government agencies. Patients and civic groups,
though, had little influence due to their lack of organization and lack of trust in the decisionmaking process, and because they did not see clear channels for participation. Unions were
strongly opposed to the reform, especially teachers, oil workers, and the armed forces, all
of whom—in the end—were not included in the health reform and were able to keep their
existing insurance plans. Issues such as the extent of the reform, funding, limitations, and
how to introduce concepts of solidarity with market reforms, among many other technical
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Mechanism that measures poverty and health needs, used to determine what segments of the population
are to be included in the government subsidized health scheme.
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issues made the discussions very heated. The law was finally approved in December of
1993 and signed into law by President Gaviria (Ramirez, 2004).
The law significantly changed the existing health care provision in the country and
its funding. The same year (1993), Law 60 was introduced, greatly changing the role of
Departments and municipalities in public service delivery, deepening decentralization.
In their strategy to have the reforms approved, Londoño and his team involved each
legislator in the discussions, making sure to understand individual concerns99. They also
framed the discussion in the larger long-term objective of reforming social security and
pensions. The close alliance between the ministers of health and labor also aided to reduce
the opposition of unions. “During this stage, and as a result of the congressional request
to consult a wide range of groups, the reform team talked to every visible leader of the
groups involved in the reform: unions, doctors, producers’ associations, prepaid medicine
organizations, academic forums, and so on” (Ramirez, 2004; page 137).
The implementation of the law suffered greatly because of the political crisis that
ensued following the election of the Samper administration (1994-1998) and by the law’s
lack of specificities. Many aspects of its implementation were achieved via decrees and
ministerial resolutions. The lack of legitimacy, and the governability crisis that involved
all levels of government, made implementation very difficult. Moreover, in 1999,
Colombia entered a serious financial and economic crisis—the worst since the 1970s. In
addition to the economic crisis, the country experienced an intensification of internal armed
conflict and increased violence and insecurity, and internal displacement of the population
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In all interviews, the importance of Londoño’s negotiating skills were recognized and highlighted.
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was on the rise. The Pastrana administration (1998-2002) also faced these problems; thus,
the implementation of reforms was difficult to fulfill.
Neither Samper nor his first Minister of Health (Alonso Gomez) were great
supporter of reform. In July of 1995, Samper appointed a new Minister (Augusto Galan
Sarmiento) and reforms began to move forward. The pace of reforms further increased with
the appointment of his third Minister (Maria Teresa Forero de Sade).
During the Pastrana administration, the central government understood that the
progress of reform needed to occur more rapidly, and that adjustments were needed due to
the implementation challenges of both Law 60 and Law 100. Thus, in 2001, Congress
modified the Constitution and passed Law 715, which aimed to address earlier problems
of financing and accountability 100 . These reforms were seen as key solutions to the
macroeconomic instability impacting the country’s finances, which was partly blamed on
the fiscal decentralization initiatives put in motion by the 1991 Constitution, and the
decentralization laws approved up to that point. Nevertheless, national and local
bureaucracies, hospitals, and health workers remained strongly opposed to many aspects
of the reform. Hospitals continued to receive funding from the national annual budgets,
though Law 100 had technically put an end to this, and the deepening economic crisis also
meant that many people were not able to enroll in the health programs.
Colombia was able to implement such broad, complex, and difficult reforms partly
because the political class understood the dangers of disintegration and lack of legitimacy
faced by the state and its agencies. Health reform was part of a wider discussion on how to
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A former Senator interviewed in Bogota noted that, without Law 715/2001, Colombia’s decentralization
might have failed altogether due to the fiscal pressure the process was having on the country’s fiscal balance.
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reform social pensions, and reformers were successful in linking health decentralization to
an overall initiative to reform social security. The administration of President Gaviria was
able to seize the moment and propose and pass important legislation. The strategy pursued
by Minister Londoño—of building consensus by involving all stakeholders and drawing
on significant expertise—gave the process substantial legitimacy despite problems and
challenges during implementation. The presence of a policy entrepreneur such as Minister
Londoño likely ensured the success of the approval process.
In contrast with education decentralization—where Ramirez (2004) believes
progress has not been made—in the case of health decentralization, four factors were
important: first, linking health reform to pensions helped gain the support of the president
and his administration, as pension reform was one of his main objectives; second, there
was a commitment to the reforms from many senior government officials in the national
government; third, the health worker unions were divided and did not achieve consensus
in their opposition to the reforms, contrary to the case in the education sector; and fourth,
the proposed health reform included values that were important to many, including
universal coverage, equity, solidarity, and the principles of efficiency.
Having reviewed the approval process of the law, we now direct the discussion
toward analysis of the significant changes the law brought about in the Colombian health
system.

Law 100 and the Reform of Colombia’s Health System: Radical Changes
The 1991 Constitution and the Law 100 of 1993 sought to create a new system
where universal coverage, efficiency, solidarity, integrality, unity, and participation
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became core values—creating what has been called a “regulated market.” The
implementation of the new system started in 1995 (Yepes et al., 2010).
Law 100 of 1993 radically changed the provision of health services. Its objective
was to guarantee universal health coverage and to generate competition between health
insurers and health providers. It formally created the General System of Social Security in
Health (SGSSS—reflecting Spanish terminology) 101 . Exempted from the new health
system were the military, congressmen, teachers, employees of the Bank of the Republic,
and oil workers, who all kept their health providers.
Law 100 sought to provide universal health care coverage for all Colombians
through a universal health insurance aimed at guaranteeing efficiency through competition,
quality through the free selection of insurers and providers, and equity and solidarity
through a contributive scheme for those who could afford it, and subsidized scheme for the
poor. The assumption in the Colombian model was that the market would ensure the
optimization of resources with the regulatory participation of the State (Bernal & Zamora,
2014; Yepes et al., 2010; Santa Maria et al., 2011; Galilea et al., 2011; Avila Urdaneta,
2010; Molina & Spurgeon, 2007; Molina et al., 2006; Homedes & Ugalde, 2005; Bossert
et al., 2003; Jaramillo, 2002; Hernandez, 2002).
With the new law, local governments also played a role in the provision of basic
health care, mostly through awareness campaigns in areas such as reproductive health,
vaccination campaigns, preventable diseases campaigns, and environmental health (e.g.,
local campaigns promoted proper waste disposal). Mayors are responsible for
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Sistema General de Seguridad Social en Salud
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implementing these local health plans (called PABs or Plan de Atencion Basica) with most
of the funding provided by the national government. This is now part of what is referred to
as public health care.
The national government reserved for itself four major roles: (1) setting guidelines
in collaboration with the National Health Council; (2) subsidizing demand for those in
extreme poverty; (3) oversight and overall control of the system; and, (4) controlling health
policy in areas such as catastrophes and epidemics. These functions are now called “public
health” but are distinctively separated from the provision of medical/health services, which
is done exclusively through the contributive or subsidized schemes.
One of the main objectives of the Law was to provide universal coverage (Yepes et
al., 2010; Santa Maria, 2011), which was achieved through two schemes: the contributory
and the subsidized. The previous social security system by which employers contributed a
portion of their salaries was expanded to cover their immediate family, and independent
workers who earned at least one legally established minimum wage, and to those who could
afford it. The contributory system does not receive government funding, and employees
contribute 8% of their salaries (8.5% after 2007), and employers 4%.
The subsidized scheme was the result of the constitutional mandate to offer
universal coverage, and the market oriented trend for a system based on demand and not
necessarily on supply. It was intended to cover the poorer segments of the population. This
system is funded 47% by funds of the nation’s current revenues account, which are
transferred to local governments and/or Departments depending on whether or not
municipalities are “certified,” 34% by transfers from the contributive system, and 19% by
municipalities and Departments from their own budgets (Yepes et al., 2010).
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The subsidized scheme works with two central instruments:
-

A national standard health plan called POS (Plan Obligatorio de Salud) that must
be offered to all insured people.

-

A per capita payment unit or UPC (Unidad de Pago per Capita), which is the same
for all insurers and paid to them per person insured.

Both the UPC and POS amounts are established by the National Council on Social
Security and Health or CNSSS (Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Social en Salud).
To ensure compliance, the law creates the Health Promotion Entities or EPSs
(Entidades Promotoras de la Salud) as new actors in charge of providing health insurance,
and the creation of a network of providers, both public and private, called the Service
Providers Institutions or IPSs (Instituciones Prestadoras de Servicios).
The EPSs could also be public or private, not-for-profit or for profit. They all have
to offer the same POSs. In this way, it was expected that insurers would compete for quality
and efficiency as the services they provide and the revenues they receive are regulated.
In order to qualify for the subsidized scheme, a mechanism to evaluate poverty
levels and capacity of payment was devised by the National government, called the
SISBEN or Sistema de Seleccion de Beneficiarios de Programas Sociales (Santa Maria et
al., 2011)102. The SISBEN is an instrument designed to identify structural poverty; it is
based on classifying the population in six categories—taking into account socio-economic
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An important factor in the Colombian reform was to maximize and optimize the use of subsidies on those
with the most need. In order to better identify those in need, Colombia (based on the Costa Rican and Chilean
models) developed a Beneficiary Identification System (SISBEN).
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characteristics. It is a point system based on a survey, which is then combined with other
socio-economics and statistical information. The municipalities are in charge of collecting
the information that feeds the system in the areas of their municipality considered poor103.
Levels 1 and 2 of the SISBEN are for those who qualify for the subsidized scheme;
in some municipalities belonging to Level 3 might also qualify for the subsidized scheme.
As of 2008, 70% of participants in the subsidized scheme belonged to Levels 1 and 2 of
the SISBEN and 15% to Level 3, and 15% (up to 1.3 million people) had registered for the
subsidized scheme but had not been classified by the SISBEN, and thus it was not known
if they actually qualified for the scheme.
The contributive scheme is composed of people employed with payment capacity
or those in Level 3 or higher in the SISBEN mechanism. Those belonging to the
contributive system have health coverage for themselves and their immediate family, but
coverage is limited to each individual in the subsidized scheme. In 2006, a Partial
Subsidized Scheme (RSP or Regimen Subsidiado Parcial) was established with reduced
coverage offered to some in the Level 3 of the SISBEN.
The subsidized system is managed by the ARS (Administradora del Regimen
Subsidiado), which contracts with service provider institutions (Instituciones Prestadoras
de Servicios or IPSs). The administration of the insurance is done by the EPSs (Empresa
Prestadora de Servicios), and the provision of the services by the IPSs. The idea was that
both public and private institutions will seek insurance providers in a market system and
the population would be able to choose between EPSs and IPSs.
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This has been criticized as being a source of corruption and clientelistic practices, as some mayors have
benefitted supporters by making sure they qualify for categories 1 and 2 of the SISBEN.
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For those employed, but who did not qualify for either scheme, the Law anticipated
a transition period—ultimately categorizing those individuals into one of the two schemes.
The original deadline was 2001, but as of 2010, this had not yet been achieved (Santa
Maria, 2011).
In the contributory scheme, workers and employers pay into the system. Each
beneficiary is free to choose from established insurers (EPSs) and the services are
provided by the IPSs contracted by the EPSs. A principle of solidarity was established in
the system by which, the contributive scheme transfers 1.5% to the subsidized scheme,
and people with less health risks contribute to those with higher health risks.

Figure 1: Contributory scheme

FOSYGA*

Worker + Employer
contribute 12.5% of salary
- Insured selects EPS - IPS
and receives POS
- Independent worker
contributes 12.5%

FOSYGA receives funding
from well performing EPSs
and transfers to deficitary
EPSs. The EPS receives a
UPC per person covered

EPS
EPS contracts with an IPS
network and/or establishes
its own network

IPS
Provides established
services as per POS to the
insured and beneficiaries

Source: Adapted from Yepes et al. (2010)
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The fiscal resources for the subsidized scheme are transferred by the national
government to the municipalities, and the resources for the solidarity fund (collected from
the contributive system) are transferred by Solidarity and Guarantees Fund (or FOSYGA—
reflecting Spanish terminology)104.
In the subsidized scheme, the municipality receives the transfers from the FOSYGA
and the General Transfer System (national government). The municipality hires and pays
the EPSs (insurers) 105 , in turn the EPSs contracts out services—and pay for services
provided—to the IPSs (providers). Municipalities must identify people in need, applying
the criteria established by the government (SISBEN), and the EPS is in charge of enrolling
those identified.

104

Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantia

105

As mentioned before, allegations of corruption, patronage, and clientelism have been rampant both on
the contracting of EPSs and in the SISBEN access.
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Figure 2: Subsidized scheme

National
Transfer
System and
FOSYGA

Municipality

IPS

EPS
Source: Adapted from Yepes et al. (2010)

Administration and provision of services
Law 100 also transferred ownership of hospitals and health centers to the
Departments and municipalities, as well as the responsibility for coordinating health
services. On the other hand, public hospitals were transformed into quasi-state agencies
with more management autonomy, with a directorate comprised of professionals and
members of the community, and with the competency to seek resources in the private
market as well. Briefly, public hospitals were transformed into public social enterprises.

Law 715 of 2001 replaced Law 60 of 1993 and established the responsibilities of
each level of government in health services provision (Santa Maria et al., 2011; Galilea,
2011; Yepes et al., 2010).
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As such, the law established that the national government is in charge of designing
the system, establishing regulations, and directly funding some of the services (Table 53
below summarizes the competences per level of government). The Departments are to
manage the hospitals of Categories 2, 3, and 4 (offering more sophisticated and complex
care). Municipalities administer the subsidized scheme (select beneficiaries through the
SISBEN administration, contract with the ARSs, and provide funds for such services).
Local governments are also in charge of local health centers and hospitals providing
services of Category 1. The fact that all three levels of government have a role in the
administration, management, and funding of health service provision, makes for a very
complex and often confusing system, with difficulties for oversight, follow-up, and
accountability.106
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In fact, interviews with representatives of the health sector, as well as mayors, and advisors for both the
municipal and Departmental Federations indicate that irregularities in the use of funds, as well as accounting
bottlenecks have caused that the national government now directly transfers the funds to the EPSs, and the
Departments and municipalities only record the transactions for accounting reasons, without actually
receiving those funds.
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Table 53: Competences in Health by Level of Government
Central Government
- Formulate public health
policies, service delivery,
sets objectives for
population receiving
subsidies, and creates a
National Health Information
System
- Establish the priorities for
the Basic Health Plan

Departmental Government
- Adopt and implement
public health policies,
provide services, and
distribute resources
-

- Decide and provide for the
National Vaccination Plan
- Provide technical assistance
to the Departments
- Distribute and control fiscal
transfers
- Oversight the
implementation of health
reforms and the delivery of
services
- Provide highly specialized
health treatments in
coordination with other
agencies

Formulate the Basic Health
Plan for the Department

-

Administer the regional
health plan, and provide
health services of secondary
and tertiary level

Formulate and implement
the Basic Health Plan:
preventive programs and
health promotion

-

Provide health services to
the population either by
contracting out or with its
own health care institutions

-

Oversee and control public
health, and of the services
provided by health
organizations

-

Promote the creation of
community organizations to
participate in and control
the quality of services

-

Implement the Health
Information system

-

Carry out the survey of the
Subsidized Beneficiaries
Identification System
(SISBEN), and create a
database of the population
by social and economic
category

-

Allocate subsidies to poor
populations

Oversee the Departmental
health plan implementation,
the control of health
provision services, and the
resources

-

Provide technical assistance
to the municipalities

-

Grant legal registration to
health institutions

-

Implement the Health
Information system

-

Municipal Government
- Adopt and implement
public health policies,
provide services, and
allocation of subsidies to
the target population

Distribute and control the
funds of the Subsidized
Regimen

-

Contract the provision of
services for the poor
population included in the
subsidized system
Source: Molina & Spurgeon (2007) based on Laws 10/1990; 60/1993; 715/2001
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Article 153 of Law 100 charged the regulation, oversight, and general direction of
the national health system to three agencies: (a) the National Council on Social Security
and Health (CNSSS or Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Social en Salud), the highest
authority, responsible for updating and designing the POSs and for setting the value of
UPCs; (b) the Ministry of Social Protection (MPS or Ministerio de Proteccion Social) in
charge of policy setting, strategies, design of programs and plans, charged with increasing
efficiency in the management of the system; and, (c) the National Health Superintendence
(SNS or Superintendencia Nacional de Salud) in charge of oversight, inspection, and
control of the different players in the system. The SNS is also charged with conflict
resolution in disputes involving pre-existing conditions or when other complaints are
raised.
The CNSSS is composed of 14 members representing each sector involved in the
provision of services (government, companies, professionals, users, employees), the
Minister of Finances, representatives of regional and local governments, and the Ministry
of Social Protection. Eight members—proposed by companies, the EPSs, the IPSs, health
professionals, employees, retired personnel, and users in rural areas—are selected by the
national government.
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Summarizing, the reform has created new important actors in the Colombian health
system:
-

The EPSs, which replaced the state institutions in providing health coverage. They
must offer an “integral” health plan as established by the Obligatory Health
Services Plan (POS)107 regulated by the government.

-

FOSYGA, created as a fiduciary, administers the funds of the contributive scheme,
as well as the solidarity fund of the subsidized scheme.

-

Users’ Associations, created for all participants to represent them in the defense of
their rights and to oversee the quality of services provided.

The reform also changed the roles of traditional players, in particular:
-

Public hospitals became state social enterprises: public hospitals that had
traditionally been funded and administered by Departments and municipalities,
were transformed in state social enterprises, autonomous in their administration and
management, ruled by a Board Council with state participation, community leaders
and health professionals, and funded by the provision of services (90% as of 2010).
Public hospitals had to learn how to bill for services, change their incentives, and
restructure their administrations.

-

Public insurers with a captive clientele became the EPSs, competing amongst
themselves: public insurers had to adapt to a new system, by becoming EPSs or
were dissolved. The political implications were many as these unions were strong
and well represented.

107

Plan Obligatorio de Servicios de Salud (POS)
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-

The Health Superintendent Office took a new role as the agency that authorizes
new EPSs and supervises their performance, particularly in regard to selection
criteria to avoid discrimination. It is also the mediator in cases of conflict; receives
complaints about the system, and establishes sanctions if needed.

In summary, Law 100/1993—and the many decrees, rules, and regulations that
followed it—substantially changed the provision of health services in Colombia while
trying to keep a difficult balance between market oriented incentives and government led
policies aimed at achieving universality, equality, and equity in health care.
Citizen Participation in the Health Decentralization Process
The Colombian reform also considered citizen participation mechanisms that
would ensure accountability and control over the system, making it more democratic,
participatory, and reflective of local needs; in doing so, the links between communities and
the state were strengthened (Arevalo, 2004; Yepes et al., 2010; Santa Maria, 2011;
interviews).
Overall, interviews with mayors, health secretaries, and health reformers indicate a
consensus that, despite advances in promoting participation in general, there have been no
significant advances in social control of the process, there is dispersion and atomization of
social control, and there are serious weaknesses in participation encoded into institutional
policy. Years of intense political and often violent confrontations are noted as explanations
for the lack of effective citizen participation in the process.
Nevertheless, attempts to promote citizen participation date back to the late 1950s
when the Community Action Councils (Juntas de Accion Comunal) were created by the
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National Front to legitimize and improve relationships between the State and local
communities. The process though was hijacked by clientelism and patronage. In the 1970s,
independent groups and social movements demanded more participation in the design of
social policies. The decentralization reforms of the 1980s, including the direct election of
mayors, were a response to these demands for more direct participation. It was during this
time that the Local Administrative Councils or JALs, for their Spanish name, (Juntas
Administradoras Locales), were created as administrative subunits of local governments
with an advisory role in budgetary issues, and a surveillance role in the provision of public
services. The Constitution of 1991 expanded the roles of JALs giving them a bigger role
in oversight of public funds and the allocation of the budget (Arevalo, 2004).
In 1989, the Committees for Community Participation or COPACOs (Comites de
Participacion Comunitaria) were created. Law 10 of 1990 expanded their role and gave
communities the opportunity of being part of the local health boards through the
COPACOS. Several decrees regulated the implementation of citizen participation: citizens
could create users’ associations and could be represented on boards of the IPS or the ARS,
both public and private; also, municipal health directors were to be part of the COPACOs,
as well as the Departmental health director and representatives of the education sector.
Each COPACO was to include the local mayor or his/her representative, the local health
director, the director of the most representative IPS in the municipality, and one
representative from each social or community organization.
In general, citizen participation was expected to play a role in the planning process
of local health plans and in the oversight of implementation. Though the design and
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management of the plans needed to be done with the different social sectors, the
mechanisms to do it were not put in place.
Citizen participation, and its ability to have an impact on the decision making
process and implementation of local health plans, is influenced by size of the municipalities
and their respective institutional capacity. The low levels of technical capacity, the lack of
professionalized human resources, and ignorance about the legal framework have been
obstacles to implementing many aspects of citizen participation (Arevalo, 2004; interviews
with local health directors, and former mayors).
Most users’ associations have a very small number of members, with an average in
2004 of about 10 people, and only the largest municipalities had associations with more
than 25 members. In a survey, almost 80% of IPSs have at least one users’ association, and
only 10% of IPSs did not have an association (Arevalo, 2004).
An important role—not originally planned—in oversight of the system, and in
promoting citizen participation, has been taken on by the Personeros in charge of ensuring
the efficiency and transparency in the delivery of public services. Since Law 100 of 1993
also emphasized the need of municipalities to ensure that citizen participation mechanisms
were put in place in the decision making process, the role of Personeros in this regard has
increased, but with moderate success.
Overall, the implementation of citizen participation mechanisms in the health
decentralization process have had mixed results with the size and capacity of municipalities
being—quite naturally—one of the most important factors, along with the political will of
the local political authorities. Lack of resources, trust, and weak inter-institutional
collaboration have been impediments to the ability of users’ associations to influence the
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process. The preeminence of a fiscal oversight role for the users’ associations and the
COPACOs 108 has also reduced their ability to be part of the decision making process.
Citizen participation in general has been limited109.

Evaluation, Impact, and Results of the Health Reform
Trying to assess the success of health decentralization is a difficult task. Many
factors must be accounted for while analyzing the results obtained over 20 years of
decentralization. As Nelson (2004) states, “health outcomes of course are determined not
only by the amount and quality of health care but also – indeed, more importantly – by
nutrition, housing, and related services (especially the supply of clean water), income and
education, environmental factors, and an array of public health measures” (page 24).
A review of different studies conducted on the results of health decentralization
implementation shows mixed results, but with an overall consensus that the principal goal
of universal coverage had, by 2010, mostly been achieved with about 95% of the
population having access to health care—be it through the contributive or the subsidized
scheme (Bernal & Zamora, 2014; Santa Maria et al., 2011; Yepes et al., 2010; Galilea et
al., 2011; Avila Urdaneta, 2010; Molina & Spurgeon, 2007; Molina et al., 2006; Homedes
& Ugalde, 2005; Bossert et al., 2003; Jaramillo, 2002; Hernandez, 2002). Nuances in the
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Their greatest contribution has been to provide information about local needs, populations in need (for
the SISBEN requirement), preferences and complaints about providers and insurers. They have not always
been taken into account at the time of designing policy initiatives or programs.
109

The Secretary of Health for the City of Bogota, and an advisor to the Colombian Federation of
Municipalities, as well as other former mayors interviewed, confirm that the lack of a clear understanding
of the process by many citizens and actors involved, made the efficacy of citizen participation questionable.
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level of success are to be expected, with the quality of care and equity of access continuing
to be a serious structural problem not yet solved by the reform.
Some studies have concentrated on the effectiveness of using formulae based
allocations to improve equity in resource allocation (Bossert et al., 2003), finding that, in
general, smaller municipalities had spent more from their own budgets on health services
than larger ones.
Previous studies show, and interviews with former mayors and health officials in
Colombia confirm, that the lack of local capacity—both at the government level and within
the EPSs, has been a major problem in the implementation of health reforms, along with
poor participation by communities in the management process of health decentralization
(Galilea et al., 2011; Avila Urdaneta, 2010; Molina & Spurgeon, 2007).
To implement reforms, municipalities, in particular, need ample administrative
capacity. Results of analyses by Molina & Spurgeon (2007) find that municipal health
directorates, in general, lack the administrative capacity to fulfill their duties. Clientelism,
with mayors tending to appoint those with shared political affiliation and/or personal
loyalty over those with capacity, has resulted in plans not implemented, poor oversight,
and high personnel rotation. The Ministry of Health has not provided sufficient or
consistent technical assistance either.
Hospitals have found themselves with higher administrative costs as a consequence
of personnel increases to comply with new regulatory and reporting demands.
Others criticize the process as an imposition by multilateral organizations such as
the World Bank and other multilateral agencies (Homedes & Ugalde, 2005), where
privatization and market reform considerations prevail over the needs of the population
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and, as a consequence, many of the neediest individuals still lack access to decent health
care. In their view, the EPSs were able to find loopholes to bypass the requirements of the
law, offering poor quality health care or not coverage at all; thus, most people remain in
the subsidized system110. Hernandez (2002) joins this criticisms and argues that the reforms
have only perpetuated the inequalities (including clientelism and patronage) present in
Colombia’s society, which are the results of the country’s violent and often conflictive
history111.
Jaramillo’s evaluation (2002), after ten years of health decentralization
implementation, noted that the new system had three basic characteristics:
1) public subsidies were decentralized to Departments and municipalities;
2) public hospitals have become state social enterprises, with significant changes in
management model;
3) a system of health subsidies has been created for the poorest citizens, and the old
monopoly on health and social security was eliminated.
Jaramillo finds that the reforms have increased financial resources, which has led
to an increase in public health staff and higher salaries. Hospitals have increased their
budgets, and 20% of the poorest have benefitted from subsidies on demand. “However,
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Interviews with health officials in Colombia confirm that one of the main problems of the system is that
too many people still remain in the subsidized scheme when the original previsions expected most people to
move to the contributive scheme after about 10 years. The financial long-term sustainability of the program
is then threatened.
111

For Hernandez (2002), the fact that the subsidized POSs needed to meet only 70% of the benefits offered
by the contributive one, already set the poor at a disadvantage. It must be clarified though, that in 2015 a new
law was passed aimed at correcting this problem, and all EPSs have now to offer the same POSs regardless
of the scheme people belong to.
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indicators of public health have fallen and health professionals are critical of a system
based on mediation, which increases transaction costs” (Page 48).
Molina and Spurgeon (2007), in their analysis of elements of citizen participation
and institutional capacity of municipalities to implement health decentralization, find that
clientelism is still a key factor for the implementation and progress of the process. The mix
of decentralization and privatization has also created conflicts in the delivery of services.
Contracting problems are present in many municipalities including, in some
instances, EPSs that have not delivered the necessary services to the municipalities,
requiring patients to visit different hospitals and travel significant distances. Some EPSs
and ARSs do not renew their contracts on time and delay payment to hospitals or health
providers112; and the provision of services has been fragmented so patients are forced to
visit several health organizations to receive basic services (Molina & Spurgeon, 2007;
Hernandez, 2002).
Clientelism has been a serious problem with mayors, councilmembers, and even
Departmental councilmembers—benefiting those who are politically loyal to the detriment
of those who really need the subsidies. Clientelism and patronage have impacted local
governments’ capacity to mobilize political, social, and technical resources, and their
capacity to gain credibility and autonomy.

112

Delay in payments to EPSs and to IPSs continues to be a significant problem. Interviews in Colombia
indicate that the national government has opted to transfer funds directly to the EPSs instead of to
Departments and certified municipalities in order to avoid financial bottlenecks. The transfers are still
recorded as to subregional governments for accounting purposes.
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Ironically, the private sector, with more resources and capacity, has benefitted from
the reforms, gaining access to public funding easier than public hospitals, without assuming
responsibility for the poorest population.
Lack of capacity at the local and regional level has also hindered the control and
oversight of the system. Molina et al. (2006) in a study of three Departments (Antioquia,
Caldas, and Risaralda, with over 164 municipalities considered) found that 81% have a
health director, though 40% of them do not have the qualifications required for the position.
Control and oversight is still weak or lacking. Moreover, 79% of municipalities have
various providers, offering people more options; but in cases where ARSs are selected by
mayors, those who use ARSs do not have choices in providers.
In the same Molina et al. (2006) study, the authors find that decentralization has
not greatly impacted access, quality, and coverage. All municipalities have community
participation organizations but they do not play a fundamental role in the decision making
process.
In essence, the questions to consider are then: has the system reduced barriers to
access and increased coverage? Has competition and freedom of choice increased the
quality and efficiency of health services? Has equity in access improved? Have health
indicators improved and is there more health equity in Colombia?
Overall, different evaluations indicate that, as previously mentioned, the
contributive scheme has grown more slowly than the subsidized one, but—as of 2010—a
significant difference remained between the POSs of the contributive system vs. the
subsidized system (Yepes et al., 2010).
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Reforms have increased coverage of the most poor among the population (Levels
1 and 2 of SISBEN) and in rural areas. But the differences in the services provided by the
two systems make it structurally unequal, as poor people are offered less services than
those in the contributive system.
Serious problems remain with universal coverage by income, as 43% of the poorest
people have not joined vs. just 14% of the richest (Yepes et al., 2010). An important
accomplishment has been to reduce the gap between insured and uninsured in rural and
urban areas; as well as the age gap with younger (less than 15) and older people (over 60)
being covered (Yepes et al., 2010).
Regarding access to health, there is not enough information as a baseline prior to
the implementation of reforms. A proposed way to measure access to health is via insured
individuals’ ability to obtain services. Data from 2007 and 2008 indicate that 79.5% of
participants of the contributive scheme and 74.4% of those in the subsidized scheme
received services when they first felt sick; only 49.7% of those without insurance did
(Yepes et al., 2010)
The Colombian Constitution allows citizens to contest the way services are
provided through a system of “wardship” or tutelage aimed at protecting basic rights. If the
number of tutelages can measure lack of access, then a high number of tutelages presented
(over 60,000 per year between 1999 and 2005) by individuals covered by some kind of
POS could be an indicator of serious access problems (Yepes et al., 2010, interviews).
A second consideration in the study of Yepes et al. (2010) is the impact of
competition and freedom of choice on the quality and efficiency of services provided. The
impact of competition is, quite naturally, bigger in large and mid-size cities, but it is not
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possible in most of the country’s municipalities where often there are very few insurers
and/or providers, and the population is too small to justify more insurers or providers to
enter the market. This lack of competition impacts people’s freedom of choice (again,
especially in rural areas and small urban centers).
Other common problems that have impacted quality of care provided involve too
many administrative requirements, such as: constant contract renewals between
Departments, municipalities, and insurers; peoples’ need to change plans due to unsteady
jobs; the need to constantly update the SISBEN; and delays in transferring funds.
Corruption, overpricing, medical absenteeism, and unscrupulous enterprises that do not
register all their workers in the system contribute to the lack of quality care. The 2007 Law
1122 required the establishment of a quality control system for all IPSs, but, as of 2010, it
has not yet been implemented.
In evaluating the impact of reforms on equity of access to health services,
researchers (Yepes et al., 2010; Santa Maria et al., 2011) note the lack of a baseline to
compare from, but nevertheless emphasize that this goal has not been achieved. The
existence of different schemes with different services and procedures covered implies a
lack of equity in access (Yepes et al., 2010; Hernandez 2002). Typically, the poorest
individuals have POSs with fewer benefits. In the case of independent workers, to access
the contributive system they must assume all costs related to the plans’ contributions,
which puts them at a disadvantage, creating barriers to access equality.
Better equality in certain services have been achieved (for example, in pre-natal
care and delivery services), but inequality by programs and by income is still a significant
problem.
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Have overall health indicators improved? Most analysis and studies point to a lack
of advances in improving health indicators in Colombia, partly due to a system that was
not adapted to the highly unequal Colombian reality113. Some indicators, such as infant
mortality rates for those under five years old and malnutrition, have decreased, but other
serious diseases such as tuberculosis, respiratory infections, and maternal-birth-related
deaths have not seen major changes (Bernal & Zamora, 2014; Santa Maria et al., 2011;
Yepes et al., 2011; Galilea et al., 2011; Avila Urdaneta, 2010; Molina & Spurgeon, 2007;
Molina et al., 2006; Homedes & Ugalde, 2005; Bossert et al., 2003; Jaramillo, 2002;
Hernandez, 2002).
As of 2010, some positive results of the reform include:
-

A reduction in out-of-pocket expenses. Between 1977 and 1980, the proportion of
family income spent on health was 12.1% (Yepes et al., 2010); in 1997 it was about
10.7%, and in 2003 about 7.24%.

-

Overall increase in total coverage both through the subsidized and the contributive
schemes. The number of members in the subsidized scheme tripled between 1997
and 2008 (from 7 million to 23 million), mostly the very poor (those classified as
Level 1 and 2 in the SISBEN). Increase in coverage has also reduced the gap
between the very rich and the poor in terms of access. While in 1993 only 24% of
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Interviews conducted in Colombia confirmed the fact that the country’s historical inequalities have made
the principle of equity of care and access very difficult to achieve. A mayor explained that one of the major
challenges in the whole decentralization process in Colombia, has been the fact that the country’s inequalities
and diversity were not taken into account while designing the decentralization laws and programs. Thus, the
same programs apply to all local and regional governments regardless of their size and capacity, when a
staggered process would have been more appropriate. He referred to the challenge of the “Three Colombias”:
the Colombia of the big cities with large capacities, the Colombia of the mid-size cities, and the ‘forgotten
Colombia’, the one of the poorest and where the national government does not reach.
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the population had access to health services, and of those about 90% belonged to
Categories 3 and up; in 2003 that percentage was 85%, of which about half were
from Categories 1 and 2 (Santa Maria et al., 2011).
-

Reduction of inequality in terms of coverage between urban and rural regions, by
age, and by education level.

-

Optimization in the use of subsidies. Though there have been great improvements
in the allocation of subsidies, the SISBEN system has not been exempt of serious
criticism114.

-

Better access to health services for those with coverage.

-

Increase number of preventive visits to health centers.

On the other hand, as of 2010, some the negative results of the reform include:
-

In terms of access to services, structural problems remain such as the differences
between POSs, the high number of tutelage actions in response to lack of services,
and the lack of qualified human resources to implement reforms.

-

Among structural problems, the reform has put too much emphasis on financial
issues and ensuring its smooth implementation without an overall vision of the
complexity of the problem and a lack of a national health policy agenda. The need
to constantly verify who qualifies as poor (through the SISBEN), and thus who
qualifies for the subsidies, adds administrative costs and burdens to the system. The
differences between POSs that were supposed to be transitory have not been fixed,

114

Besides the allegations of corruption already mentioned, some people - who the SISBEN leave out of the
subsidized scheme, consider it unfair or discriminatory.
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aggravating the existing inequality. Delays in funds transfers, lack of incentives,
and deficient information systems.
-

The negative impact the reforms have had on the labor market, with many
companies laying off or changing the labor status of their workers, to reduce the
contributions they are required to make to the contributive system (Santa Maria et
al., 2011).

-

Duplication of efforts and duplication in the use of funds, especially in the case of
hospitals, where many expenses are made more for political reasons than technical
ones (per Law 715/2001, the management of hospitals was transferred to the
Departments). The efficient use of resources continues to be a problem.

-

Problems of “adverse selection” with many EPSs and ARSs taking in high risk
patients (as they are paid by services provided and based on UPCs) with the
probability of serious financial consequences.

-

As previously mentioned, the subsidized scheme has become a financial liability.
When Law 100 was enacted, the expectation was that the contributions and
enrollment of the contributive system would suffice to cover the needs of the
subsidized scheme. But, over the years, experience has shown that enrollment in
the subsidized scheme continues to increase, but the contributive one does not. In
fact, in the Santa Maria et al. report (2011) it is estimated that 22 million people are
in the subsidized scheme while only 16 million are in the contributive one115. It is
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As of November of 2013, 52.51% (22,586,073 people) belonged to the subsidized scheme, while 46.59%
(20,040,671 people) were enrolled in the contributive scheme, and 0.90% (387,986 people) were in the
special scheme. The Departments of Cundinamarca, Antioquia, Risaralda, San Andres, Santander, Valle del
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clear that the long-term financial sustainability of the system is at risk. Also, the
fiscal stability of the system is further at risk by continually relying on transfers
from the central government. Interviews in Colombia confirmed this assertion.
-

The eligibility mechanisms of the SISBEN are not clear and thus its impact on the
selection process is not always transparent116. It seems the pool of poor is ever
larger, and political considerations also seem to impact who qualifies for the
subsidized scheme.

-

Institutional problems include the complexity of the financial and institutional
arrangements creating bottlenecks in the transfer of funds, making the follow-up,
oversight, and accountability of the system very difficult, especially in the
subsidized scheme. The CNSSS is also highly dependent on the Ministry of Social
Protection as its guidelines, as well as all administrative and technical support,
comes from the Ministry. The members of the Council also have a high level of
rotation making consistency and long-term planning difficult. There is no
accountability system for members of the Council, making them susceptible to third
party influences in the decision-making process.

-

Another institutional problem is the status of EPSs and ARSs; though they act as
financial institutions, their financial activities are not supervised by the
Superintendence of Finances.

Cauca and the city of Bogota are the only ones where over 50% of enrolled are in the contributive system
(Ministry of Health).
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Some of the variables used by the SISBEN include information on human capital, demography,
unemployment, income, overcrowding, housing characteristics and ownership of home appliances, as well
as access to public services such as potable water, bathrooms, and waste disposal (Santa Maria et al., 2011).
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-

And finally, many EPSs (almost 70% of them) offer their services only through
their providers’ network, making the freedom of choice for consumers difficult and
generates congestion and client attention problems.

Examining Health Indicators
To asses if health decentralization has impacted some basic indicators, and given
that improving infant mortality rates was one key indicator to be taken into account, this
section will now try to analyze if Departments with the highest number of certified
municipalities have achieved better indicators than Departments with the least number of
certified municipalities. The exercise will also help to determine if there is a difference
when Departments are in charge of decentralization—since in the case of municipalities
that are not certified, Departments are given competence over health care—as opposed to
those with the largest number of certified municipalities117.
The Departments considered are some of the wealthiest and most populated ones
in Colombia (Antioquia, Cundinamarca, and Valle del Cauca), as well as some of the
poorest (Choco, Boyaca, and La Guajira), representing areas where a great number of
Colombians reside.
The Departments with the largest number of certified municipalities (see Table 54
below) considered here are Antioquia with 94.4% of municipalities being certified (as of
2005), and Cesar with 92%, Huila with 100%, Santander with 64.3%, and Tolima with
74.4%.

117

Data available on the number of certified municipalities was obtained from the Colombian Planning
Department (DANE) as for the year 2005. Data on the infant mortality rate under 1 year of age was obtained
from the Ministry of Health for the 2001 – 2011 period.
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The Departments with the fewest certified municipalities include the Department
of Cundinamarca, one of the most populous in the country, with just 12% of local
municipalities certified as of 2005, Boyaca with just 2.4%, Choco with just one local
municipality certified, La Guajira with 13.3%, and Valle del Cauca with 28.5% of
municipalities certified.
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Table 54: Number of Certified Municipalities by Department (Health – 2005)
Department*
Antioquia
Atlantico
Bolivar
Boyaca
Caldas
Cauca
Cesar
Cordoba
Cundinamarca
Choco
Huila
La Guajira
Magdalena
Meta
Nariño
N. Santander
Quindio
Risaralda
Santander
Sucre
Tolima
Valle
Cauca

del

Number of
Municipalities
(Total)
125
23
48
123
27
42
25
30
116
31
37
15
30
29
64
40
12
14
87
26

Number of Certified
Municipalities (2005)
118
12
33
3
12
2
23
21
14
1
37
2
5
11
44
6
2
9
56
9

Number of NOT
certified Municipalities
(2005)
7
11
15
120
15
40
2
9
102
30
0
13
25
18
20
34
10
5
31
17

47

35

12

42

12

30

*Departments of Caqueta, Arauca, Casanare, Putumayo, San Andres, Amazonas, Guainia, Gauviare, Vaupes
and Vichada were not included as data was not available. Special districts such as Bogota, Medellin, and Cali
were not included either as their size and resources are not representative and are treated differently by the
DANE.

In the case of the Department of Antioquia118 it can be argued that there have been
no major differences or improvements on infant mortality rates (children under 1 year old,
live births) when compared to the Department of Cundinamarca (See Tables 55 and 56

118

Both Antioquia and Valle del Cauca Departments are the only ones, throughout the period considered,
where the majority of the population belong to the contributive scheme.
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below). As shown in the tables below, neither one of these Departments improved
dramatically, nor did the other Departments considered here119.
Table 55: Infant Mortality Rate (Per 100,000) per Department – 1 year old (live
births) – Departments with the most certified municipalities

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

1319

1375

1627

1420

1192

1256

1257

1212

1198

1174

955

772

1043

1435

1659

1431

1452

1486

1633

1842

1804

1568

Huila

1702

1964

1919

2005

1493

1234

1443

1383

1242

1261

1078

Santander

1069

1008

1068

1018

881

856

1172

1065

1102

947

929

Tolima
1597 1411 2020 1787 1519 1094 1155 1242 1222
Source: Author, based on Basic Health Indicators Reports 2001 – 2011, Ministry of Health.

1009

884

Department
Antioquia
Cesar

Table 56: Infant Mortality Rate (Per 100,000) per Department with the least
certified municipalities

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

1243

1234

1278

1191

1257

1075

1422

1379

1115

1179

923

Cundinamar
ca

945

1241

1408

1365

1378

1300

1323

1158

1155

1095

926

Choco

1256

1043

1670

1771

1616

1661

1254

1438

1217

1307

1525

La Guajira

1564

1516

2137

2137

2194

1539

1326

1201

1358

1080

1134

1104

922

Department
Boyaca

Valle del
1126 1196 1198 1230 1068 1053 1119 1137 1015
Cauca
Source: Author, based on Basic Health Indicators Reports 2001 – 2011, Ministry of Health.

119

These results are consistent with interviews conducted in Colombia in the fall of 2015 where secretaries
of health, former hospital directors, and advisors concurred that the “certification” of municipalities was not
to have a major impact on the ability of local governments or Departments to improve basic health indicators,
as all policy programs are designed by the central government and whoever is in charge of the funding (be it
certified municipalities or Departments), all have to comply with the central government’s directives.
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Per capita health expenditures, as a percentage of GDP (See Table 57 below), does
not seem to greatly impact indicators either. While many other factors including education
levels, income, employment, and poverty rates influence, and impact infant mortality rates,
a correlation between more funds spent per capita and improved indicators could not be
established. From 2005 onward, when the country spent more per capita on health, the
Departments with the most certified municipalities saw few improvements in the indicator
considered here (actually the Department of Cesar’s indicator worsens in this period). In
the case of the Departments with fewest certified municipalities, three saw continuing
reductions for the 2005-2011 time period (La Guajira, Choco, and Cundinamarca), while
in the other two (Boyaca and Valle del Cauca), the reductions fluctuated more. Since La
Guajira and Choco—being two of the poorest Departments in the country—have benefitted
from other social policies, it is difficult to establish a direct link between GDP health
expenditure per capita and reductions in infant mortality rates. If anything can be garnered
from these comparisons, it is corroboration that more certified municipalities does not
necessarily mean better indicators, and certainly many other factors might be playing roles
as well.
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Table 57: Health Expenditure per Capita and as Proportion of GDP – 2001 - 2010120
2001

GDP Per Capita
Invested
on
75.9
health
(US$ per person)
National Health
Expenditure
7.7
per year as a
Proportion
of
GDP (%)

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

n/a

104

69

125

116

116

116

237

317

323

n/a

8.2

8.2

8.2

7.8

7.8

7.8

7.4

5.9

6.4

Source: Author, based on Basic Health Indicators Reports 2001 – 2011, Ministry of Health.

While in general the indicator considered here has improved in the overall period
between 2000 and 2010, great disparities depending on ethnic, income, and rural/urban
divide remain. As of 2013, and according to reports of the Ministry of Health, infant
mortality rates under one year old were 32% higher among the poorest of Colombians.
Departments in the Colombian Amazon region as well as in Choco and La Guajira (though
improved), continued to see higher rates in this indicator than other Colombian
Departments. Table 58 below shows that income is still an important factor when
considering mortality rates, with the poorest quintile (Quintile 1) with higher rates than the
wealthiest quintile (Quintile 5).
Table 58: Mortality Rates under 1 year old 1995 – 2013 per wealth quintiles
Quintile 1 (poorest)
Quintile 2
Quintile 3
Quintile 4
Quintile 5 (richest)

1995
39.0
25.0
31.0
28.0
19.0

2005
27.9
22.2
20.9
9.4
6.7

2013
9.2
8.1
7.0
7.8
7.1

Source: Santa Maria et al., 2011 and Ministry of Health’s “Analysis of Health Sector 2013”

120

Health reforms were initiated in 1995. In 1998, Colombia’s Department of Planning changed how these
indicators were calculated. Thus, only the period 2001 – 2011 was used.
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Most reports conclude that there were improvements in areas expected to improve
such as maternal and children care (Bernal & Zamora, 2014; Santa Maria et al., 2011;
Yepes et al., 2011; Galilea et al., 2011; Avila Urdaneta, 2010; Molina & Spurgeon, 2007;
Molina et al., 2006; Homedes & Ugalde, 2005; Bossert et al., 2003; Jaramillo, 2002;
Hernandez, 2002). In those cases, the impact was very important and indicators positively
improved. Other indicators did not show the expected impact and many problems persist.

Conclusions
Examining the process of health service decentralization in Colombia, as in other
parts of Latin America, reveals that decentralization has taken the form, mostly, of
deconcentration as the central government has maintained its role as director, regulator,
and controller of the system (Molina & Spurgeon, 2007).
Administration of the services were decentralized but the central government has
retained control over regulation and supervision of the system. Heavy dependence on
transfers from central government continues, and resources are still controlled by the
central government. The lack of clarity on who is finally responsible for oversight and
control of the reforms among the three levels of government continues to make
implementation very difficult.
Colombia has designed a highly complex and ambitious health decentralization
process where the mix of market initiatives, competition, privatization, and
decentralization has made the reform difficult to understand and implement; and while
universal coverage has almost been achieved, serious problems in terms of equity and
quality of care remain.

285

Supporters of health decentralization in Colombia were able to push reforms
through Congress by aptly working out a coalition of stakeholders that supported the
reforms, as well as by linking the need for health decentralization with other necessary
reforms impacting fiscal stability like pension reforms. Undoubtedly, the difficult political,
social, and economic problems Colombia experienced in the 1990s provided momentum
to reforms and an urgency that contributed to building consensus in support of the reforms.
Thus, in contrast with other countries where reforms were barely supported by the political
elites in Congress, in the Colombian case, and thanks to the role played by policy
entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 2003), there was generalized support not only to approve the
required legislation, but also to enact the necessary rules, regulations, and normative
needed for implementation as soon as possible. By doing this, some details were left for
later review, which made duplication of efforts and confusion common.
Many veto points (Immergut, 2008) occurred along the way, including incidences
of violence against local authorities, or takeovers by guerrilla and/or paramilitary groups
of municipal governments (be it by way of elections, or by ensuring the elected officials
responded to their demands). Complexities in contracting out services between insurers
(EPSs) and providers (IPSs), as well as cases of corruption, duplication in enrollment, and
the failure to move people from the subsidized scheme to the contributive one, also gave
the perception that the reforms were ineffective or insufficient.
The complex, new health system devised by the health reformers made the
relevance, responsiveness, adequacy, costs and benefits, quality and quantity of services,
as stated by Katorobo (2004), difficult to establish. The fact that there are no clear
guidelines of who is ultimately responsible for services and results, especially in cases of
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municipalities that are not certified, make oversight and accountability of the reforms hard
to evaluate. The fact that governors are only required to “coordinate” service delivery gives
them a reason to avoid responsibility when difficulties and contradictions arise.
The process of health decentralization in Colombia has been one of partial
decentralization (Devarajan et al., 2009), and a “managerial view” (Nickson, 2011) has
prevailed, as the central government decentralized administrative responsibilities and
financial resources, but the overall control of the process remained in the hands of the
Ministry of Health and the National Planning Department. Though substantial financial
resources were decentralized to regional and local governments, funding is strongly
earmarked—also, these governments do not have the capacity to create new resources and
they are highly dependent on government transfers.
The relationship of local governments with their communities was certainly
recognized and given priority, evidenced by the importance given to citizen participation,
and the need to involve community organizations in the local health councils and in the
preparation and implementation of local health plans; but, overall, the Colombian case
shows very few instances of effective citizen participation in the health decentralization
reforms and/or during implementation.
This chapter has shown that, in the case of Colombia, the close collaboration of
political leaders represented in Congress (and given the urgency to re-legitimize the State),
key stakeholders, and civil society organizations contributed to the approval of health
decentralization reforms that impacted Colombia’s health system. Thus, hypothesis one
(H1) is generally positive.
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In regard to hypothesis two (H2), the evidence is harder to establish. The review of
ten Departments (five with a majority of certified municipalities; five with a minority of
certified municipalities), as well as a review of per capita expenditures on health as
percentage of GDP, did not provide clear indication of having an impact on the chosen
indicator (infant mortality rate under 1 year old, live births).
As Colombia implemented a health system that has practically privatized the
delivery of all health services (reserving for the government only services such as
vaccination campaigns, public health campaigns, or dealing with catastrophic events and/or
pandemics), the ability of political parties or the political elite to influence the delivery of
health services has been very limited. The degree of collaboration between the three levels
of government, as well as with other stakeholders, has been essentially defined by the way
the system has been redesigned, with a limited role for the government sector. Though
collaborative mechanisms have been established, there have been difficulties with
implementation. The impact of reforms on health indicators has been more difficult to
establish. Thus, H2 is partially confirmed: collaboration impacts successful reforms’
approval and implementation, but it does not necessarily translate to improved indicators.
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CHAPTER EIGHT

EDUCATION DECENTRALIZATION IN PARAGUAY: 1990 – 2010

Introduction
This chapter will examine the education decentralization process in Paraguay as
another way of testing hypothesis one (H1)121 and two (H2)122 of this study. It will first
consider a brief overview of education decentralization literature emphasizing what
conditions make the process successful. The chapter will then analyze the role played by
political parties, congress, and other stakeholders in the passage and approval of education
decentralization policies. It will attempt to assess the impact of education decentralization
on basic indicators.
The research will argue that implementation of the proposed decentralization
reforms was confronted with serious political and financial challenges from representatives
of the central government and unions and by tensions among governors, local mayors, and
authorities of the national government themselves.

121

H1: If national, regional, and local political leaders participate and collaborate in the promotion of
political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization, there is a greater probability for the passage, approval,
and implementation of public service decentralization laws.
122

H2: Once public service delivery decentralization has been enacted, the higher the degree of collaboration
between national, regional, and local levels of government (in essence the type of intergovernmental relations
established), stakeholders and citizens (other socio-political actors); the greater the probability of its success
and effectiveness.
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Education Decentralization: Background and Some Concepts
Over the last two decades, education decentralization has been implemented using
various approaches in many different parts of the world. The education-specific rationales
for education decentralization include: improving enrollment rates; improving quality of
education and equity in education; and increasing communities’ participation and
accountability (Winkler, 1989; Hanson, 1997; Berhman et al., 2002; Naidoo, 2003;
Kaufman & Nelson, 2004; Gropello, 2004; Daun, 2007; Lora, 2007; Meade & Gershberg,
2008).
Specific reforms usually accompany education decentralization including:
devolution of authority to local governments (spending, staffing, and content); schoolbased management; community financing of education; curriculum reform; school
vouchers; and demand-side financing (Berhman et al., 2002).
While the reasons to decentralize have been mostly political or fiscal in nature,
there is the expectation, from an educational perspective, that indicators will improve as a
result. Outcomes in schooling are many but at a minimum involve “level and distribution
of learning and years of schooling” (Winkler & Gershberg, 2000).
Winkler (1989) grouped the rationales for education decentralization under three
broad categories: educational finance, efficiency and effectiveness, and redistribution of
political power. Aside from improving quality of education, Hanson (1997) refers to
different possible goals and strategies sought with education decentralization, including:
accelerating economic development by dispersing power, wealth, and executive talent;
increasing management efficiency; redistribution of financial responsibility by distributing
power; increasing democratization; promoting market-based education; and neutralizing
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competing centers of power. Daun (2007) includes economic decline, cultural factors, the
weakening of the state/public sector, and/or international/globalization pressures as reasons
behind the promotion of education decentralization. Arguments linking education and
development, and the need to have better human capital, have also been emphasized by the
World Bank, and other international organizations (Kaufman & Nelson, 2004), as essential
for the long-term future of developing countries.
In regard to claims of improving or promoting citizen participation through
education decentralization, Naidoo (2003), by reviewing education decentralization in a
number of countries, identifies a series of important factors that increase community
participation in the process, including: a positive perspective in the communities involved
on basic education; regular and stable household income; a history of social mobilization;
the level of community organization and leadership present; a community’s involvement
in education beyond the financial aspects; the general status and appreciation for education
that local leaders show support for; the level of community involvement in the decision
making process; the kind of government support provided to the process; and students’
achievements, among others. Economic factors, such as poverty levels and income
distribution, impact the success of decentralization, along with other indicators related to
health and political stability.
When discussing citizen participation, within an education decentralization
process, certain key questions are relevant, including who can participate, how
participation takes place, the inclusiveness of the process, the role of civil society’s
participation in the process, how democratic the participation process is, and if roles are
clearly defined. The answers to these questions can help define if an education
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decentralization process (or any type of service provision decentralization for that matter)
is considered successful or not (Meade & Gershberg, 2008; Hanson, 2006; Berhman et al.,
2002).
In regard to the financing of education decentralization, the types of services that
are actually decentralized is a central issue, and this will have implications for the financial
impact of the process. Over the past decades, many countries have experimented with
different types of education decentralization, but Naidoo (2003) places them in four broad
categories: (1) decentralization of school budgets to buy basic supplies (this implies a the
minimum level of decentralization); (2) decentralization of specific functions such as
school management, building maintenance, and school feeding programs; (3) full school
autonomy (including fiscal autonomy); and, (4) competitive grants and incentives.
As correctly pointed out, but often overlooked, “system-wide cost implications are
often a key factor in decentralization reforms” (Naidoo, 2007). And, the difference between
the cost of education services and the financing of the system is important, as the former
refers to the actual cost of factors such as supplies and teachers’ salaries, and the latter
refers to where those funds are coming from, who decides how funds should be spent, and
who collects those funds.
One of the main concerns, and the reason for many criticisms of education
decentralization processes, involves the quality of human resources capacity at the local
level to implement decentralization and, consequently, involves issues of capacity
building. Developing capacity “requires the state and its several partners to make
deliberate and sustained efforts to train local leaders and their communities, as well as
local organizations in the skills needed to support decentralized governance” (Naidoo,
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2007). For this to occur, multiple stakeholders must be part of the process, including not
only central, regional, and local government agencies, but also businesses, cultural
institutions, NGOs, students, and parents. Important attention should be given to ensuring
that traditionally excluded groups are not left out of the process, and that their needs are
properly addressed.
Capacity development should be an ongoing process that must be implemented in
phases to be successful. Many of the capacity building strategies used will be conditioned
by the context in which they are implemented, and political commitment is essential for
long term sustainability and continuity.
Winkler (1989), in his analysis of education decentralization from an economic
perspective, points to different factors that are necessary for successful implementation of
education decentralization, including:
1. The presence of a tradition of self-reliance at the local level (this is
important as many education decentralization policies aim to increase
parents’ participation in defining education policies or make the process
more participatory);
2. Local authorities’ or communities’ capacity to have their own source of
revenues, create them, or control its spending;
3. Local demand for decentralization, as opposed to decentralization being
imposed from central planners;
4. Keeping key stakeholders in the process (parents organization, teachers
unions, local bureaucracies, etc.) well informed and involved in the
development and implementation of decentralization process; and
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5. Existing local administrative capacity or providing such capacity through
training.

Very similarly, Naidoo (2007), in evaluating the successful implementation of
education decentralization, finds the following issues as critical:
1. Understanding the reforms: clear communication exists, legal instruments
are present, and roles are clearly established and understood by all.
2. Communication: clear information to all stakeholders is available
3. Staggered implementation: regions and local governments require
administrative capacity and local political support.
4. Systemic approach: decentralization process must take into account the
needs of all levels of government and the necessary coordination.
5. Clear lines of monitoring/evaluation: a strong system of accountability
should be established, well understood and applied to the process.
6. Clearly connect educational quality with educational management reforms:
a clear connection between educational reforms and outcomes should be
developed and monitored.
7. Clear role of community/local level: this also requires the strengthening of
grass roots structures in the communities.
8. Transparency in delivery of resources and decision-making: transparency
and accountability also from local leaders to their constituents.
9. Data and information: as the process widens, is essential to monitor and
evaluate the success of programs.
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In essence, for education decentralization to be successful, a “mix of political will”
(policy makers working together with stakeholders) is essential, including: whether or not
the main political parties have a shared vision about the objectives of the reform and agree
on collaboration; technical inputs (competent policies and personnel in education); and
economic factors (adequate resources) (Naidoo, 2007; Hanson, 2006).
Education services in Latin America have usually been organized around a
centralized Ministry of Education, which had control over resources, personnel,
curriculum, and administrative decisions, as well as assessments. This monopolistic
organization produces users that have no input in the process; generates strong, and
difficult to deal with, unions; and creates inefficiency in structures where control and
oversight are too difficult to achieve (Lora, 2007).
The decentralization of education in the 1990s occurred in the context of a wave of
democratization in the Hemisphere, and the need to reform government policies that have
proven inefficient. In the case of Latin America, “The decentralization of the
administration and, to a lesser extent, the financing of public school systems to subnational
governments (or directly to the schools) have been the most common reforms in the region
since the 1990s” (Lora, 2007; p. 48).
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The Case of Paraguay
Introduction
The Paraguayan state has a long and sad record of failing its citizens—especially
the poorest among them—in the provision of quality education that could equip them with
the necessary tools to attain a better future.
Though the Constitution ensures that education should be accessible to all (Article
73), many people do not have access to education and, when they do, its quality its very
poor. The failures of the school system have contributed to increased poverty rates, and
have not helped to improve human capital or contributed to strengthening workers skills,
with many socio-economic repercussions. Grade repetition and dropouts rates are still
alarmingly high and great socio-economic and ethnic disparities exist (Oscar Flecha et al.,
1996).
The end of the Stroessner regime in 1989 marked a new impulse toward education.
The 1992 Constitution not only established free, basic education as a fundamental human
right, but also guaranteed that the first years of education could be completed in the
maternal language of the child123 (Gaete, 2012).
In 1998, a new General Education Law (Law 1264) was enacted, establishing the
guidelines for public and private education in the country; and making education one of
the main goals and priorities of the Paraguayan state (Gaete, 2012).

123

Paraguay is an officially bilingual country with two main languages: Spanish and Guarani. 37% of
Paraguayans speak only Guaraní, 50% Guaraní and Spanish, 7% only Spanish, and 6% use other languages
(Gaete, 2012).
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The Ministry of Education and Culture is in charge of regulating the educational
system and implementing its reforms. The Paraguayan education system has three levels:
pre-K and basic/elementary education; middle school (grades 7-9); and high school
education (grades 10-12). Special needs education, and other training and vocational
studies, are also provided by public schools. Universities (both private and public) are
autonomous and are covered by a separate legal framework.
All aspects of public education from the design of academic curricula, to
supervising the implementation of the curricula, the national academic calendar, the
evaluation of the process, hiring and firing of human resources, and expenditures, as well
as investment in infrastructure, are controlled by the Ministry of Education (Gaete, 2012).
Most students in Paraguay attend public schools (on average 65%), and the rest attend
private schools (about 25%), and lesser numbers attend private schools that receive funding
from the state.124 Most special-needs education children attend public schools.
The lack of access to, and quality of, education in Paraguay can be seen in the great
differences that exist among rural and urban areas, with urban children benefitting from
better schools and infrastructure. There is also greater concentration of resources—both
material and human—in the city of Asuncion, its metropolitan area, and other large urban
areas. Ethnicity is also a great indicator of inequality, as illiteracy and dropout rates are
prevalent among indigenous groups.

124

Information gathered from http://datos.mec.gov.py/index available on the Ministry of Education’s web
page. Accessed on 8/11/2015
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Financing of Education system
The financing of education in Paraguay depends almost completely on the
allocations assigned to it in the National Budget. According to the National Constitution,
the amount allocated to education must not be less than 20% of the total allocated to the
central administration (Article 85). On average 92% of the education budget is spent on
current expenses, and only 8% on capital expenditures (Gaete, 2012; Villagra Carron et al.,
2011).
Governorships and municipalities have invested in education out of their own
budgets, but have not had any input in school management and oversight, or on education
management issues. In the time period analyzed here (1990-2010), their investments—
when they did occur—were done with the knowledge of the Ministry but there were no
official agreements signed or required. There were no fiscal rules guiding how much the
subregional levels of government must spend on education. And, in general, those expenses
were for repairs and infrastructure, custodian/janitorial services, or to assist with the
nutritional needs of the students (Gaete, 2012).
The table below (Table 59) shows that expenditures on education, as a percentage
of the overall national budget, and as required by the Constitution, has more or less been
complied with over the years. But, as a percentage of GDP, expenditures on education have
not increased over the same period of time, and are actually low by international and
regional standards. The administration of President Lugo (2008-2010) saw increases in
education’s budget. Information on how much governors and mayors have spent on
education was not available, but in general these subregional levels of government have
invested few of their own resources on education, partly because the legal framework is
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not clear on their roles, and also because the financial resources were not available. Only
after 2012, with the approval of the National Fund for Development and Investment Law
(FONACIDE), which allocates a portion of royalties collected to governorships and to local
governments, did subregional levels of government secure access to funds that are
earmarked for school infrastructure and for nutritional programs.
Table 59: Education Expenditures – Paraguay – 1999 – 2011
Year
2011
2010
2007
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999

Education Budget Budget Education
(Millions €)
(% public spending)
805,7
22,48%
587,0
18,72%
356,9
19,33%
221,3
18,23%
230,1
20,86%
259,6
18,82%
363,7
19,88%
405,4
21,56%
350,5
21,88%

Budget
Education
(% of GDG)
4,80%
3,77%
3,55%
3,44%
3,95%
3,88%
4,25%
4,57%
4,45%

Source: http://www.datosmacro.com/estado/gasto/educacion/paraguay

As indicated above, the majority of budget is spent on salaries of education sector
personnel, and very limited resources are available for capital expenditures or for teacher
training programs. Numbers of total employees in the education sector are hard to
determine and, thus, it is difficult to estimate the total number of employees and/or how
much is spent on salaries125. As is the case in many countries, resources are very limited
but, in the case of Paraguay, interviews and reviews of the press indicate that many of those
financial resources are misused.

125

Only in 2013, did the Ministry of Education, for the first time in its history (and in compliance with a
new civil service law), provide an estimated number of employees. About 11,000 people -between
administrators (about 5,100), teachers (about 5,000), and contractual employees (about 880) – work for the
education sector in Paraguay (http://www.abc.com.py/nacionales/mec-divulga-su-lista-de-funcionarios632217.html). It is important to keep in mind that the appointments in the education sector are a notorious
source of patronage in Paraguay
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Legal Framework of Education Sector in Paraguay
The three main legal texts dealing with education in Paraguay are the National
Constitution of 1992, the General Education Law of 1998 (Law 1264), and the Childhood
and Adolescence Code of 2001 (Law 1680) (Villagra Carron et al., 2011). The
administrative organizational laws of both the regional governments (Departments) and the
municipal governments also give some role to these authorities in the education sector (see
table 60 below); and Law 1725 of 2001, which describes the responsibilities and rights of
workers in the education field. The latest significant piece of legislation was approved in
2009 establishing free middle school and free pre-K education in all public schools in
Paraguay.
The Departmental Administrative Law (Ley Orgánica Departamental), established
that governors will “coordinate school education and training activities with the relevant
organizations” (Article 16), but there are no specifications as to what that coordination
entails, and Article 45 of the same law also established that governors must, in their
“investment plans”, include educational development and—in particular—contribute to the
construction and maintenance of educational centers. The law, though, fails to allocate
resources to governorships for these tasks; further legislation has also failed to clarify the
coordination among the three levels of government—or other relevant organizations—and
how expenses will be covered.
In 2009, the Ministry of Education signed a cooperation agreement with the Council
of Governors in which both parts committed to deepen and strengthen the decentralization
process in education; but, the text does not clearly state what each party is responsible for—
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or how reforms (and their funding)—would be implemented. As of 2014, interviews
conducted reveal a consensus that not much has been achieved.
The municipal administrative law (Ley Orgánica Municipal), in force at the time
of this study, established that in the area of education, municipalities are responsible for:
1) providing “education services”—the law is vague but states that municipalities
are responsible for providing education services according to local needs, under
the supervision of the Ministry of Education, and according to the guidelines
provided by the Ministry;
2) Elaborating municipal education plans;
3) Encouraging community educational activities;
4) Building and maintenance of locally based education infrastructure (including
furniture, equipment, supplies, and consumables);
5) Promoting culture, sports, and tourism;
6) Promoting civic education and participation.

As noted above, the law is ambiguous and did not establish financing mechanisms,
nor did it clarify which specific responsibilities were assigned to the local government, the
regional government, and the national government. For example, the lack of clarity on
subsection 4 above, which notes that municipal governments are responsible for supplies
and consumables, has led to conflict as local governments fear that they could be asked to
provide—paid using their own resources—school supplies (a responsibility of the national
ministry) or the “glass of milk” program—a responsibility of the Departmental
governments (Merino Estrada et al., 2010).
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Interviews with former senior education government officials indicate that
opposition to decentralization reforms from the education unions has been strong, and this
has played a significant role in blocking the process.

Table 60: Summary of Legal Framework, 1990 – 2010
1992 National Constitution

Chapter VII of the Constitution
established the gratuity of
education and the role of the
State

•

Article 75 defined the role
of the State in education

•

Article 163 established that
Governorships should
coordinate with the central
government the provision of
educational services

•

Article 168 established the
role of municipalities in
regard to education
Article 16 established that
Governorships must
coordinate in the their
respective territories the
actions of the Executive in
regard to education
according to their local
needs
Articles 18, 33, 43, and 69
gave municipalities
responsibilities in
promoting education, allows
Municipal Juntas/Councils
to have education
committees, and gave local
governments a role in
assisting educational
institutions.
Article 4 established that
the State is responsible for
providing free education
and that it should guarantee
access and equity. Funding
for education will come for
the General National
Budget

Law 426/94

Creates Departmental
Governments

•

Law 1294/87

Municipal Administrative Law

•

Law 1264/98

General Education Law
established the role of the State
in providing educational services

•

• Article 6, the State will
promote education
decentralization. The
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education budgets for the
Departments will be
prepared in coordination
with the Governorships
• Article 16, municipalities
will promote local
education
• Article 90, the Executive
branch will promote
education decentralization,
supporting and advising
Governorships and
municipalities

Resolution 10711 of the Ministry
of Education (2000)

Law 1725/01

Administrative Charter Law for
workers of the education sector
– regulates the teaching
profession in the levels of initial,
primary and secondary school
education in the national
education system, both at public
or private educational
institutions.

Law 4088/10

• Article 117, the Ministry of
Education will develop its
general plans of action and
curricular needs in
accordance with the needs
of decentralization
• Established the
Departmental Educational
Councils in each of the 17
Departments and describes
their responsibilities
• Article 35 established that
Departments and
municipalities can support
and promote the training
and continuing education of
teachers in their region or
communities
• Established free pre-K and
middle school education in
all public schools

Source: Author based on documents and laws reviewed

Reform and Decentralization
Paraguay’s

history

shows

no

significant

experience

with

education

decentralization. The Ministry of Education was first established in 1870 but it was not
until the year 2009 that its charter was drafted (Table 61 below).
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Table 61: Ministry of Education, Paraguay
1870
1942
1956
1998
2009

The Department of Justice, Worship, and Public Education was established
Department of Education established
The area of Worships affairs its included to the Education Department
Name is changed to Department of Education and Culture
The charter of the Department is drafted

Source: author based on Department of Finance documents

Through the years, many reforms to improve the sector’s performance were
introduced. But, the objectives of the reforms were mostly aimed at the deconcentration of
the Ministry’s work and not the decentralization of education services. The main goal with
deconcentration was to improve education management and efficiency, as well as the
modernization of the general administration.
Deconcentration dates back to 1921 when the first School Directors at the
Departmental level were named to supervise schools. In the 1940s, “education areas” were
established in which certain schools were considered the “main” centers of learning, and
satellites schools were also established. The 1960s saw the establishment of teacher
training centers at the regional level to improve the quality of human resources in charge
of education. By 1992, the Regional Educational Councils were created as part of
regionalization program of the Department of Education. In the beginning, only
representatives of educational institutions of the region could be part of the Councils. Later,
citizens were encouraged to participate, but this initiative never succeeded as expected. By
1995, the Ministry began promoting the signing of memorandums of understanding with
the governorships to promote decentralization. But, the roles of governors were kept vague
along with details on financing. In the year 2000, with the launching of a national plan for
the Redesign of Education Supervision, the Departmental Educational Councils (CDEs—
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reflecting Spanish terminology) were created (governorships needed to sign an MOU with
the Ministry). Many other initiatives were launched to promote decentralization, though
many are yet to be implemented (see Table 62 below)

Table 62: Measures aimed at promoting education decentralization – Status (as of
2010)
Pedagogical units in each of the country’s 17 Departments
Departmental Management Teams
Teachers Selection Committees
Association of Schools Cooperation (equivalent to US PTAs)
Decentralization Commission
Departmental General Directorate at the central level
Qualifications and certification for regional supervision
Departmental Statistics Unit
Decentralization Secretariat
Departmental Education Councils (at the Governorship level)

Inactive
Mixed
Inactive
Mixed
Inactive
Inactive
Mixed
Mixed
Inactive
Mixed

Source: author based on interviews and review of documentation

As shown above, the central government has retained control over the provision of
educational services in the country, and very little has been done to promote
decentralization of services, funds, or human resources related to this important area of
government services.
The process of educational reform in Paraguay has experienced different phases
(Villagra Carron et al., 2011), with a first phase occurring between 1990 and 1995, where
the National Advisory Council for Educational Reform (CARE) was formed (1992). With
the approval of the National Education Law in 1998, the CARE was replaced by the
National Council on Education (CONEC). The mission of the Council is to promote
educational reforms.
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The objectives of CONEC include:
1) Develop the nation’s culture and education, in coordination with the Ministry
of Education;
2) Cooperate with implementation in the short, medium, and long term;
3) Assist in the coordination, among all education related stakeholders, and among
different administrative levels, of education and culture related activities;
4) Periodically evaluate and inform the Executive Branch and Legislative Branch
about the status and progress of the national education system;
5) Periodically evaluate the performance of public and private universities, as well
as other higher learning centers, and present reports to the Congress for their
consideration;
6) Provide advice on education policy;
7) Propose to the Ministry of Education reforms or adjustments to policy
programs, as needed, to improve education;
8) Advise national scientific and technological research in the country, in
coordination with the respective government agencies126.

In this first phase, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) became an
important player supporting the reforms and providing financial and technical assistance,
especially for elementary education; the World Bank played a similar role in the case of
middle schools (Villagra Carron et al., 2012; Rivarola, 2000).

126

http://www.conec.gov.py
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The main objectives of this first phase included universalizing access to education
and promoting equity; prioritizing quality education; improving curricula and teaching
(including Guarani as a language of instruction); improving human resources; and
expanding and improving school infrastructure (Villagra Carron et al., 2011).
The second phase (1996-2000) saw the approval of the National Education Law in
May of 1998 (Law 1264). The Presidency of Juan Carlos Wasmosy established universal
and free pre-K schooling (with the technical assistance of the IDB). Evaluation
mechanisms were considered and implemented from the central government, again with
the support of the IDB.
The 2001-2005 phase had as a theme “education with quality and equity.” A
National Literacy Plan was launched, oriented to adults with no education, especially in
rural areas of the country.
A final phase, for the time period considered here, occurred from the year 2006 to
2010 and includes the administration of President Fernando Lugo (2008-2010). In this time
period, the administration of President Nicanor Duarte Frutos (2003-2008), himself a
former education minister in the Wasmosy administration, devoted significant resources to
public education, with special emphasis again on rural areas, improvement of human
resources, and reducing absenteeism and dropout rates.
Since 2008, with the administration of President Lugo, as in the case of the health
sector, there was a strong political discourse in favor of ensuring that the benefits of free
education were accessible to all. Education was defined then as a “public good” and a
fundamental right of every Paraguayan citizen. The State assumed the role of guaranteeing
that right (Uharte Pozas, 2012). Law 4088 of 2009 exemplifies this commitment,
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establishing that middle school education would be free for all, in fact extending free public
education (Uharte Pozas, 2012).
Throughout the process of reform in Paraguay, it is argued that the goal of
educational decentralization reforms were directed more toward the deconcentration of the
Ministry’s activities, and not toward full decentralization to subnational levels of
government. The 1998 law called for the creation of Departmental Educational Councils,
Commissions of Educational Reform and Management at the Departmental level (never
implemented), and a National System for Teachers’ Training, among other proposed
reforms. Other decentralization proposals included the creation of parent associations,
which were supposed to co-manage and support the local schools attended by their children
(very few of these have been created and/or are active) (Gaete, 2012).
A significant initiative regarding education decentralization was the creation of
Departmental Educational Councils or CDEs (Consejos Departamentales de Educacion),
with responsibilities such as the formulation, and support for the implementation, of
educational plans for each Department in consultation with local communities. The
Councils were to be composed of up to 11 different organizations including the
governorship, the Departmental Junta (regional legislative body), municipalities, and
regional educational centers, the Catholic Church, universities, training institutes, teachers
and parents associations, and supervisory organizations, among others. The relationships
among them were not clearly defined, and the CDEs have no authority to fire or evaluate
teachers who continue to be responsive only to the national education ministry. In essence,
CDEs do not have a management or administrative role in schools (Gaete, 2012).
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The Education Law did not create a similar structure at the municipal level, and
though some local governments—with the support of NGOs and cooperation agencies—
tried to implement local education councils, based on the model of local health councils,
the initiatives were not successful and/or sustainable in the long term (Gaete, 2012;
interviews).
Departmental governments were given responsibility for the so called Nutritional
Complement Program by which children attending school were given a glass of milk and
enriched food to help alleviate malnutrition. Funding for this initiative was contentious up
to the recent approval of the so called FONACIDE Law, by which specific funds were
assigned for this nutritional program to regional governments. The implementation of this
program is not without criticism, as interviews with some NGO representatives and senior
officers from the Ministry of Education allege that funds were being misused.
In general, the Ministry of Education, and its bureaucracy, has not been very
supportive of decentralization initiatives and the process remains very slow. The Ministry
has delegated certain basic functions (especially in the area of maintenance and payment
services), but all other key areas such as human resources management, curriculum
reforms, evaluation, training, etc. remain firmly in control of the central government.
By examining which level of government is in charge of the decision making
process in public schools, the table below illustrates the limited role played by local and
regional governments in the provision of education services (Table 63).
As indicated, the Paraguayan legal framework provides a very limited role to
governorships in the running of schools, and much less to municipal governments. And, in
the case some responsibilities that have been assigned to them, compliance with the law is
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limited. Local communities have no major role in the day-to-day management of schools,
and their involvement has been limited to the Association of Schools Cooperation (or
Asociaciones de Cooperativas Escolares—ACEs) where parents, teachers, and the
leadership of the schools supposedly have voice in how some budgetary decisions are
made.
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Table 63: Education Decision Making by Level of Government/Authority in Public
Schools, 2010
National
Hiring/Firing of
teachers (1)
Hiring/Firing of
School directors
Teachers’
promotion
Payment
of
Salaries
Budget/Use of
resources
School calendar
School fees (2)
Maintenance of
Schools
Textbooks
selection
Curricula
designs
Study Programs
Class schedule
Class
organization
Teachers
supervision (3)
Teachers
training
Teachers
evaluation (4)

Departmental Municipal

X

X

X

X

Community

School

X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

Notes: (1) Technically there are Selection Commissions at the Departmental level. As of 2010 there
were no cases in which Governorships have made those decisions.
(2) In the year 2008, fees for middle school were eliminated.
(3) Each district should have a pedagogical and administrative evaluation commission.
(4) There is a process of self-evaluation and evaluations made by school directors. Their purpose are
for diagnostic and training reasons.
Source: Translated from 2013 Educational Report of Paraguay. Rodolfo Elias et al.
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Discussion of Reforms
Paraguayan educational reforms concentrated vastly on improving quality, equity,
and access to education. Many plans and programs were drafted, and many strategic
consultancy meetings were held, but, the reforms were always controlled by the Ministry
of Education, and decentralization was not extensively discussed, nor was it included in
the discussions and/or plans of the central authorities. If civil society organizations
included decentralization in their proposals, they were not really taken into account. The
fact that decentralization, in the form of the creation of Departmental Education Councils
(CDEs), was included in the 1998 Law has been suggested as both a consequence of the
momentum for decentralization that, at the time, the health decentralization law had
created; and to the fact that the Governors Association was able to lobby for some more
specific role for governorships that were otherwise not given much responsibilities by the
Constitution and the subsequent laws.
Some factors might help explain this lack of progress in education decentralization
services:
1)

Interviews with senior officials, in both Congress and the Ministry of
Education, indicated that technocrats within the central administration
have played a role in keeping decentralization initiatives alive—at least
at the proposal level—but, there is no clear political commitment to
actually implement them.

2)

There has not been a strong demand from citizens or civil society to push
for education decentralization. Citizens do not trust local authorities in
the provision of educational services.
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3)

There has not been a political figure(s) or civic leader(s) able to create
coalitions or networks supporting education decentralization, or with the
capacity to galvanize such momentum. There has not been a class of
policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 2003) in this area.

4)

There has not been a strong commitment from Congress, as many
legislators do not want to antagonize powerful education unions, or
because they have used employment in the education sector as a
patronage tool.

5)

It has also been suggested that governors themselves, when given the
small opportunity to implement programs, did not live up to the
challenge, and used it for political benefit.

6)

Lack of support from the Ministers of Education themselves.127

7)

Strong opposition from public sector unions and from education sector
bureaucrats.

Instead, deconcentration of education services has been the norm. Recent
interviews with representatives from civil society organizations involved in improving
Paraguayan public schools revealed a potential, emergent push for reform, as the private

127

In fact, and as an example of the lack of political will from central authorities, in the mid-1990s, the
Institute for Public Management & Community Service (IPMCS) of Florida International University (FIU)
was implementing a USAID funded program in support of decentralization. IPMCS had a meeting with the
then Minister of Education to propose a decentralization pilot program on education, much as it was been
done on the health sector. The proposal was firmly rejected. None of the Education ministers of the 1990 –
2010 period analyzed here have been known for supporting decentralization policies.
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sector, realizing that the quality of education is not providing qualified human resources,
and this might hinder economic development, is now pushing for educational reforms.
Education decentralization has not been seen as a process by which governorships
and municipalities obtain a significant role in the provision of education services. The few
responsibilities that were decentralized (many of them not implemented as of 2010),
involve “coordination” and support in the design of school curriculum to better reflect local
or regional needs, or with infrastructure needs. But, in fact, very few of these initiatives
have been implemented. The central government retains authority over every major
decision that involves education, from human resource management and evaluation, to
funding, to decisions over school calendar, opening and closing of schools, teachers
training needs, and information and statistics systems. All remains under the firm control
of the central authorities in Asuncion.
Though Article 75 of the Paraguayan Constitution states that education provision
is the responsibility of the family, the municipalities, and the State, very little has been
done to include local governments in the decentralization process.
As of 2015, interviews and reviews of local press indicated that the situation was
not likely to change and that, in fact, no new developments regarding education
decentralization were to be expected.

Indicators of Success?
If Paraguay has minimally decentralized education but has put emphasis on some
deconcentration, can progress in education be measured? Most people interviewed for this
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research agreed that little progress has been achieved, and the central authorities (regardless
of the political party in power) have done little to implement reforms.
The country has improved some of its education indicators with the reduction of
illiteracy, increased school enrollment, and better infrastructure. The involvement of some
civil society organizations has greatly contributed to these improvements, though regional
and ethnic differences make the improvements relative.
A 2009 United Nations (UN) report and a 2013 Partnership for Educational
Revitalization in the Americas (PREAL—reflecting Spanish terminology)128 report on the
progress of educational reform in Paraguay for the 1990-2010 period show that, though
progress has been made, many challenges remain, including (Villagra Carron et al., 2011;
PREAL report, 2013):
1) High levels of grade retention at the elementary level (up to 30%);
2) Very low levels of graduation at the middle school level (27%);
3) High dropout rates among indigenous communities and in rural areas. The
average school attendance for Paraguay was, for those older than 15 years of
age, 8.2 years (2010). Only 3 of 10 students entering the first grade in 1999 had
completed their formal education in 2010;
4) Illiteracy rates among indigenous people over 15 years of age continues to be
very high (40%);
5) In terms of enrollment, school registration has increased but there is a large
number of children between the ages of 13 and 17 that do not attend school;

128

Programa de Promoción de la Reforma Educativa en América Latina y el Caribe (PREAL)
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6) Paraguay continues to score very low on regional and international tests of
students achievement;
7) Place of residence, maternal language, and ethnic differences continue to be
serious challenges to equity in the provision of education services;
8) Teachers evaluation, training, and preparation is still weak;
9) Though the budget of education as percentage of public spending has slightly
increased over the period, as a percentage of GDP it continues to be low, thus
investment in teachers training, infrastructure, or students has diminished;
10) Decentralization of education management has been very challenging, and the
Departmental Education Councils have had limited impact on policy decision
and implementation129. Some parents associations (ACEs) have had a limited
role in the budget decisions of their local schools130.

By referring back to what Winkler (1989) and Naidoo (2007) considered necessary
factors for a successful decentralization, and applying those factors to the Paraguayan
experience between 1990 and 2010, the country’s initiative has failed to meet most of the
proposed criteria (Table 64)

129

A limited number of DECs are active in the country. Some as the one in the Department of Caacupe is
quite active, but most are not or have been established but play no specific role.
130

The number of ACEs is hard to establish. Interviews indicate that if each school had one, there should be
between 5,000 to 8,000 ACEs established. But, ACEs are not recognized as legal entities, thus their capacity
to make decisions or influence the management of local schools is limited and is directly tied to the
relationship that each one might have with their respective school directors.
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Table 64: Factors for a Successful Decentralization
Yes
Presence of tradition of self-reliance at local level
Subregional governments have access -and autonomy in the use
of - to funding
There is local demand for decentralization
Key stakeholders are involved in the decision making process
Local administrative capacity exists
Clear understanding of reform process
Staggered implementation
Clear lines of monitoring and evaluations are shared by all
stakeholders
Central authorities support for decentralization
Transparency in the delivery of resources and decision-making

No
X
X

Mixed

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Source: author based on Winkler (1989) and Naidoo (2007)

Overall then, the education reforms proposed in Paraguay, including some
decentralization initiatives, have had a very limited impact on improving the quality and
equity of education services in the country. The implementation of the proposed
decentralization reforms were confronted with serious political and financial challenges
from representatives of the central government and unions, as well as by other internal
political tensions among governors, local mayors, and authorities of the national
government themselves.
The lack of clear legal framework, both in terms of responsibilities assigned to the
different levels of government, and financially, hindered the process, made it more
confusing, and held back reforms. Congress did not give impetus or guidance to the
process, and did not enact the necessary legislation to move the process forward. Moreover,
the Ministry of Education leadership was also not supportive of the process. Thus, the
progress made has been very slow and the results not very encouraging.
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Decentralization reforms proposed such as the creation of CONEC, the
Departmental Education Councils, and the ACEs have not played an important role in
promoting decentralization of education.
It is possible that the approval of the Education Law in 1998, was done under the
impetus of what was happening in the health sector, and at a time when some legislators in
Congress were supportive of decentralization. But, the implementation confronted serious
opposition from the Ministry’s bureaucracy, unions, and a political situation that made it
very difficult to succeed. Funding to regional and local governments was never enough and
their responsibilities were limited in scope.
As in the case of the health sector, this chapter has shown that education
decentralization, even more than in the health case, has been dependent on the political will
of key stakeholders. Even more than in the health sector, there was no national discussion
on educational decentralization reforms, and the degree of collaboration that was present
at the time of enacting Law 1264 of 1998 quickly dissolved, and opposition to the process
took the upper hand. Thus, hypothesis one and two are partially confirmed, but the impact
on basic indicators could not be measured.
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CHAPTER NINE

EDUCATION DECENTRALIZATION IN COLOMBIA 1990 – 2010

Introduction
For most of its modern history, Colombia’s public education has been marked by a
lack of clear rules, powerful unions, and poor results. The country’s public education has
not been characterized as one that excels in preparing students for the labor market or one
that provides a good education. Over the years, formal education catered mainly to the
middle and upper classes, emphasizing preparation for more prestigious careers such as
law, was prioritized over the education of poor Colombians (Hudson, 2010).
The 1991 Constitution established that basic education was free and compulsory
for all children between 5 and 15 years of age; including kindergarten, five years of
elementary school, and four years of secondary education. Access and quality continue to
be a serious challenge, and most people who can afford it send their children to private
schools. Inadequate resources and mismanagement continue to drive students to the private
sector.
Though indicators, such as coverage and literacy rates, have improved significantly
with the implementation of decentralization policies, the statistics must be interpreted
cautiously as serious regional and social differences remain (Hudson, 2010. Santa Maria et
al., 2009; Iregui et al., 2006; Faguet & Sanchez, 2006). Major cities have mostly achieved
universal coverage and literacy is also very high, but in rural areas, the situation is very
different.
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The national government oversees all public education policies in Colombia and
provides most of the funding for public schools, whether directly through the Ministry of
Education or through transfers to subnational governments. The decentralization reforms
initiated in the 1980s, and accelerated after the 1991 Constitution, though, have given
Departments and local governments a voice in the control of the schools. Thus, the Ministry
has found itself sharing responsibilities with regional governments, which tend to be more
responsive to political pressure, and whose record of performance varies widely (Hudson,
2010; Santa Maria et al., 2009).
A significant obstacle to education reform has been the Colombian Federation of
Educators (FECODE), which is the largest union in the country. FECODE has strongly
resisted decentralization initiatives that would give more control to subnational authorities
over teachers’ evaluations and resources, preferring to maintain its grip on national politics
by exerting pressure at the national level (Hudson, 2010; Santa Maria et al., 2009; Melo,
2005; Lowden, 2004; Hanson, 1995).
This section will examine education decentralization in Colombia, its background,
and the decentralization reform process, including its implementation to test the validity of
hypothesis one (H1)131. The section will conclude by analyzing the impact of reforms to
test the validity of hypothesis two (H2) 132 by using indicators of school coverage and
enrollment.

131

H1: If national, regional, and local political leaders participate and collaborate in the promotion of
political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization, there is a greater probability for the passage, approval,
and implementation of public service decentralization laws.
132

H2: Once public service delivery decentralization has been enacted, the higher the degree of collaboration
between national, regional, and local levels of government (in essence the type of intergovernmental relations
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Background of the Reform: The Need for Reform
Public education in Colombia has been affected by poor allocation of resources,
regional inequalities, teachers’ selection mechanisms, teachers’ salaries, socio-economic
factors of each student, and the transitory aspects of many reforms (Iregui et al., 2006).
The Ministry of Education has historically lacked the capacity to execute national
education policies in the country, as well as the capacity to enforce education standards.
In the 1950s, Colombia was lagging behind most Latin American countries in
educational indicators. Illiteracy reached 44% of the population older than 7 years old, and
elementary education only reached 46.3% of children between 7 and 11 years old. High
school indicators were abysmal. Recommendations were made to increase coverage and to
improve quality, especially of basic elementary education and vocational schools. The
government of Rojas Pinilla sought to implement some of these reforms (Iregui et al.,
2006).
In the 1960s, there was a considerable increase in resources allocated to education,
and special emphasis was placed on improving secondary education. A result of these
efforts was the creation, in many parts of the country, of National Institutes of Diversified
Education (or INEM—reflecting Spanish terminology)133, aimed at providing classes not
only on the classical curriculum, but also vocational training in industrial, commercial, and
agricultural areas. By the end of the decade, the Educational Regional Funds (FERs—
reflecting Spanish terminology)134 were created to centralize education administration, and
established), stakeholders and citizens (other socio-political actors); the greater the probability of its success
and effectiveness.
133

Institutos Nacionales de Educacion Media Diversificada
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the Situado Fiscal was established to provide Departments with resources to be spent on
education.
The efforts made did not produce much results as the 1970s still saw serious
problems with lack of infrastructure (classrooms and unfinished buildings), poorly trained
teachers, absenteeism and high drop-out rates. Regional inequalities continued, as well as
lack of curricular integration between the three levels of schooling (Iregui et al., 2006). A
series of policies were again designed to address these persistent problems, including the
universalization of primary education, the creation of pre-K centers, and the adoption of a
mechanism of automatic promotion in primary school, increased coverage in high school
education, and the standardization of salaries for secondary education. A training program
for teachers was designed, as well as an economic incentive one to attract better qualified
teachers to the public sector.
Toward the end of this decade, some improvements in elementary education could
be seen, but secondary education continued in critical condition, including tertiary
education where only 9 out of 1,000 students had access to a public university. An
important development was the adoption, in 1979, of the Teachers’ Statute (Estatuto
Docente), oriented toward establishing the conditions by which teachers would be hired,
promoted, and retired in the public schools system (Iregui et al., 2006; Lowden, 2004).
The 1979 enactment of the teachers’ labor regime, the Estatuto Docente gave the
teachers’ union (FECODE) great influence and bargaining power at the national level. The
new rules were to have a great impact for future decentralization reforms, as many benefits

134

Fondos Regionales de Educacion
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(such as automatic promotion based on years of service or attendance to
trainings/publications, no performance evaluation criteria, tenure, and the near
impossibility of being fired) were to be seen as threatened by the unions if decentralization
advanced. As such, the power of FECODE was cemented. FECODE also sought to defend
its bargaining power as a nationally representative organization, and feared that
decentralization would impact their national-level bargaining power (Santa Maria et al.,
2009; Lowden, 2004; Melo, 2005; Hanson, 1995).
At the beginning of the 1980s, the Betancur administration tried again to boost
public education and a national literacy campaign was launched, aimed especially at
traditionally excluded communities (called CAMINA), and a National Program for Open
and at Distance Universities with the objective of making higher education more accessible
and with broader coverage.
By 1989, a serious attempt to reform the Ministry of Education (MEN) was
launched calling for a rational distribution of tasks through administrative decentralization.
“The role of the reorganized MEN is to specialize in nationwide policy formation, planning,
evaluation, and training” (Hanson, 1995; page 110). Within the guidelines and parameters
established by MEN, local municipalities were to establish their own priorities on issues
such as school construction and maintenance, budget expenditures, and personnel needs.
Mayors and local councils were put in charge of educational leadership and coordination.
In accordance with the stated goal of increasing participation in the education decisionmaking-process, “large committees of appointed and elected members at the municipal,
Departmental, and national levels” (Hanson, 1995) were established with the responsibility
of approving decisions made by the mayors and their education secretaries. A process of
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fiscal decentralization was also established to finance the administrative decentralization
of education.
The Barco administration also sought to expand education at all levels, but no
specific programs or plans were designed to advance quality of education. Universities still
lacked research capacity, and though there was an expansion in the number of higher
education institutions, they were besieged by administrative and financial problems (Iregui
et al., 2006).
At the beginning of the 1990s, discussions about the need to reform public
education were placed in the context of its importance for the development of human
capital and economic development. At this time, access to secondary and tertiary education
continued to be serious bottlenecks; simultaneously, improvements in the quality of
educators started to be noticeable, but the quality of education results continued to be poor.
A serious problem persisted: called the “politization of education,” governors used
appointments and promotions in schools for political gain (Meade & Gershberg, 2008;
Iregui et al., 2006).
The Constitution of 1991, and Law 60 of 1993, marked the beginning of education
decentralization and the launching of new reforms, especially fiscal ones. Financial
resources for education increased dramatically. Departmental and local governments began
to have a much larger role in the administration and expenditure of financial resources.
In 1994, the General Education Law was enacted to regulate the provision of
education services in accordance with the requirements of the new Constitution. By the
end of the decade, with the exception of large cities, universal coverage was still not
prevalent, access to education, by socio-economic categories and by regions, continued to
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be highly unequal, and quality was still a serious problem (Hudson, 2010; Santa Maria et
al., 2009; Iregui et al., 2006; Lowden, 2004).
The Pastrana administration, in an attempt to improve the sector, focused on
reducing the teacher/student ratio, as well as on the need to better the socio-economic
situation of families, seen as a major obstacle to students’ achievements. The proposed
reforms of his administration included the transfer of teachers within municipalities or
within the same Department, and also the revision of financial mechanisms including
considering a voucher system, and greater collaboration with the private sector.
By 2001, of great concern were the fiscal implications of decentralization on the
macroeconomic stability of the country. Thus, by way of Legislative Act 1 in the same
year, the transfer system to regional governments was reformed and unified in one fund,
creating the General Sharing System (SGP—reflecting Spanish terminology)135.
As discussed in other sections of this study, Law 715 in the same year (2001)
modified the allocation of funds in the SGP, and defined the competences of Departmental
and local governments in education and health.
Complementarily, Decree 1278 of 2002 issued a new Teachers Statute by which
the criteria for hiring, promotion, and retirement of public education were redefined, and a
new echelon of compensation was established based not only on years of service, but also
on performance.
No major developments have taken place since then, but the overall goal of
continuing to expand coverage, increase access and quality, as well as to open more the

135

Sistema General de Participaciones
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tertiary sector have been kept as important objectives of the education decentralization
process.
Legal Framework, the 1991 Constitution and Education Decentralization
Between 1975 and 1987, the public education system was greatly centralized. The
Ministry of Education was the agency responsible for formulating policies and coordinated
the activities in the area. The national government controlled the transfers to Departments.
Each Department had a delegate of the central government charged with overseeing how
expenditures were made, and making sure that contracting was done according to national
guidelines (Iregui et al., 2006).
A first attempt at decentralization occurred in 1987 by giving local governments
responsibility over local infrastructure. A 1989 law gave authority to the mayors to hire
teachers with the national government in charge of paying salaries.
Law 29 of 1989 turned over management of the majority of teachers to the
municipalities. The law did not have the support of FECODE or the mayors, as they feared
that resources would not be available and they would be held responsible for any failure.
During the 1980s and 1990s, responsibilities were split between central, regional,
and local levels without clear definitions; thus, duplication, confusion, and lack of
accountability was common (Meade & Gershberg, 2008).
With the 1991 Constitution, the administration of elementary and secondary
education was transferred to regional and local governments with the main objective of
expanding coverage, especially for elementary and middle school.
The drafting of the new constitution in 1991, and the critical political situation of
the country, provided an opportunity to redefine the provision of services in the country,
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and the need for educational reform was central to many delegates (Galilea et al., 2011;
Meade & Gershberg, 2008; Lowden, 2004; Dillinger & Webb, 1999).
During the Constitutional Assembly, one of the most contentious issues was
whether to orient decentralization toward a greater role for Departmental governments or
toward municipalities. FECODE (represented at the Assembly by two of its former leaders)
was strongly opposed to the municipalization of education. Lowden (2004) attributes the
success of diluting education decentralization to the fact that many representatives to the
Assembly feared the power of FECODE, and saw the number of governors (32) as more
“manageable” than a thousand mayors 136 . But, President Gaviria and his teams highly
preferred municipalization of education based on principles of subsidiarity and local public
choice, including more autonomy to local schools (Lowden, 2004). In the end, a
compromise was reached with regional and local governments sharing some
responsibilities for education administration, though it was left for future legislation to
clearly define the competences of each.
The voices of NGOs, church groups, and private school associations were also
represented at the constitutional assembly but did not have much influence on the outcome.
The Federation of Municipalities and the Governors Association did not have a major role
either, as they were relatively new and had very different interests and lacked institutional
capacity.
Overall, the discussions regarding education decentralization in the Assembly had more to
do with fiscal and administrative issues and not with pedagogical ones.

136

This view was shared by people interviewed in Colombia (December 2015)
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The new Constitution made education a right and increased the number of years for
obligatory attendance, but did not make it “free and mandatory for all,” something the
national government opposed as it would have curtailed greater private participation in
public education (Lowden, 2004; and interviews). The design and implementation of
education reform was postponed for later discussion.
Laws 60 of 1993 and 115 of 1994 were the major legislative initiatives to regulate
education after the enactment of the new Constitution (Bonet et al., 2014; Galilea et al.,
2011; Iregui et al., 2006; Melo, 2005; Dillinger & Webb, 1999). More autonomy was given
to governors and mayors in terms of human and financial resources administration.
Law 60, left in the hands of Departments and the special districts (Bogota,
Cartagena, Santa Marta, and Barranquilla) the Situado Fiscal, which gave them a
percentage of the current central government revenues—scheduled to increase from 22.1%
in 1993 to 24.5% in 1996. A share totaling 60% of the Situado Fiscal was to be spent on
education, with 20% for health, and the remaining 20% designated for discretionary
purposes. The municipalities were to allocate 30% of their share to education, 25% to
health, 20% basic infrastructure and sanitation, and 25% to other expenditures (Santa Maria
et al., 2009; Lowden, 2004).
Administrative responsibilities were also redefined, with the Ministry of Education
maintaining its regulatory and policy-setting role, Departments were to administer and pay
teachers, and have a supervisory role over municipalities, which were put in charge of the
administration and provision of infrastructure. In order for Departments, and municipalities
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of over 100,000137 to take over the new functions, they needed to be “certified” by the
Ministry based on meeting a series of criteria, which included having an institutional
structure, development plan for education, and an information system (Bonet et al., 2014;
Di Gropello, 2004; Lowden, 2004; Dillinger & Webb, 1999).
The second major law of this period was introduced by FECODE, and became Law
115 of 1994, which was supposed to ensure school autonomy with the creation of the
Institutional Education Projects—allowing schools to present their own pedagogic
projects. However, the law gave schools no financial or administrative authority.
Moreover, the law increased the role of the newly created departmental education
secretariats and also allowed the creation of secretariats at the local level. Their functions,
though, remained vague.
In particular, Law 115/94 sought to give more autonomy to local schools by
allowing the creation of school governments to include teachers, parents, and students in
charge of establishing the internal rules of the school, identifying needs, and evaluating its
performance criteria. Institutional Educational Plans (or PEI—reflecting Spanish
terminology) 138 , defined the academic goals of each school according to the general
guidelines provided by the Ministry of Education. In practice, neither one had real
autonomy, neither in resource management nor in the decision-making process.
By 2001, fiscal pressures and economic crisis paved the road for the Pastrana
administration to annul Law 60, and enact Law 715, which substantially changed how
137

Some decentralization reformers had proposed that the threshold be 50,000 inhabitants, but they were
defeated (Lowden, 2004).
138

Plan Educativo Institucional
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subnational governments were to be financed139. The Situado Fiscal, and other sources of
funding, were consolidated in the General Sharing System (Sistema General de
Participaciones), which was delinked from increases or decreases of the central
government revenues, and a ceiling to total transfers was established. Funds could be spent
on infrastructure, food, and transportation (after paying for salaries); municipalities could
also contract with private entities to provide services.
Law 715 created a new system by which central funds for education were to be
allocated according to the number of students enrolled in public schools and no longer on
the number of teachers employed in each jurisdiction. Departments and municipalities were
also no longer able to create teaching posts (no doubt a good source of patronage and
clientelism) unless they had the budget to pay for them. Reforms to the teaching career
were also made, including increasing the number of years teachers needed to be in each
category before they could move up on the career ladder (Lowden, 2004).
The Law also increased the power and control of the Education Ministry over
teachers’ management, including elimination of posts and transfers, new reporting rules
and regulations were put in place to ensure better oversight of Departments and
municipalities by the central authorities (Lowden, 2004). The Law made certification easier
for municipalities (assuming control of resources and administration from the
Departments) by making possible for local governments with less than 100,000 inhabitants

139

Interviews with former Pastrana administration senior officials also expressed the deep preoccupation
at the time with the financial stability of the country and the perception that local and regional
governments’ financial imbalances were threatening the country’s fiscal stability.
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to apply for certification. School directors were given more autonomy in the selection and
management of teachers and resources.
The main purpose of Law 715 from the central government’s perspective was to
strengthen decentralization, but with greater central government enforcement capacity
(Lowden, 2004). The Law was supported by many political actors and stakeholders as the
fiscal situation of the country was increasingly difficult, governors and mayors claimed for
clarification of their roles and responsibilities, and many felt that the power of FECODE
needed to be curtailed. In this regard, in 2002 the Pastrana administration reformed the
Estatuto Docente or Teacher Statute establishing clear requisites to enter the teaching
profession, as well as for promotions and retirement, conditions for reallocation, and
dismissal of teachers. Decree 230 established norms to evaluate students and school
performance (Lowden, 2004).
Table 65: Law 60/1993 – Responsibilities by Level of Government – Education

-

-

National
Government
sets the policies and
general objectives of
the education sector
establishes the
technical, curricular,
and pedagogical
norms to be used by
the Departments
designs and manages
the national
information system

-

-

-

-

Departmental
Governments
administers and
directs, jointly with
the municipalities, the
provision of
elementary and
secondary education
participates in the
funding and cofunding of the area,
and on infrastructure
administers and
transfers the Situado
Fiscal (resources
from the central
government)
promotes and
evaluates teacher
training

Source: Author. Adapted from Melo (2005)

331

-

-

-

Municipal
Governments
administers pre-K,
elementary and
secondary education
as designed by the
Department
finances the
necessary investment
for infrastructure and
maintenance of
education facilities
examines and
supervises the
provision of
education services

Law 715/2001 redefined the role of Departments and of certified municipalities in
human resources administration (hiring, establishing guidelines, promotions), and were
allowed to transfer teachers within municipalities (Table 66 below summarizes
competences by level of government). Non-certified municipalities could only transfer
teachers within the educational institutions present in their territory, could invest their own
resources in infrastructure or to improve educational outcomes (Bonet et al., 2014; Galilea,
2011; Di Gropello, 2004).
In the case of Departments, the requirements for education certification included
having (Melo, 2005; Di Gropello, 2004):
-

a functional information system,

-

the approval of a development plan for the area,

-

the approval by the Departmental Junta of the rules and regulations by which
resources were to be used,

-

the adoption of a plan to increase the number of enrolled students,

-

an agreement with the Ministry of Education.
In the case of municipalities, certification has been slow, partly due to institutional

challenges and lack of capacity at the local level, but also due to the opposition of
Departmental government, which see their resources diminished. As of 2009, only 4% of
municipalities were certified in education (48 of 1,120 municipalities). The requirements
for education certification were established by the Ministry of Education by decree 2700
of 2004 and include (Santa Maria et al., 2009):
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-

Presenting a municipal education development plan in accordance with national
guidelines. The plan must include a description of programs, projects, goals and
indicators for coverage, quality, and efficiency in the provision of services.

-

Human resources staff with the required proficiency, as established by national
government guidelines. The municipality must elaborate a feasibility study that
justifies the human resources and provide such study to the Departmental
government with an analysis of the financial viability. Once certified, the
Department will formally, and effectively, transfer the education human resources
to the municipality.

-

Local governments must have the educational facilities needed to provide such
services140.

-

Institutional capacity: in accordance with guidelines established and defined by the
Ministry of Education, municipalities must have undergone a modernization plan
that would allow them to have the technical capacity to take over their new roles.
Municipalities that intend to be certified must submit a request to the governor of

the Department, who will have a month to consider the petition. After that, the Department
must assist in the certification process. The Ministry of Education will verify the level of
support provided by the Department to the local government. Once all requirements are
met, the municipality formally requests the certification from the Department. The
governor would then make an official transfer of the education resources to the

140

The law requires that educational institutions must be able to provide education from pre-K (one year
of pre-K) to ninth grade.
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municipality, with the municipality from then on receiving the financial transfers directly
from the central government.
By the end of 2001, only one municipality was certified in education (Armenia),
and by 2007 the number had increased to 39141. Lowden (2004) attributes the reasons for
this partly to political conflict and tensions between FECODE and the governors and
between governors and mayors, and also to the reluctance of many municipalities to
assume responsibilities without proper funding, especially in regard to the refusal by some
Departments to cover the pension costs of teachers (Meade & Gershberg, 2008; Lowden,
2004).

141

http://www.portalterritorial.gov.co/preguntas.shtml?apc=r-caqueta;x;x;x1-&x=80241
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Table 66: Law 715/2001 Competences by Level of Government – Education
National
Government
formulate policies and
objectives of the
education sector, and
provide the norms and
rules for the
organization and
delivery of services;
regulate the provision
of services for public
and private institutions;
promote, fund,
coordinate and evaluate
investment programs;
evaluate the financial
and administrative
performance of regional
governments;
transfer the education
resources of the SGP;
annually define the per
student allocation;
establish the
requirements for
municipalities’
certification, and decide
about the certification
of municipalities of less
than 100,000
inhabitants (in the case
the Department refuses
to do it).

Departmental
Municipal
Governments
Governments
General Competences:
For certified municipalities:
- provide financial,
- direct, plan, and
administrative, and
provide education
technical assistance on
services in the pre-K,
the provision of
elementary, and middle
education services to
levels;
the municipalities;
- administer and
- administer, and be
distribute among the
responsible for, the
educational institutions
education information
the financial resources
of the Department
coming from the SGP;
(including its reliability
- administer the
and quality);
educational institutions,
- support and provide
as well as teaching and
technical and
administrative
administrative
personnel.
assistance to the
municipalities wishing
For non-certified municipalities:
to be certified;
- administer and
- certify the
distribute the SGP
municipalities that
resources assigned to
fulfill the requirements.
them for the
Competences Regarding nonmaintenance and
certified municipalities:
improvement of
- direct, plan, and
quality, the transfer of
provide education
teachers and vacancies
services in the pre-K,
between their
elementary, and middle
educational institutions;
levels;
- provide the information
- administer and
required by the
distribute among
Department and the
municipalities the
national government.
financial resources
coming from the SGP;
- administer the
educational institutions,
as well as teaching and
administrative
personnel;
- distribute among
municipalities the
teaching and
administrative staff in
accordance to the needs
of the system.
Source: Author. Adapted from Santa Maria et al., 2009 & Galilea et al., 2011
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Financing of Public Education
By 2009, only about 4% of municipalities were certified. Most of education
decentralization has, in practice, been taken over by Departmental governments (Santa
Maria el at, 2009).
The principal source of funding for public education comes from transfers of the
SGP. These transfers are distributed among Departments, certified municipalities, and
special districts in accordance to the criteria established by Law 715/2001. Subnational
governments can also allocate from their own budget, resources to education. A particular
source of revenue in this regard are the funds from the Royalties Fund which are used to
finance regional development plans to include education.
Presently, Law 715 orders that 58.5% of the SGP must be spent in education.
Criteria for the distribution of resources, as per Law 715, is based on population served
(students enrolled). Each year the Ministry defines a per student allocation, per each level
of education (pre-K, elementary, middle), and per area (rural and urban). Once resources
are allocated by population served, the balance is distributed taking into account criteria of
students to be served and by poverty index.
About 90% of expenses are paid from transfers of the SGP, which shows the high
dependence of Departments and certified municipalities on transfers from the central
government (Santa Maria et al., 2009).
Between 2002 and 2007, the Departments with the largest population dispersion,
were the ones that received the most funds from the SGP per student enrolled (Guainia,
Vaupes, Vichada, and Amazonas). Of the 32 Departments (plus the city of Bogota), 23, or
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72%, received in average 1 and 1.3 million of pesos—the average spent per enrolled
student (Santa Maria et al., 2009).
Royalties also play a role in the financing of public education. Law 141 of 1994,
established that Departments and municipalities could use the funds from royalties to
increase coverage in health, education, and potable water. Law 756 of 2002 also established
that, as long as subregional levels of government did not meet the basic coverage indicators
in infant mortality rates, basic health and education coverage, potable water and sewage,
Departmental governments must allocate no less than 60% of the total royalties transfer to
these services. In the case of local governments, the percentage is 90% (Santa Maria et al.,
2009; Melo, 2005).
The national government transfers the royalties through two mechanisms: direct
royalties transferred to the producing Departments and municipalities, and to the port cities
from where the products are exported to; and indirect royalties that benefit all Departments
and municipalities of the country through the presentation, to the National Royalties Fund
or FNR (reflecting Spanish terminology),142 of development programs and projects for its
approval and funding. Those projects are evaluated and prioritized by the National
Planning Department and its approval is dependent on the Royalties Advising Board, an
advisory agency of the FNR. Overall, the amounts are low and their share of education
financing too. According to Santa Maria et al. (2009), it represented less than 1%.
Direct royalties have been characterized by uncertainty as the price of commodities
have fluctuated, and economic crisis have impacted the transfers. The producing

142

Fondo Nacional de Regalias
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Departments of Casanare, Arauca, Meta, Guajira, Tolima, and Huila are the ones who have
benefited the most from direct royalties, though they are subject to market fluctuations and
commodity price slumps.
A problem with the use of royalties is the heavy dependence on transfers from the
central government. Moreover, though the law established that when basic indicators are
not been met, 60% of royalties funds must be spent on health, education, and water and
sanitation, there are no requirements or guidelines as to what percentage should be spent
on what sector, leaving it to the discretion of governors and mayors—the resources are
often misallocated, misspent, embezzled, or simply spent on projects of poor technical
quality or with no sustainability (Santa Maria et al., 2009).

Impact of Education Decentralization in Colombia
Analyzing the impact of education decentralization is not an easy task as many
socio economic factors influence the possible results of the proposed policies.
In terms of the legal framework established, Meade and Gershberg (2008) point to
the fact that, during the 1980s-1990s in the intergovernmental system established in
Colombia, responsibilities were split between central, regional, and local levels without
clear definitions; thus, duplication, confusion, and lack of accountability was common.
Impediments to reform included a lack of unity within the national ministry to
facilitate reforms, clientelism, and opposition by unions, and a lack of capacity at the local
level. The Education Ministry had little enforcing capacity, accountability was problematic
(the ministry lacked a good information system to be able to know what was happening in
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remote regions). Smaller cities had low capacity, poor infrastructure, and some were
embedded in conflict.
As central funding was tied to the number of teachers employed by Departments,
this led to an extremely unequal distribution of funding (plus it also encouraged
clientelism). The numbers of teachers hired continued to rise, as well as their salaries.
Di Gropello (2004) and Melo (2005) also note that the dispersion of responsibilities
across political actors, while it can make sense politically, greatly complicates
accountability relationships because of the absence of a level that is clearly responsible for
service delivery. This view was expressed by many people interviewed in Colombia who
mentioned that with everybody being responsible for some part of the reforms, in the end,
nobody is responsible for anything143.
In an analysis of the impact of fiscal decentralization on public education (in
essence how efficiently have regional and local governments spent the resources), Melo
(2005) concludes that there are high levels of inefficiency. During the time that Law 60
was in place, there was a positive impact on coverage, but a negative impact on the
academic achievements of students. The transfer of more resources has not been
accompanied by an increase in the quality of education.
Universal coverage was one of the main goals of decentralization (Melo, 2005).
Governors seem to have concentrated on expanding coverage but were not as concerned
with the quality of the education provided. As a result of conflicting responsibilities, quality
of education has not significantly improved. Public schools continue to be at the bottom of

143

Representatives of the Governors and Mayors Federations during many interviews conducted for this
research.
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quality indexes, and the results of per-grade-proficiency level exams are, in general, very
poor (Iregui et al., 2006).
Public expenditure on education has increased. As percentage of GDP it grew from
3.3% in 1993, to 4.9% in 1999, to 4.8% in 2010 (World Bank data. See Table 67 below).
On average, the central government covers about 85% of education expenses, and
Departments and municipalities, using their own resources, contribute the remaining 15%.
The largest expense is by far salaries and pensions (see Tables 67 & 68) where up to 90%
of public education expenditures is spent on education staff compensation.

Table 67: Education Expenditures – Colombia 1998 – 2010

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

Expenditure on
education (1)
12.4
13.1
13.2
13.4
15.2
15.5
15.4
15.5
13.7
14.4
14.6
16.0
16.4

Government expenditure on
education (2)
3.9
4.4
3.5
3.7
4.3
4.3
4.0
3.9
3.8
4.0
3.9
4.7
4.8

Per Capita
Expenditure
(Euros)
90
94
100
107
87
91
110
116
140
146
177
229

(1) as % of total government expenditure (%)
(2) as % of GDP (%)
Source: Author based on World Bank Development Indicators. Accessed 1/14/2016 and
http://www.datosmacro.com/estado/gasto/educacion/colombia

The increase on public expenditures in education can be seen in Table 68 below,
which shows the education budgets per Department.
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Table 68: Public Expenditure in Education per Department, 2002-2007 (millions of
pesos, 2008)
Department
Antioquia
Bogota
Valle Cauca
Santander
Bolivar
Cundinamarca
Cordoba
Tolima
Nariño
Boyaca
N. Santander
Cauca
Atlantico
Magdalena
Huila
Cesar
Meta
Guajira
Caldas
Sucre
Casanare
Risaralda
Choco
Putumayo
Caqueta
Quindio
Arauca
Guaviare
Amazonas
Vichada
San Andres
Guainia
Vaupes
Total

2002
1,132,423
1,273,137
680,339
554,039
399,747
611,432
382,959
365,930
422,486
526,466
346,936
320,886
349,811
273,220
275,352
219,646
184,949
128,621
290,047
204,778
116,957
207,588
173,546
105,664
121,483
143,641
97,504
36,125
29,086
32,965
23,047
24,367
24,560
10,079,682

2003
1,151,569
1,247,522
698,111
545,084
444,949
573,391
385,757
371,071
453,825
511,059
340,320
329,523
366,459
285,484
277,896
238,586
189,943
153,827
284,525
245,092
120,085
215,595
183,368
108,418
123,382
148,059
100,534
34,772
29,813
32,084
21,552
25,044
24,324
9,920,703

2004
1,198,661
1,214,342
756,990
514,179
497,398
553,597
442,677
364,983
571,062
437,971
343,788
343,952
393,668
403,668
293,186
270,825
214,061
215,111
255,901
259,005
132,193
212,826
195,266
133,719
249,930
135,080
82,868
45,294
38,600
36,796
21,603
21.224
19,165
10,484,579

2005
1,333,733
1,473,483
804,120
541,071
530,674
583,067
472,368
381,283
441,574
450,879
345,768
343,437
404,207
354,681
307,054
267,262
228,102
173,493
255,448
262,346
125,692
217,798
184,885
132,545
132,994
131,834
89,822
46,958
38,703
36,151
20,972
21,225
19,648
10,349,157

2006
1,464,470
1,536,902
822,387
550,655
535,466
564,991
476,174
368,531
468,868
450,078
392,739
357,759
400,073
374,004
302,073
283,542
258,603
253,383
262,531
261,609
137,039
224,320
185,307
132,563
136,864
158,384
101,139
44,972
41,019
34,912
23,890
28,688
19,656
11,429,271

2007
1,248,820
1,117,382
883,567
588,886
566,331
564,893
531,038
493,493
482,751
467,832
398,067
390,085
388,804
376,645
346,191
329,221
305,127
265,338
262,437
260,927
218,156
211,346
183,440
147,891
140,400
138,851
136,291
46,753
38,287
35,687
23,328
20,486
19,715
11,445,026

Source: Santa Maria et al., 2009

The Colombian government’s own ten year evaluation of education
decentralization (1990-2001) finds that education “decentralization has favored an increase
in coverage, reduction in the general illiteracy rate, greater availability of teachers and
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higher schooling levels” (Rojas & Frank, 2004). Faguet and Sanchez (2009), in analyzing
the results of education decentralization in Colombia, also find that decentralization
coincides with a 20% increase in total school enrollment, and increased literacy rates
(93%). The authors also stress the finding that enrollment increased sharply in those
districts that were the most financially decentralized and most free from central
government influence.
There is overall consensus that coverage has increased. The vast majority of
students in Colombia attend public schools. Between 1985 and 2002, 75% of students were
enrolled in public schools, and 70% of teachers worked for public schools. Elementary
school coverage increased from 68.4% in 1989 to 83.7% in the year 2000, and secondary
education coverage increased from 40.3% in 1989 to 62% in 1997 (Santa Maria et al.,
2009).
Coverage has increased nationwide, especially for elementary (6 to 10 years old),
and secondary education (11 to 14 years old), with less success in expanding middle
education (15 to 17 years old). Tables 69 and 70 below show national improvements in
primary and secondary enrollment rates, as well as in completion rates for primary students.
Completion and enrollment rates have improved significantly—since the implementation
of decentralization and the 1994 education law—for secondary students (one of the main
policy goals), with gross enrollment rates improving from 64% in 1994 to 71% by the year
2000, to 82% in 2005, and 95% by 2010. Completion rates have also increased, from 45%
in 1993 to 58% in 2001, reaching 91% in 2010 (see also Figure 3).
Great regional variations remain. The newest Departments (Vichada, Guaviare,
Vaupes) have the lowest coverage for elementary school and secondary school. Choco is
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another Department that stands out for its low coverage at all levels (Santa Maria et al.,
2009). School drop-out rates continue to be a problem in many Departments. In 2007, the
average dropout rate, at the Departmental level, was of 7.1%. For the 2002-2007 period,
the Department of Caqueta had the most serious problem in this regard with 14.9% drop
out rate, and the best was the city of Bogota with just 3.2% (Santa Maria et al., 2009).

Table 69: Education Indicators (Selected) – Colombia 1990 – 2010
Series&Name

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

Enrolment&in&primary&education(1)
4246658 4310970
OutBofBschool&children&of&primary&school&age(2) ..
1190651
Gross&enrolment&ratio,&primary&(3)
105.4405 106.1356
Primary&completion&rate,&both&sexes&(%)
73.55794 72.94743

4525959
875312
110.4852
81.81144

4599132
857424
111.3202
82.92981

4648335
840109
111.5517
82.62786

1995

1996

1997

1998

4692614 4916934 ..
725269 532967 ..
111.6661 116.09 ..
86.39491 87.58864 ..

..

2377947 2686515 2829435 2935830 3025350 3252128 ..
52.36373 58.23482 60.50289 62.07318 63.34929 67.57471 ..
..
..
45.66249 ..
..
..
..
..
..
90.52465 ..
..
96.995 ..

..

Current&education&expenditure,&total(8)
..
Expenditure&on&primary(9)
..
Government&expenditure&per&primary&student(10)& ..

..
..
..

..
..
..

..
..
..

..
..
..

..
..
..

..
..
..

..
..
..

..

All&education&staff&compensation,&primary(11) ..
All&education&staff&compensation,&secondary(12) ..

..
..

..
..

..
..

..
..

..
..

..
..

..
..

..
..

Enrolment&in&secondary&education(4)
Gross&enrolment&ratio,&secondary(5)
Lower&secondary&completion&rate(6)
Youth&literacy&rate,&population&15B24&years(7)

..
..
..
..

(1) both sexes (number)
(2) both sexes (number)
(3) both sexes (%)
(4) both sexes (number)
(5) both sexes (%)
(6) both sexes (%)
(7) both sexes (%)
(8) (% of total expenditure in public institutions)
(9) as % of government expenditure on education (%)
(10) as % of GDP per capita (%)
(11) (% of total expenditure in primary public institutions)
(12) (% of total expenditure in secondary public institutions)
Source: Author based on World Bank Development Indicators. Accessed 1/14/2016
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1999

2000

5162260 5221018
270024 198353 159945
119.0579 118.5221 118.8807
93.39546 94.86706 94.8574

3589425 3568889
72.42449 72.57739 71.51099
69.17265 ..
..
..
..
..
..

..

44.93812 45.16187 44.55692
13.24931 15.24253 11.95551
..
..

..
..

Table 70: Education Indicators (Selected) – Colombia 2001 – 2010
Series&Name

2001

Enrolment&in&primary&education(1)
OutBofBschool&children&of&primary&school&age(2)
Gross&enrolment&ratio,&primary&(3)
Primary&completion&rate,&both&sexes&(%)
Enrolment&in&secondary&education(4)
Gross&enrolment&ratio,&secondary(5)
Lower&secondary&completion&rate(6)
Youth&literacy&rate,&population&15B24&years(7)

2002

2003

5131463 5193055 ..
234995 189015 ..
116.0434 116.9415 ..
92.17438 92.58965 ..

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

5259033 5298257 5296190 5292476 5285523 5299258 5084972
281828 178763 222685 272710 295334 319134 391648
118.4376 119.633 119.733 119.7376 119.5937 119.8435 114.9137
100.0221 103.5889 109.3641 110.8273 110.4283 114.623 113.3939

..
..

3723348 ..
73.2597 ..
58.6589 63.78273 ..
..
..
..

4050525
78.1847
69.81939
97.99131

4297228
82.21493
75.2119
97.9584

4509406
85.76431
77.94411
97.88317

4684033
88.71023
80.1693
97.96863

4772189
90.15461
82.43913
97.98927

4992062
94.25033
88.81356
97.93743

5079732
95.96435
91.30218
98.09842

Current&education&expenditure,&total(8)
..
96.83647 ..
Expenditure&on&primary(9)
44.57196 39.88195 ..
Government&expenditure&per&primary&student(10)& 13.06542 13.51016 ..

93.31497 ..
..
100
100 ..
77.73353
48.3245 47.43698 40.49725 36.62786 37.30254 38.40722 35.92155
15.94129 15.4463 13.05167 12.49926 12.45925 15.75964 15.83455

All&education&staff&compensation,&primary(11)
..
All&education&staff&compensation,&secondary(12) ..

76.47044 ..
76.47042 ..

..
..

..
..

..
..

80.06557 75.26206 93.1597 89.70094
80.06557 75.26207 93.1597 89.70095

(1) both sexes (number)
(2) both sexes (number)
(3) both sexes (%)
(4) both sexes (number)
(5) both sexes (%)
(6) both sexes (%)
(7) both sexes (%)
(8) (% of total expenditure in public institutions)
(9) as % of government expenditure on education (%)
(10) as % of GDP per capita (%)
(11) (% of total expenditure in primary public institutions)
(12) (% of total expenditure in secondary public institutions)
Source: Author based on World Bank Development Indicators. Accessed 1/14/2016
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Figure 3: Evolution of Primary and Secondary Enrollment (1998 – 2010)
Government Expenditure on Education (1998 – 2010) – Colombia

In the case of municipalities, data has been very difficult to gather to compare their
effectiveness in implementing education decentralization. But, Faguet and Sanchez (2006),
using large-N and quantitative analysis of municipalities in Bolivia and Colombia (90% of
Colombian municipalities), find evidence of the link between decentralization and
increased number of school enrollment. Also, those municipalities that spend more of their
own resources in education, as well as those that are certified, show higher enrollment rates
than those which are not (Faguet & Sanchez, 2006).
In truth, since the law establishes that municipalities with over 100,000 inhabitants
and Departments are certified, and the municipalities meeting that population threshold are
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in the minority, most of education decentralization in Colombia has been implemented by
the regional governments. The goal of increasing enrollment has been largely achieved,
but serious quality gaps remain.

Conclusions
The Colombian experience with education decentralization offers some important
insights into a process that is often complicated, reversible, and filled with power struggles
and intense politicking.
As noted at the outset of this review of the Colombian experience, some key
questions related to roles and responsibilities, fiscal impact, accountability, local capacity,
and local participation in the decision-making process must be addressed and taken into
account as decentralization processes are unfolding (Winkler, 1989; Naidoo, 2007;
Hanson, 1997). In the case of Colombia, some of these issues were not properly addressed
and problems appeared early in the process.
By applying what Winkler (1989) and Naidoo (2007) consider necessary factors of
successful decentralization, to the Colombian experience between 1990 and 2010, it is
evident that the country’s initiative has met some of the proposed criteria (Table 71 below),
resulting in an overall mixed success in the implementation of education decentralization
policies.
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Table 71: Factors for a Successful Decentralization
Yes
Presence of tradition of self-reliance at local level
Subregional governments have access—and autonomy in the
use of—to funding
There is local demand for decentralization
Key stakeholders are involved in the decision making process

No
X

Mixed
X
X

X
Local administrative capacity exists
Clear understanding of reform process
Staggered implementation
Clear lines of monitoring and evaluations are shared by all
stakeholders
Central authorities support for decentralization
Transparency in the delivery of resources and decision-making

X
X
X
X
X
X

Source: author based on Winkler (1989) and Naidoo (2007)

At the beginning of the process in Colombia, years of persistent political violence
meant that local communities lacked a tradition of self-reliance, so it was necessary to
ensure accountability at the local level and citizens’ involvement in the process. Some of
the school reforms aimed at including parents and students in participatory school and
curriculum management failed because of this. Key stakeholders also lacked clear
information and understanding of what the process entailed, and what was expected from
each level of government. Lack of information and communication has negatively
impacted accountability at all levels.
Some other obstacles to the reform included the lack of coordination among
different stakeholders; lack of a shared vision of what the process entailed; confusion as
there were no clear guidelines of what was expected from each level of government; the
and opposition of national, regional, and local bureaucracies, as well as the powerful
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teachers’ union (FECODE). Decentralization for the teachers’ union meant losing political
power, which came from being able to negotiate national contracts (Berhman, Deolalikar,
Soon, 2002). The unions scored some important victories as schools were not given
autonomy to select, hire, and discipline staff, for example.
At the Departmental and municipal levels, a main problems was the weakness of
administrative institutions, and the lack of local capacity, in particular for smaller
municipalities and Departments. As these concerns arose, much to its credit, the Colombian
government and the Colombian Federation of Municipalities continued to implement
training to local and regional governments on managing the new programs.
Many local governments also felt that the central government was transferring
responsibilities and challenges before a minimum standard was achieved. Thus, local
governments would have to spend many resources to bring their local schools to the new
standards and mayors would risk the political fallout in case reforms did not work out.
The lack of a shared vision of what education decentralization aimed to accomplish,
and what level of government was to be in charge of what aspect of implementing the
reforms, added to the misunderstandings and the setbacks in the Colombian process.
Vested interests, in particular the teachers’ union, ministries’ bureaucracies, some political
movements, and to some extent, the violent armed movements, made certain reforms very
difficult to implement, whittling down the proposed changes. An “all-at-once,” “from-thetop” imposed strategy did not help the government’s initiative.
The Colombian case also demonstrates that regional differences and local diversity
should be taken into account in the design and implementation of education
decentralization policies. Wealthier and larger Departments, as well as local governments,
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were reluctant to accept the new responsibilities as long as roles, funding, and
accountability were not clearly defined and established. Necessary good will and political
capital were lost in those first years of implementation.
One of the main problems in the Colombian education decentralization experience
was, and to some degree still is, with fiscal autonomy and local and regional governments’
lack of capacity to procure their own source of revenues, create them, or control spending.
The Colombian central government still has tight control on how Departments and local
governments can spend the funds that are transferred to them.
The case of education decentralization in Colombia shows just how complicated
and difficult it is not only to design, but also to implement, decentralization. Setbacks have
not been uncommon, but—to their credit—Colombia’s political leaders (especially at the
regional and local level) have shown resilience and political will to continue demanding,
and improving, the implementation of education decentralization. Decentralization of
education services, as is the case for any other service, is not an easy task; the issue is
finding the appropriate balance. Thus, hypothesis one (H1) tends to be positive.
In regard to the effectiveness of the policies implemented, the goal of extending
coverage and increasing enrollment has largely been achieved. Coordination toward this
goal has not been easy, and the central government has kept close control of the process,
but, in general, there has been cooperation and collaboration. Thus, the proposed
hypothesis 2 is also largely positive. The more collaboration between different
stakeholders, including the three different levels of government, the more likely that public
policy decentralization objectives would be achieved.
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CHAPTER TEN

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: PARAGUAY AND COLOMBIA
Colombia and Paraguay are unitary and decentralized countries, as defined in their
political constitutions. The present research has explored the way inter-governmental
relations were re-shaped in the 1990s as a consequence of significant reforms initiated in
both countries, and we have examined the political factors that shaped the decentralization
reforms in Colombia and Paraguay. These centralized countries were selected for analysis
because of how reforms emerged from the historical circumstances unique to each country.
Violence and a need to re-legitimize the State motivated many of Colombia’s reform, while
departure from years of authoritarian rule and the imperative to strengthen institutions
motivated Paraguay’s reform. Both countries owed their societies improved delivery of
public services.
The particular historical characteristics of each country and the evolution of their
political and intergovernmental systems was described in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study.
Colombia’s political system had been marked by years of violent conflict, civil wars, right
and left wing extremism, and the infiltration of drug cartels in politics. Facing continuously
weakening democratic institutions, the traditional parties (Conservative and Liberal)
allowed for significant political reforms aimed at re-legitimizing the State. In the case of
Paraguay, its political psyche had been scarred by two external wars, followed by years of
political upheaval that ended in the longest dictatorship—by one man—in Latin American
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history. Succession tensions and economic worries led to the replacement of the dictator
and the transition to democracy. In Paraguay, too, there was a need to re-legitimize the
State and its presence in the territory. Thus, both countries launched a series of reforms
leading to new political constitutions (in 1991 in the case of Colombia, and in 1992 in the
case of Paraguay).
The present research has shown that external shocks provided reformers with both
the opportunity, and the challenges, to move reforms forward and realize their policy goals.
Critical junctures, and taking advantage during a window of opportunity, offered
supporters of decentralization in both Colombia and Paraguay the momentum to push
reforms forward. Domestic, international, and economic factors contributed to the impetus
for change, and those same factors are at the heart of slowdown. The present research has
also considered changes that occurred over time and that contributed to a gradual and
incremental institutional change (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010).
We examined formal rules (political and judicial, economic, social), and their
hierarchy (Constitutions, laws, decrees and bylaws), that might constrain institutional
changes (North, 2009). The bargaining strength of different stakeholders was also taken
into account in the analysis.
In the end, it is essential to keep in mind that, as North (2009) posits, institutional
change is “overwhelmingly incremental.” We have observed that Colombia’s and
Paraguay’s decentralization reforms, with all their successes and setbacks, show a “gradual
restructuring of a framework in which the interconnections between formal and informal
constraints and enforcement characteristics evolved” over time (page 89). The limited
success of Paraguay’s decentralization can be attributed to the limited degree of freedom
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that politicians and stakeholders might have to bargain and still maintain the loyalty of their
constituencies.
If using Daughters and Harper’s (in Lora, 2007) proposed Decentralization Maturity
Index to assess how appropriate or effective decentralization reforms have been in five
fundamental policy areas (political decentralization, expenditures assignment, subnational
taxation, intergovernmental transfers, and subnational debt management), a clearer picture
of their similarities and differences can be attained:
1) Local democratic representation: indicating whether subnational authorities are
directly or indirectly elected;
2) Effective assignment of roles and responsibilities at various levels of government:
measuring the extent of responsibilities over a specific sectors’ delegation to
subnational authorities;
3) Strengthening of subnational taxation system: expanding subnational governments’
authority over local taxes;
4) Reduced discretion in the intergovernmental transfer system: level of discretion
over transfers by the central government, namely the extent to which transfers are
automatic or freely allocated;
5) Creation of hard credit culture for subnational borrowing: measuring the presence
of borrowing restrictions.
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Table 72: Decentralization Maturity Index – Colombia and Paraguay
Democratic
representation

Responsibilities

Taxation
System

Colombia

Yes

Mixed – much
confusion
remains

No

Paraguay

Yes

Mixed – much
confusion
remains

No

Discretion
of transfers
Yes – but
central
government
keeps
control
Yes – but
central
government
keeps
control

Borrowing
capacity
No

No

Source: Author based on Daughters and Harper (in Lora, 2007)

As indicated, the differences between the two countries are not significant, except
in the level of expenditures made by subnational governments in Colombia (much higher
than their Paraguayan counterparts), and the fact that, though responsibilities are in both
cases not clearly defined, Colombia’s subnational governments do play a more important
role in the implementation of health and education decentralization reforms than the
Paraguayan regional and local authorities.
Fiscal decentralization has been significant in Colombia but much less so in the
case of Paraguay. Fiscal decentralization has been a process principally involving public
expenditure rather than revenue; and three major concerns remain regarding the
movements toward fiscal decentralization and how the services decentralized are being
financed: (a) generating own revenues which, in general, is very limited; (b) the heavy
reliance on fiscal transfers from the central government; and (c) borrowing, which has also
been seriously limited (Gomez Sabaini, & Jimenez, 2006). Tax collection remains a
problem for most local and regional governments in Colombia and Paraguay.
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Treisman’s indicators of decentralization (2002) can be used to measure the level
of decentralization achieved by these two countries: Vertical decentralization refers to the
number of tiers for each country; decision making decentralization refers to the extent to
which subnational levels of government have autonomy to make political decisions. In that
regard, Treisman points to weak autonomy (constitution reserves exclusive right to legislate
on at least one specific policy area to subnational legislatures), residual authority
(constitution gives subnational legislature exclusive right to legislate on policy areas not
specifically assigned in the constitution), and subnational veto (regionally-chosen upper
house of parliament has constitutional right to block legislation). Appointment
decentralization refers to the extent to which executive appointments are made by actors at
same tier; electoral decentralization to the extent to which subnational authorities are
directly elected; fiscal decentralization, the share of subnational governments in total
public expenditures or share of tax revenue collection; and finally, personnel
administration, the share of government employees at the subnational level (see table 73).
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Table 73: Treisman’s Decentralization Indicators: Colombia and Paraguay
Vertical
Decentral
ization
Number
of Tiers

Colo
mbia

Parag
uay

3

3

Decision Making Decentralization
Weak
Auton
omy

No

No

Resi
dual
Pow
ers

Regiona
lly
chosen
upper
house
can
block
financia
l bills

Appoint
ment
decentral
ization

Electoral
Decentral
ization

Fiscal
Decentral
ization

Personne
l
Decentral
ization

Regio
nally
chose
n
upper
house
can
block
nonfinanc
ial
bills

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes for
Depart
ments
No for
municip
alities

No

Yes

Yes

18% of
tax
revenue
collected
by
subnation
al level*
subnation
al
governm
ent
expendit
ure
32.3%*
subnation
al
governm
ent
expendit
ure 6%
(2006)**
*

43% **

8.6%
(2006)**
*

*OECD Territorial Reviews OECD Territorial Reviews: Colombia 2014
** OECD Colombia: Implementing Good Governance, 2013
*** UCGL Country Profiles: Paraguay (http://www.citieslocalgovernments.org/gold/Upload/country_profile/Country%20Profile%20Paraguay.pdf)

The table above serves to visualize the stark differences between these two unitary
countries. Though both have very similar legal frameworks in terms of political and
administrative autonomy, Paraguay’s regional governments are more restricted fiscally as
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their budgets are finally approved by Congress and are part of the nation’s budget. This
contrasts the situation of Colombia’s Departments. Moreover, Colombian municipalities
are not subject to central government intervention in cases of mismanagement or
malpractice; while in Paraguay, the legislation allows it—although these instances are rare.
The main difference between the two countries involves fiscal decentralization.
Here again, both have limited the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments. They are
not allowed to create new taxes, but can raise existing ones (in the case of local
governments), or increase the fees that they already collect. In both Colombia and
Paraguay, regional and local governments rely heavily on transfers from the central
government, including royalties. But, the clearest indicator of how much more fiscally
decentralized Colombia is lies in the share of public expenditures spent at the subnational
level, which in the case of Colombia reaches 32%—the highest of any other unitary
country. Paraguay lags behind at only 6%. What is not different between them is the little
autonomy and/or discretion that regional governments have in the use of funds.
If central governments only decentralize certain services and funds are earmarked
to control what subnational governments can actually do, why do they only “partially
decentralize”? (Lockwood, in Ahmad & Brossio, 2009). The present research has shown
that this was partly because central governments feared being held responsible for the
mistakes and mishaps of subnational authorities. In the case of Colombia, for example, the
fiscal problems of the first wave of decentralization led to the 2001 Law 715 that pushed
back some of the fiscal decentralization reforms already in place.
The way decentralization has been designed in many countries, including Colombia
and Paraguay, has made accountability in the use of funds and outcomes of subnational
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governments by citizens very difficult (Devarajan et al., 2009). Central governments have
incentives to deliberately withhold resources from local governments—a widespread
practice by the Finance Ministry in the case of Paraguay. In both Colombia and Paraguay,
the central government has put stringent conditions on the transfer of funds, earmarking
them in such a way that little autonomy is left for subnational governments. Finally,
transfers have been, in certain instances, selective—benefitting some political allies more
than others, particularly in the case of Paraguay.
This partial decentralization creates a governance trap (Devarajan et al., 2009), as
local and regional governments, facing insufficient resources and lacking decision making
autonomy, are thus not accountable to their citizens, and central governments blame
subnational authorities for the lack of capacity they themselves help to perpetuate. As such,
and as evident in the cases of Colombia and Paraguay, a perverse and self-reinforcing cycle
is set in motion by which subnational authorities blame central authorities for a poorly
designed and funded decentralization model, creating incentives at the local level for
patronage and clientelism; central authorities blame local and regional governments of their
lack of capacity and accountability. As long as subnational authorities do not have
autonomy and control over resources (and thus are held accountable for their use and
outcomes), the expected success of policy decentralization will never materialize.
The section on political parties (Chapter 5), and their frequent lack of support for
further decentralization reforms, could be partly explained by the structure of electoral
incentives (Grofman, in Weingast & Wittman, 2006) —where incentives for voters (or
their desires) do not always align with those of candidates and parties (aiming to be
reelected) —and by the ambiguity that characterizes the approval of conflictive legislation
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where, even when legislation is approved, details are left to be decided by future legislation
in order to avoid conflict and further tensions.
The chapter also offered an analysis of the role played by patronage and clientelism
in defining the characteristics of both countries’ political system, and the influence these
practices still have in the decision-making process. By analyzing how political
decentralization, and the electoral reforms enacted in the 1990s, have contributed to the
denationalization and fragmentation of political parties in both countries, the research
shows that the practices of clientelism and patronage have been, in some instances,
encouraged.
It is argued here that the differences, and the internal divisions within the parties,
have contributed to the Executive branch’s lack of support—in both countries—for
decentralization, and to the central government’s ability to define the public policy
decentralization agenda with an emphasis on fiscal issues, control over policy areas, and
by restraining the authority of subnational governments.
The remaining chapters of this research (Chapters 6 through 9) have analyzed the
process by which public service delivery decentralization, in the areas of health and
education, occurred. It offers an evaluation of the effectiveness (defined as the capacity to
implement the policies formulated with the desired results), and efficacy (defined as the
capacity to make decisions or formulate adequate policies) of the policies devised. Both
Colombia and Paraguay can be considered good examples of efficacy (laws and programs
were mostly approved), but they have not necessarily been effective—subnational
governments’ capacity to implement programs has been curtailed by legal requirements,
excessive reporting, and fiscal constraints.
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By examining laws dealing with health and education decentralization in both
Colombia and Paraguay, the present research has attempted to explain how the agenda
setting for reform occurred and explain the role of key actors in such processes (Kingdon,
2003; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Mintron & Norman, 2009). The role of policy
entrepreneurs, such as Minister Vidovich Morales of Paraguay and Londoño in Colombia,
in health decentralization was also discussed. Their ability to create coalitions and networks
of support to further reforms were essential to the approval process. Education
decentralization in both countries seemingly lacked key policy entrepreneurs to champion
reform implementation.
By analyzing how those reforms were approved and implemented, the present
research has sought to understand the complex relationships between legislators,
bureaucrats, voters, politicians, and members of civil society. In the end, uncertainty and
risk aversion have played a significant role, especially in Paraguay, in slowing down the
decentralization reforms initiated in the mid-1990s.
Regulatory uncertainty, the role of large state bureaucracies in health and education,
and labor unions, as well as informal rules of interparty consultation, have also been
discussed in the chapters dealing with the particulars of health and education
decentralization in these two cases. In general, these informal institutions have made
decentralization implementation very difficult.
The research presented here strengthens previous findings (Kaufman & Nelson,
2004) that major social sector reforms, especially in health and education, are often moved
to the backburner due to pressing concerns of the political agenda of the country’s political
class. As a consequence, and even when the legal framework was enacted and put in place,

359

the path of reform implementation has been very slow in the case of Paraguay, and has
slowed down in the case of Colombia.
The present research describes the phases that Colombia and Paraguay have
traversed during the reform process: from the point that decentralization was included in
the policy agenda; to a second phase in which concrete proposals were designed, approved,
and brought to the Executive for approval; to the formal authorization of the reforms; and
finally, the implementation phase (Kaufman & Nelson, 2004).
The final phase has proven to be a very difficult one, with the introduction of a host
of new actors impacted by the consequences of the proposed reforms. In this case, labor
unions played a significant role in either blocking reforms or modifying them in such a
way as to either derail implementation or slow it down. This is particularly true, both in
Colombia and Paraguay, in the case of education decentralization where labor unions had
long had a very powerful influence on politicians, a long tradition of strong organization,
and an ability to influence the process, mostly, in their favor. In the case of health, since so
many different stakeholders were involved and/or impacted by the reforms, a cohesive
front of opposition was not present in either case, and some part of state bureaucracies
were, in fact, in favor of the reforms.
As discussed above, many difficulties have hindered the effective and efficient
implementation of public policy decentralization, ranging from vague legal frameworks,
unclear mandates, lack of adequate human capital, competing political forces, and the
fundamental fact that local and regional governments in both countries continue to be
heavily dependent on the transfer of resources from central authorities. Central authorities
have also, through excessive regulations and controls, found a way of exercising control of
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subnational governments, hindering their ability to be innovative and creative in the
implementation of health and education decentralization reforms.
Today, the future of public service delivery may emerge from the small but
nonetheless significant changes that can be implemented through ministerial decrees, local
initiatives, or changes in administrative practices—leading to new ways of delivering
services with greater autonomy for subnational levels of government. These small steps, as
long as they remain uncontroversial, could, in the long term, contribute to incremental
changes in the way services are delivered.
Though Kaufman et al. (2004) only analyze the decentralization policy reforms in
various Latin American countries, they do not attempt to evaluate the extent to which those
policies have been successful. The present research has modestly tried to evaluate the
impact of health and education reform in Colombia and Paraguay by examining infant
mortality rates (children under one year old, live births) in the case of health, and school
enrollment (coverage) in the case of education.
The findings are mixed in both countries, as many other social factors influence
these indicators, and because so much of the desired data were not available. Nevertheless,
these preliminary findings seem to support the assumption that, as subnational levels of
government are given increased fiscal and administrative autonomy, basic indicators tend
to improve, though the quality of those services is still very much in doubt and very difficult
to assess.
The present research has shown that health and education decentralization reforms
imply: a series of very complex, difficult to implement new structures; a redesign of
policies and procedures; changes in the relations between stakeholders; and changes in
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intergovernmental relations that are not always clearly defined, much less understood, by
all participants, including local communities. Thus, implementation suffers and demands
for “better reforms” increase resulting, in some instances, in the slowing down of the
process as different strategies are put forward to improve decentralization and no
agreements are reached.
By analyzing the dynamics by which these reforms were approved, this research
has also shown that the political will of some key political actors—from ministers, state
bureaucracies, legislators, community organizations, unions and associations, to
presidents—was essential for the approval and implementation of decentralization reforms.
In the case of Paraguay’s health decentralization, the commitment to reform of then
Minister Andres Vidovich Morales—and his ability to create consensus both within his
Ministry, as well as with national legislators, the president of the country, and subnational
authorities—was fundamental to achieving reforms. Implementation, though, was
impacted by his departure as Minister, as well as by the difficult political upheavals that
would characterize Paraguayan politics in subsequent administrations.
The case of health decentralization in Colombia has also shown the important and
similar role played by Minister Juan Luis Londoño. In the Colombian case, implementation
has been more successful and reforms have profoundly changed how health services are
provided in the country.
Promoters of health decentralization in Colombia benefitted from a strong reform
team in the Ministry, as well as social movement, interest groups such as the Colombian
Federation of Mayors, and political parties willing to support the coalition for reform. In
the case of Paraguay, the coalition consisted mostly of the then Minister of Health, some
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legislators in Congress, and few civil society organizations, and though associations such
as the mayors and governors once supported the initiatives, momentum was—through the
passage of time and implementation problems—slowly lost. The Lugo administration’s
(2008-2010) decision to make health provision free of charge for all Paraguayans, though
a laudable initiative, greatly diminished the little autonomy local governments had
achieved in implementing and funding small health programs at the local level.
In the case of education, neither country has had a key figure promoting
decentralization. In Paraguay, education decentralization implementation never occurred
and has essentially failed. In the case of Colombia, even with the strong opposition of the
Colombian Federation of Educators (FECODE), there had been a previous tradition of
subnational governments’ involvement in providing education services; thus, with the
arrival of political decentralization, mayors and governors were empowered and demanded
a role in education decentralization.
Finally, in applying Bjork’s propositions for effective decentralization144 (2006) to the
Colombian and Paraguayan experience:
1) The greater the accepted vision of decentralization between the distinct center of
power, the greater the chance for successful change: in both countries this assertion
holds true, with the qualifier that, in both cases—but especially in the case of
Paraguay—the definition and implications of decentralization were not clear for all,
and the consensus decentralization created did not hold for long.

144

Though his proposals are specifically for education decentralization, they can easily be applied to other
policy areas.
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2) Devolution rather than delegation of authority and responsibility has a greater
chance of long-term success: Neither Colombia nor Paraguay devolved authority
and resources to subnational levels of government.
3) It is easier to initiate decentralization in times of political, economic, and social
stress, than during times of relative stability: the research has shown that this
assumption holds true for both Colombia and Paraguay.
4) When decentralization initiatives die, it is usually for political rather than
administrative/technical reasons: here the results are mixed. First, in neither case
has decentralization “died.” Though both countries show signs of a slowdown in
decentralization, which can be attributed to political reasons (especially for
Paraguay), administrative obstacles have also proven to be a factor in the
slowdown, especially in Colombia. In fact, it is argued here that central authority
bureaucracies, through excessive regulations and reporting requirements, have
managed to effectively slow down the implementation of reforms.
5) The presence of a strong management infrastructure at the regional level creates
greater opportunity for success: this assumption holds true for both countries. In
the case of Colombia, the presence of a more established infrastructure and previous
experience in implementing such programs (especially in education) was important
for Departmental governments in their success with extending coverage and
enrollment. Paraguay’s subnational governments have lacked experience and
infrastructure.
6) Readiness and an incremental approach are important factors when
decentralizing: this research has shown that one of Colombia’s problems,
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according to subnational authorities interviewed and previous research, was the fact
that the immense differences in resources, capacity, and ability to manage and
implement public policies of Colombia’s subnational governments was not taken
into account. This has been a very important factor for the perceived failures in
implementation. In the case of Paraguay, the incremental approach was applied in
the health sector reforms with the signing of memorandums of understanding
between the Ministry, Departments, and local governments that required a series of
steps to be met before health decentralization could be initiated.
7) People who have been part of an organizational culture that has managed a
centralized system are not very effective in managing a decentralized system:
Paraguay and Colombia have demonstrated that large bureaucracies are difficult
and slow to change, and since decentralization involves relenting power, these
authorities tend to combat any reforms.
Colombia and Paraguay have shown that sufficient power is required to influence the
process. In both cases, but particularly in Paraguay, mayors and governors have lacked it.
In Colombia, mayors in particular, have been more successful in exercising their power to
influence the process.
In neither case do subnational levels of government have sufficient autonomy in the
management of financial resources, however in both cases, the way fiscal decentralization
has been designed and implemented with its heavy dependence on transfers from the
central government, makes them very vulnerable to the political will of those central
authorities.
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Adequate capacity in both cases has already been noted as a problem, along with the
lack of reliable accountability mechanisms. Accountability issues might be the result of a
lack of a democratic tradition and widespread practices of clientelism and patronage that
are hard to eliminate, but at least in the case of Paraguay, it is somehow counterbalanced
by an emerging and vocal civil society.
In conclusion, the cases of both Colombia and Paraguay are a combination of “classic
deconcentration” and “coercive devolution” (Lowry, in Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007),
where subnational levels of government have mixed administrative responsibilities in the
implementation of public service delivery.
In the case of Paraguay’s educational system deconcentration has been the norm as the
few programs that exist are still implemented at the local level by local staff of national
agencies. Primary implementation authority remains in the central government, and local
authorities have minimal discretion in planning and implementation as noted in Chapter 8.
Their planning and management capacity is also highly controlled by the central
government, and accountability goes upward to the national ministry. In the case of health
decentralization, in the initial stages of the reform and through the period between 1996
and 2008, the goals included increasing subnational governments’ involvement in the
decision-making process with more responsibilities and management capacity. But the
situation has, with time, moved toward a classic deconcentration model (Chapter 6).
In the case of Colombia’s education and health reforms, the model more closely
resembles that of coercive devolution, as local officials implement local plans, but central
government authorities review their actions for consistency with national priorities and
guidelines. The system is frequently characterized by tension as national, regional, and
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local officials argue about who is in charge. The central government reviews local and
regional implementation plans and regulatory compliance with national guidelines.
Subnational governments are expected to meet certain criteria for successful
implementation, and non-compliance is punished (Chapters 7 and 9).
Decentralization continues to struggle against a number of challenges in both countries
due to the unique complexities of Paraguayan and Colombian societies, the administrative
and political challenges the countries still face, residents’ demands for more services and
improved services, the presence of political turmoil and conflicting values, economic
problems, and the constant need for political leadership. Future research can further explore
and analyze the role played by state bureaucracies in hindering or advancing
decentralization implementation, the initiatives to strengthen local capacity, and under
what conditions would further decentralization of service provision occur.
The present research has shown that “getting the institutions right” (Ostrom, 1990) is a
very difficult task. The reshaping and realignment of intergovernmental relations spawns
tension and conflict; therefore, incrementalism is an important factor for success.
Institutional change always carries tension as resource considerations, which have
distributional consequences (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010), are thrust to the forefront of
political considerations. In both Colombia and Paraguay, political and economic resources
and control of those resources were, and are, at the center of discussions of decentralization
reform.
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